On Tuesday 13th November, the Syrian Minister for National Reconciliation Affairs, Ali Haidar, released a statement declaring that the political reconciliation process in Syria’s Idlib Province has come to a halt. Haidar’s statement was issued following an increase in violence in the region instigated by the militant group the Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) over the course of last week and over the weekend of the 10th and 11th November.
The HTS, which until now has remained ambivalent towards the implementation of the DMZ, made a number of attempts to establish itself in the areas of the DMZ that had recently been vacated by National Liberation Front (NLF)-affiliated groups. Following an attempt to gain control of the town of Kafr Hamra, northern Aleppo, clashes broke out between the HTS and the NLF, resulting in the deaths of two HTS militants. The HTS used these deaths to launch a series of major attacks on the NLF in the surrounding countryside. HTS was largely repelled, although they managed to maintain control of Kafr Hamra before a ceasefire was brokered.
In addition to the clashes between the HTS and the NLF, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) conducted an infiltration mission around the frontlines near Zilaqiat on Friday 9th, resulting in the deaths of 23 Jaish al-Izza fighters and the injury of a further 15. Pro-Government observers justified the attack on grounds of it avenging the death of an SAA commander in Joreen on Tuesday 6th, which in turn was justified by pro-Opposition observers as revenge for the shelling of Jarjanaz on Friday 2nd.
Tit-for-tat attacks like these significantly increase the likelihood of escalation and the failure of the DMZ. Indeed, Jaish al-Izza promised to retaliate to the attack in a statement and on Saturday 10th, the leader of Ahrar al-Sham (part of the NLF)), Jaber Ali Basha, issued a statement, calling for all factions to “direct all efforts to prepare for the battle with the criminal regime”. Ali Basha noted that the SAA attack on Jaish al-Izza on Friday proved that an open war is now inevitable. His statement raises further concerns regarding the viability of the demilitarised zone in Idlib, especially since it comes from a leader within the NLF (which accepted the DMZ agreement).
So far, the NLF has avoided taking part in the clashes along the DMZ which involved the HTS and the Wa Harid al-Muminin Operations Room (consisting of Tanzim Hurras al-Din, Ansar al-Tawhid and other hard-line factions) and the SAA. However, the apparent reluctance of the HTS to abide by the terms of the DMZ will continue to provide the SAA with the pretext to continue its fighting in the region. Having NLF factions join the fighting would make the DMZ virtually impossible to maintain.
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