Can Turkish-Russian Ceasefire Bring Peace to Idlib?

For much of the first two months of 2020, Idlib has witnessed a steady escalation of fighting between the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), backed by Russia, Iran and a number of allied militias, and the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), which supports a number of factions, most prominently the Syrian National Army (SNA). Numerous strikes and counter-strikes between the two sides, including one incident on 27th February where over 30 Turkish soldiers were killed, threatened not only a direct war between Syria and Turkey, but threatened to drag Russia and NATO into the fray as well. Repeated meetings between Turkish and Russian officials did not succeed.

It was under these conditions that the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, met the Russian President, Vladimir Putin on Thursday, 5th March. Following a six-hour summit, the two sides declared a ceasefire, which came into effect at midnight connecting Thursday to Friday. The ceasefire agreed on the creation of a “security corridor” that is six kilometres wide and six kilometres deep along the M4 Highway, which runs horizontally through Idlib, with Turkish and Russian patrols taking place between Taranba (west of the strategic town of Saraqib where the M4 connects to the M5 Highway before leading up to Aleppo City) and Ain al-Hayr. The readout indicated that the Turkish and Russian Defence Ministries will provide specific parameters for the corridor within seven days. The two sides also expressed the usual commitments to the territorial integrity of Syria, to a political peace process and to the provision of aid to the displaced Syrian population.

Subsequently on Tuesday, 10th March, Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, confirmed that the area south of the M4, consisting of a small strip of land still held by the Syrian Opposition, would be secured by Russia while the TSK would handle security north of the M4. Notably, the agreement did not stipulate the withdrawal of the SAA from the areas it captured during its military offensive, including the M5 Highway and major towns such as Khan Sheikhoun, Ma’arat Nu’man, Kafr Nabl and Saraqib.

By most indications, the ceasefire represents a significant win for Damascus and Moscow who have effectively legitimised their hold over their recent gains in spite of Ankara’s earlier demands for the SAA to withdraw to its pre-December positions. With Çavuşoğlu seemingly confirming that Russia will control the areas south of the M4, Damascus and Moscow stand to make further gains. Meanwhile, having control over the M5 and prospective access to the M4 will be a major economic win for Damascus.

Since the implementation of the ceasefire, the region has remained notably calm. Although a number of skirmishes did occur, with Monday, 9th March, seeing a bout of escalation in particular, these incidents appear to be isolated on the whole.

Has the Turkish-Russian agreement therefore brought peace to Idlib?

In the short-term, the answer would be yes. There is no denying that the ceasefire has brought some respite to the region’s massive population of displaced people, who have numbered almost 1 million people since the emergence of conflict in December. Furthermore, the lack of incidents and escalation, in contrast to prior ceasefires that were routinely violated in the immediate aftermaths of them coming into effect, seem to suggest that Moscow and Ankara are both intent on securing the peace – for now.

The medium-to-long-term view is less optimistic. Although the ceasefire, in places, has been begrudgingly accepted by the mainstream Syrian Opposition, the hard-line group Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which controls much of Idlib, has rejected the ceasefire, citing Moscow as an untrustworthy negotiator and noting that a military solution is the only solution. In Moscow, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, has indicated that the ceasefire does not preclude the SAA from fighting “designated terrorist groups”, almost certainly referring to the HTS. This wording is also present in the agreement and represents a much more specific description of extremist groups compared to the previous Russian-Turkish agreement. As Damascus and Moscow often justified their Idlib operations on the grounds of countering HTS’ presence, the wording here gives the exact legal opening they need to continue targeting Idlib. It is therefore extremely likely that the SAA and HTS will find ways to provoke each other.

The agreement around the M4 also represents a challenge. It is difficult to imagine that the HTS or even the SNA would willingly withdraw from the areas south of the highway. Indeed, prior, similar arrangements surrounding the opening of the M5 Highway to commercial traffic, back when the majority of the sections in Idlib were under Opposition control, failed due to similar reasons. Here, Ankara is left with few good options. It can either force the HTS and the SNA to leave the region, potentially losing what good will it has with the Syrian Opposition and getting embroiled in a new conflict, or it can choose not to act, inviting retaliation from Moscow for inaction, especially given that Moscow has already blamed Ankara for failing to clamp down on the HTS as part of the Sochi Agreement in 2018. Although there have been rumours that Ankara is working to dissolve the HTS and fold its rank-and-file into the SNA, the HTS has repeatedly shown itself to be unwilling to pursue such course of action.

As it stands, despite Çavuşoğlu’s statements that Ankara and Moscow are working towards a permanent ceasefire, the underlying conditions that led to the situation in Idlib remain unresolved. Thus, the lull will likely be used by both sides to recoup their strength and wait for the political pressures over the region to wind down before hostilities resume. With the civilian presence in Idlib remaining a top concern, Ankara and Moscow may also implement a process to gradually return displaced civilians to areas under the control of the Syrian Government. Although most displaced civilians remain suspicious and fearful of retaliation, the gradual evacuation of civilians from the Rukban Refugee Camp near Jordan shows that unbearable humanitarian conditions can push desperate people to take the risk.

How does the picture look for the rest of Syria?

Speaking about the ceasefire, Erdoğan justified the deal as having secured Turkey’s interests and made Turkey less vulnerable to terrorism. Given that Ankara’s main concern regarding Idlib was a refugee crisis, not terrorism, Erdoğan’s words could mean that Moscow has agreed to a number of undeclared conditions stipulated by Turkey. Most likely, this could involve the targeting of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in regions like Tal Rifaat in northern Aleppo, which has remained a hotspot of recurrent clashes. With rumours that the talks between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – which includes the YPG under its umbrella – breaking down, increased Turkish pressure on the group could be seen as a viable way by Damascus and Moscow to force the group back onto the table and accept conditions more favourable to Damascus.

Turkey’s acquiescence in Idlib and the general attention directed by Turkish officials towards Turkish-Russian bilateral ties could also suggest that Ankara simply chose its own direct interests with Moscow.

For Damascus, the ceasefire represents an opportunity to focus on a number of other areas. Although the SAA is unlikely to draw-down significantly around Idlib, the lull provides the SAA with the opening to deal with a number of other crises. Over the past weekend, Daraa Province has seen a major escalation of insurgent attacks. Although the insurgent hot-spot of Sanamain has been pacified, attacks in the region continue and Damascus may seek to clamp down on the remaining towns that are under de-facto Government control but are still being held by “reconciled” Opposition factions.

Similarly, ISIS-linked attacks in the Syrian Desert continue to cost the SAA lives and resources, and the lull in Idlib would be an opportunity to clamp down on the insurgency there. Already, numerous militias that were present in Idlib have been deployed east. The re-deployment of SAA to eastern Syria would also serve to put more pressure on the SDF for the reasons covered above.

On the whole, the ceasefire is a respite, especially for the displaced residents in Idlib. But nobody is under any illusion that it will continue indefinitely, and past history gives good cause to believe that it will not last.