On March 11th, the Islamic State (IS) announced the selection of a new leader in an audio statement, confirming that its previous leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, was killed and naming Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Quraishi as the new leader.
The announcement came at a time when international attention was drawn away from the Middle East and North Africa region and instead focused on the escalating war between Russia and Ukraine. Alongside ongoing crises such as Covid-19, the news of the IS’ new leader was largely buried by the emerging conflict in Ukraine.
The relatively muted response to the selection of a new IS Caliph, however, is also telling about the group’s continued relevance after grabbing headlines over the 2010s. In this context, it would be fair to ask if the selection of a new leader is relevant at all.
In this article, we look into what we do and do not know about the IS’ new leader. In examining the announcement, as well as the facts and speculation around the man who now leads the group, we conclude that the IS’ main concern is threefold:
- To project a sense of resilience in light of ongoing (global) challenges;
- Maintain continuity between its past and present leadership;
- Generate a sense of legitimacy and inspiration for IS cells around the world while maintaining the independence of these cells through a broad guiding strategy.
We note that the IS strategy to rebuild itself resembles that of its strategy in the lead-up to 2014 and that the group has been investing in its resilience to continue its operations even after decapitation strikes targeting its leadership. We further note that while resilience and capacities of local communities against the IS improved, we warn that the current international climate may result in the erosion of these defences, allowing the IS to carve out a space for itself once again.
Background
The IS announced the selection of its new leader a little over a month after his predecessor, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, was killed in a raid by the US forces. Although the group did not acknowledge the US involvement in his killing, the statement did note that he died during a battle. The statement further noted that Abu Ibrahim handpicked his successor as Abu al-Hassan.
Over the month of relative quiet from the IS’ central command, there was some speculation that the group was experiencing a leadership struggle or was otherwise struggling to communicate between different cells in order to appoint a suitable leader. If this was the case, however, there were no visible internal clashes or reports of tensions within the group. Indeed, much of the group’s media retained a sense of casual calm during this period. When Abu al-Hassan was finally appointed as the group’s leader, IS franchises around the world were quick to acknowledge him. If there were internal tensions, the group was successful in hiding them.
Notably, little is known about the group’s new leader. The group did not share any photos of its new leader, nor did it reveal his name, instead referring to him only with his Nom-De-Guerre.
The inclusion of al-Hashimi al-Quraishi are possible indicators of Abu al-Hassan’s tribal background. Indeed, the IS has often sought to appoint leaders from the Quraish tribe, the original tribe of Prophet Muhammad and many early Islamic caliphs. This historical link is often held as a precondition for becoming a caliph by many modern Salafi Jihadis. When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared a Caliph, his connection to the Quraish bloodline was frequently emphasised in IS propaganda. His successor, Abu Ibrahim, was similarly given the “Quraishi” title despite him being widely believed to be a Turkman from Tal Afar. It is very possible that Abu al-Hassan does not actually belong to the Quraish tribe either and was bestowed the title for propaganda purposes.
However, given the lack of details around Abu al-Hassan, all such details remain speculative.
Ever since the IS announced the selection of its new leader, experts sought to decipher who he truly is. Citing Iraqi security officials, the Reuters news agency suggested that Abu al-Hassan is the brother of the group’s first caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
However, at least one claim has been made to cast doubts on that assertion, suggesting that Baghdadi’s brother is likely the group’s newly-announced spokesperson instead of the leader. Instead, it was suggested that the group’s new leader is Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaidai (also known as Ustath Zaid, Abu Khattab al-Iraqi, Abu al-Moez al-Iraqi and Abu Ishaq). He is believed to have been involved with the IS’ predecessor, Ansar al-Islam under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi during the 2000s before officially joining the IS in 2013. If these speculations are correct, this makes the IS’ new leader a veteran jihadi leader and one of the last remaining members of the IS’ original cadres.
What Does the Selection of a New Leader Mean?
Without knowing more about Abu al-Hassan and his background, it is difficult to ascertain how the new leadership will impact the group. However, some signs of the group’s main concerns and trajectory are apparent in the selection process as well as how this process was communicated with the wider public. Overall, the IS appears to be concerned with maintaining legitimacy among its supporters while offering a sense of continuity and resilience.
Just as the group is attempting to gain legitimacy from the distant past, it is also trying to connect itself to the jihadi struggles of the more recent times. If Abu al-Hassan truly is Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaidai, then his status as a veteran jihadi and a follower of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi would essentially confirm him as a hardliner who will not compromise or divert from the group’s ideological bedrock and virulent sectarianism. It is entirely possible that this was behind the group’s decision to message that Abu al-Hassan was handpicked as a successor by his predecessor.
Another message Abu al-Hassan’s selection sends is resilience. Although the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was met with some disbelief, concern and even panic among the group’s followers, the death of Abu Ibrahim drew little such reactions. In part, this was because he was not the leader of the group for a long time and was hardly visible. As far as the day-to-day affairs of the IS goes, his death appears to have had little impact.
Indeed, the group’s franchises around the world, especially in Africa, continued to launch and publish attacks, seemingly with little disruption. Overall, IS franchises from West Africa to Afghanistan appear to be committed to their objectives.
Following Abu Ibrahim’s death, experts noted that his death would likely have more symbolic consequences, as opposed to operational ones. This indeed appears to have been the case. However, even the morale damage predicted appear to have been limited. Instead, the group looks to have leveraged an orderly transition to show to the world that decapitation strikes will not end the group or dissuade its followers.
Ultimately, the IS’ goal to rebuild its strength by pursuing an insurgency will remain unchanged. In a bid to achieve this goal, the group will likely continue to follow tactics that resemble the tactics it pursued in the lead-up to its emergence as a territorial force in 2014. Such tactics include:
- To continue attacks on “apostate governments” in the MENA region to retain relevance and, where possible, free imprisoned supporters;
- To continue attacks on other jihadi factions deemed insufficiently devoted to Islam – such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda – to brandish its hard-line credentials;
- To continue attacking soft targets like community leaders to instil fear and suspicion in isolated communities;
- To exploit local grievances and failings in governance to gain supporters and recruits among local populations.
For a cell-based organisation, such tactics are easily achievable and do not require constant oversight from the leadership, reducing the need to engage in communications that could compromise the safety of the leaders. Instead, the leadership appears to be intended to serve as a source of inspiration, leaving cells capable of operating independently even in the aftermath of decapitation strikes.
After a US airstrike killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, the group that would become the IS was viewed as a spent force. His successor, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was similarly killed in a US raid in 2010, setting the stage for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the group’s eventual rise in Iraq and Syria.
Having experienced and emerged stronger from leadership losses, it is conceivable that the IS invested heavily into making the group more resilient against future strikes. Although the pool of the original jihadi leaders from the 2000s may be running low, the group retains large numbers of armed militants and supporters across Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It may also have as much as $50 million in reserves. Thus, viewing the group as a spent force on account of its reliance on jihadi symbolism to legitimise itself would be a mistake.
Regional and International Dynamics Will Influence the Actions of the IS
Although the IS’ inspiration and strategy may be drawing from the past, the group nevertheless finds itself in an environment quite different from when it rose to power nearly a decade ago.
Chief among such changes is the tone of caution among many experts about the group’s fortunes. Unlike the triumphalism seen in the 2000s and the early 2010s, experts today are adamant that the jihadi threat may resurge and that the elimination of the group’s leadership is not the end of the group itself. Unsurprisingly, post-conflict programmes in formerly IS-held areas have sought to address not only practical issues like reconstruction and services but also enhance community cohesion to make them more resilient against IS propaganda. The group may be employing its old playbook, but it will meet communities who are more aware of the group’s tricks.
The IS will also find the international jihadi scene a lot less welcoming compared to its emergence in the 2010s. When the group rose to power in Iraq and Syria in the 2010s, it did so through alliances with local factions, both jihadi and non-jihadi, before proceeding to co-opt or liquidate its former allies. Since then, the IS’ notoriety for violence was compounded by a reputation for picking fights with any faction that doesn’t pledge loyalty to the IS’ caliph. The IS has come into conflict with nearly every major jihadi faction around the world, with some local exceptions in West Africa and the Maghreb. As factions like the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria experiment with more pragmatic modes of governance, they will likely find the IS’ brand increasingly toxic.
However, other international developments may favour an IS resurgence. Chief among these is the on-going (and escalating) war between Ukraine and Russia. The world’s already-diminishing attention towards the MENA region was, practically overnight, turned towards Ukraine instead. With prospects of conventional, interstate war once again on the books, the preoccupation with counter-insurgency operations in the Middle East since 2001 may come to a gradual end. Indeed, even prior to the conflict in Ukraine, the US was drawing down its presence in Iraq, with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) conducting anti-IS operations with relative independence. Such improved capabilities are a far cry from the state of affairs when the IS emerged in 2014. Moving forward, it will be vital to ensure that local counter-terrorism and intelligence capabilities do not erode. Lulls in attacks, in particular, should not comfort security agencies into a false sense of comfort, as such lulls could be part of an IS subterfuge to wait for the world’s attention to fully move away from the group, allowing it to carve out a space in the MENA region more effectively.
More significantly is the possibility that the IS may exploit the war directly. In Syria, for example, IS militants remained highly active in the Syrian Desert, regularly attacking the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions and ambushing loyalist militias. Although Russian presence in eastern Syria is not widespread, Russian military and economic assistance nevertheless allowed the SAA to gain control of the region over the course of 2018, while the IS rule was collapsing. With the war in Ukraine potentially diminishing Russian assistance for the SAA, there is a possibility that IS’ insurgency may become ever-more brazen. Improved IS capabilities could then spillover into neighbouring regions such as those controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or across the border into Iraq.
Ultimately, much about the future of the IS remains uncertain, especially in light of lack of information surrounding the group’s new leader. The fact is that under the rule of Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, the IS faces a world that is both deeply changed from 2014, yet at the same time, worryingly similar.