North Press Agency, which is affiliated with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AA) and the SDF, reported that four ISIS militants managed to escape from the prison. The news agency then reported on Monday (30th March) that the Internal Security Forces (Asayish) managed to arrest the four escapees. Mazloum Abdi, the commander-in-chief of the SDF, tweeted late on Monday night that his organisation has been able to “avoid catastrophe and take control”, adding that no prisoners escaped. Another spokesperson for the SDF, Kino Gabriel, stated that HAT had successfully quelled the upheaval and that all detainees are currently in the prison.

Despite claims by the SDF officials that a state of calm had returned to the prison, reports circulated of a second break-out attempt by the ISIS prisoners. A local journalist told The Associated Press that gunshots continued to be heard from inside the prison and that ambulances were evacuating wounded individuals. The Rojava Information Center tweeted on Monday that the situation was still live and not resolved, while also reporting instances of gunfire and the presence of ambulances at the scene.

There has been debate as to whether the riot was sparked by fears related to the recent spread of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) in Syria, which has thus far reported ten confirmed cases and two deaths. A commander of the SDF, Mervan Qamishlo, told The Independent that the SDF does not believe that the demands of the rioters are directly related to the spread of COVID-19, as is currently the case in several prisons across the Middle East, and that the loss of control is related to the large number of prisoners and the low capacity of the security forces to manage the prisons. The Rojava Information Center, however, claims that there is a direct link.

Another matter of debate concerns the question of exactly who instigated the riot. The Rojava Information Center has stated that the upper levels of the prison mostly hold Syrian ISIS militants. Reports from Sunday suggest that the rioting took place on the first floor, meaning that foreign ISIS members have likely been the prime instigators of the riots.

This is indeed not the first case of a riot sparked by ISIS militants held in prisons and camps in northern and eastern Syria. In mid-March, simultaneous mutiny attempts were instigated in the Sina’a as well as the Suwar prison in northern Deir ez-Zour. Back then, information was circulating that local trials of ISIS militants were set to soon begin. It was also a time when news concerned with the global COVID-19 crisis was picking up speed, and prison riots in neighbouring Jordan and Lebanon took place as a result. It is likely that these immediate factors again motivated the ISIS militants to attempt the recent break-out.

In addition to these incidents, al-Hol IDP camp in Hasakah has represented a heavy burden for the AA authorities and local security forces. It is perhaps the site of greatest concern for the AA authorities, as it accommodates over 71,000 people, many of whom are ISIS-affiliated women and children. Several instances of rioting by ISIS-affiliated women at the camp as well as repeated attempts by ISIS militants to smuggle families out of the camp have severely tested the capacity of the local security forces, who have been distracted by military developments in other parts of the region.

More long-term factors that have allowed ISIS militants to cause disruptions in prisons, as well as in IDP camps such as al-Hol, are the reduction in the regional security forces’ capacity to administer those sites and the delay in any decision regarding trials of ISIS-affiliated individuals, especially non-Syrian ones. These factors allowed for prison break-out attempts by ISIS militants throughout 2019, especially following the Turkish-backed Operation Peace Spring in northern Syria in October 2019 and the US’ declaration that it would be withdrawing its troops from the region.

First of all, with regards to the future trials of ISIS militants in Syria, the Social Justice Council of the AA seems to be eager to push for the establishment of local “special tribunals” to prosecute foreign ISIS militants. Following the reluctance of states to take back their citizens from Syria and to hold trials in their home states, in addition to their ambiguous stance vis-à-vis the establishment of international courts in northern Syria, the AA appears to be taking matters into its own hands. The undertaking of these trials were approved in February while the establishment of the “special tribunals” was confirmed in late March. The continuation of riots and similar disturbances in AA-administered prisons and camps is highly likely to stimulate the regional authorities to initiate local trials in these “special tribunals” very soon.

Western states have thus far had a cordial, if not positive relationship with the AA, with the International Coalition providing direct support in the fight against ISIS and several delegations from EU countries visiting the AA authorities in recent times. The establishment of the tribunals in northern Syria is likely to meet tacit if not direct support from Western countries, especially those that are unwilling to bring back ISIS-affiliated individuals to their countries and amid the ever-changing unstable context of the global COVID-19 crisis.

The Syrian Government and its international ally Russia have been largely quiet in relation to the issue of trials against ISIS militants in Syria. The AA and Damascus have not yet reached a power-sharing political agreement, despite Russian efforts to mediate between the two sides. Although the Syrian Government is keen to take back political and military control over northern and eastern Syria, towards which it made inroads after being invited by the AA to counter the Turkish-backed Operation Peace Spring, Damascus itself may also tacitly approve the AA trials of ISIS militants as it would take a potential future burden off its back.

In any case, even if the AA authorities manage to put the ISIS militants to trial, its capacity to administer prisons holding those found to be guilty will be an immense challenge. The AA may even have to build new prisons to be able to manage the sheer numbers of potential inmates. On its own, the Sina’a prison, which was converted from a school, is said to hold around 5,000 ISIS militants.

Considering the cost and the practical capacity required to administer prisons following potential trials, it is difficult to envisage a situation where the AA could deal with all of this without direct international support. The UN is currently grappling with the spread of COVID-19 in northern Syria and is especially concerned with the fate of displaced people stranded in IDP camps. It has yet to directly engage with the AA authorities on the matter of ISIS prisoners and the establishment of tribunals. The break-out attempt at Sina’a prison, whether or not influenced by an individual issue like COVID-19, in addition to the above mentioned myriad factors at play, is nevertheless a signal for the international community to engage more urgently with the broader matter of ISIS prisoners at hand.

The news, although significant, was hardly surprising. All of Syria’s neighbours, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, had cases of the virus in recent weeks. Furthermore, two of Damascus’s main allies, Iran and China, have been epicentres of the outbreak, with Iran still struggling to contain the transmission of the virus. Indeed, many observers have noted that it was unrealistic for Syria to have evaded the virus for so long. In the lead-up to the announcement, there had been persistent rumours that the virus had been spreading among Iranian-affiliated militias in Deir ez-Zour, across refugee camps in Idlib and in major Government-held cities such as Damascus, Tartous and Aleppo. With the confirmation that the virus is in Syria, there will likely be more cases being reported across the country. Already, the Minister of Health for the Opposition’s Syrian Interim Government (SIG), Maram al-Sheikh, announced that one person from Afrin and two people from the Atmeh Refugee Camp in northern Idlib have been put under quarantine on suspicion of being infected.

Experts have long agreed that the arrival of the virus in Syria would be disastrous. The country’s health system, once one of the best in the region, has been teetering near collapse as a result of the war and the resultant destruction of facilities, as well as the shortage of medicine, staff and equipment ranging from ventilators to protective gear

Furthermore, the country is home to a disproportionately large population of poor and displaced people, many of whom with no access to sterile environments or healthcare on a normal basis. Idlib, in particular, is densely populated with people displaced from other parts of the country living in squalid conditions that are ideal for the spread of the virus. The abundance of ungoverned spaces, especially in eastern Syria, makes the outbreak even riskier.

Luckily, authorities across Syria seem to recognise the dangers posed by the outbreak. In the lead-up to the outbreak, authorities in nearly every part of the country had already started implementing restrictions to entries and exits, suspending public gathering spots, schools and sports games, enacting sterilisation campaigns in public buildings and restricting public transport. Following the confirmation of the outbreak, these measures were further tightened. The Syrian Government announced that it would shut down all its crossings and suspend air traffic to and from Syria. Both the SIG and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AA) enacted curfews. In the SIG, the curfew appears to have been implemented in response to scenes from major cities such as al-Bab where public spaces remained busy over the weekend despite warnings from officials.

The most lacklustre response came from the region that is perhaps most vulnerable to it: Idlib. The Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), based in Idlib City and supported by Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), increased prices on various goods such as bread as part of “sterilisation and cleaning fees” but has not implemented any shut-downs including of mosques, which, according to activists, were full during last week’s Friday prayers. Activists also reported hard-line fundamentalist militants expressing lack of concern about the spread of the virus. From Iran to the United States, experience has shown that underestimating the virus and failing to close public spaces has been a fatal mistake. With many healthcare facilities under SSG control already operating at limited capacity owing to heavy bombardments, the region stands to lose the most, should the outbreak spread.

Geopolitics has also been a determinant for the response to the outbreak. Although internationally isolated and suffering from a severe economic crisis, the Syrian Government has had support from Russia and China to enact stronger monitoring mechanisms, and retains enough recognition to solicit support from the World Health Organisation (WHO). Damascus also solicited for sanctions relief to help deal with the crisis. In a surprising move, US President, Donald Trump, announced last week that he wanted to work with Damascus to secure the release of Austin Tice, a journalist who went missing in 2012, and said that the US would show its appreciation for Tice’s release. It is possible that the two sides may leverage this development for some relief. However, in light of Washington tightening sanctions on Iran despite the outbreak, this is unlikely.

In contrast, the SIG’s Minister of Health expressed frustration that the WHO has not launched any of its programmes, including a testing program in refugee camps in Idlib and Aleppo, despite plans having been in the works over the past month. Although Turkey will likely support the SIG as well, the outbreak in Turkey is severely testing its own capacities.

The AA, meanwhile, has had even less support despite its close but increasingly-strained ties with Washington. Health officials in the region warned that there are very few ventilators and other equipment to help sick people, adding that the region does not even have testing kits. Both Damascus and Moscow could gain local support by providing the region with such equipment. However, activists say that such support has not materialised. It would appear that despite proclamations of senior Kurdish officials, such as Ilham Ahmed, that the crisis could be an opportunity for Syrians to work together, partisan interests still define the response to the crisis, and the extent of cooperation.

Another geopolitical factor is whether the outbreak will have a major impact on Iranian activities. Since the outbreak struck Iran, there have been persistent rumours of the disease spreading in eastern Syria, carried by Iranian-backed fighters. The fact that several high-ranking Iranian military officials fell ill from the disease has also spurred these rumours. In Washington, there appears to be a hope that the outbreak in both Syria and Iran could compel Tehran to redirect its resources from Syria to containing the disease, ultimately leading to an Iranian withdrawal. US and Israeli officials will likely seek such an outcome via sanctions and airstrikes. They may also link Damascus’s request for sanctions relief to the removal of Iranian-backed forces, perhaps even stoking Damascus’s suspicion towards Tehran for the emergence of the outbreak in Syria. Tehran, however, is unlikely to withdraw its forces yet, barring significant new developments in Iran itself or otherwise assurances that its Syrian allies – Syrian Hezbollah and other local militias – can carry forward its cause without need for direct involvement.

ISIS remains another factor. Although the group has advised its militants to avoid outbreak areas, it has also been open about its jubilation that the industrialised nations around the world are undergoing such a crisis. The group will certainly try and use the outbreak and the redirection of resources to expand its reach, weaken security measures and free its militants and their families being held in places like al-Hol Refugee Camp. Already, this weekend saw a smuggling attempt in the camp in which a number of ISIS women and their children tried to escape the camp was busted. Such attempts could backfire on the militants amidst rumours of the virus spreading in al-Hol itself. However, the risk of infected militants deliberately spreading the virus can be expected from a group that has already shown suicide attackers as its favoured method.

There is no doubt that Syria is in for a difficult path forward, especially coming on the heels of a ten-year conflict. It is positive that the country’s many governments, perhaps with the exception of the SSG, have taken the crisis seriously and implemented precautions. However, political, geopolitical, structural and economical obstacles will hamper the efforts to confront the virus which will find ample room to spread in the country’s ungoverned, destitute and overpopulated spaces.

The latest round of rocket attacks on US forces began on Wednesday 11th March following reports on Tuesday 10th March that the US military was moving advanced air defence systems into Iraq in order to boost troops’ capability to protect themselves from any potential Iranian attack.

On Wednesday evening, 18 rockets hit Taji Base near Baghdad, which houses International Coalition personnel. Following the attack, the Spokesperson for the International Coalition, Colonel Myles B. Caggins III, posted an official statement on Twitter revealing that two US and one UK service members were killed and 18 others were injured as a result of the attack on Taji. The Joint Operations Command (JOC) condemned the attack, calling it a dangerous and hostile act. The attack was also condemned by Iraqi officials and figures, as well as US and UK officials, who called on the Iraqi Government to hold accountable those responsible for the attack and defend their forces from further strikes.

Later on Wednesday night, several outlets reported that PMU bases along the Syrian-Iraqi border were targeted by aircraft, which resulted in the death of 25 PMU members and the injury of 15 others, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). Nonetheless, by Friday, the International Coalition denied conducting these attacks.

By midday on Thursday, KH issued a statement “blessing” the attack on Taji, calling on the faction that carried out the attack to claim it publicly so that “it can protect its history”. The statement noted that the “occupying forces must bear the consequences of their illegal presence in Iraq”, adding that “the timing of the attack was appropriate”. The statement indirectly revealed that KH was not responsible for the attack, while at the same time revealing that the attack was likely carried out by another Iran-backed “resistance” faction in the country. By Thursday evening, US Secretary of Defence, Mark Esper, following discussions with US President Donald Trump, stated that “all options are on the table” regarding US retaliation to the Taji attack, which he ascribed to “Iran-backed Shi’a militias”.

The US Strikes Back

The retaliation for these attacks came within a single day. By the early hours of Friday, the US and UK made a series of retaliatory airstrikes against what they labelled in a statement released by the US’ Department of Defence (DoD), as five KH weapons storage facilities across Iraq. The DoD statement made clear that the attacks were in retaliation for the Camp Taji attack. The statement cautioned that the US was prepared to respond again if needed and that these attacks would “significantly degrade” KH’s ability to carry out any further attacks on International Coalition forces. On his end, Britain’s Foreign Minister, Dominic Raab, said that the US-led attack on the five targets was “swift, decisive, and proportionate”, adding that “anyone seeking to harm them [Coalition Forces] can expect a strong response”.

Despite the US and UK’s insistence that the targets were all KH facilities, images showed that amongst the targets hit by the US’ retaliation was Karbala International Airport, a civilian facility which is currently under construction. One civilian was killed and several others were injured in the attack.

In response to the US and UK airstrikes, Iraq’s JOC issued a scathing statement via the Twitter page of the Security Media Cell (SMC) on Friday morning, condemning the retaliation and saying that it “violated the principle of partnership” between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the International Coalition. According to the statement, the strikes targeted Jurf al-Nasr, al-Saeedat area, Behbehani area, al-Ashter Industrial facility, and the Karbala Airport. The statement revealed that three Iraqi Army members were killed and four were wounded, two Emergency Police members were killed and two others were wounded, and five PMU fighters were injured in the attacks, in addition to the one civilian in Karbala airport. The JOC warned of grave consequences for everyone if similar attacks were to take place.

Iraqi President, Barham Salih, also issued a statement condemning the attack, describing it as “a foreign attack” and an infringement of Iraqi sovereignty and called on the Iraqi Government to do all that it can to protect its sovereignty, implement the rule of law, and prevent Iraq from turning into a battlefield. The head of the Sadrist Movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, called on all parties to practise self-restraint and spread peace in this sensitive time in Iraq’s history. Al-Sadr said that while he does not support calling for peace with the “occupiers”, he believes that the current situation that Iraqis are facing requires de-escalation.

The military response to the US’ and UK’s retaliatory attack came one day later. On Saturday morning, the Taji military camp, which houses International Coalition forces, was struck once again by rockets, marking the second targeting of the base within a week. According to the JOC, the camp was struck by 33 rockets, which led to the injury of three International Coalition personnel and two Iraqi service members. The statement revealed that the JOC discovered seven rocket launchers inside a garage nearby, which contained a further 24 unused rockets. Addressing potential US retaliation, the JOC said that any further US action is not sanctioned without the approval of the Iraqi Government, making reference to the 13th March attack on the five KH sites, adding that there must be a speedy implementation of the Iraqi Parliament’s decision on the Coalition’s withdrawal.

The League of Revolutionaries

By Sunday evening, a video emerged online from a group called “Usbat al-Tha’ireen” (The League of Revolutionaries), claiming that their members conducted both recent attacks on Camp Taji. In the statement that was posted in the video, the group, whose logo is similar to those of several pro-Iran armed groups in the country, said that the attacks on Coalition forces was an act of vengeance for the US’ assassination of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, adding that this revenge will not end until the US withdraws from the country altogether. Despite similarities to pro-Iran armed groups in Iraq, the style and voice used in the video drew notable comparisons to those previously issued by the Islamic State (IS). However, claims at this stage are pure speculation, given the lack of information about the group, with some observers believing that it is an amalgamation of former KH, Jaish al-Mahdi (now Saraya al-Salam), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) members who broke off to create a separate group. In doing so, the aim would be to establish plausible deniability between these attacks and the primary factions who are officially under the institution of the PMU, a state-sponsored military apparatus.

On Monday, the US State Department issued an official readout between US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, and Iraq’s caretaker Prime Minister, Adil Abd al-Mahdi, who had spoken on Sunday, regarding the recent attack. According to the readout, Pompeo stressed that the Government of Iraq must defend International Coalition personnel who are training the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in their fight against the IS. Pompeo said that the groups responsible for these attacks must be held accountable, adding that the US will not tolerate these attacks and threats, and will take additional action in self-defence, if necessary.

Despite these threats, the attacks did not stop. On Monday evening, the SMC reported that two missiles fell on the Besmaya military base, located 45 kilometres south-east of Baghdad. The camp houses between 350 to 550 Spanish troops currently in Iraq under the International Coalition. According to the latest statements, this did not result in any material or human causalities.

The failure of these rockets to hit any targets did not stop “Usbat al-Tha’ireen” from releasing a second video on Tuesday night. In the video showing a man in military attire covering his face with a balaclava and using voice changing technology to mask his voice, the group claimed the recent attack on Camp Taji and Besmaya military camp, saying that these attacks are merely a simple message to show a small part of the capability to strike US troops. The group added that there are longer-range missiles in their arsenals that they will use for more distant targets. The group then threatened the remaining troops in Iraq to leave the country “vertically” or otherwise they will be sent back “horizontally”. The wording was a clear reference to a statement made by Hezbollah Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, in which he advised US troops to leave the Middle East by leaving alive vertically, by their own accord, or they will be sent back dead horizontally, lying in coffins.

The authenticity of the one-minute clip is yet to be verified, especially as the style of these videos is not in line with other visual releases made by “resistance factions.” With no real information about this new group, it is yet to be seen whether this is a real attempt at creating a new anti-US group, or a hoax, attempting to discredit factions opposing the US.

US Troops Withdraw From 3 Bases

Amidst increasing attacks on bases hosting foreign troops, US forces will be withdrawn from three out of eight military bases across Iraq in the coming weeks, including the base in al-Qa’im in Anbar Province, with the equipment at the base in al-Qa’im set to be handed over to the Iraqi Army. Colonel Myles B. Caggins III later revealed on Twitter on Tuesday that he would be holding important discussions with the spokesperson of the SMC, Major General Tahsin al-Khafaji, regarding the departure of International Coalition troops from al-Qa’im. Reports also claimed that US troops will be withdrawing from the Qayyarah Airbase, which was the launchpad for anti-IS operations in Mosul/Nineveh, and the K1 Base in Kirkuk, which was targeted on 7th January by Iran in retaliation to the assassination of Soleimani. While some US officials have officially stated that this withdrawal is due to the efforts and successes of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and that it is just the US readjusting its forces in light of the Coronavirus outbreak in the region, others believe that the US may actually be withdrawing troops from the country indefinitely. It can also be argued that this latest move was actually due to the success of armed groups threats against US troops, especially as US President Trump wants to avoid increasing US casualties, in fear of public outcry ahead of the 2020 elections. While US President, Donald Trump, stated earlier this year that the US will be reducing the number of soldiers in Iraq, and that it was in discussion with the Iraqi Government regarding the mechanism for withdrawal, talks to this end have faded out as the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and the wrangling over the Prime Minister position began to make headlines.

Al-Zurfi Assigned

Up until Tuesday, the political deadlock had made the situation worse. However, the designation of Adnan al-Zurfi as the PM-designate has thus far done nothing but add more fuel to the fire. The Fatah Coalition, headed by Hadi al-Ameri, which includes several pro-Iran parties, including AAH and KH, issued a statement condemning the designation of al-Zurfi, saying that it was unconstitutional since al-Zurfi was not selected by the largest bloc, a stipulation mandated by the Iraqi constitutional. The Fatah Coalition said that any repercussions of this decision falls on President Salih for taking this “provocative step” that disregards the law and constitution, signaling a potential feud that may escalate to armed conflict.

With Iraq already facing several crises, including the rejection of some parties of al-Zurfi, who they described as a “US stooge”, the collapse of oil prices, and the spread of Coronavirus which resulted in a country-wide lockdown as the number of infected individuals reaches 164, military escalation against the US will push Iraq towards further instability.

If the Iraqi Government does not act fast and seek to halt the tit-for-tat attacks, and reduce the hostilities between US forces and armed factions in Iraq, many believe that this could plunge the country into a direct armed conflict between the US and Iran-backed factions fought on Iraqi land, especially with the emergence of this new group “Usbat al-Tha’ireen.” As this group is not officially recognised as part of the PMU or any other official security apparatus, the Iraqi Government must seek to enforce its monopoly on the authorised use of violence. This was a promise that al-Zurfi made in his latest appearance addressing the public. However, this may also be met with severe pushback by several factions in the country, who believe that armed resistance against an occupying force is legitimate. Thus, al-Zurfi’s Government may be hard to pass through Parliament.

Future Developments

Nonetheless, with talks of US withdrawal from the country returning to the table once again, especially following Iraq’s JOC statement calling on Parliament to follow through with its 5th January resolution to remove foreign troops, and the statement by Caggins on US withdrawal from several bases, a catastrophe may be averted.

If Iraq can negotiate with the US a timetable to start withdrawing from the country, tensions vis-à-vis the attacks could decrease. However, this decision will probably be rejected by many Sunni and Kurdish blocs, as well as some Shi’a blocs, who believe in the necessity of the US troops’ presence in the country. Nonetheless, if al-Zurfi, who the US favours, manages to pass his government, he will be in a stronger position to negotiate this withdrawal deal. Al-Zurfi has 30 days to to create and pass his government.

A final unintended consequence of recent international events is the outbreak of the Coronavirus, which continues to affect policies – both domestic and foreign – across the world. Given the substantial amount of domestic criticism being levied at Trump for his response to the spread of Coronavirus in the US, the President may seek to divert attention ahead of his election campaign towards attacks on US facilities in Iraq by Iran-backed groups. This will likely see the emergence of heightened anti-Iran rhetoric by both Trump and other US officials over the coming days. This has already been seen with US Marine General Kenneth McKenzie, the head of the US Central Command, saying that “Iran is now more dangerous with Coronavirus”.

On the other hand, the scale of the political and economic impact on the US may see it take another road and try to focus on rebuilding domestic credibility and refocus efforts on domestic issues. If Trump decides to step more concretely away from Iraq and focus on countering Coronavirus and fixing the economy ahead of the 2020 elections, we will see the US decreasing the number of troops in Iraq under the guise of its “America First” policy. This will include continuing to invoke the now limited influence of the IS in Iraq and the wider region and preventing the spread of the Coronavirus to US military officials, especially given neighbouring Iran’s position as a regional epicenter of the virus.

With the rate and speed that events are currently taking place globally, however, it remains highly unpredictable how things will unfold over the next few weeks and months.

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It was under these conditions that the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, met the Russian President, Vladimir Putin on Thursday, 5th March. Following a six-hour summit, the two sides declared a ceasefire, which came into effect at midnight connecting Thursday to Friday. The ceasefire agreed on the creation of a “security corridor” that is six kilometres wide and six kilometres deep along the M4 Highway, which runs horizontally through Idlib, with Turkish and Russian patrols taking place between Taranba (west of the strategic town of Saraqib where the M4 connects to the M5 Highway before leading up to Aleppo City) and Ain al-Hayr. The readout indicated that the Turkish and Russian Defence Ministries will provide specific parameters for the corridor within seven days. The two sides also expressed the usual commitments to the territorial integrity of Syria, to a political peace process and to the provision of aid to the displaced Syrian population.

Subsequently on Tuesday, 10th March, Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, confirmed that the area south of the M4, consisting of a small strip of land still held by the Syrian Opposition, would be secured by Russia while the TSK would handle security north of the M4. Notably, the agreement did not stipulate the withdrawal of the SAA from the areas it captured during its military offensive, including the M5 Highway and major towns such as Khan Sheikhoun, Ma’arat Nu’man, Kafr Nabl and Saraqib.

By most indications, the ceasefire represents a significant win for Damascus and Moscow who have effectively legitimised their hold over their recent gains in spite of Ankara’s earlier demands for the SAA to withdraw to its pre-December positions. With Çavuşoğlu seemingly confirming that Russia will control the areas south of the M4, Damascus and Moscow stand to make further gains. Meanwhile, having control over the M5 and prospective access to the M4 will be a major economic win for Damascus.

Since the implementation of the ceasefire, the region has remained notably calm. Although a number of skirmishes did occur, with Monday, 9th March, seeing a bout of escalation in particular, these incidents appear to be isolated on the whole.

Has the Turkish-Russian agreement therefore brought peace to Idlib?

In the short-term, the answer would be yes. There is no denying that the ceasefire has brought some respite to the region’s massive population of displaced people, who have numbered almost 1 million people since the emergence of conflict in December. Furthermore, the lack of incidents and escalation, in contrast to prior ceasefires that were routinely violated in the immediate aftermaths of them coming into effect, seem to suggest that Moscow and Ankara are both intent on securing the peace – for now.

The medium-to-long-term view is less optimistic. Although the ceasefire, in places, has been begrudgingly accepted by the mainstream Syrian Opposition, the hard-line group Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which controls much of Idlib, has rejected the ceasefire, citing Moscow as an untrustworthy negotiator and noting that a military solution is the only solution. In Moscow, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, has indicated that the ceasefire does not preclude the SAA from fighting “designated terrorist groups”, almost certainly referring to the HTS. This wording is also present in the agreement and represents a much more specific description of extremist groups compared to the previous Russian-Turkish agreement. As Damascus and Moscow often justified their Idlib operations on the grounds of countering HTS’ presence, the wording here gives the exact legal opening they need to continue targeting Idlib. It is therefore extremely likely that the SAA and HTS will find ways to provoke each other.

The agreement around the M4 also represents a challenge. It is difficult to imagine that the HTS or even the SNA would willingly withdraw from the areas south of the highway. Indeed, prior, similar arrangements surrounding the opening of the M5 Highway to commercial traffic, back when the majority of the sections in Idlib were under Opposition control, failed due to similar reasons. Here, Ankara is left with few good options. It can either force the HTS and the SNA to leave the region, potentially losing what good will it has with the Syrian Opposition and getting embroiled in a new conflict, or it can choose not to act, inviting retaliation from Moscow for inaction, especially given that Moscow has already blamed Ankara for failing to clamp down on the HTS as part of the Sochi Agreement in 2018. Although there have been rumours that Ankara is working to dissolve the HTS and fold its rank-and-file into the SNA, the HTS has repeatedly shown itself to be unwilling to pursue such course of action.

As it stands, despite Çavuşoğlu’s statements that Ankara and Moscow are working towards a permanent ceasefire, the underlying conditions that led to the situation in Idlib remain unresolved. Thus, the lull will likely be used by both sides to recoup their strength and wait for the political pressures over the region to wind down before hostilities resume. With the civilian presence in Idlib remaining a top concern, Ankara and Moscow may also implement a process to gradually return displaced civilians to areas under the control of the Syrian Government. Although most displaced civilians remain suspicious and fearful of retaliation, the gradual evacuation of civilians from the Rukban Refugee Camp near Jordan shows that unbearable humanitarian conditions can push desperate people to take the risk.

How does the picture look for the rest of Syria?

Speaking about the ceasefire, Erdoğan justified the deal as having secured Turkey’s interests and made Turkey less vulnerable to terrorism. Given that Ankara’s main concern regarding Idlib was a refugee crisis, not terrorism, Erdoğan’s words could mean that Moscow has agreed to a number of undeclared conditions stipulated by Turkey. Most likely, this could involve the targeting of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in regions like Tal Rifaat in northern Aleppo, which has remained a hotspot of recurrent clashes. With rumours that the talks between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – which includes the YPG under its umbrella – breaking down, increased Turkish pressure on the group could be seen as a viable way by Damascus and Moscow to force the group back onto the table and accept conditions more favourable to Damascus.

Turkey’s acquiescence in Idlib and the general attention directed by Turkish officials towards Turkish-Russian bilateral ties could also suggest that Ankara simply chose its own direct interests with Moscow.

For Damascus, the ceasefire represents an opportunity to focus on a number of other areas. Although the SAA is unlikely to draw-down significantly around Idlib, the lull provides the SAA with the opening to deal with a number of other crises. Over the past weekend, Daraa Province has seen a major escalation of insurgent attacks. Although the insurgent hot-spot of Sanamain has been pacified, attacks in the region continue and Damascus may seek to clamp down on the remaining towns that are under de-facto Government control but are still being held by “reconciled” Opposition factions.

Similarly, ISIS-linked attacks in the Syrian Desert continue to cost the SAA lives and resources, and the lull in Idlib would be an opportunity to clamp down on the insurgency there. Already, numerous militias that were present in Idlib have been deployed east. The re-deployment of SAA to eastern Syria would also serve to put more pressure on the SDF for the reasons covered above.

On the whole, the ceasefire is a respite, especially for the displaced residents in Idlib. But nobody is under any illusion that it will continue indefinitely, and past history gives good cause to believe that it will not last.

On Thursday 27th of January, around 30 Turkish soldiers were killed near the village of Balyoun. Although what happened there on the day remains unclear, by most indications, an initial airstrike struck a Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) convoy in the afternoon, causing injuries and forcing a stoppage. Taking advantage of the convoy’s stoppage, successive airstrikes started targeting the convoy, even as, according to Ankara, Russian forces were informed of the Turkish presence. The airstrikes reportedly struck not just the convoy but the buildings the soldiers took shelter in, resulting in a spike of casualties.

Since then, the TSK has significantly ramped up its support for the Opposition factions, predominantly the Syrian National Army (SNA) in Idlib. Turkish strikes targeted not only the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) near the frontlines of the Idlib and Aleppo provinces, but also targeted major bases such as the Hama Airbase, the Nairab Airbase near Aleppo City (which has reportedly been rendered inoperable), the Kuweires Airbase, the Menagh Airbase (which was mostly used as a staging ground, as its airfield was already defunct) and, most significantly, the Hmeimim Airbase where Russian forces in Syria are headquartered. The TSK also shot down town Syrian SU-24 aircrafts over Idlib. The Turkish strikes, which gave the Opposition enough opportunity to reclaim a number of territories, including the critical town of Saraqib, were contextualised by the Turkish Defence Ministry under “Operation Spring Shield”, suggesting that Turkey’s long-awaited Idlib offensive has been launched.

It would appear that these developments represent Ankara’s efforts to back its threats with credible action. Indeed, the strikes have, for some time, strained the SAA’s ability to make gains while resulting in credible losses, with the TSK losing comparatively little in the process. Ankara also made good on its threats to “open the gates” to Syrian refugees looking to cross into Europe by announcing that it would not prevent refugees from making the crossing if they so wished to. In the ensuing hours, the borders of Greece and Bulgaria both saw massive influxes of refugees attempting to cross into the European Union.

On the ground in Idlib, Syrian Opposition factions, demoralised and increasingly sceptical about Ankara, have rallied, with even hard-line factions that were originally sceptical of Ankara’s motives seemingly turning to support the Turkish operations. Other developments, such as a massive escalation of fighting and protests over the weekend, especially in the town of Sanamain, suggest that Opposition supporters have seen this moment as the opportunity to put further pressure on Damascus.

What do these developments mean for the future of Syria?

The main gain for Ankara would be that it has managed to regain significant credibility to its threats. For years, Ankara has been threatening military action against Damascus. However, the lack of responses to the successive gains made by the SAA in Idlib and Aleppo have long created the perception that these threats were hollow. Indeed, many pundits in the United States and elsewhere noted that Ankara’s actions have dismantled the arguments against striking the SAA on grounds that the SAA was too strong or doing so would invite too severe a retaliation. The strikes have also likely countered the view of the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, being “in the pocket” of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin.

Indeed, Moscow’s relative quiet on the matter is significant. In the hours and days following the strike on Turkish soldiers, Russian officials, while offering condolences, also implicitly blamed Ankara for the incident on grounds that Turkish soldiers were operating alongside “terrorist” factions, while also reiterating their accusations that it is Ankara, not Moscow, that failed to abide by the Sochi Agreement. Besides these oft-repeated talking points, there were no new arguments or retaliations that came from Russia, certainly not anything on the level that followed that Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet in late-2015. Indeed, both sides have expressed that they do not wish to target each other. Ankara, in particular, has sought to explicitly avoid blaming Russian aircraft for the killings of Turkish soldiers even as many Syrian and Turkish activists emphasized that the style and intensity of the attack bore the hallmarks and capabilities of Russian strikes.

If war is politics via other means, then it would seem that both Moscow and Ankara are focused on maximising their military gains in Idlib ahead of the direct talks between Erdoğan and Putin, expected to take place on Thursday and result in some sort of a ceasefire agreement.

However, this does not mean Moscow is in a back-foot in Idlib. Despite continued Turkish strikes, Russian aircraft continued to support the SAA in Idlib, enabling them to regain control of the strategic town of Saraqib. Furthermore, there were reports on Monday, 2nd March, that Russian Military Police has been deployed in Saraqib in what appears to mark a red-line for Turkey in which it cannot support an Opposition counteroffensive without risking directly targeting Russian personnel.

How the EU and NATO also respond to the situation will also be a factor in how the events in Idlib play out. Relations between Turkey and the rest of NATO have been steadily improving since Turkish-Russian relations began to deteriorate, with NATO certainly eyeing an opportunity to pull the increasingly-distant Turkey back into its orbit. Ankara, for its part, has sought to leverage the détente into tangible support for Turkish troops in Idlib. The Turkish media’s highlighting of the involvement of groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah in Idlib in recent days were similarly intended to play into the sensitivities of the United States on the matter. Similarly, the “opening of the gates” and the facilitation of a refugee crisis was likely intended to increase the urgency of the matter for the EU, forcing it to get more involved or otherwise offer Turkey increased incentives to prevent the crisis.

While Ankara’s risk-calculation on Moscow appears to have been successful, its calculations vis-à-vis the EU and NATO may be less so, and could even backfire. Member states of both the EU and NATO have expressed verbal support for Turkey over the situation in Idlib but did not take credible action. NATO, in particular, has, so far, opted to not consider the killing of Turkish soldiers as part of NATO’s Article 5 that stresses mutual defence. However, a draft NATO statement supporting Turkey’s position in Idlib was vetoed by Greece whose government was angered by Turkey’s push of refugees into its borders. Other EU states have also viewed Ankara’s actions vis-à-vis the refugees with hostility. Thus, the current course of events may see what little détente made between Ankara and NATO or the EU being lost, especially given that Ankara is already frustrated with the lack of tangible action from both international bodies.

Should this end up being the case, the diplomatic, military and political in Idlib and wider Syria may once again shift towards Moscow.

This announcement came hours after Iraq’s Ministry of Health announced that four citizens were discovered to have been affected by the virus in Kirkuk Province. According to reports, the four citizens who are members of the same family had arrived back from the city of Qom in Iran almost eight days ago. Sources claimed that the four citizens went to the hospital on Monday night, where they were screened, confirmed to be carrying the virus and then quarantined to prevent further spread of the Coronavirus. While rumours online claimed that the four individuals “escaped” the hospital, the Kirkuk Health Authorities confirmed that the family is still under quarantine.

Despite the Iraqi Ministry of Health continuing its screenings of citizens in both Najaf, Kirkuk and other provinces throughout the country, the emergence of fake news reports and rumours online, has resulted in an atmosphere of panic and fear. As a result, eight different provinces have announced that schools and universities will be stopped from a period ranging from 14 days to one month in order to counter the spread of the virus.

Increasing reports from around the country have claimed that pharmacies and medical supply centre’s have been engaging in price gouging with medical masks increasing in price from 500 IQD to at least 5,000 IQD and 15,000 IQD in some cases. As a result the Ministry of Health issued a statement on Tuesday stressing the importance of following up with pharmacies to ensure that this crisis is not being taken advantage of to monopolise and raise the prices of medical equipment. The statement also announced the halting of flights from and to Iran, China, Thailand, South Korea, Japan, Italy and Singapore.

As health professionals continue to scurry for aid in containing the virus, the representative of the World Health Organisation (WHO) in Iraq, Adham Ismael, said late on Monday, that the Coronavirus would not be able to resist the hot climate in Iraq during the summer season. Ismael also revealed that the WHO is closely following the situation in Iraq, adding that it is continuing to supply Iraq with the necessary equipment and medical consultations.

Nonetheless, the country is still at risk of a possible health catastrophe. While these preventative measures and efforts to contain the virus have succeeded thus far, if the country is not able to enforce these measures or discover further cases of the virus in time, the poor health situation in the country can potentially lead to a spike in Coronavirus infections. Health practitioners have warned that the country does not have the capacity to properly treat and test for infections in individuals allegedly carrying the virus.

Over the past several decades, healthcare in Iraq has significantly deteriorated due to the continued wars and the corruption with the ministry. The extent of the corruption was revealed last year when Health Minister, and Former Regional Director of the WHO Region of the Eastern Mediterranean, Alaa al-Alwan resigned from his position due to corruption within the ministry and political pressure. According to al-Alwan, the Ministry was not being allocated enough funds, and the funds that were allocated were being funneled to political parties and individuals rather than actually implementing health projects.

To make matters worse, the deterioration of the official health systems in the country has resulted in the emergence of non-professional clinicians who prescribe medicines and administer shots to ailing patients. According to some reports, these faux-clinicians have wrongly administered medicines to patients who have ended up losing there lives. This comes as increasing reports in the past have claimed that many of the medicines that have been imported to Iraq have either expired or are counterfeit.

While seeking to avoid alarmist tropes, the necessity of improving the health structures in the country is now needed more than ever. In coordination with the WHO and other healthcare organisations, the Iraqi Government should seek to implement measures that not only prevent the Coronavirus from entering the country, but also seeking to provide treatment for those already in the country. Furthermore, public health campaigns must be launched on a wide-scale level in order to educate the public on the proper means of preventing both Coronavirus infections as well as other diseases that continue to emerge in Iraq, like Typhoid and Hepatitis A and B, which are still heavily impacting the country despite the availability of precautionary vaccinations.

For more information on this subject and other developments in Iraq, subscribe to our daily intelligence reports and weekly digests.

The incident had been a long time coming. Over the past few months, both Russia and the US have increased their forces and involvement in the region. For the US, the intensification of the forces in the northeast began after the US’ withdrawal from northwest Syria during September and October 2019 in the lead-up to Turkey’s launch of Operation Peace Spring. The US forces still in Syria have since entrenched themselves in the northeast in a bid to support the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Russia’s entry into the region, meanwhile, was similarly facilitated by the Turkish operations, which prompted the SDF to invite the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and the Russian Military Police (RMP) to take over the Turkish-Syrian Border, as well critical areas such as the M4 Highway, which stretches from the coastal town of Latakia through Aleppo to SDF-held territory in the northeast. Having been virtually absent from the region except a few areas in and around Qamishli, Damascus and Moscow quickly sought to capitalise on this development, with Russia, in particular, taking ownership of a number of abandoned US outposts and the Qamishli Airport itself.

Although Washington has since reverted from its position from a full withdrawal from Syria – likely in response to the fears about Moscow taking advantage of the US’ absence – the brief period of uncertainty was enough to alter the geopolitical forces at play. The sight of SAA, RMP and US vehicles all staring down at each other in Khirbet Hamo was described by many as the summary of a geopolitical quagmire, with some observers expressing fears that the current situation is unsustainable and could lead to an open conflict between the parties involved.

With the situation around Qamishli back to a state of calm for now, how likely is another round of escalation? And what does the future hold for the region?

Viewed from Moscow and Damascus, the incident is welcome. The footage of villagers angrily confronting US soldiers during the incident has allowed them to push the narrative of the US not being welcome in the whole region. Although Khirbet Hamo has been somewhat exceptional owing to the strong support for Damascus – indeed, it was the stage of one of the few instances of open fighting between the SAA and the predominantly-Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in 2016 – such nuances were easily overlooked within the wider dynamics. Bolstered by the incident, the village has since been the scene of a number of anti-US demonstrations, including one instance where members of the RMP appeared to encourage locals to chant anti-US slogans. At the very least, such actions will discourage the US forces in the region from crossing through the village, reducing their reach. At most, they can serve to instigate more anti-US incidents in the region, bolstering the narrative of a grassroots-led “national liberation”.

Viewed from Washington, the urgency of the situation appears to be nowhere as severe. In the aftermath of the incident, the Coalition issued a statement, blaming militia members for the incident but expressively noting Russian non-involvement. Although footage from the area shows that the RMP was present at the scene and did intervene, the Coalition’s reference to Russian non-involvement could be interpreted as a way to avoid putting the blame on the Russian forces. Indeed, Washington’s response to the incidents between the US and Russian troops has been low-key since they first began. It is possible that Washington does not view the Russian presence in the region as a threat to its interests and may be more interested in retaining Russia’s partnership on certain contexts, such as the prevention of creeping Iranian influence. Given that the US remains adamant that its presence in Syria is temporary, Washington may not be too willing to engage in a battle for influence.

There is also the factor that Washington and Moscow already had some positive interactions in avoiding conflicts through the “deconfliction hotline” that was established in 2015. Although the hotline was subject to disruptions at times, it was instrumental in preventing clashes between US and Russian-backed forces in eastern Syria where the two sides operated in close proximity to one-another and were forced to contend with an increasingly-busy airspace. Even during rare instances of violent US-Russian confrontation, such as the so-called Battle of Khasham in 2018, further escalation was averted through such means of deconfliction. It is possible that such precedents have encouraged both sides to de-escalate. Furthermore, the two countries have a long history of near-conflicts that never quite escalated, stretching all the way back to the Cold War and, before then, World War II. If that is the case, however, news of gradual incitement driven by Moscow and Damascus against the US forces in Syria, as well as their emphasis on the need to remove the US forces from the country, may strain the limits of the familiarity that has been established.

The SDF may emerge as both as a mediator and a kingmaker out of the situation. The group has ties with both the US and Russia at varying capacity. Although the US was instrumental in establishing the SDF, one of its main components, the YPG, has had long ties with Russia. The SDF itself has recently moved closer to Moscow owing to the view that Washington has enabled Turkey’s operations against it. Furthermore, Moscow is acting as mediator in the talks between the SDF and Damascus, even if many within the SDF still remain sceptical of the motives of Moscow and Damascus, believing that the autonomous model is anathema to the Damascus-based central government. As such, SDF officials have been open about looking to maintain their relations with both Russia and the US in a bid to ensure their own political survival. Although there has been widespread opinion, especially in the pro-Damascus camp, that the SDF will have to choose soon, the group could conceivably keep the middle road, using its ties with both sides to ease tensions.

The biggest challenge will not come from the US-Russia rivalry but from potential spoilers who may benefit from exacerbating tensions and even open clashes between the two sides. ISIS, which has already attempted to stoke intercommunal tensions, could set up an attack on a US or Russian patrol in which the two sides would end up blaming each other. Similarly, Damascus or Iran, concerned about US-Russian cooperation, may attempt to instigate more incidents like those in Qamishli in a bid to force Moscow into more decisive action.

Despite these risks and the overall geopolitical complexity of the situation, a US-Russian conflagration in northeast Syria remains unlikely.

What has been truly remarkable about the incident have been the exchanges between Moscow and Ankara since the incident. Unlike the previous instances of violence between the TSK and the SAA, which saw Moscow working to de-escalate the situation by deploying its military police as a buffer in sensitive areas and compensating both sides in roundabout ways, the responses to the present situation have been one of intensifying hostile rhetoric. The initial responses from Moscow blamed the TSK for failing to inform the Russian forces about their movements in Idlib, while denying that the words of Erdoğan and Akar about counter-strikes against the SAA had any truth to them.

The responses from Ankara, meanwhile, vehemently denied any wrongdoing including the failure to inform the Russian forces about TSK movements. In an attempt at political escalation, Erdoğan also spoke in favour of the Ukrainian Government’s position against Moscow, expressing support for Kiev’s position vis-à-vis the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The TSK has also unilaterally cancelled the joint patrols with the Russian Military Police (RMP) along the Turkish-Syrian Border.

The Turkish and Russian responses to the incident come on the heels of gradually-intensifying hostile rhetoric between the two powers over the situation in Idlib. Ankara, in particular, has been vehement about the notion that Moscow and Damascus are not abiding by the Astana track and the Sochi agreement that entailed the creation of the TSK posts in Idlib to begin with. Describing the process as “damaged” or even “dead”, Turkish officials have been making their dissatisfaction over the situation clear.

It would seem that the period of warm bilateral ties between Ankara and Moscow since July 2016 and their growing cooperation in Syria is coming to an end. But what is the future of relations between the two countries and how will this impact their policies in Syria and the wider region?

For its part, Moscow has remained relatively consistent in its approach to Idlib and the wider Syrian conflict. It has often emphasised that all of Syria needs to come under the control of Damascus, defining Idlib as “terrorist-controlled” and often referring to the situation in northern Aleppo, presently-controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), as temporary. In Idlib, it has justified its operations on grounds of targeting the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), calling on the more mainstream Syrian Opposition, presently represented by the SNA, to extricate itself from the HTS even as the fluidity of alliances in Idlib made such a task virtually impossible to accomplish.

Moscow’s consistent definition of its interests in Syria contrasts to Ankara’s often-shifting and increasingly-unquantifiable interests. Although Ankara initially positioned itself as an ally of the Syrian Opposition, the breakdown of the Kurdish peace process in Turkey and the subsequent war against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, alongside the increasing anti-Syrian xenophobia in Turkey, have forced Ankara to shift its approach repeatedly. These shifting interests and Ankara’s deteriorating ties with Washington have forced Ankara to collaborate increasingly with Moscow, allowing the parameters of the conflict in arenas such as Idlib to be defined by the Russian Government in the process. As it stands, although Ankara has virtually abandoned the notion of deposing Bashar al-Assad, it cannot fully abandon the Syrian Opposition without experiencing severe backlash from its constituents, supporters around the Middle East or the 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. Having “lost” Egypt and finding its allies in Libya on increasingly tenuous ground, losing the Syrian Opposition would be a disastrous blow to Turkey’s soft power.

Similarly, however, taking a stronger stand against Moscow would be disastrous for Turkey’s already-struggling economy, which has benefited from significant Russian investment, especially after relations with Washington and the European Union soured. Although Erdoğan’s recent and cordial contacts with the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, suggests that Ankara is following a well-established foreign policy pattern of once again attempting to pivot to the West, the EU has grown far too suspicious of Ankara’s motives to enter a full détente. And therein lies Ankara’s dilemma whose Syria policy has pushed the country into a corner from which there is no clean escape.

This would explain Ankara’s actions following the SAA strikes on the TSK. The claims that the TSK struck the SAA were not only dismissed by Moscow, they were doubted by Idlib-based activists who noted that the retaliation was nowhere as severe as described by Turkish officials. Indeed, no images of the damage, the actual strikes or the casualties have emerged. The few items of footage of alleged TSK retaliation belonged to earlier military operations. It is possible that Ankara amplified the narrative of a swift and powerful retaliation to mollify the Turkish public without inviting retribution from Moscow. Similarly, on Tuesday 5th February, Erdoğan seemed to take a conciliatory position, noting that the Astana process is damaged and Turkey will seek reparations for what took place in Idlib but adding that there is no need for a conflict with Russia.

That does not mean that Ankara will stand idle in the face of what is taking place in Idlib. A number of Turkish concerns borne directly from the SAA operations in Idlib, such as a refugee crisis, are very real. With Ankara providing increasing military support for the SNA, it is clear that there is a concerted effort to make the SAA offensive as costly as possible. However, with the Syrian Government controlling the sides and having access to overwhelming amounts of firepower that it is willing to use regardless of the human costs, Ankara’s is merely causing a delay, as opposed to changing the behaviour of Damascus and Moscow. It is likely that even this meagre response will soon become politically untenable.

Following this withdrawal, protesters who were frustrated with what they termed al-Sadr’s “betrayal” began calling on other citizens to join the protests to repopulate the movement, as the numbers visibly decreased after al-Iraqi’s statement. The same evening, the “Shock Forces” in Basra were deployed to the protest squares in the province, where they burnt protesters’ tents in order to forcibly remove them. Prior to the protests, the Shock Forces, which were introduced as part of the security forces in 2018, were responsible for sting operations on drug cartels in Basra as well as resolving disputes between tribal groups. On Saturday, the security forces continued to push back against the protesters in Baghdad. Activists claimed that the attacks on protest squares in Baghdad, Basra, and Dhi Qhar over the week were in direct coordination with the withdrawal of al-Sadr’s followers. According to the activists, this push back was facilitated by al-Sadr’s armed factions in coordination with the official security forces. Many of the calls from the ground were against al-Sadr, with protesters carrying signs saying that al-Sadr is just another corrupt official.

On Sunday, al-Iraqi issued a statement saying that due to the constant attacks on al-Sadr for withdrawing from the protests, al-Sadr would halt “all positive and negative” support to the protests. The statement threatened that if the protest movement does not return to its previous peacefulness and clear anti-Government path, then the Sadrist Movement would take “another position to aid the heroic security forces, which have to ensure security”. Many protesters saw this statement as al-Sadr threatening to crack down on the protests if the protesters do not cease criticism of al-Sadr’s decision to withdraw. Later that day, Salih posted another statement signed by al-Sadr entitled “Advice” [to the protesters]. In the 12-point statement, al-Sadr called on protesters to bring the protests back to their peaceful nature, as well as banish instigators and trouble makers. Al-Sadr also called for the resumption of all schools, including those in Nasiriyah. Al-Sadr stated that while he does not want any of his pictures hung in the protest squares, he called on protesters to reject those trying to sow discord by spreading hate, in reference to protesters attacking the Sadrist Movement for their betrayal. Al-Sadr ended the statement saying that if this advice is heeded, he would renew support for the protests; otherwise, he would be the first to say that the protests have been hijacked and have deviated from their original aims.

On Sunday evening, protesters in Nasriyah’s Haboubi Square were attacked by armed men who burned their tents and used live ammunition and tear gas against protesters. Protesters immediately accused al-Sadr’s followers of carrying out this attack, which resulted in further division amongst the protesters and further splits between the protesters and Sadrists themselves.

Over the past several weeks, al-Sadr’s positions towards the protests and his former rivals have changed dramatically. While al-Sadr previously called groups like Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba “uncontrolled militias”, the assassination of the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp’s Quds Forces (IRGC-QF), Qassem Soleimani, and the deputy chairman of the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, resulted in al-Sadr allying with these groups to demand the US’ withdrawal from the country. Furthermore, in an interesting transition, al-Sadr whose relationship with the head of the Fatah Bloc, Hadi al-Ameri, has been on and off over the past years, seems to have been strengthened. Following a lawsuit by al-Ameri against MP Faiq al-Sheikh Ali for defamation, al-Sadr issued a statement backing al-Ameri’s lawsuit.

While protesters on the ground reject al-Sadr’s recent leaning towards Iran and other pro-Iran factions, the large decrease in protesters in the protest squares after the Sadrist withdrawal has left a hole in the movement. Despite previously downplaying the Sadrist Movement’s participation in the protests, protesters in Tahrir Square seem to be trying to make amends with al-Sadr. According to several observers, activists on the ground who posted on social media platforms against al-Sadr have since deleted their posts and are attempting to plea with the Sadrists to return to the protest squares. A video that emerged on Tuesday showed protesters sending a message to Sadrists apologising for the attacks made against them and al-Sadr. They called on Sadrists to return to the protests in order to continue their fight against corruption.

On Tuesday, al-Iraqi posted an image on Facebook, which highlights three demands by the protesters: finalising the electoral law, selecting an independent and undebatable prime minister, and determining the date of a snap elections. Many saw this post as an implicit resumption of Sadrist backing of the protests. Nonetheless, the future of Sadrist Participation in the protests is still unknown.

While some have been saying that al-Sadr’s latest steps are his attempts to ride the protest wave, as a means of ensuring his position within the political arena, others believe al-Sadr has restored his relationship with Iran in order to create a consolidated Shi’a front. According to these observers, this may result in civil conflict and may eventually result in the fracturing of the country. Yet al-Sadr has been able to successfully adapt to the situation in the country multiple times, especially since 2014. Despite seeing them as prior enemies, al-Sadr struck alliances with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and many other Sadrist splinter factions in order to fight the Islamic State (IS), taking a pragmatic position to overcome a shared enemy. By the end of the war against the IS, al-Sadr returned to his previous positions regarding the aforementioned groups and tried to recreate his image as a nationalist leader ahead of the 2018 elections. During the beginning of the protests, al-Sadr fully sided with the protests, only to reestablish his relations with his former rivals after the US’ strikes on Iraq. While it is likely that al-Sadr’s position towards the protests will soften soon, the leader of the Sadrist Movement will attempt to keep his role and influence intact both on the streets and within the political arena.

While al-Sadr did not reveal when and where this demonstration was going to take place, Saleh Mohammed al-Iraqi, an individual closely linked to al-Sadr issued a statement on Wednesday (15th January) saying that the protest is set to take place this Friday (24th January) in the capital, Baghdad. In the days following this statement both al-Sadr and al-Iraqi published several tweets encouraging strong participation in the planned demonstration.

Nonetheless, al-Sadr has faced some pushback.

In what was seen as a slight jab at al-Sadr, the official social media accounts of the Abbas Shrine, which is affiliated with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, posted a reminder from one of the Ayatollah’s sermons, which warned against figures seeking to hijack the popular movement in order to serve personal interests. Protesters in Tahrir Square and other protest squares have also rejected Sadr’s call, saying that his demonstration seeks to hijack their protest and that his followers may attempt to violently attack them.

In response, al-Sadr addressed this issue saying that the two protests are “two lights emerging from the same lamp” and called on the protesters to continue their peaceful demonstration, which he supports. Protesters in Tahrir Square responded to this saying that while they also reject US presence in Iraq, they also equally condemn Iranian presence in the country, an issue which has been largely ignored by al-Sadr over the past few weeks especially as he been residing in Iran since around September 2019.

While caretaker Prime Minister, Adil Abd al-Mahdi, has continued calls for the US to withdraw its troops, despite US threats of severe sanctions, other officials in the country say that the withdrawal decision was one sided. During the parliamentary session in which this decision was made, a leaked video showed Speaker of the House, Mohammed al-Halbousi, addressing MPs saying this this move may not be the best move, especially due to lack of Sunni and Kurdish MP participation. This sentiment was further echoed by the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Nechirvan Barzani, who said in an interview that the Shi’a blocs who voted for this resolution did not consult the Sunni and Kurdish blocs in parliament. Furthermore, over the past few weeks, the US has repeatedly stated that they are not planning on withdrawing troops from Iraq but are open to discussing a restructuring of the security agreement. This came after US troops in Iraq announced that they have resumed operations in Iraq after they were halted following al-Muhandis’s and Soleimani’s assassination. This motion was immediately rejected by Baghdad, which said that the resumption was not agreed upon as the US was not given the required authorisation.

Washington’s determination to remain in the country, while supported by many Iraqi politicians, has not rested well with several armed groups including Kat’aib Hezbollah (KH), Asa’ib ahl al-Haq, and al-Sadr’s newly rejuvenated Jaysh al-Mahdi and Kata’ib al-Yom al-Maw’oud, which recently announced that they would establish a united transnational resistance against US troops if diplomatic talks do not resolve the issue.

While anti-US sentiment in Iraq is not a new phenomenon, the assassination of Soleimani and al-Muhandis have acted as catalysts and resulted in mass mobilisation of those opposed to the US in Iraq. This is in conjunction with a longstanding political movement to pressure the US to leave Iraq, which gained traction last summer following the strikes on PMU bases in Iraq. While this issue was never brought to parliament, several MPs stated at the time that they would begin efforts to bring this vote on US troop removal to MPs.

If al-Sadr succeeds in bringing millions onto the streets during Friday’s demonstration, political parties and blocs are more likely to escalate the situation politically, viewing the crowds as popular support for this decision. However, if it fails to mobilise enough demonstrators, al-Sadr and others will be dealt a blow to their anti-US movement. There is also concern from some of his supporters about his recent alliances with groups like Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat al-Nujaba, who they consider rivals after they splintered from al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi in 2005. But despite these concerns, al-Sadr has previously been able to rally his supporters during critical socio-political events, such as during the 2016 summer protests, where he gathered large crowds against the Iraqi Government and issued calls for a technocratic government.

And there are observations among many people that his ability to mobilise groups will materialise once again. If al-Sadr is able to gather protesters for his “million-man” march, the US may take stricter positions against him, including imposing financial sanctions, a position that has already been taken against some of his rivals-turned-allies. Furthermore, the public pressure that will be put on the already divided Iraqi Government may further entrench the ethno-sectarian disputes between Iraq’s Shi’a and Sunni blocs, and between Baghdad and Erbil. It will also likely dampen the US’ relations with Baghdad, who the US views as leaning more towards Iran, especially in recent months.

One of the more immediate ramifications that will likely been seen is further pushback against the protesters in Tahrir Square and other protest squares in Baghdad. While al-Sadr continues to say that the protests will not clash, other factions participating in the demonstrations have been rather hostile towards the protest movement. Thus, if these factions begin to take a more violent approach towards the protesters under the guise of anti-US sentiment, we may unfortunately see more bloodshed and division.