On 22nd December 2019, the Islamic State (IS) launched a new assassination campaign under the title “Revenge for the Killing of the Two Exalted Sheikhs”. The campaign, named after and intended to avenge the killings of the group’s former leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and spokesperson, Abu Hasan al-Muhajir, unleashed a series of attacks not just in Iraq and Syria, but Mali, Niger, Afghanistan, Yemen, Egypt and Somalia. In addition to the IS itself, local factions affiliated with the militant group, such as northern Aleppo-based Harakat al-Intiqam al-Islamiya (The Islamic Vengeance Movement), also called for attacks to be conducted on the group’s enemies. According to an infographic published by the group in January 2020, the campaign has resulted in 139 attacks in eight countries, resulting in over 300 killed or injured, 51 vehicles damaged or destroyed, and seven vehicles and five houses destroyed. The highest numbers of claims and casualties were in Iraq and Syria, followed by attacks across Africa.
On the face of it, this is an impressive scorecard and a vindication for those who warned that the group remains a threat, as well as those who support the group. The fact that attacks in individual countries were not highly localised to one area but spread across the country – with attacks in Syria, for instance, spanning from Daraa in the south to Aleppo in the north and Hasakah and Deir ez-Zour in the east – certainly gives the sense that the group has agents across the many countries they operate in. Furthermore, the bombastic nature of the campaign, combined with the high quantity of the attacks across the world gave the group a degree of media exposure that it has not had in a while. From a propaganda point, the group appears to have achieved what it wanted.
As of mid-January, the rate of attacks claimed by the IS has gone down to an even lower level than their pre-campaign levels. The few attacks claimed by the group since did not bear the title “Revenge for the Killing of the Two Exalted Sheikhs”, suggesting that the campaign is over.
Beyond the propaganda purposes, was the campaign a success? Did it achieve strategic and tactical goals while showing that the group is in a position of strength? On the surface it would seem so but beyond that, the attacks signal a gradual erosion of capacity.
While the attacks under the campaign claimed a fair few number of lives, many of the claims published by the group were also notable for the lack of actual deaths. The group’s announcement of a mortar attack in the Sinai, a motorcycle bomb against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Deir ez-Zour and an IED attack in Iraq, all lacked references to casualties, only material damage. Similarly, the group appears to have dressed failed assassination attempts by highlighting the material damage done instead. This trend continued since the apparent ending of the campaign, with the attacks claimed by the group often containing references to damaging/destroying the home of an individual without actually killing him. The use of “killed and injured” without actually specifying numbers also serves to obfuscate the actual numbers of those killed in IS attacks.
Furthermore, the capacity of the group’s militants does not appear to be keeping up with those of its enemies. In the areas under SDF control in Syria, security forces are finding increasing numbers of explosive devices before they can detonate. Attacks on SDF checkpoints have also left fewer and fewer casualties, with IS militants instead focusing on “soft targets” such as civilian officials. A similar picture is apparent in Iraq where the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have thwarted IS attacks with increasing frequency. More notably, the ISF has started launching counter-IS operations without the International Coalition for the first time in January 2020.
The group’s tendency to inflate the numbers of its attacks, at least in Iraq, are apparent, with some 76% of the claims believed to be hyperbole. While statistics in Syria, especially Deir ez-Zour, are hard to come by, activists tend to confirm only a fraction of IS-claimed attacks. In the two countries, the only areas of consistent IS activity have been the areas around Kirkuk and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA)-held parts of the Syrian Desert. Meanwhile, smaller attacks, such as those claimed by Harakat al-Intiqam in northern Syria, were often blamed on Kurdish insurgents at first, potentially resulting in increased mistrust and misplaced retribution in a region already suffering from inter-communal tensions.
While it is hardly a rosy image, it does seem to highlight that the group’s highly-public assassination campaigns in Iraq and Syria are more an attempt at propaganda than anything else.
This, however, stands in high-contrast to the situation in the Sahel and Maghreb regions of Africa. Although by its own admission, the group conducted far fewer attacks in West Africa (18), the number of casualties (dead and injured) caused during these attacks (102) were closely behind Syria (121) and Iraq (117), suggesting that each attack resulted in far greater loss of lives. While these claims are likely to be inflated, it highlights the IS’ growing focus on Africa; in January, the group released a video entitled “Then It Will Become an Anguish for Them”, showing its operations in the Lake Chad regions of Nigeria, Niger and Chad. While the militants shown in the videos visibly lacked combat finesse, they’ve nevertheless been able to navigate in the sparsely-populated regions with ease, attacking isolated civilian settlements, with security forces often lacking training and equipment to counter the militants effectively while also experiencing low morale.
Indeed, the United Nations Security Council recently warned of “unprecedented” rise in terrorist attacks in the region, with 4,000 terrorism-related deaths reported in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in 2019 alone. Last Thursday alone saw suspected Islamist militants attack an army base in Niger, killing 89 soldiers. While not all of these attacks and deaths were IS-related, it highlights that the region fertile for terrorist activities. Jordan’s King Abdullah also warned that the intensifying fighting in Libya may provide the group with room to grow, especially amidst reports of fighters from Syrian groups relocating to Libya.
On the whole, the “Revenge for the Killing of the Two Exalted Sheikhs” campaign reveals that the group, while still a credible threat, is less powerful than it tries to portray itself as, with the bombastic claims of attacks across Iraq and Syria proving to have little force of substance behind them. Maintaining pressure on the IS, being vigilant against its efforts to stoke communal tensions, preventing the emergence of vacuums the group can operate in – such as the Syrian Desert and the Kirkuk region – and adapting to its capabilities while eroding the group’s insurgency know-how will be vital towards ensuring that the IS does not revive in Iraq and Syria.
The Sahel and Maghreb regions of north and west Africa are another matter. The group, alongside other extremist groups, is patiently biding its time to grow in strength and capacity, and, if left unchecked, may re-emerge as a major threat. Indeed, the rapid rise of attacks in the region and the growing number of casualties suggests that the process is already underway.
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