Over the past weekend, the already-tenuous security situation in Daraa and Suweida, southern Syria, has taken a turn for the worse amidst escalating attacks led by the Popular Resistance, an insurgency group operating in the region. Just this weekend alone, three separate shootings, attributed to the Popular Resistance, targeted a Ba’ath Party Official, an officer of the Air Force Intelligence and a reconciled former rebel leader. These attacks came two weeks after, a roadside bomb targeted a bus transporting Fourth Division troops of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) on a road between Daraa and al-Yadudah, killing five. This week, numerous SAA checkpoints have been targeted in grenade and gunfire attacks around the town of Sanamain, northern Daraa.
In addition to the attacks attributed to the Popular Resistance, both Daraa and Suweida experienced suicide bombings, something of a rarity in these parts of Syria. The attacks targeted the SAA in Suweida’s Tarba and Daraa’s Malihah al-Tish. The Daraa attack was explicitly claimed by ISIS, as opposed to its former local affiliate, Jaish Khalid Ibn al-Walid (JKIW), which often claimed attacks during its time of activity in the region between May 2016 and July 2018.
The timing of the attacks is notable, as they came shortly after rumours emerged in Opposition media of the Syrian Government releasing as many as 60 former JKIW militants from prison. Many of these militants were arrested in the country’s south, in particular around the Yarmouk Basin, during the Syrian Government’s ‘Operation Basalt’ offensive against Opposition groups in 2018.
ISIS’ claim of attack comes within the context of increased pro-Opposition activity in the area amidst efforts by Damascus to re-impose its authority. Many of the Opposition factions that signed reconciliation agreements retained a degree of autonomy in their hometowns. However, Popular Resistance attacks, reports of pro-Opposition graffiti across the countryside and frequent protests in Daraa City have been a source of concern for Damascus, which has sought to flex its authority in the region.
A similar story is being played out in Suweida, which is officially under the control of Damascus but has a degree of autonomy. Although the autonomy enabled the Druze majority population to officially back Damascus, it has also allowed pro-Opposition activists to continue their activities, with groups such as Rijal al-Karama often pushing back against perceived power-grab attempts by Damascus.
Although this proved to be a highly pragmatic method through which Damascus could assert its authority whilst maintaining its core SAA divisions on fronts elsewhere in the country, it is well-known that Damascus does not view such autonomy as viable in the long term. As such, those suspicious of the Syrian Government’s motives have been quick to attribute the release of the JKIW militants as an attempt to excuse a crackdown. Similar suspicions have also been present in Suweida where Damascus was accused of facilitating ISIS movements – including the horrific attack last year that saw more than 250 deaths – so that it can enter the region and present itself as the saviour.
The Syrian Government followed a similar tactic in the earlier days of the war by releasing suspected jihadists to radicalise the Syrian Opposition, only for the war to escalate in intensity as many of the released militants were able to organise quickly against Damascus. If this is the case, then such past experiences should be instructive for the future and stability of southern Syria.