Russia Carves Up Turkey In Syria

During the late hours of 2nd February 2020, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) shelled an observation post of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) around the strategic town of Saraqib, Idlib Province, which the SAA had been pushing towards as part of their on-going military offensive in the region. Marking one of the bloodiest exchanges between the SAA and the TSK, eight Turkish soldiers were killed in the attack. Shortly afterwards, the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkish Minister of Defence, Hulusi Akar, announced that the TSK had retaliated with airstrikes and artillery and that 54 SAA positions were hit and 76 soldiers were killed or injured.

What has been truly remarkable about the incident have been the exchanges between Moscow and Ankara since the incident. Unlike the previous instances of violence between the TSK and the SAA, which saw Moscow working to de-escalate the situation by deploying its military police as a buffer in sensitive areas and compensating both sides in roundabout ways, the responses to the present situation have been one of intensifying hostile rhetoric. The initial responses from Moscow blamed the TSK for failing to inform the Russian forces about their movements in Idlib, while denying that the words of Erdoğan and Akar about counter-strikes against the SAA had any truth to them.

The responses from Ankara, meanwhile, vehemently denied any wrongdoing including the failure to inform the Russian forces about TSK movements. In an attempt at political escalation, Erdoğan also spoke in favour of the Ukrainian Government’s position against Moscow, expressing support for Kiev’s position vis-à-vis the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The TSK has also unilaterally cancelled the joint patrols with the Russian Military Police (RMP) along the Turkish-Syrian Border.

The Turkish and Russian responses to the incident come on the heels of gradually-intensifying hostile rhetoric between the two powers over the situation in Idlib. Ankara, in particular, has been vehement about the notion that Moscow and Damascus are not abiding by the Astana track and the Sochi agreement that entailed the creation of the TSK posts in Idlib to begin with. Describing the process as “damaged” or even “dead”, Turkish officials have been making their dissatisfaction over the situation clear.

It would seem that the period of warm bilateral ties between Ankara and Moscow since July 2016 and their growing cooperation in Syria is coming to an end. But what is the future of relations between the two countries and how will this impact their policies in Syria and the wider region?

For its part, Moscow has remained relatively consistent in its approach to Idlib and the wider Syrian conflict. It has often emphasised that all of Syria needs to come under the control of Damascus, defining Idlib as “terrorist-controlled” and often referring to the situation in northern Aleppo, presently-controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), as temporary. In Idlib, it has justified its operations on grounds of targeting the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), calling on the more mainstream Syrian Opposition, presently represented by the SNA, to extricate itself from the HTS even as the fluidity of alliances in Idlib made such a task virtually impossible to accomplish.

Moscow’s consistent definition of its interests in Syria contrasts to Ankara’s often-shifting and increasingly-unquantifiable interests. Although Ankara initially positioned itself as an ally of the Syrian Opposition, the breakdown of the Kurdish peace process in Turkey and the subsequent war against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, alongside the increasing anti-Syrian xenophobia in Turkey, have forced Ankara to shift its approach repeatedly. These shifting interests and Ankara’s deteriorating ties with Washington have forced Ankara to collaborate increasingly with Moscow, allowing the parameters of the conflict in arenas such as Idlib to be defined by the Russian Government in the process. As it stands, although Ankara has virtually abandoned the notion of deposing Bashar al-Assad, it cannot fully abandon the Syrian Opposition without experiencing severe backlash from its constituents, supporters around the Middle East or the 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. Having “lost” Egypt and finding its allies in Libya on increasingly tenuous ground, losing the Syrian Opposition would be a disastrous blow to Turkey’s soft power.

Similarly, however, taking a stronger stand against Moscow would be disastrous for Turkey’s already-struggling economy, which has benefited from significant Russian investment, especially after relations with Washington and the European Union soured. Although Erdoğan’s recent and cordial contacts with the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, suggests that Ankara is following a well-established foreign policy pattern of once again attempting to pivot to the West, the EU has grown far too suspicious of Ankara’s motives to enter a full détente. And therein lies Ankara’s dilemma whose Syria policy has pushed the country into a corner from which there is no clean escape.

This would explain Ankara’s actions following the SAA strikes on the TSK. The claims that the TSK struck the SAA were not only dismissed by Moscow, they were doubted by Idlib-based activists who noted that the retaliation was nowhere as severe as described by Turkish officials. Indeed, no images of the damage, the actual strikes or the casualties have emerged. The few items of footage of alleged TSK retaliation belonged to earlier military operations. It is possible that Ankara amplified the narrative of a swift and powerful retaliation to mollify the Turkish public without inviting retribution from Moscow. Similarly, on Tuesday 5th February, Erdoğan seemed to take a conciliatory position, noting that the Astana process is damaged and Turkey will seek reparations for what took place in Idlib but adding that there is no need for a conflict with Russia.

That does not mean that Ankara will stand idle in the face of what is taking place in Idlib. A number of Turkish concerns borne directly from the SAA operations in Idlib, such as a refugee crisis, are very real. With Ankara providing increasing military support for the SNA, it is clear that there is a concerted effort to make the SAA offensive as costly as possible. However, with the Syrian Government controlling the sides and having access to overwhelming amounts of firepower that it is willing to use regardless of the human costs, Ankara’s is merely causing a delay, as opposed to changing the behaviour of Damascus and Moscow. It is likely that even this meagre response will soon become politically untenable.