On Saturday (26th May), reports began to emerge that Turkey was sending rebel factions in Idlib a large supply of armour and weapons. In conjunction, Turkey also deployed units of the Syrian National Army (SNA) to Idlib to assist the National Front for Liberation (NFL). There has been widespread speculation that the delivery of weapons and the deployment of the SNA came as a response to Turkey’s failed attempt to persuade Russia to end military operations in Idlib and northern Hama and was instigated in an attempt to make the Syrian Arab Army’s (SAA) offensive in the region costlier and more difficult.
Nonetheless, by Thursday (30th May) Ankara attempted to reach a ceasefire agreement with Moscow in regards to the clashes in Greater Idlib. However, these talks soon collapsed.
Following this, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, made a second attempt by calling on his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, to implement a ceasefire in order to prevent further civilian deaths and the influx of refugees from Idlib to neighbouring Turkey. On Friday (31st May) Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, held a press conference, in which he noted that it is Turkey’s responsibility to stop militant groups from targeting Russian facilities and civilians, effectively placing the blame for the fighting on Ankara.
Amidst the exchange of blame, the SAA operations in Greater Idlib continued, with much of the region facing heavy shelling, as well as airstrikes from Syrian and Russian aircraft. As a result, the NFL and Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), now joined by the SNA, have been attempting to stop the SAA from making further advances in the region and retreat to the de-escalation frontlines that were agreed upon by Ankara and Moscow.
While Moscow and Damascus have accused Ankara of failing to contain the HTS, the latest move to send in the SNA to join forces with the NFL (and implicitly the HTS, which controls much of Greater Idlib) can be seen as an attempt by Turkey to prevent growing anti-Turkish sentiments in Idlib that have increasingly protested against Turkey’s perceived inaction. The “Break the Border” protest (#كسر_الحدود) held near the Turkish border in Atmeh likewise highlights Ankara’s vulnerability to a new refugee crisis amidst growing nationalist and xenophobic sentiment in Turkey.
It is no secret that Turkey has been vying to launch operations against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the Tal Rifaat region of northern Aleppo. When the SAA operations were first launched in the Greater Idlib region, it was expected that the SNA would launch its own push against the YPG in Tal Rifaat. Despite some skirmishes between the SNA and the YPG, a full assault has not materialised. The deployment of the SNA into Idlib, therefore, represents an attempt by Ankara to push Moscow and Damascus back into negotiations.
The SNA deployment can also be seen as an attempt by Turkey to out-influence the HTS in Idlib in a bid to allay Russian accusations of Turkey failing to uphold its own side of the Idlib agreement. This was further supported when Turkey began withdrawing more professional and trained SNA forces out of Afrin and the Euphrates Shield area to send them towards Idlib. In that case, however, it would seem that Turkey’s planned operations against the YPG have been suspended in a bid to focus on Idlib.
As shelling and counter-attacks continue to take place in Greater Idlib, with the SAA’s latest capture of the village of Qasabiyah, and three other villages in in northern Hama earlier this week, the trajectory of the conflict remains unclear, leading many to believe that both the military and the political battles will continue for a prolonged period.
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