Will US-Russia Tensions in Northeast Syria Lead to Wider Escalation?

On Wednesday 12th February, a patrol of the United States-led International Coalition was involved in a brief altercation in the village of Khirbet Hamo outside the city of Qamishli, north-eastern Syria, when local villagers, as well as some pro-Syrian Government militiamen, attempted to prevent the crossing of the patrol. While the exact sequence of events remains unclear, the incident left one local dead – a militia member who reportedly fired on the US vehicles – and the US forces withdrawing under air cover.

The incident had been a long time coming. Over the past few months, both Russia and the US have increased their forces and involvement in the region. For the US, the intensification of the forces in the northeast began after the US’ withdrawal from northwest Syria during September and October 2019 in the lead-up to Turkey’s launch of Operation Peace Spring. The US forces still in Syria have since entrenched themselves in the northeast in a bid to support the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Russia’s entry into the region, meanwhile, was similarly facilitated by the Turkish operations, which prompted the SDF to invite the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and the Russian Military Police (RMP) to take over the Turkish-Syrian Border, as well critical areas such as the M4 Highway, which stretches from the coastal town of Latakia through Aleppo to SDF-held territory in the northeast. Having been virtually absent from the region except a few areas in and around Qamishli, Damascus and Moscow quickly sought to capitalise on this development, with Russia, in particular, taking ownership of a number of abandoned US outposts and the Qamishli Airport itself.

Although Washington has since reverted from its position from a full withdrawal from Syria – likely in response to the fears about Moscow taking advantage of the US’ absence – the brief period of uncertainty was enough to alter the geopolitical forces at play. The sight of SAA, RMP and US vehicles all staring down at each other in Khirbet Hamo was described by many as the summary of a geopolitical quagmire, with some observers expressing fears that the current situation is unsustainable and could lead to an open conflict between the parties involved.

With the situation around Qamishli back to a state of calm for now, how likely is another round of escalation? And what does the future hold for the region?

Viewed from Moscow and Damascus, the incident is welcome. The footage of villagers angrily confronting US soldiers during the incident has allowed them to push the narrative of the US not being welcome in the whole region. Although Khirbet Hamo has been somewhat exceptional owing to the strong support for Damascus – indeed, it was the stage of one of the few instances of open fighting between the SAA and the predominantly-Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in 2016 – such nuances were easily overlooked within the wider dynamics. Bolstered by the incident, the village has since been the scene of a number of anti-US demonstrations, including one instance where members of the RMP appeared to encourage locals to chant anti-US slogans. At the very least, such actions will discourage the US forces in the region from crossing through the village, reducing their reach. At most, they can serve to instigate more anti-US incidents in the region, bolstering the narrative of a grassroots-led “national liberation”.

Viewed from Washington, the urgency of the situation appears to be nowhere as severe. In the aftermath of the incident, the Coalition issued a statement, blaming militia members for the incident but expressively noting Russian non-involvement. Although footage from the area shows that the RMP was present at the scene and did intervene, the Coalition’s reference to Russian non-involvement could be interpreted as a way to avoid putting the blame on the Russian forces. Indeed, Washington’s response to the incidents between the US and Russian troops has been low-key since they first began. It is possible that Washington does not view the Russian presence in the region as a threat to its interests and may be more interested in retaining Russia’s partnership on certain contexts, such as the prevention of creeping Iranian influence. Given that the US remains adamant that its presence in Syria is temporary, Washington may not be too willing to engage in a battle for influence.

There is also the factor that Washington and Moscow already had some positive interactions in avoiding conflicts through the “deconfliction hotline” that was established in 2015. Although the hotline was subject to disruptions at times, it was instrumental in preventing clashes between US and Russian-backed forces in eastern Syria where the two sides operated in close proximity to one-another and were forced to contend with an increasingly-busy airspace. Even during rare instances of violent US-Russian confrontation, such as the so-called Battle of Khasham in 2018, further escalation was averted through such means of deconfliction. It is possible that such precedents have encouraged both sides to de-escalate. Furthermore, the two countries have a long history of near-conflicts that never quite escalated, stretching all the way back to the Cold War and, before then, World War II. If that is the case, however, news of gradual incitement driven by Moscow and Damascus against the US forces in Syria, as well as their emphasis on the need to remove the US forces from the country, may strain the limits of the familiarity that has been established.

The SDF may emerge as both as a mediator and a kingmaker out of the situation. The group has ties with both the US and Russia at varying capacity. Although the US was instrumental in establishing the SDF, one of its main components, the YPG, has had long ties with Russia. The SDF itself has recently moved closer to Moscow owing to the view that Washington has enabled Turkey’s operations against it. Furthermore, Moscow is acting as mediator in the talks between the SDF and Damascus, even if many within the SDF still remain sceptical of the motives of Moscow and Damascus, believing that the autonomous model is anathema to the Damascus-based central government. As such, SDF officials have been open about looking to maintain their relations with both Russia and the US in a bid to ensure their own political survival. Although there has been widespread opinion, especially in the pro-Damascus camp, that the SDF will have to choose soon, the group could conceivably keep the middle road, using its ties with both sides to ease tensions.

The biggest challenge will not come from the US-Russia rivalry but from potential spoilers who may benefit from exacerbating tensions and even open clashes between the two sides. ISIS, which has already attempted to stoke intercommunal tensions, could set up an attack on a US or Russian patrol in which the two sides would end up blaming each other. Similarly, Damascus or Iran, concerned about US-Russian cooperation, may attempt to instigate more incidents like those in Qamishli in a bid to force Moscow into more decisive action.

Despite these risks and the overall geopolitical complexity of the situation, a US-Russian conflagration in northeast Syria remains unlikely.