Background

Unilateral military interventions by Turkey, which have been absent since Northern Cyprus in the 1970s, have now become a frequent feature in its foreign policy towards Syria. Since 2015, Erdogan, whose ruling AKP had lost its majority in the elections, has expressed intent to create the 30-km “safe zone” in the north of Syria. The stated attempt is to prevent the formation of a Kurdish-majority state run by Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, now named the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Ankara regards AANES as a political extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), long regarded by the Turkish state as a threat to its territorial integrity due to its goal of creating a Kurdish state. A number of military operations were conducted between 2016 and 2020 in attempts to create the aforementioned “safe zone”. A watershed moment in this regard was Operation Euphrates Shield, launched in August 2016, which paved the way for Turkey’s direct interventions inside de jure Syrian territory. However, up until this point, those operations have led to the occupation of only certain pockets of territories in northern Syria, in tandem with Syrian rebel forces on the ground.

What is the Purpose of the “Safe Zone”?

Ankara’s primary stated aim in the creation of the “safe zone” is to prevent “terrorists” from conducting any attacks in Turkey. The predominant military force currently present in the north and east of Syria is the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with the primary faction being the People’s Defence Units (YPG), a group ideologically related to the PKK in Turkey. Kurdish separatism has been a concern of the Turkish state since its establishment and have been further amplified since the formation of the PKK in the 1980s. Cross-border interactions between Kurds (and other ethnic groups) in Turkey and Syria led to the formation of a common political culture among significant parts of these populations. As a result, numerous political and military forces, including Kurdish-dominated forces, emerged in the aftermath of Damascus losing authority in these regions since 2011. Turkey’s stated concerns are thus primarily political and ideological as it is wary of the political programme propagated by the aforementioned groups taking hold within Turkey.

Prior to the war in Syria, Damascus and Ankara regulated their mutual concerns regarding the Kurdish issue through the 1998 Adana Agreement, which aimed to uproot pro-PKK Kurdish political activism in Syria. However, the political disarray in Syria led to a perception in Ankara that Damascus was no longer capable of enforcing the agreement. As a result, Turkish officials cited unilateral actions as their main option. A similar pattern has also emerged regarding Turkish military operations in northern Iraq, where PKK elements have based themselves. Turkey has recently increased its aerial airstrikes on the PKK, as well as its efforts to get Baghdad to align with its goals.

Why Now?

With Ankara’s plan to create a 30km “safe zone” already in the works over the past years, the TSK has already been undertaking some of the more practical steps towards its objectives. However, such steps have slowed down and even outright paused over the past two years, suggesting that Ankara was done with military interventions. So, why is Erdogan now calling for renewed operations?

One reason is that shifts in the geopolitical map have aligned in such a way that Ankara feels more at ease launching another cross-border intervention. Perhaps most significantly, Russia’s own cross-border military operation in Ukraine has played a role in this shift. One of the main obstacles to Ankara’s wishes to go ahead with another military intervention in northern Syria has been Russia’s opposition to a further Turkish push into Syrian territory.

However, with the severing of diplomatic ties between several Western countries and Russia, as well as the Western sanctions on Russia, Moscow is keen to maintain its diplomatic relations with countries that have retained relations. Although Turkish-Russian relations have experienced bouts of tensions over the course of the Syrian war, Moscow is now demonstrating greater willingness to take Ankara’s interests into account. Early in June, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, expressed Russia’s opposition to Turkey’s military plans in northern Syria. However, only a week later, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that Russia “fully understands” Turkey’s concerns.

Another related development is Sweden and Finland’s proposed accession to NATO. Turkey is currently vehemently opposed to their accession, in particular that of Sweden’s. In recent years, Sweden accepted refugees from Turkey with sympathies towards, or expressing outright support for, the PKK and YPG. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has recently stated that Turkey’s concerns are “legitimate”, providing Turkey with further room to pursue its ambitions in northern Syria in the knowledge that NATO will not directly oppose those plans. In sum, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have increased Turkey’s geopolitical capital and bargaining chips both vis-à-vis Russia and NATO, allowing Turkey to take further unilateral action in Syria at this juncture.

Finally, perhaps the most significant internal reason that is pushing Ankara to take this step is the growing domestic political resentment in relation to the currency and debt crisis and increasing anti-refugee views. Although the two issues are not directly related, opposition forces are capitalising on general discontent and linking both issues in their accusations directed at the current government. Erdogan has consequently asserted that the proposed “safe zone” will accommodate a million Syrians who have sought refuge in Turkey. He added that their return will be “voluntary”, despite several accounts in recent years demonstrating that Syrian refugees have already been forcibly deported to other parts of northern Syria that have already been occupied by Turkey. Such domestic dissatisfaction has already led to AKP losing Ankara and Istanbul in 2019 local elections. Recent opinion polls point to the AKP haemorrhaging support, which bodes badly for the general elections in June 2023. With 2023 also being the centennial of Turkey’s founding, the timing of these renewed military operations appears, at least partially, to be related to the AKP’s need to maintain domestic legitimacy.

Possible Repercussions

Although the geopolitical winds are currently favouring Ankara, there are serious potential risks involved with a renewed military operation in northern Syria.

Firstly, in terms of potential geopolitical consequences, Turkey’s proposed military operation has met sustained criticism from the US and Iran. Washington has supported the SDF in their fight against the Islamic State (IS), something that already strained ties with Ankara. Although former US President Donald Trump ordered the withdrawal of US troops in northern Syria in 2020, a contingent has remained in the region and it continues to provide the SDF with support. American officials have warned that the Turkish intervention will lead to an emboldening of the IS in the region. Indeed, the IS prison outbreaks that took place earlier this year are testament to the threat that the group continues to pose. Although the US has previously attempted to prevent direct Turkish interventions into northern Syria, they have thus far failed to stop them, at best limiting Turkish-led advances and sending signals to Ankara through economic sanctions. The US’ partial withdrawal initiated in 2020, along with American reluctance to further deepen already tense diplomatic tensions with Turkey, will likely limit the US’ response to Turkey’s military operation to somewhat innocuous public criticisms.

Iran, on its part, has categorically expressed its opposition to the military operation. Iran and Turkey have thus far avoided direct confrontation in Syria; however, the villages of Zahra and Nubl will fall within the scope of Turkey’s proposed “safe zone”. These two villages have gained significant strategic importance for Damascus and pro-Shiite forces from Iran, Iraq and Lebanese, who have supported local forces against Sunni rebel groups throughout the conflict. Iran-backed groups directly coordinated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are allegedly already stationed in both towns. A Turkish-backed military offensive would thus risk Turkish-Iranian military clashes.

Iran has also regularly criticised the previous Turkish military operations in northern Syria and Turkey’s support for Syrian opposition groups. Turkey and Iran are more or less on the same page when it comes to the PKK and Kurdish rebels inside their respective state borders. However, both states are on opposite camps in Syria, with Tehran likely viewing Turkish-backed groups as a greater threat than the SDF. Thus, neither country is likely to seek a compromise on the matter as Turkey is insistent on creating the “safe zone” and Iran is reluctant to lose its influence within Syria that could threaten its belt of allies running across Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

Secondly, the political and military situation within Syria itself will undoubtedly change following any the potential Turkish operation. If Ankara insists on creating the 30-km “safe zone”, it will be its most ambitious intervention to date and will lead to the reconfiguration of relations between a host of internal actors, including the AANES (and its military wing, the SDF), Damascus, and the wide array of Syrian opposition groups. Indeed, the SDF leadership have already stated that they are willing to coordinate a defence with Damascus. While, Damascus has yet to openly announce its stance on any possible coordination with the SDF, the Syrian Army already has a history of collaboration with the SDF in anti-IS operations, and has in certain cases agreed to support the SDF against Turkish-backed advances. However, political negotiations between the AANES and Damascus has been stalled for years, and both sides have failed to reach any compromise on the question of autonomy in northern and eastern Syria. A potential Turkish-backed offensive will likely accelerate those talks and put the AANES in a more dependent position.

In addition, the main Opposition faction in Idlib, Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has recently been conducting military drills in anticipation of an alleged Syrian government offensive. HTS are considered rivals of other Syrian rebel groups, most notably of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), now known as the Syrian National Army (SNA). Both groups, which themselves are composed of various factions, have recently sought to mend their ties. However, such efforts have been hampered by factionalism and infighting within the FSA/SNA. There is a possibility that the proposed Turkish military operations against mutual enemies – the SDF and the Syrian Army – could help bring greater rapprochement between these factions.

Finally, the proposed military operations will inevitably lead to humanitarian consequences. There are a number of precedents to refer to in this regard from previous Turkish-led military operations in northern Syria. The occupation of Afrin in 2018 led to a string of human rights violations as documented by Human Rights Watch. Following the Operation Peace Spring in 2019, as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated that over 200,000 were displaced and civilian casualties directly resulted from the operation. Civilian populations continue to inhabit the area targeted by Erdogan as part of the “safe zone” and, consequently, mass displacements and civilian casualties are inevitable.

All in all, the Turkish government and TSK will have made both political and military calculations before stating its intent on going ahead with their attempt to create a “safe zone” in northern Syria. The current geopolitical climate seems to indicate that regional and global players are highly unlikely to make any counter-intervention, especially relevant in the case of Russia. The diplomatic relations with countries critical of the operation are in all likelihood going to maintain their status quo. The response from Damascus will be highly significant in affecting both geopolitical and internal dynamics. Military involvement from Damascus would effectively lead to an inter-state war between Turkey and Syria and this may prolong the conflict in the north.

In the case where the SDF will stand alone in the face of the Turkish-backed offensive, it is difficult to imagine how it will prevent the formation of the “safe zone”. However, Damascus is unlikely to remain silent on such a substantial incursion into its sovereign territory, and so Syrian-Turkish relations will in any case be dealt a further blow. Whatever the political implications of the potential Turkish military operation in northern Syria would be, the humanitarian cost is a priori undisputable.

For much of the Syrian conflict, Suweida has been kept relatively safe through informal local arrangements that kept the region autonomous while leaving it still formally affiliated with the authorities in Damascus. However, it would appear that socio-economic conditions and Damascus’s desire to re-establish full authority over the region is rendering the status quo that lasted over the past years increasingly untenable.

Background to the Tensions

Located east of Daraa Province in southern Syria, Suweida Province has enjoyed a limited form of autonomy over the course of much of the Syrian conflict. The region, like others, witnessed protests in 2011. However, although many Druze leaders expressed sympathy for the Syrian Opposition, hostile clashes with some extremist groups linked to the Opposition – such as Jabhat al-Nusra, now known as Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham – stopped many locals from outright supporting it. Instead, Druze leaders practiced a form of neutrality that allowed Damascus to retain control of the region with a skeleton personnel. Under this arrangement, locals were held exempt from conscription while anti-government expressions in limited forms were permitted. Groups such as Rijal al-Karama (Sheikhs of Dignity) and Ahrar Jabal al-Arab (Free Men of the Arab Mountains) emerged during this period, with the goal of retaining their limited autonomy.

However, the arrangement did not rest on stable foundations. It was no secret that Damascus tried to expand its authority over the region at every opportunity. Locals from Suweida travelling elsewhere risked forced conscription, forcing many young men to remain in the region despite worsening economic conditions and lack of economic prospects. Sporadic clashes between local armed factions and pro-Government militias never fully subsided and have been picking up in recent months, alongside tit-for-tat kidnappings.

While local Druze tribal fighters did fight alongside the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) against Jabhat al-Nusra and, later, the Islamic State (IS), some local leaders regularly accused Damascus of enabling the movements of these extremist groups in order to justify the deployment of pro-Government forces in the region. Such was the case after the bloody IS attack in 2018 that saw more than 250 people killed and dozens abducted, which led to heavy criticisms levied against Damascus authorities by Druze leaders.

What Is Behind the New Bout of Tensions?

To an outsider, the repeating cycle of tensions followed by calm would seem as if the dynamics in the region are broadly static. However, the region has been seeing significant developments behind the scenes.

In particular, Druze factions have increased their political activism in the region. In 2021, a new political party, the Syrian Brigade Party, was founded. The party’s Secretary-General, Malik Abu al-Kheyr, heralded its secular nature and support for a political solution within a national framework, although Opposition outlets have been keen to frame the party as pro-Opposition.  A similar formation, the National Council of Suweida, was formed with the intent of “filling the political gap in Suweida”. In conjunction, armed groups such as Ahrar Jabal al-Arab have intensified their violent rhetoric against Damascus, expressing intent to confront the authorities.

These developments coincided with a sharp drop in living standards in the region since 2018. Local activists have been warning that the quality of services has dropped sharply even as violent crime and gang activity, including kidnappings, have acutely risen. Signs of other societal concerns are also increasingly visible amidst rising drug abuse and youth suicides. Indeed, the renewed rise in tensions over February 2022 coincided with numerous cuts in subsidies enacted by Damascus authorities.

Part of the economic difficulties and resulting decline in services can be attributed to the economic state of Syria as a whole, which has been impacted by more than a decade of war, the implementation of the Caesar Sanctions by the United States, as well as the economic collapse of neighbouring Lebanon. However, many locals have also accused Damascus of enabling and even funding criminal activity in order to justify increasing its control over the region. Some have even accused Damascus of enacting an “economic blockade” over the region, limiting the entry of resources and business in a bid to constrict the region.

These developments came alongside a steady uptick in security interventions against anti-government protests. Throughout April 2022, state authorities have attempted to set up new “settlements” in a bid to put an end to conscription evasion. Arrests over – often petty – criminal charges have also picked up, with some activists accusing authorities of using these arrests as a way to force through the aforementioned settlements. Interventions by security agencies against protests have also picked up during this period.

What Is Next for Suweida?

Although the status quo in Suweida continues to hold, there will be a limit as to how much longer this can continue. Damascus’s relative victory over Opposition factions in southern Syria and Idlib has likely emboldened authorities to put pressure on Suweida in a bid to re-establish full authority. However, Damascus has limited options. Although the SAA is much stronger than its near-disintegrated state in the mid-2010s, it is still facing serious equipment shortages and logistical challenges that would make an outright military offensive a fraught possibility. These risks are further compounded by Damascus’s economic troubles, on-going insurgencies in Daraa and Deir ez-Zour, a tense frontline along Idlib and Russia’s military troubles in Ukraine that might make support from Moscow less reliable. Despite these challenges, pro-Damascus factions have remained hawkish in their view of Suweida, with the National Defence Forces (NDF) militia issuing a statement in which it described the Syrian Brigade Party as “the new ISIS”. Rhetorical attacks such as these may be intended to deter the region from taking the side of the Opposition – which itself has often been equated to the IS by pro-Damascus voices – while building casus belli against those who are undeterred. However, they could easily lead to an anti-Damascus backlash.

Meanwhile, as mentioned above, armed local groups such as Ahrar Jabal al-Arab have increased their violent rhetoric against Damascus, threatening violence if authorities continue to put pressure on the region. Others, such as the Syrian Brigade Party, also mentioned that they are expanding their influence in Damascus-controlled regions like Daraa and Quneitra.

The newest bout of tensions Suweida is experiencing will likely not result in an overnight descent into conflict. However, it is apparent that the current set of arrangements have an expiry date. Preventing a descent into fighting will come through intense diplomatic efforts, political sensitivity, socio-economic stability, and strategic foresight. Unfortunately, Syria today has little of any of these.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | April #2 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• Egypt announces aid to Sudan following the visit of Sudanese Army General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo
• The IMF increases its growth projection for Egypt for FY 2021-22 despite the impact of the Ukraine-Russia war
• Militia groups once again stop production in Libya’s El Feel oilfield, evidencing growing splits between eastern and western regions in the country
• Algeria and Italy sign energy deal
• Saudi crude exports reach their highest level since April 2020
• The new presidential council in Yemen is inaugurated, with further signs that Saudi Arabia is looking to exit the conflict
• Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, reopen embassies in Lebanon, pointing to an easing of tensions
• The Islamic State (IS) conducted an attack on an Iraqi army outpost in Anbar Province
• The World Bank projects economic growth in Iraq of 8.9%, largely due to higher oil prices

The circumstances of Al-Qurayshi’s death were curiously similar to that of his predecessor, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The raid on Al-Baghdadi took place in Barisha, only an hour’s drive away from Atmeh. Both raids occurred in territory largely controlled by the group Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and extremely close to the Turkish border.

Two questions arise following this set of events – one specific and one more general:

1. How did both raids take place in territory that is controlled by a group opposed to both the US and the IS?
2. Are the killings of jihadist group leaders all they are made out to be?

The HTS itself has stated that it was oblivious to the presence of Al-Qurayshi in Idlib and was not privy to details of the US operation, which it officially condemned, despite HTS’ antagonistic stance towards the IS. Unwitting residents of the town of Atmeh also claimed that they were unaware of Al-Qurayshi’s presence in the area. While there is as of yet no evidence to prove or disprove that the HTS or local residents were unaware of Al-Qurayshi’s presence, it still begs the question as to why both IS leaders, as well as other elements of the group, chose to base themselves particularly in that part of the country.

Most of Syria is now under the control of the government in Damascus, while a significant portion is governed by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. Both political entities hold fiercely belligerent stances against the IS, both in terms of ideology and realpolitik. The HTS and its representative Syrian Salvation Government based in Idlib, nevertheless, is ideologically the closest political entity to the IS. Although they have relatively stark differences between them in realpolitik attitudes and even jihadist goals – the former working more within a nationalist framework while the latter has, since its inception, espoused global goals.

The HTS condemnation of the US raid can be interpreted largely in two ways that are not necessarily mutually exclusive:

• HTS has more or less secured a relatively high level of political sovereignty in Idlib province and any external forces directly infringing upon that sovereignty, even if it is against enemies, is subject to condemnation;
• HTS has a hierarchy of enemies which gives certain jihadist groups leeway when in opposition to the US or other such non-jihadist forces.

The second point has, nevertheless, been called into question and some observers even made claims of US-HTS-Turkey cooperation over the matter.  HTS’ recent accommodation of modern modes of politics and its intent to develop relations with states such as Turkey as a means of self-legitimisation, however, is starting to lend more credence to such claims. The group’s leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, has made a number of public appearances over the past couple of years in an attempt to rework his image as a jihadist tyrant. For instance, he has appeared in Western-style clothing at the opening of the Aleppo-Bab al-Hawa road as well as on television in an interview with American journalist Martin Smith from PBS. HTS’ goal of legitimising its rule at least in Idlib, considering its recent drive to shed its image as a terrorist organisation in the eyes of the US, may have trumped any ideological convergences with the IS. The allegedly “softening” stances of HTS may have thus proven costly for Al-Qurayshi, who may have counted on a more hard-line jihadist scene in Idlib when he first entered the area.

Regarding the second question, there are doubts being raised by counter-terrorism experts as to the effectiveness of focusing energies on “neutralising” the leaders of jihadist, especially global, groups. The past decade or so has seen the high-profile deaths of Osama bin Laden, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and now Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, all a result of US military operations.

There is nevertheless some uncertainty as to the extent to which their deaths have had an impact on minimising the activities of jihadists groups. There is an element of these operations that is geared towards domestic audiences, especially in the US, taking into account the language used by US presidents in recent history regarding the protection of “national security” and “national interests”. However, US counterterrorism strategy, especially in its presentation to the public, has placed genuine importance on “cutting off the head of the snake”. It sees the removal of key leaders of terrorist groups as an important element of causing disarray among such groups, thus, weakening them in the short and long run. Nevertheless, jihadist groups have proven to act more like the many-headed Hydra of Greek mythology rather than a single-headed snake.

Support for jihadist groups at the local level in the Middle East and elsewhere comes from a mix of factors: real grievances against dictatorial governments and what is perceived to be nefarious external interference (focused mainly on the US); local cultural and inter-communal sensitivities; and economic, social and political marginalisation.

An overarching ideology that claims to address these real-life human experiences on the ground has pulled in hundreds of thousands of adherents. Killing the leaders of such groups without addressing the root causes of why these groups remain capable of recruiting adherents is not sufficient.

Despite its totalitarian, discriminatory and hierarchical ideology, the IS has shown itself to be a flexible and multi-layered organisation with several branches and leaderships across the globe. Its ideology remains headstrong in several parts of the world as it exploits real grievances that are perceived to be rooted in the rule of local dictatorial governments as well as foreign interventions. Jihadist groups such as the IS garner local support against those forces by attaching the source of all evil(s) to the latter.

This is not only the case in Syria and Iraq, but also most prominently in Afghanistan, South East Asia, the Horn of Africa and also other parts of the world, where people join the group for broadly similar reasons, despite the differing local contexts. Al-Qurayshi represents one head of a multi-headed Hydra.

Drug smuggling attempts along the Jordanian border with Syria have picked up significantly since the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) took full control of the southern provinces of Daraa and Quneitra in 2018. In addition to narcotics such as hashish, smugglers operating in Syria are best known for smuggling the amphetamine stimulant, Captagon. In recent months, authorities across the Middle East, Gulf and Europe have expressed concerns about the growing Captagon trade originating in Syria.

The conflict in Syria is no stranger to Captagon. Since the conflict erupted, Captagon production and trade in Syria has skyrocketed, with the pills bearing the iconic ‘C’ logo finding their way into every armed faction in the country, including the Islamic State (IS). However, the rapid rise in the production and trade of Captagon and similar substances have raised fears that Syria, beset with a shattered economy and sanctions, is rapidly becoming a “narco-state”.

The deeply-damaged state of the Syrian economy beset by sanctions and lack of comprehensive reconstruction is likely fuelling both the drug trade as well as drug use itself. Should these conditions not be addressed, Syria may face long-term social and public health crises relating to drug abuse, exacerbating the existing crises the country already faces due to a decade of war. Beyond that, organised crime, especially built on drugs, will make the re-emergence of conflict likelier as different factions squabble over production facilities and smuggling routes.

Rising Drugs Trade in Syria Fuelled by Conflict

Production and trade of illicit drugs in Syria and other countries in the Levant, such as Lebanon, have a long but relatively local history. In Lebanon, the cultivation of hashish, especially in the Beka’a Valley, grew in the 1960s and 1970s. The inventory of available drugs expanded to include opium poppies and cannabis, which became popular amidst the ‘warlordisation’ of the country. It is estimated that during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), drugs generated around $500 million annually for the local economy. The emergence of complex amphetamines such as Captagon, however, occurred in the more industrialised Syria, in the region between Homs and Latakia, where the availability of industrial chemicals and the facilities to process them enabled production. Although such drugs occasionally found their way to insurgents in Iraq during the 2000s, knowledge of the drugs, especially Captagon, remained relatively unknown until the Syrian conflict.

When the Syrian conflict broke out and the Syrian state withdrew from increasingly fragile areas amidst growing lawlessness, armed factions were able to capture factories with the capacity for drugs production and transform them for their own use.

As early as 2013, experts were warning that production in Syria was outpacing that in Lebanon. A combination of diminished civilian economic capacity and a need on the part of fighters to remain active during combat generated demand. At the time, pro-Government militias linked to Iran were largely implicated. However, there were signs that drugs were spreading to practically every faction, including jihadi factions that normally disavow drugs.

By 2015, the knowledge that Islamic State (IS) militants consumed Captagon and other substances was becoming commonly recognised. Captagon, in particular, was noted to make the militants feel “invincible” and offered an explanation for the rapid gains made by the militants during the earlier stages of the conflict in Iraq and Syria. Similarly, the irrational levels of violence displayed by the militants were attributed by the survivors of IS atrocities to the drugs they consumed. Anecdotal examples offered to the author by those who fought against IS cells in Iraq also referenced the prevalence of Captagon and other drugs in militant hideouts.

The current state of affairs, however, is linked to more recent developments. Over the latter half of the 2010s, the Syrian Government gradually regained control over the country’s borders with Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. The hope was that the resumption of trade and economic activity could help restore Syria’s embattled economy. However, factions that support the Syrian Government are believed to have taken advantage of Damascus’s expanded control over these border areas. Hezbollah in Lebanon, in particular, was often accused of facilitating drug production and trade alongside other, lesser-known factions backed by Iran. Amidst sanctions and destitution, the trade in drugs offered such groups a source of income, facilitating recruitment and patronage networks.

Syrian authorities have consistently denied that their country is facilitating the production and trade of drugs. Syrian state media frequently makes a show of drug busts in the areas under its control. Assuming such statements are truthful, however, belies the fact that much of Damascus’s control over the country, especially in the south, is facilitated by a smattering of armed non-state actors, local militias, loyalist warlords and other entities who have integrated themselves into state structures to facilitate their own business. It begs the question of whether Damascus could clamp down on such activities. Indeed, the emergence of the drugs trade in Myanmar’s rebellion-hit areas since 2021 shows that the phenomenon is directly linked to state weakness.

Meanwhile, the fact remains that the trade of drugs from Syria is picking up exponentially. In July 2020, Italy announced the largest seizure of Captagon from Syria, estimated at a street value of $1 billion. Similar busts were reported in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Greece.

The Impacts Are Far and Wide

While drugs may have poured gasoline onto the Syrian conflict, its transition to a frozen conflict is not going to put an end to the trade and production of illicit substances. Instead, the many challenges the country faces risk being exacerbated by an increasingly-entrenched drugs industry.

The most obvious and immediate factor is public health, especially with regards to mental health. Years of conflict have already taken a toll on the mental well-being of many Syrians. In a country whose healthcare system practically collapsed during the war and where psychological support was never particularly prevalent, the drugs offer a way to self-medicate the effects of PTSD and other ailments. However, such self-treatment can come with long-term psychological impacts. If the reports about the violence linked to Captagon use is correct, the impacts may be felt across whole swathes of Syrian society. Even absent such impacts, addiction will put further strain on medical services and, without rehabilitation services, can lead to increased criminality.

Indeed, criminality and conflict related to drugs is almost certainly the greatest destabilising factor Syria faces from continued drug trade. In addition to potentially turning users to crime, the drugs trade, especially those facilitated by warlords and militias, risks creating additional conflict. In the phenomenon referred to as “war for drugs”, rival criminal organisations vying for access to trade routes could engage in battles against one-another, resulting in the perpetuation of instability and incentives for continued fighting.

Having regained control over its territories on the backs of such militias, the Syrian state will likely find it difficult to clamp down on their activities even if it is pressured or incentivised to take action. In an extreme scenario, the Syrian state could end up with an open-ended drugs war in an increasingly-cartelised country.

Such effects would be deleterious on their own. However, in a geopolitical quagmire such as Syria, drugs activities will almost certainly have wider impacts. Endemic instability and recurring criminality along the Syria-Jordan border have already caused repeated border closures, hampering efforts to facilitate legitimate trade between the two countries. The matter was important enough to be brought before the two countries’ respective defence ministries and it forced direct meetings between Damascus and Amman. Jordanian officials have also become increasingly vocal about the impacts drugs from Syria are having on Jordan. Last week’s clashes along the border will almost certainly force Jordan to take firmer measures, impacting diplomatic relations between the two countries and side-tracking the Gulf efforts to bring Syria “back into the Arab fold”.

Such a rift already occurred between Lebanon and the Gulf after large quantities of Captagon hidden in agricultural produce was confiscated in Jeddah, prompting Saudi officials to impose a total ban on fruit and vegetable imports from the country at a time when Lebanon’s economy was spiralling. A similar scenario is highly likely in Syria despite the Gulf efforts to normalise relations with Damascus. For Damascus, which staked its credibility on its ability to bring order and stability to the areas it controls, the continued growth of the Syrian drugs trade represents a severe risk to its international objectives.

Ultimately, any efforts to clamp down on the drug trade will be an uphill battle and likely a violent process. Due to spiralling economies in Syria and Lebanon, there are now many factors to both pull and push individuals to drugs production, trade and use. Geopolitical factors that limit economic reconstruction such as sanctions, the impasse between Syrian factions that hampers cooperation, and the involvement of mutually-hostile foreign powers in the country will all complicate the actions taken against the drug production and trade.

There are measures that can help combat the effects of the drugs trade on Syrian society. Such measures include an effective and transparent law enforcement process, mental health support and rehabilitation for users, and the facilitation of reconstruction and gainful economic activity to reduce push factors. However, all of these measures are few and far between in Syria.

By all indications, the IS attack was intended to break out an estimated 3,500 IS militants, most of whom are foreigners. Among the prisoners are several high-ranking leaders of the group.

Although the SDF has managed to keep the situation from escalating, and numerous militants who escaped were captured, the situation nevertheless represents the exact type of nightmare scenario that SDF officials have been warning about since 2019. With an estimated 10,000 IS militants held in facilities across SDF-held territories in northern Syria, the attack on the Sinaa Prison once again highlights that the IS has not only remained a credible threat, but has now become emboldened enough to launch full-frontal assaults on high-security facilities.

Furthermore, the fact that the attack on the Sinaa Prison took place on the same day as an IS attack in an Iraqi outpost suggests some degree of coordination and could be a sign of future escalation of its insurgency operations.

While the fact that the IS attack on the prison was repelled is a positive development as far as local counter-terrorism capacities are concerned, the attack should nevertheless compel the authorities to reassess their capabilities and address any deficiencies in their response to the IS threat. Moving forward, members of the International Coalition should also address the lingering question of what to do with the captive IS militants. However, with numerous international crises diverting attention and resources away from Syria, implementing robust measures to manage these concerns will be an uphill task.

What Do We Know of the Attack?

Located in the Ghwayran District of Hasakah City, the Sinaa Prison (also known as Ghwayran Prison) holds about 3,500 IS militants, many of whom are foreigners. Like the al-Roj and al-Hol Camps, the prison has been long regarded as a tempting target for IS militants.

On the night of Thursday January 20^th, the IS detonated two car bombs along the walls of the prison before launching a ground attack on the prison itself in an attempt to free the inmates.

During the initial hours of the attack, the IS militants appear to have had success in taking control of parts of the facility. In the hours following the attack, IS militants posted videos showing freed militants, as well as some of the hostages they took.

Since then, however, the SDF and the International Coalition mobilised and established a cordon around the district, and announced a curfew across the whole city. The International Coalition carried out airstrikes around the prison, signifying the intensity of the fighting. The fighting remain sporadic as of Thursday, 27^th January as the SDF clears the last blocs still under militant control.

Overall, the SDF reported that 550 IS militants who escaped have surrendered or have been captured, while another 175 have been killed during the clashes. These numbers will almost certainly change as the toll of the attack becomes clearer in the aftermath. Among the most significant considerations will be whether the large majority of the prisoners managed to break out or not.

What Does This Bloody Day Signify?

The assault on Sinaa Prison took place on the same day as another bloody IS attack, this time in the Diyala Province of Iraq. There, suspected IS militants attacked an Iraqi army barracks in the al-Azim District 120 kilometres north of Baghdad, killing 11 soldiers. It was the deadliest attack of 2022 so far and one of the deadliest to take place since the group lost its territorial holdings in the country in 2017. The attack represented an upwards trend in high-casualty attacks, having followed another attack in the Makhmour Mountains last month in which ten people, including seven Peshmerga fighters, were killed. As a whole, the ISF warns that IS attacks around the Baghdad belt, especially around Tarmiyah and Taiji have picked up.

Overall, these attacks were some of the most brazen to be conducted by the militants. The International Coalition framed the attack as one of desperation. Indeed, the group was likely, in part, motivated by a need to grab the headlines after being eclipsed by a succession of developments around the world, including the Taliban victory in Afghanistan mid-2021. A high-profile attack on a secure compound aimed at freeing its militants would almost certainly have raised the group’s profile among the global jihadi scene.

Similarly, desperation can also be attributed to why the group launched such a high-profile attack to begin with. After all, it is entirely possible that the decision to free thousands of imprisoned militants was motivated by recruitment pools elsewhere drying up. However, framing the attack as being entirely motivated by desperation would be a grave mistake. The attack was, by all accounts, well-coordinated. Furthermore, it was able to proceed even after the authorities in Iraq busted an IS cell last November that was preparing for an attack on the prison.

Significantly, the attack did not take place in isolation but was rather a culmination of a years-long insurgency campaign in both Iraq and Syria that sought to keep security forces off-balance. Attacks targeting community leaders, checkpoints and other soft targets have been a regular feature, especially in areas controlled by the SDF. Although the group has remained weaker than it was during its peak, US military officials warned that the group’s operational capabilities are showing higher levels of “maturity”. In this sense, the attack on the prison, as well as the attack on the Iraqi army barracks in Diyala, may represent the next stage of the IS insurgency as it tries to make a comeback. Indeed, in our forecast for 2022, we noted prison break attempts as a possible sign of the group reconstituting itself.

Echoes of 2014?

At Integrity UK, we have frequently warned that the IS could go back to the insurgency model it pursued between 2008 and 2014.

During those six years following the IS’ defeat back when it was known as “Islamic State of Iraq”, the group waged a low-intensity but constant insurgency in northern Iraq, targeting security forces and community leaders while embedding itself among remote communities in the region. Prison breaks around Mosul and Tikrit were one of the hallmarks of this campaign and offered the group an easy source of loyal recruits. Already building strength, they have exploited the conflict in Syria, the political disorder in Iraq, and the withdrawal of the United States in order to operate openly, taking over large swathes of territory.

The situation today resembles that of 2008-2013 in many ways. Iraq is once again in the midst of a political crisis over endemic corruption and political deadlock that has triggered a major, nation-wide protest movement. The hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the on-going withdrawal in Iraq has similarly emboldened jihadi groups who are expecting a similar development to take place in Syria where the US-led Coalition continues to support the SDF. With international tensions also rising due to developments in Ukraine, it is possible that the IS saw the current situation ripe for the next stage of its insurgency.

These trends are certainly paying attention to, and are indicative of what the group may do next. However, the strategic and political landscape has changed significantly since the last decade.

First off, both Iraq and Syria have significantly improved counter-terrorism capabilities. In Iraq, in particular, years of intelligence and counter-terrorism development capabilities have allowed the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to become almost entirely self-sufficient. Although there remain many questions about operational capabilities and, in particular, coordination between the different branches, the skills, capabilities and morale of the ISF has improved significantly since 2014.

Similarly, the SDF and the US-led Coalition have spent the years since the destruction of IS’ territorial presence improving counter-terrorism capabilities. Although limited resources and a fraught political terrain limits the SDF’s capabilities, the group has nevertheless remained capable of busting IS cells. Furthermore, the fact that no significant breakouts have taken place from prisons despite repeated attempts by the militants – albeit none as ostentatious as last week’s attack – suggests that the SDF is, for now, capable of addressing security needs.

The jihadi scene is also far more fractured than it was in 2014 when the IS was able to build alliances with a smattering of other factions. Today, many other jihadi groups are mistrustful of the IS for their established track record of liquidating former allies. The success of more “nationalist” models of jihadi governance in Afghanistan and Syria’s Idlib may also make the IS model less attractive to prospective jihadi militants.

Moving Forwards

Any optimism to be had, however, needs to be tempered. With international attention gradually moving away from the Middle East, despite many of the structural factors that led to the rise of the IS remaining unaddressed, the group will almost certainly continue to exploit the so-called grey zones, deficiencies in governance or political instability to rebuild its brand and recoup its capabilities.

The most important matter to address will be that of the IS prisoners still being held in SDF facilities across Syria. Since capturing the IS stronghold of Baghuz almost exactly three years ago, the SDF has been adamant that it cannot keep the group’s foreign militants indefinitely. SDF officials have repeatedly called on countries around the world to repatriate their citizens to take the burden off the SDF while preventing the group from bolstering its ranks in the event of a prison break.

Thursday’s attack should be a wake-up call for any government around the world which still has citizens held in facilities across northern Syria. A recent sentencing of a German IS militant and his wife for their part in the Yazidi genocide may offer a legal precedent that can help other governments repatriate their own citizens and put them on trial. Achieving this, however, is contingent on creating an effective international framework that may simply not be possible in today’s fraught international climate.

Meanwhile, counting the cost in the aftermath of the attack is the most pressing priority for the SDF and the International Coalition. It is entirely possible that the IS attack on the Sinaa Prison ended up costing the group more than it gained. If that is the case, then security forces should take this as an opportunity to go on the offensive against IS sleeper cells.

If the IS, however, was successful in freeing large numbers of militants and absconding with captured equipment from the SDF, then the coming days will see intensified attacks on high-security installations. Developments around holding facilities such as al-Roj and al-Hol will be especially important to watch. The group may also launch more cross-border attacks in a bid to expand its operation range, denying the SDF, Baghdad and Damascus spaces to secure and govern along more remote areas.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | January #1 2022

In this edition, we cover:

• Libya grapples with the aftermath of its postponed elections.
• Tunisia launches the national consultation on constitutional reforms.
• Syria joins China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
• Frontlines around Marib in Yemen shift, move south amidst gains by the Saudi-led Coalition.
• Lebanon announces new elections for May 15 as the Lebanese Pound crashes again.
• Iraq holds “chaotic” first parliamentary session after election results are confirmed by the Federal Court.
• JPMorgan Chase & Co. predicts Egyptian bond windfall for investors.
• King Abdullah II meets Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | December #2 2021

In this edition, we cover:

• Postponement of elections in Libya amidst further signs of renewed conflict across the country.
• Iran’s Ambassador to Sana’a recalled to Tehran before passing away from Covid-19.
• UN Secretary General meets Lebanon’s President, Michel Aoun, to discuss the ongoing social, political and economic crises, as well as assurances that elections will be held in March 2022.
• The Syrian Government publishes its 2022 budget, with a large year-on-year drop, attributed to Damascus’s ongoing economic woes.
• Muqtada al-Sadr reaches out to rival Shia parties in an attempt to build a political consensus.
• Egypt’s trade picks up with China and East African states.
• Jordanian officials host Saudi-Iranian talks amidst a sign of thaw in relations.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | December #1 2021

In this edition, we are covering:

• The UN warns that the situation in Libya may become too unstable for elections, amidst polarising candidates and growing militia impunity
• Further details emerge about the attempted assassination of Iraq PM al-Kadhimi
• Israel and Egypt Foreign Ministers meet in Cairo

• The removal of the Grand Mufti of Syria and the IRGC Head in Syria from their positions – what are the implications for their removal in Syria and the wider region?
• Libya’s updated candidate list for the country’s December 24th elections – who has been approved and rejected by the electoral commission?
• Jordan’s energy and water agreement with Israel, the UAE and the US – what were the responses from Palestinians in the country and the implications for the Saudi-UAE rivalry?

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | November #2 2021