Despite diplomatic to-and-fro between Moscow and Ankara, tensions between the two countries over the situation in Idlib continue to intensify. Over the course of the past week, a series of events have occurred that threatens to exacerbate the situation even more.
On Thursday 27th of January, around 30 Turkish soldiers were killed near the village of Balyoun. Although what happened there on the day remains unclear, by most indications, an initial airstrike struck a Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) convoy in the afternoon, causing injuries and forcing a stoppage. Taking advantage of the convoy’s stoppage, successive airstrikes started targeting the convoy, even as, according to Ankara, Russian forces were informed of the Turkish presence. The airstrikes reportedly struck not just the convoy but the buildings the soldiers took shelter in, resulting in a spike of casualties.
Since then, the TSK has significantly ramped up its support for the Opposition factions, predominantly the Syrian National Army (SNA) in Idlib. Turkish strikes targeted not only the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) near the frontlines of the Idlib and Aleppo provinces, but also targeted major bases such as the Hama Airbase, the Nairab Airbase near Aleppo City (which has reportedly been rendered inoperable), the Kuweires Airbase, the Menagh Airbase (which was mostly used as a staging ground, as its airfield was already defunct) and, most significantly, the Hmeimim Airbase where Russian forces in Syria are headquartered. The TSK also shot down town Syrian SU-24 aircrafts over Idlib. The Turkish strikes, which gave the Opposition enough opportunity to reclaim a number of territories, including the critical town of Saraqib, were contextualised by the Turkish Defence Ministry under “Operation Spring Shield”, suggesting that Turkey’s long-awaited Idlib offensive has been launched.
It would appear that these developments represent Ankara’s efforts to back its threats with credible action. Indeed, the strikes have, for some time, strained the SAA’s ability to make gains while resulting in credible losses, with the TSK losing comparatively little in the process. Ankara also made good on its threats to “open the gates” to Syrian refugees looking to cross into Europe by announcing that it would not prevent refugees from making the crossing if they so wished to. In the ensuing hours, the borders of Greece and Bulgaria both saw massive influxes of refugees attempting to cross into the European Union.
On the ground in Idlib, Syrian Opposition factions, demoralised and increasingly sceptical about Ankara, have rallied, with even hard-line factions that were originally sceptical of Ankara’s motives seemingly turning to support the Turkish operations. Other developments, such as a massive escalation of fighting and protests over the weekend, especially in the town of Sanamain, suggest that Opposition supporters have seen this moment as the opportunity to put further pressure on Damascus.
What do these developments mean for the future of Syria?
The main gain for Ankara would be that it has managed to regain significant credibility to its threats. For years, Ankara has been threatening military action against Damascus. However, the lack of responses to the successive gains made by the SAA in Idlib and Aleppo have long created the perception that these threats were hollow. Indeed, many pundits in the United States and elsewhere noted that Ankara’s actions have dismantled the arguments against striking the SAA on grounds that the SAA was too strong or doing so would invite too severe a retaliation. The strikes have also likely countered the view of the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, being “in the pocket” of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin.
Indeed, Moscow’s relative quiet on the matter is significant. In the hours and days following the strike on Turkish soldiers, Russian officials, while offering condolences, also implicitly blamed Ankara for the incident on grounds that Turkish soldiers were operating alongside “terrorist” factions, while also reiterating their accusations that it is Ankara, not Moscow, that failed to abide by the Sochi Agreement. Besides these oft-repeated talking points, there were no new arguments or retaliations that came from Russia, certainly not anything on the level that followed that Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet in late-2015. Indeed, both sides have expressed that they do not wish to target each other. Ankara, in particular, has sought to explicitly avoid blaming Russian aircraft for the killings of Turkish soldiers even as many Syrian and Turkish activists emphasized that the style and intensity of the attack bore the hallmarks and capabilities of Russian strikes.
If war is politics via other means, then it would seem that both Moscow and Ankara are focused on maximising their military gains in Idlib ahead of the direct talks between Erdoğan and Putin, expected to take place on Thursday and result in some sort of a ceasefire agreement.
However, this does not mean Moscow is in a back-foot in Idlib. Despite continued Turkish strikes, Russian aircraft continued to support the SAA in Idlib, enabling them to regain control of the strategic town of Saraqib. Furthermore, there were reports on Monday, 2nd March, that Russian Military Police has been deployed in Saraqib in what appears to mark a red-line for Turkey in which it cannot support an Opposition counteroffensive without risking directly targeting Russian personnel.
How the EU and NATO also respond to the situation will also be a factor in how the events in Idlib play out. Relations between Turkey and the rest of NATO have been steadily improving since Turkish-Russian relations began to deteriorate, with NATO certainly eyeing an opportunity to pull the increasingly-distant Turkey back into its orbit. Ankara, for its part, has sought to leverage the détente into tangible support for Turkish troops in Idlib. The Turkish media’s highlighting of the involvement of groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah in Idlib in recent days were similarly intended to play into the sensitivities of the United States on the matter. Similarly, the “opening of the gates” and the facilitation of a refugee crisis was likely intended to increase the urgency of the matter for the EU, forcing it to get more involved or otherwise offer Turkey increased incentives to prevent the crisis.
While Ankara’s risk-calculation on Moscow appears to have been successful, its calculations vis-à-vis the EU and NATO may be less so, and could even backfire. Member states of both the EU and NATO have expressed verbal support for Turkey over the situation in Idlib but did not take credible action. NATO, in particular, has, so far, opted to not consider the killing of Turkish soldiers as part of NATO’s Article 5 that stresses mutual defence. However, a draft NATO statement supporting Turkey’s position in Idlib was vetoed by Greece whose government was angered by Turkey’s push of refugees into its borders. Other EU states have also viewed Ankara’s actions vis-à-vis the refugees with hostility. Thus, the current course of events may see what little détente made between Ankara and NATO or the EU being lost, especially given that Ankara is already frustrated with the lack of tangible action from both international bodies.
Should this end up being the case, the diplomatic, military and political in Idlib and wider Syria may once again shift towards Moscow.
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