Over the past week, forces belonging to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a major constituent of the United States-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have begun withdrawing from the Ras al-Ain region in north-eastern Syria in preparation for the implementation of the US-Turkish administered safe zone. The withdrawal of the YPG in the region came after an announcement two weeks ago by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hulusi Akar, who said that a joint US-Turkey operations centre to manage the safe-zone is “fully operational”. The first ground patrols between the US and Turkey began on Sunday 8th September. After months of wrangling, it appears that the agreement, which was reached on 7th August between Washington and Ankara, as well as the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the political wing of the SDF, is being implemented, and constitutes a major development towards resolving what was a rapidly deteriorating crisis between the two countries.
Despite the YPG’s role in defeating ISIS in eastern Syria, Turkey has long viewed the Kurdish-majority group as the Syrian branch to the Turkish-based group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As such, relations between Washington and Ankara have worsened in recent years over the US’ continued support for the YPG as a constituent of the wider SDF. Ankara, for its part, has long stated its opposition to the presence of YPG forces on the Syrian border, in addition to any suggestion of future autonomy for the Kurds in north-eastern Syria as part of a future peace deal with the Syrian Government. Indeed, earlier this week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had finalised their build-up along the Syrian border and would invade “within a fortnight”.
Nevertheless, the exact details of the implementation and maintenance of the safe zone have yet to be announced by Washington and Ankara, beyond vague statements of joint US and TSK patrols, as well the construction of observation posts. Indeed, beyond an assertion by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu that it would reach 32 kilometres into Syrian territory, its exact location and length has yet to be determined. Although joint air patrols had already begun between the two sides, the agreement reached last month towards the formation of a safe-zone has likely been approved to open further dialogue between Washington and Ankara. This would serve to remove the immediate threat of a TSK advance into north-eastern Syria, and the potential for the US-backed SDF clashing with a NATO ally.
Indeed, the US has yet to announce any motion to bolster its forces in Syria to assist in the implementation of the safe-zone, which until recently had been poised for a rapid withdrawal from Syria. Without reinforcement, management of the safe-zone will likely be mostly entrusted to the TSK, with the limited US forces in the region providing limited observation and patrols in accordance with the agreement. As a result of this, Ankara will likely find itself with a greater level of flexibility to implement its own ambitions in the territories that comprise the future safe-zone.
This would likely result in the settlement of Syrian refugees in the region as part of an effort by Erdoğan to offset the increasing domestic pressure he has faced to repatriate the three million Syrians currently residing in Turkey. Moreover, following an attempt last week by people in Idlib to overrun the Bab al-Hawa border crossing between Idlib and Turkey, Erdoğan likely views a safe-zone as a longer-term solution to a potential future refugee crisis in Idlib should the Syrian Government continue its assault on the Opposition-held province. Indeed, on Thursday 5th September, Erdoğan threatened to permit Syrian refugees to transit Turkey into Europe if the US does not act fast enough in its pledge to assist in the implementation of the safe-zone.
However, this could raise the possibility of Syrians repatriated under duress to a region in which its long-term future is undetermined. Moreover, earlier this year the co-chair of the SDC, Ilhan Ahmed, warned that Turkey’s aim of repatriating up to one-million mostly Arab refugees in the safe-zone would likely form part of an attempt to alter the demographic balance in the Kurdish-majority region. For the US to avoid a deterioration to its affiliation with the SDF, it is likely that guarantees would need to be made on the part of the US to ensure a balance between the interests of Syrian Kurds and that of Ankara. This may, inevitably, lead to greater US involvement in Syria, despite US President Donald Trump’s as-yet undetermined timetable for the US’ withdrawal.