In Syria’s Druze-majority province of Suweida, there are renewed tensions between local factions and the central government in Damascus. Although tensions – including protests and clashes – have been a regular feature of the province over the course of the war, the new round of tensions gripping the region since February 2022 have been remarkable in their intensity, as well as the increasingly violent rhetoric surrounding them.
For much of the Syrian conflict, Suweida has been kept relatively safe through informal local arrangements that kept the region autonomous while leaving it still formally affiliated with the authorities in Damascus. However, it would appear that socio-economic conditions and Damascus’s desire to re-establish full authority over the region is rendering the status quo that lasted over the past years increasingly untenable.
Background to the Tensions
Located east of Daraa Province in southern Syria, Suweida Province has enjoyed a limited form of autonomy over the course of much of the Syrian conflict. The region, like others, witnessed protests in 2011. However, although many Druze leaders expressed sympathy for the Syrian Opposition, hostile clashes with some extremist groups linked to the Opposition – such as Jabhat al-Nusra, now known as Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham – stopped many locals from outright supporting it. Instead, Druze leaders practiced a form of neutrality that allowed Damascus to retain control of the region with a skeleton personnel. Under this arrangement, locals were held exempt from conscription while anti-government expressions in limited forms were permitted. Groups such as Rijal al-Karama (Sheikhs of Dignity) and Ahrar Jabal al-Arab (Free Men of the Arab Mountains) emerged during this period, with the goal of retaining their limited autonomy.
However, the arrangement did not rest on stable foundations. It was no secret that Damascus tried to expand its authority over the region at every opportunity. Locals from Suweida travelling elsewhere risked forced conscription, forcing many young men to remain in the region despite worsening economic conditions and lack of economic prospects. Sporadic clashes between local armed factions and pro-Government militias never fully subsided and have been picking up in recent months, alongside tit-for-tat kidnappings.
While local Druze tribal fighters did fight alongside the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) against Jabhat al-Nusra and, later, the Islamic State (IS), some local leaders regularly accused Damascus of enabling the movements of these extremist groups in order to justify the deployment of pro-Government forces in the region. Such was the case after the bloody IS attack in 2018 that saw more than 250 people killed and dozens abducted, which led to heavy criticisms levied against Damascus authorities by Druze leaders.
What Is Behind the New Bout of Tensions?
To an outsider, the repeating cycle of tensions followed by calm would seem as if the dynamics in the region are broadly static. However, the region has been seeing significant developments behind the scenes.
In particular, Druze factions have increased their political activism in the region. In 2021, a new political party, the Syrian Brigade Party, was founded. The party’s Secretary-General, Malik Abu al-Kheyr, heralded its secular nature and support for a political solution within a national framework, although Opposition outlets have been keen to frame the party as pro-Opposition. A similar formation, the National Council of Suweida, was formed with the intent of “filling the political gap in Suweida”. In conjunction, armed groups such as Ahrar Jabal al-Arab have intensified their violent rhetoric against Damascus, expressing intent to confront the authorities.
These developments coincided with a sharp drop in living standards in the region since 2018. Local activists have been warning that the quality of services has dropped sharply even as violent crime and gang activity, including kidnappings, have acutely risen. Signs of other societal concerns are also increasingly visible amidst rising drug abuse and youth suicides. Indeed, the renewed rise in tensions over February 2022 coincided with numerous cuts in subsidies enacted by Damascus authorities.
Part of the economic difficulties and resulting decline in services can be attributed to the economic state of Syria as a whole, which has been impacted by more than a decade of war, the implementation of the Caesar Sanctions by the United States, as well as the economic collapse of neighbouring Lebanon. However, many locals have also accused Damascus of enabling and even funding criminal activity in order to justify increasing its control over the region. Some have even accused Damascus of enacting an “economic blockade” over the region, limiting the entry of resources and business in a bid to constrict the region.
These developments came alongside a steady uptick in security interventions against anti-government protests. Throughout April 2022, state authorities have attempted to set up new “settlements” in a bid to put an end to conscription evasion. Arrests over – often petty – criminal charges have also picked up, with some activists accusing authorities of using these arrests as a way to force through the aforementioned settlements. Interventions by security agencies against protests have also picked up during this period.
What Is Next for Suweida?
Although the status quo in Suweida continues to hold, there will be a limit as to how much longer this can continue. Damascus’s relative victory over Opposition factions in southern Syria and Idlib has likely emboldened authorities to put pressure on Suweida in a bid to re-establish full authority. However, Damascus has limited options. Although the SAA is much stronger than its near-disintegrated state in the mid-2010s, it is still facing serious equipment shortages and logistical challenges that would make an outright military offensive a fraught possibility. These risks are further compounded by Damascus’s economic troubles, on-going insurgencies in Daraa and Deir ez-Zour, a tense frontline along Idlib and Russia’s military troubles in Ukraine that might make support from Moscow less reliable. Despite these challenges, pro-Damascus factions have remained hawkish in their view of Suweida, with the National Defence Forces (NDF) militia issuing a statement in which it described the Syrian Brigade Party as “the new ISIS”. Rhetorical attacks such as these may be intended to deter the region from taking the side of the Opposition – which itself has often been equated to the IS by pro-Damascus voices – while building casus belli against those who are undeterred. However, they could easily lead to an anti-Damascus backlash.
Meanwhile, as mentioned above, armed local groups such as Ahrar Jabal al-Arab have increased their violent rhetoric against Damascus, threatening violence if authorities continue to put pressure on the region. Others, such as the Syrian Brigade Party, also mentioned that they are expanding their influence in Damascus-controlled regions like Daraa and Quneitra.
The newest bout of tensions Suweida is experiencing will likely not result in an overnight descent into conflict. However, it is apparent that the current set of arrangements have an expiry date. Preventing a descent into fighting will come through intense diplomatic efforts, political sensitivity, socio-economic stability, and strategic foresight. Unfortunately, Syria today has little of any of these.