On Monday 17th September, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the formation of a 15 to 25 kilometre-wide demilitarised zone (DMZ) in Syria’s northern rebel-held province of Idlib. The agreement, which was announced following a summit between the two leaders in the Russian city of Sochi, has effectively averted the short-term threat of a military offensive by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies to recapture the province.
Over the course of the weekend of the 29th and 30th September, numerous reports regarding the implementation of the Idlib DMZ emerged among news sources affiliated with the Syrian Opposition. These reports indicated that the entirety of the DMZ is set to be in the areas controlled by the Syrian Opposition, rather than being divided evenly between the Opposition and the Syrian Government as it was originally believed to be the case. Under these plans, the DMZ includes notable towns and cities such as Jisr al-Shugour, Ma’arat Nu’man and Saraqib.
The emergence of these reports resulted in widespread confusion and anger among the Syrian Opposition, with many groups within the National Liberation Front (NLF) demanding clarification. The NLF spokesperson, Naji Mustafa, described the issues as “disagreement and debate over some points”. However, at least one faction that had previously announced support for the agreement, Jaish al-Izza, has since issued a rejection of the agreement and on Monday 1st October, there were contradictory reports on whether Faylaq al-Sham began to withdraw its heavy weapons from the DMZ or not. In addition, local governments across the western and southwestern countryside of Aleppo rejected the clauses of the DMZ following a general conference held on Sunday 30th.
The reports also indicated that the militant factions Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Tanzim Hurras al-Din and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) would be forced to withdraw from the DMZ. Notably, these factions are exempt from the Astana de-escalation agreement, which has previously been used by the SAA and its allies as a justification for conducting continued airstrikes and shelling in the Greater Idlib region.
HTS, meanwhile, remain conflicted about how to approach the DMZ, particularly as it currently maintains a strong presence in some areas of the Idlib border regions. The group’s rejection of the agreement, as well as its subsequent refusal to withdraw, could significantly complicate the implementation of the DMZ and exacerbate tensions with the Turkish Government, which in recent months have called for the disbanding of the militant group.
Despite this, reports emerged this week of HTS militants preventing the al-Qaeda-linked Tanzim Hurras al-Din from launching an offensive in the region, resulting in tensions between the two jihadist factions. This could also suggest that the HTS may be abiding by the DMZ despite not declaring its official stance on the matter.
The framework of the agreement means that both Turkey and Russia will need to move quickly to establish the DMZ, with the agreement stipulating that all heavy weaponry should be withdrawn from the buffer zone by the 10th October. Moreover, the agreement does little to address the presence of hardline factions in the region, which is likely to hinder the progression of any future peace deal. However, preventing a military offensive in the short term could provide the international community with the diplomatic breathing space for subsequent additional agreements over the long-term future of Idlib.