One week after the launch of Russian operations, media outlets and analysts remain firmly focused on the events unfolding in Ukraine, attempting to make predictions and assess what they mean for the world writ large.

Although the Middle East and North Africa is removed geographically from the conflict, the fighting could have significant ramifications for numerous political, social and economic ties within the region. Both Russia and Ukraine have significant economic ties with MENA countries and supply numerous commodities, including food and hydrocarbon products.

Russia has also developed its engagement throughout the 2010s with a number of countries such as Libya, Israel and Egypt, and also backs the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, following Moscow’s direct intervention in the country in 2015.

In this article, we will be looking at some of the potential impacts of the Russian-Ukrainian War in the MENA region. While we do not anticipate any direct spillover of the conflict, there are numerous dynamics that can exacerbate social and economic concerns across much of the region, although some countries, especially oil-producing ones, may stand to benefit from the developments.

We also anticipate that armed groups in Syria and Libya will exploit any opportunity to target Russian interests while Moscow remains focused in Ukraine. These include Turkish-backed anti-Russian forces in both countries; however, it is likely that these groups will be bound by other geo-political limitations, such as the Turkey-Russia entente. Some specific groups, such as Chechens in Syria, may also view this period as an opportunity to target Russian interests, especially amidst growing Chechen involvement in Ukraine, on both a pro-Moscow and a pro-Kyiv capacity.

Background

On 24^th February 2022, the Russian Government announced that it would launch “special operations” against Ukraine. Justified in terms of protecting Russian security interests vis-à-vis NATO expansion and on grounds of “de-Nazifying” Ukraine, the first hours of the Russian military offensive saw a rapid push into Ukrainian territory in a bid to capture major cities including Kyiv. By all indications, however, the offensive progressed slower than expected amidst reports of numerous strategic and logistical mistakes.

Since the shock of the initial Russian offensive wore off and the Ukrainian resistance rallied, many countries around the world, especially the European Union and the United States, began targeting Russia with sanctions, causing the value of the Russian Rouble to plummet. Many Russian neighbours such as Finland also began reconsidering their long-standing policy of neutrality. Developments such as these signal that there will be significant geopolitical shifts in the coming weeks or months.

These initial pressures, however, have done little to deter Russia. Indeed, the day after talks between Russia and Ukraine concluded without success, there were reports of new Russian military movements towards Kyiv, as well as reports of increasing use of heavy artillery and rockets in contested cities such as Kharkiv and Mariupol. By most indications, fighting will continue in the coming days and even weeks.

Signs of Economic Troubles for Much of the MENA Region

In the immediate aftermath of the Russian declaration of military operations in Ukraine, global wheat prices – already on a 10-year-high – shot up significantly. This is unsurprising, given that they together make up for about 30% of global wheat production, rivalled only by the US, China and India.

In the MENA region, however, Russian and Ukrainian wheat plays a much more significant role. Yemen, already entirely reliant on food imports, buys 27% of its wheat from Ukraine and 8% from Russia. Both Turkey and Egypt import 85% of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine, with imports from Ukraine to Turkey rising significantly in recent years. Tunisia similarly relies on Ukraine for 50% to 60% of its wheat imports.

There are widespread fears that the disruption in Ukraine, compounded with sanctions on Russia and limits of Black Sea naval traffic could create a combination of factors that result in a famine across the MENA region. Indeed, the first day of the war already saw shortages of wheat products in Tunisia.

Already, vulnerable countries such as Lebanon are looking at alternative sellers, such as the United States. However, Lebanon is not alone in the pursuit for alternative sellers. With demand now concentrated to a smaller pool of sellers, chances of prices rising are especially high. Thus, even if a famine is averted, many poorer households face increased food insecurity as they will struggle to pay the market price for wheat products.

This, in turn, can have wide-ranging socio-political impacts. In the MENA region, bread carries deep social and economic meaning. Bread shortages and unavailability have been linked to periods of unrest, including the Arab Spring protests. As food prices rose since the 1980s, the so-called “Bread riots” became increasingly commonplace. Indeed, in Egypt, the eruption of the Arab Spring protests was preceded by stark increases in bread prices, with bread symbolism being a common element in protests across the Arab World. Many MENA countries are already suffering economically due to COVID-19. Thus, rising food prices could tip the situation to even further extremes.

Already-vulnerable countries like Yemen will be especially hard-hit. Not only will the country suffer due to rising food prices, it will also likely have to contend with global aid being directed to Ukraine, further limiting the already-diminishing pool of aid available to Yemen.

A similar concern is present with regards to commodities like oil and gas prices. In the aftermath of the eruption of the war, the price for Brent crude went past $113 per barrel. While many MENA countries are net producers of hydrocarbons and could benefit from a windfall, importers from Russia such as Turkey and Lebanon will likely face rising costs. As both countries are suffering from severe economic crises, the war could result in an additional layer of instability. Indeed, even countries like Iraq, which are expected to be among the beneficiaries of rising oil prices, are expected to pay three times what it paid last year for wheat as it substitutes Ukrainian wheat with wheat from other sellers.

Meanwhile, Egypt, which is deeply reliant on tourism from Russia and Ukraine, will likely see a quieter summer. Indeed, tourist bookings from both Ukraine and Russia had already fallen by 30% in early February, when tensions between the two countries were climbing. These numbers will likely fall further, dampening Egypt’s hopes for a fast summer recovery as it eases COVID-19 restrictions. Combined with the aforementioned food price spikes, the loss of tourism revenue can lead to several secondary impacts for Cairo.

MENA countries that have banked on Russian support may also find their fortunes diminished. Syria, detailed below, is a prime example. However, other MENA also saw growing Russian involvement. In Libya, Moscow supported the eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) government, as well as the dominant military force there, Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). In early February, when the HoR appointed former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha to replace the current, Tripoli-based Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh, Moscow backed Bashagha’s claim. With Russia preoccupied in Ukraine, such political support may dry up. While this will not seriously hinder the HoR and the LNA, as they also receive support from Egypt and many Gulf countries, the loss of the Russian military support which nearly allowed the LNA to take control of Tripoli over the past couple years may still make a difference to Libya’s strategic landscape.

The View from Syria

In the immediate aftermath of the launch of the Russian operations into Ukraine, the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, expressed support for Moscow, describing it as a “correction of history” in reference to similar statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The support from Damascus is unsurprising, given Moscow’s efforts since the outbreak of the war in Syria to ensure the survival of the Syrian President, including a direct intervention in 2015. Indeed, the parallels between Ukraine and Syria vis-à-vis Russian interests were picked up by numerous observers during the lead-up to the current conflict in Ukraine. In particular, observers noted that Russian military in Syria used its deployment there to tune its capacities and shore up any shortcomings. A number of newly-developed tools such as the refurbished Tupolev Tu-160 and Russia’s first aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, also saw their first combat deployments in Syria. There were also reports of Russia deploying Chechen soldiers into Ukraine, echoing the deployment of Chechen soldiers along the frontlines of Syria. In both Syria and Ukraine, the fearsome reputation of Chechens were highlighted.

As referenced above, both Ukraine and Russia are major wheat suppliers. Thus, the eruption of the war has led to price speculation that caused the price of wheat to shoot up. Unsurprisingly, this has had an effect on Syria. Like Egypt, Russia is Syria’s main wheat supplier. Thus, the country is unlikely to experience severe shortages in the short-to-medium term, with much of the production disruptions focused on Ukraine. With Syria already under heavy sanctions, it is unlikely the new sanctions on Russia will cause direct impacts. However, supplies may still be disrupted due to disruptions in the Black Sea trade lanes. Furthermore, rising prices may start squeezing many poorer Syrians out of the market, especially as Damascus works on lifting subsidies to manage a fraught economic position. With Russia now dealing with its own economic woes, Damascus may also struggle to obtain Russian wheat cheaply.

Beyond that, although Damascus entered some symbolic trade agreements with contested territories such as Crimea, the trade between Syria and such territories is too negligible to have a significant impact.

Instead, security and political developments will be of greater significance in Syria.

An Opening for the Syrian Opposition?

Although Russia has been involved in Syria since the start of the war in 2011, its involvement truly picked up in 2015 when it intervened directly on behalf of President Assad. Since then, Russia became Damascus’s most significant backer, eclipsing other backers like Iran. Russian military support, including intense and indiscriminate airstrikes on urban centres, cemented Damascus’s victory in a number of fronts including Aleppo. Although Russia maintained some role as a mediator, including in regions such as Daraa in southern Syria, the perceptions of Russia among the Syrian Opposition has been deeply negative, with Moscow seen as the main actor behind Assad’s survival.

As such, it is unsurprising that Opposition factions such as the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have been watching the developments with interest. Amidst mounting Russian losses in Ukraine and developments such as Turkey’s unprecedented decision to close the Bosporus to warships, some Opposition activists have mulled whether Russia will be able to reinforce the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and whether the situation creates an opening for Opposition factions.

However, such escalation is looking unlikely for the time being. Although Opposition supporters expressed support for Ukraine, there have been few signs of impending fighting in the Opposition-held Idlib. Prominent Opposition figures such Suheil Hammoud (better known as Abu TOW, in reference to his expertise with anti-tank TOW missiles) noted that there is little will for escalation in Idlib and little unity among the Opposition amidst continued infighting. He further added that Ankara, which predominantly backs the SNA, is unwilling to escalate in Idlib. Other Opposition activists noted that attempts by individual fighters or groups to break the ceasefire was swiftly punished by authorities, making it unlikely that Idlib may see a new round of military clashes.

Despite this, some fighters, including Abu TOW, say that they are exploring options to travel to Ukraine where they can fight under the umbrella of the recently-announced foreign legion of Ukraine.

One possible faction in Opposition-held Idlib that may be interested in moving their operations are the Chechens. When the war in Syria erupted, many Chechen fighters arrived in the country. Holding a reputation for being capable fighters, these fighters quickly rose through the ranks of armed groups, including extremist groups like the HTS or the Islamic State. However, many others also retained their affiliations to independent umbrella groups like Ajnad al-Kawkaz. In recent months, however, the HTS started clamping down on independent groups, requiring foreign fighters to either join it or leave the region.

Chechens of both pro-Moscow and pro-Kyiv affiliations have already clashed several times in Ukraine since 2014. In addition to the new deployments of pro-Moscow Chechens, the renewed conflict in Ukraine is also seeing the involvement of Chechen formations in the pro-Kyiv side. Those Chechens watching the conflict from Syria may conclude that their goals are now better served in Ukraine.

Iran and Israel Eye for Openings

For other countries and factions, the situation is less clear. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), for example, which operates in north and north-eastern Syria, receives crucial support from Washington, but it has also leaned on Moscow during its negotiations with Damascus, especially amidst fears of an impending US withdrawal from the Middle East as a whole.

With Moscow facing international isolation, its potential to contribute as a mediator will be constrained. If anything, rising tensions between the US and Russia may compel Moscow to fully disengage from the SDF due to Washington’s influence over the group. It is likely that the SDF may look towards other sources of support, such as the Gulf Kingdoms which are gradually normalising ties with Damascus and have already shown signs of engagement with the SDF.

Iran is another country whose fortunes in Syria could change. Since the Russian intervention in Syria, Russian and Iranian officials have often highlighted the positive aspects of their cooperation. However, it has been known that the two sides have been competing for influence, a fact that Assad has taken advantage of by jockeying their influence against each other.

Until recently, Iran was viewed as being on the back-foot. A combination of factors such as sanctions; the killing of Qassem Soleimani; growing détente between Damascus and the Gulf; and Iran’s mishandling of the first wave of COVID-19 have all contributed to the perception that the country is no longer able to support Damascus like Moscow or the Gulf can. Incidents such as the removal of Iran’s top commander in Syria, General Seyyed Javad Ghaffari, and his subsequent, puzzling death (allegedly due to COVID-19) have only fuelled these perceptions.

With Russia facing severe economic sanctions and an increasingly complex battlefield, its capacity for rebuilding the SAA or funding Syrian reconstruction will be limited, allowing Iran to once again flex its muscles in Syria. How much this influence can spread, however, will depend on how much involvement the Gulf Kingdoms choose to have in Syria.

One last country whose involvement may change in Syria is Israel. For much of the Syrian conflict, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) conducted regular airstrikes in Syria, ostensibly against Iranian-backed groups. These strikes continued after the Russian intervention, with speculation that the two sides entered a sort of “gentlemen’s agreement”, especially after a Russian plane was accidentally shot down during an IDF raid in 2018. The two sides have shown notable flexibility in balancing each other’s security interests. However, it was generally acknowledged that Russia would offer Israel a limited window for strikes, and this window was viewed to be closing after it was announced on January 2022 that Russia and Syria would hold joint air patrols.

In the aftermath of the Russian operations in Ukraine, Israel was among the countries that criticised Moscow for its conduct. Moscow hit back by referencing Israel’s control over the Golan Heights, suggesting that the matter could be held against Israel if criticisms continue. So far, Israel appears to be unconcerned with the ultimatum, with the IDF continuing to hit Syria after the Russian operations in Ukraine were launched.

It is unclear if these attest strikes were conducted with or without Moscow’s consent. If the former is the case, then it would suggest that the events in Ukraine are unlikely to significantly alter the Russian-Israeli interests in Syria.

If, however, the latest IDF raids were conducted against Russian acceptance, it could suggest that the agreement the two countries held in Syria is unravelling and both sides will, once again, pursue their interests unilaterally. This could result in increased hostile incidents between Russian and Israeli forces, likely accompanied by a wider escalation in southern Syria.

Overall, it is unlikely that the war in Ukraine will cause momentous changes to the landscape of the Syrian conflict. However, events in Ukraine will almost certainly factor into the actions of actors present in Syria. Such considerations may lead to shifts in the medium-to-long term, especially if the Russian forces in Ukraine falter.