Through it all, extremist groups and movements have been highly active, either taking advantage of pandemic-related shifts in priorities to recoup their strength or outright use the pandemic for their own benefits.

Despite initial hopes that extremist groups and organisations would struggle to maintain relevance amidst the pandemic, such groups have found fertile ground for support as a result of an increased reach in online communications over the past two years. Today, they are leveraging a mix of conspiratorial misinformation and public dissatisfaction with the status-quo to drum up support.

In this report, we identify six regions that are of interest to practitioners of research on violent extremism. These regions consist of:

• The United States and Western Europe, which continue to see the proliferation of far-right groups focused predominantly on “multiculturalism” and non-White migration.
• The Post-Soviet Space which is seeing rising “alt-right” groups who emphasise their white, European and Christian identities and espouse an explicitly “illiberal” model of governance, especially on matters of minorities, women and LGBT+ people.
• Afghanistan where a violent jihadi group, the Taliban, ousted the US, galvanising similar extremist movements elsewhere.
• Iraq and Syria, which continue to witness activities by Salafist-Jihadi groups who are looking to recoup their strength after being driven underground during the 2010s.
• The Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa region where jihadist groups of several affiliations are in competition against one-another even as they ramp up their attacks on weak governments.
• Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia where the rise of Hindu and Buddhist extremism is threatening other, smaller minorities.

In each region, we will assess the prevalent extremist risk and look at past and present trends to estimate their trajectories in 2022.

Overall, our findings suggest that various manifestations of right-wing extremism are the most prevalent flashpoint. The United States and Western Europe, the Post-Soviet Space, and the Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia are all seeing manifestations of nationalistic or religious right-wing extremism.

Meanwhile, the threat from jihadi groups remain prevalent, especially in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and the Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa. However, each of these movements will likely spend 2022 focused on recuperation and consolidation as they recover from the 2010s which saw many such groups’ capabilities eroded by security operations. Infighting among these groups will likely reduce their immediate threat. Developments around renewed recruitment, fundraising, and mergers should be observed as a possible prelude to renewal of the jihadi threat.

The United States and Western Europe

For much of the first two decades of the 21^st century, concerns around extremism in the US and Western Europe were focused firmly on Islamic fundamentalist extremism. The September 11 attacks in 2001; the resulting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the emergence of Al Qaeda affiliates and later the Islamic State (IS) in 2014; and the resulting global terrorist attacks by the group’s supporters all contributed to such preoccupations.

While the attention on white-supremacist and far-right extremism remained relatively unfocused during this period, there was also increased mainstreaming of far-right voices whose rhetoric focused on anti-Islam, anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism, especially in the US where such rhetoric was often justified as protected on the basis of freedom of speech. Although high-profile far-right attacks, such as the massacre perpetrated by Anders Breivik in 2011, occurred, these were usually seen as aberrations.

The 2015 refugee crisis, however, reinvigorated the Western far-right while mainstreaming previously fringe theories such as the “Great Replacement” which posits that immigration is being used by a vague group of “globalist elites” to “replace” the white European population. Indeed, violent activities by such groups increased exponentially since 2015, especially in Europe. The electoral wins of populist nationalists in Europe and the US were also linked to this phenomenon.

Landmark developments in 2020, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic, further bolstered far-right movements. Reframing their ideologies around personal freedoms, such movements came to vehemently oppose COVID-19 restrictions, decrying them as a means of social control. As part of such reframing, they sought to present themselves as “champions of personal freedoms.”

A combination of other factors, including social tensions following the worldwide Black Lives Matter protests and the polarising rhetoric around the 2020 US presidential election, further increased tensions, culminating in the violent riots in the US Capitol where protesters of mostly far-right affiliations attempted to prevent the certification of the electoral win of the then-candidate Joe Biden.

The Western far-right has been on the defensive since the events of January 6^th a year ago. Despite some efforts to disavow the conspiratorial rhetoric and the de-platforming of some of the most vocal and extreme ideologues, the prevalent trend in the mainstream right has been one towards reframing the events of that day. Meanwhile, they have turned their attention towards single-issues that tend to be in the interest of minorities, such as reproductive and LGBT+ rights, while ensuring that any legislation that could hamper future electoral gains – such as voting reform – are deadlocked. In 2022, such efforts will likely gain further momentum.

The Western far-right is also showing signs of becoming more “modular” and more ideologically pragmatic. The COVID-19 pandemic and opposition to pandemic-related restrictions, for example, have brought the far-right in contact with previously-unrelated movements such as wellness and anti-vaccination movements. Such hybrid, “intersectional”, “single-issue” far-right movements appear to be gaining favour among those following cohesive but often-dogmatic movements such as neo-Nazis, and this process will likely continue in 2022.

The Post-Soviet Space

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the post-Soviet space has seen the proliferation of nationalist parties. On the whole, this is unsurprising, as nationalists such as Hungary’s current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, had been highly active in the anti-communist opposition movements. Across the post-Soviet space (as well as non-Soviet states such as Yugoslavia), nationalism was often instrumentalised as a unifying ideological foundation for societies who had lost their main unifying pillar. Such exploitation of ethnic and national tensions was instrumental in the breakout of the Balkan Wars. The radicalising aftereffects of those wars continue to inform the far-right movements in the post-Soviet space.

As early as 2013, it was estimated that Russia was home to the world’s largest neo-Nazi population at about 50,000 to 70,000, making up about half the global neo-Nazi population. Although the Russian Government officially opposed neo-Nazi groups, such groups nevertheless found an enabling environment in Russia owing to Moscow’s own opposition to so-called “Western values”, especially within the context of the rights for women and LGBT+ peoples; as well as immigration and multiculturalism vis-à-vis Islam. Tropes and slurs used against Bosnian Muslims in Balkan Wars have seen a revival in their application against to Muslims as a whole. With anti-Islam a driving force of the European far-right as well, there have been increased linkages between far-right groups in Western and Eastern Europe. German officials warned in 2020 that German neo-Nazis were training at the camps operated by the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), an organisation identified as a terrorist group by the US.

However, it would be a mistake to frame far-right in the post-Soviet space as exclusively Russian-aligned. In Ukraine, the Azov movement (or Azov Battalion), known for its recruitment of neo-Nazis and assault by its members on feminist, LGBT+ and left-wing activists, has come into conflict with the Russian-backed forces in eastern Ukraine. While the European far-right may have more links with Russia-based far-right groups, Azov has gained support among the far-right in the US.

The Caucasus has also seen increased manifestations of far-right movement. In Georgia, where far-right parties struggled to gain electoral traction, an enabling environment nevertheless allowed them to act with relative impunity. When far-right activists attacked the Tbilisi Pride rally in 2021, Georgian nationalist and religious politicians denounced the members of the rally for “provocation” instead of the far-right. Armenia, a relative outlier as far as far-right activity goes, has also seen the emergence of far-right movements such as Adekvad, which has, like its counterparts, supported “traditional” values and espoused illiberal, anti-feminist and anti-LGBT+ views. The country’s fresh conflict with Azerbaijan also allowed for anti-Muslim rhetoric to gain traction. While far-right movements in both countries have been accused of having links to Russia, their goals and means of gaining support have been decidedly local.

In 2022, such movements will contend with several dynamics. The Russian and Ukrainian far-right may be preparing for a new confrontation as tensions in eastern Ukraine rise once more. How such groups reconcile – or gloss over – their mutual hostility despite wider ideological alignments on a global scale may inform far-right movements around the world.

Furthermore, the increasing visibility of far-right movements in countries like Georgia and Armenia, which have been comparatively more successful in their democratic experiments, raises concerns for the health of their democracies and the future of their civil societies. Far-right groups in these countries had a relatively good year in 2021 owing to increased political tensions and rising polarisation against a backdrop of on-going COVID-19 outbreaks. As such, they will seek to retain momentum in 2022 by looking for ways to remain relevant, likely resorting to violent confrontations if all else fails.

Afghanistan

2021 was marked with the end of the US mission in Afghanistan. The mission which started in 2002 in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, ended with the rapid collapse of Afghan security forces following the US withdrawal, resulting in the Taliban gaining control of the entire country.

The Taliban’s renewed ascent to power has led many experts around the world to speculate that the country would, once again, become a hub of transnational jihadism as it was in the 1990s. Although the Taliban have vowed to not let terrorists use Afghan soil to launch attacks elsewhere again, the appointment of senior figures from the Haqqani Network – known for its close ties al-Qaeda and recognised as Taliban’s hard-line faction – to positions of power in the new Afghan Government suggest that the new Taliban rule will be hardly different than the old.

However, although victorious, the Taliban will face a tough challenge unifying and governing the many jihadist factions that operate in the country. How this threat is managed will, in turn, determine how the extremist threat in Afghanistan will develop in 2022 and beyond.

To begin with, although victorious, the Taliban is not unified. Although the exact dynamics are hard to predict, the group is known to have a more pragmatic “nationalist” wing and a more ideologically jihadi hard-line faction, the latter represented by the aforementioned Haqqani Network. In the aftermath of the fall of Kabul, there were reports of clashes between the two factions. Although the exact details of what took place were never confirmed, the ascent of Haqqani Network officials to senior positions and the resumption of the extreme practices that characterised the Taliban rule in the 1990s, suggest that Afghanistan’s new rulers have little interest in moderating their actions, even for token or pragmatic purposes. While they may shy away openly hosting transnational violent extremist groups, the Taliban, as a supporter of an anti-Western, hard-line fundamentalist ideology, will offer groups with similar ideologies an enabling environment.

Indeed, since the Taliban’s capture of Kabul, the previously frosty relations with Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the so-called “Pakistani Taliban”, have improved noticeably in 2021. Attacks by the group against Pakistani security forces rose concurrently. In 2022, observing such attacks and how the Taliban leverages them against its relatively-cordial ties with Islamabad will be vital towards determining the future direction of transnational jihadism in the country.

On the other side is Islamic State – Khorasan (ISK), an IS franchise that has waged a constant war against the Taliban even as both groups fought an insurgency against the US. The ISK has bucked the trend in the jihadist world by not congratulating the Taliban on its victory, but instead denouncing it as a fake victory. Since then, the ISK has increased its physical and propaganda attacks against the Taliban. There have also been signs of the ISK poaching support from the Taliban through accusations that the Taliban, by focusing on a more national agenda, has failed to adhere to true jihadi goals. If the ISK continues to gain support for its hard-line stance, it might force the Taliban follow through with similar hard-line actions.

Somewhere in between these groups lies al-Qaeda. Although the group lost significant credibility and capacity in the 2010s after initial gains during the starting years of the Arab Uprisings, it remains a credible actor with a recognised brand. Furthermore, the group retains its connection to the Taliban via the Haqqani Network. As such, despite the Taliban’s promise to not let Afghanistan be used as a springboard for transnational jihadism, there is a significant likelihood that al-Qaeda will use Afghanistan as a base of operations, albeit more covertly.

Lastly, there are the myriad jihadi factions who are broadly aligned with the Taliban but have differing specific concerns. Some of these groups such as Lashkar-e Taliba, Hizb-ul-Ahrar, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Turkestan Islamic Party and others, are too small to become major players. However, they can nevertheless act as spoilers or kingmakers, giving the larger groups incentives appeal for their support. Should these groups, like the TTP, escalate their attacks on their enemies outside Afghanistan, they can also bring attention from wider foreign powers that can complicate the Taliban’s calculations.

Come 2022, the goals of the Taliban and al-Qaeda will be consolidating their gains and manage a fractious militant landscape even as the country faces economic collapse and possible famine over the winter. Suppressing dissent and retaining stability while rebuilding capabilities will likely be their main goals, limiting their ideological investment to extremist causes. The ISK, on the other hand, will likely continue the trend of escalating its attacks on the Taliban to keep the group off balance.

It is unlikely that Afghanistan’s extremist landscape will see any significant developments in 2022. However, the trends that could lead to significant developments past 2022 will become apparent this year.

Developments outside Afghanistan are likelier to impact the extremist landscape in the country. In particular, many jihadi groups around the world experienced a boost to their morale following the US withdrawal. Jihadi ideologues around the world are now looking at the Afghan model to experiment with local governance within a national framework. Some foreign jihadi fighters in regions like Syria even expressed interest in travelling to Afghanistan.

Going forward, it will be important to watch for the movements of jihadi fighters into the country and understand which group they are supporting and why. Another item to watch will be on whether the Taliban will utilise its governance as a model for other jihadi groups as an instrument of soft power.

Syria and Iraq

For better part of the last decade, much of the attention of international security experts were dominated by the events in Iraq and Syria. Since the breakout of the Arab Spring and especially since the breakout of the Syrian Civil War, the region has witnessed immense radicalisation. Such radicalisation was facilitated by the severe violence of the conflicts after the Arab Uprisings that pushed people into a more radical path, alongside the flow of weapons, money and fighters into Iraq and Syria that also made the most extreme groups also the best equipped ones, pushing out the more moderate views.

The IS was the most severe manifestation of this phenomenon. The group not only took control of large swathes of Iraq and Syria, committing genocide against non-Sunni Muslims under its rule; it also went through great lengths to ensure that its ideology and method of governance would persist. Although the group’s holdings in Iraq and Syria were eliminated, IS supporters in these countries have proven themselves to be adept at evading capture and keeping the group alive in some capacity. Insurgent attacks, especially in areas lacking governance, are common. Civilian supporters of the group have also engaged in crowdfunding projects to help secure the release of IS captives in holding zones such as the al-Hol Camp in Syria while ensuring that the children held there are raised with the group’s ideology.

The IS isn’t the only extremist group whose activities threaten further instability. Opposition-controlled Syria, in particular, has become home to a host of groups of varying jihadi persuasions. During the earlier years of the Syrian Civil War, al-Qaeda, which had been whittled down in the previous decade, managed to re-establish itself with groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra representing its cause. Although Jabhat al-Nusra, now rebranded to of Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has broken off from al-Qaeda, it retains its jihadist, fundamentalist ideology and appears to be looking to emulate a Taliban-style national governance model. Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, retains the loyalty of some smaller groups.

Further groups operating in the region include groups who draw inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood (such as the once-significant Ahrar al-Sham); conventional Salafi Jihadism (such as another once-significant group, Jaish al-Islam); or foreign jihadist groups with national goals (such as Uyghur or Chechen factions). The prevalence of such groups in a small stretch of region consisting of parts of Idlib and Aleppo, means that groups of jihadist persuasions have essentially squeezed out any other competition and frequently engage in infighting for resources and influence.

Since the campaigns against the IS, as well as Russian-backed efforts to help regain Damascus wrestle territorial control from the Syrian Opposition, jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria have been on the backfoot. In Iraq in particular, successive attempts by smaller insurgent groups to fill the vacuum, such as the brief insurgency by the White Flags organisation, were quashed with relative ease.

However, IS-linked insurgent attacks in both Iraq and Syria are picking up. The group is following patterns similar to its insurgency between 2008 and 2013, hitting soft targets, operating in ungoverned spaces and inciting intercommunal tensions. With Damascus focused on consolidating its control amidst a severe economic crisis and Baghdad focused on resolving the state of political flux in the country, there is a risk that the fight against violent extremist groups will take a backseat.

While 2022 is unlikely to see any major developments to the jihadi landscape in either country, observers should keep an eye open for continued attacks and signs for jihadi groups, especially the IS, reconstituting themselves. As was the case in the lead-up to 2013, developments such as prison breaks and assassination of security personnel will be especially pertinent as a prelude to wider jihadi violence.

In the Idlib and Aleppo regions of Syria, observers should watch the efforts of the HTS to mainstream itself and the reactions of other jihadi factions. Although the jihadist landscape in Syria is deeply fractured, the Taliban victory in Afghanistan appears to have inspired some groups, including the HTS, to reassess their approaches to governance and influence. Such Taliban-inspired methods of governance, already in progress in Idlib where the HTS backs a civilian government by the name of the Syrian Salvation Government, will be essential to understanding the nature of the extremist threat in Syria over 2022.

Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa

Many jihadi groups traditionally considered the Sahel, Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa regions as low priority backwaters. Although the region has been home to some jihadi factions, including in Algeria where they were party to a civil war in the 1990s, such groups rarely rose to significant prominence and their activities seldom elicited international attention.

The last decade saw this dynamic changing. Sustained pressure on al-Qaeda and IS operatives in the Middle East, Europe, Caucuses and Afghanistan forced many of these groups to turn their attention and resources to other theatres to retain relevance. Regional and local dynamics, such as the spill over of the Libyan conflict following the collapse of the Gaddafi rule.

Today, Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, is emerging as one of the hotspots of Salafi jihadi activity. Exploiting weak governance, corruption, proliferation of weapons and widespread poverty are all allowing jihadi groups to gain influence in these regions.

Indeed, even before the COVID-19 pandemic, there were signs that extremist groups such as the IS were directing their attention to the region. In 2019, attacks claimed by the IS in West Africa inflicted casualties (dead and injured) just barely short of the casualties inflicted in Iraq and Syria. While IS claims are often dubious, the United Nations similarly warned of “unprecedented” rise in terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, with 4,000 terrorism-related deaths in 2019 alone. The growing prevalence of Africa in IS propaganda also represented a shift as the group attempted to justify its continued existence in the aftermath of its losses in Iraq, Syria and Libya. This trend continued in 2020 which marked the deadliest year across the Sahel, West, Central and East Africa. Today, experts warn that the region could become the new focus of global counter-terror operations. Such developments are even more significant amidst an on-going drawdown by Western powers that could offer violent extremist groups a vacuum that they could fill.

Perhaps the main factor that prevented such groups from becoming an even more tangible threat is their disunity. No single group holds sway over the jihadi activities in the region. Instead, there are many factions, some of which are independent while others have loose affiliations with the IS or al-Qaeda. Although these groups cooperate with one-another more often than their counterparts in other theatres, factionalism is nevertheless taking its toll. For example, the summer of 2021 saw the death of a jihadi leader of legendary status, Abubakar Shekau, the former leader of the Nigeria-based jihadi group Boko Haram. Although Shekau allied the group with the IS and declared his group as the West Africa Province of the IS (ISWAP), disputes over leadership led him to leave the group with his core followers and he was subsequently killed by his former allies. Overall, experts have noted that transnational jihadi groups have become entangled in local rivalries at the expense of wider jihadi unity.

Overall, however, even the jihadi disunity is coming at the expense of local governance. Both ISWAP and a local al-Qaeda affiliate, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), have continued their attacks on security forces. They are also engaging in other, soft-power manoeuvres such as providing governance, water, sanitation and education to areas under their influence, functions that national governments in the region often struggled with. Indeed, at present, failures in governance and lack of opportunities appear, as well as heavily-securitised state responses appear to be leading the push factors for local populations to support these groups, as opposed to anything novel these groups offer.

Come 2022, violent extremist factions, regardless of whether they are independent or linked with the IS or al-Qaeda, will work to entrench themselves in the areas under control. Acts of propaganda, both in the forms of attacks but also services and education in their extremist ideologies, will aim to gather more support for each individual group. While infighting will be the main obstacle to jihadi unity, mergers between factions or shifting of allegiances that characterise the factional dynamics in the region may form the basis of a more unified front.

Extremist factions will likely be galvanised by the Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Western troops from the region and may seek to avoid actions that may jeopardise the wider jihadi movement, even if they don’t formally end their hostilities. The recent deployment of Russian troops in Mali following the withdrawal of French troops may also factor into the calculations of these groups, given Russia’s recent actions against jihadi groups in Syria.

The Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia

As a central flashpoint in anti-colonial struggles, a major theatre during the Cold War, and the scene of various regional power rivalries, the Indian Subcontinent as well as the wider South and Southeast Asia regions have witnessed numerous waves of armed insurgencies of various levels of extremism. Towards the end of the Cold War and their aftermath, a number of Muslim insurgencies have emerged across the region, turning more extreme amidst the emergence of the wider global jihadi movement. In the 2010s, the extremist landscape of the region was further complicated by the proliferation of Hindu and Buddhist extremists.

In India, the Maoist Naxalite insurgency present since the 1970s is still considered the “gravest threat” to India’s internal security. Although the group’s stature has diminished since the 2000s, it remains entrenched in its strongholds such as Chhattisgarh. Although the group has tried to take advantage of the farmer protests in India, it has yet to make a sizeable impact and there are presently no signs that this will take place in 2022.

Indeed, to outsiders, groups such as the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba are better known than the Naxalite insurgency, being responsible for the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. The clampdowns that followed the 2008 attacks, however, diminished the group’s abilities. Much of the group’s activities since then have been limited to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indian-administered Jammu Kashmir. Although the group did conduct attacks on the security forces in Jammu Kashmir, it has not performed a high-profile attack since 2008. The group may continue its attacks in Kashmir and may even engage in provocations between India and Pakistan, similar to the attacks by Jaish e-Mohammed in 2019 that nearly led to an Indian-Pakistani military escalation. Although the situation in Afghanistan where the Taliban have been victorious may benefit the group, it is unlikely to be highly active in 2022.

Across the wider region, although Islamic insurgencies exist, many of them, such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid in Indonesia; Jemaah Islamiyah, Darul Islam Sabah in Malaysia; Patani United Liberation Organisation, Barisan Revolusi Nasional – Koordinasi in Thailand have only been active sporadically.

Of all the jihadi groups present, Abu Sayyaf, an IS affiliate also known as the group’s East Asia Province, represents the most significant jihadi faction. The group was responsible for the capture of the city of Marawi in the Philippines in 2016. Although the group was ousted since, with its leader killed, there are on-going concerns among experts that the relative lack of reconstruction in the region and low levels of sustained counterinsurgency efforts are allowing supporters of the group keep up recruitment. Indeed, a 2019 bombing at a church in Jolo, southern Phillipines, which was claimed by the IS, shows that the group remains a threat. However, the relative lack of activity surrounding the group over the past couple years could suggest that 2022 will be mostly dormant for the IS as it recoups its losses. Recruitment of foreign militants from the region and attempts to elicit support of other dormant jihadi factions will likely be key indicators of Abu Sayyaf activity in 2022.

Indeed, today, the main source of extremist activity in the Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia does not come from Muslim or Maoist extremists but Hindu and Buddhist extremists. Although Hindu nationalist groups such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have a long history in India, this group – alongside Buddhist groups motivated by similar goals such as Bodu Bolu Sena (BBS) in Sri Lanka and Ma Ba Tha in Myanmar – have gained popularity in the 2010s. These groups have often incited hatred against their respective countries’ Muslim minorities, espousing majoritarian ideologies that explicitly “othered” Muslims. Anti-leftism, femonationalism[1] and anti-multiculturalism are frequent hallmarks of such ideologies. Thus, some experts have framed Hindu and Buddhist extremist movements as local variants of the alt-right movements present in Western Europe and the US. Indeed, the two sides, at times, attempted to cooperate towards mutual goals such as supporting the election of Donald Trump.

Myanmar, in particular, has seen the most violent manifestation of such extremism. After fighting between security forces and a local insurgent group claiming to represent the Rohingya Muslims in the country erupted in 2012, the government of Myanmar engaged in what has described as “ethnic cleansing” against the Rohingya population. Militant Buddhist nationalism and anti-Muslim rhetoric that othered the Rohingya people as foreigners was a common part of the campaign. However, both India and Sri Lanka have seen similar manifestations. Violent attacks against Muslims in India have become commonplace and the community has been subjected to numerous moral panics including conspiracies of a “Corona Jihad” involving Muslims deliberately spreading COVID-19. In all three countries, high-ranking government figures have remained noticeably quiet about attacks on Muslims and acquittals of those who attacked Muslims remain common. Internationally, such attacks drew little attention owing to the preoccupation with Islamic extremism over the 2010s, which has allowed Hindu and Buddhist extremists to frame their actions as defensive.

Come 2022, these extremist movements appear to be growing more volatile. In Myanmar, the country’s military forces have begun attacking Christian towns and villages following activities by rebels in these areas. Eyewitnesses reported that the language and tactics used by the military in Christian areas were similar to those used against the Rohingya, suggesting that the extremist narratives that targeted one minority is now being used to target another.

A similar dynamic is playing out in India where anti-Christian mobs have picked up their attacks against the country’s much smaller Christian population. Prominent Indian politicians have remained quiet or outright denied that such attacks are taking place.

Come 2022, this trend will likely continue amidst the continued conflict in Myanmar and rising polarisation in India and Sri Lanka. Geopolitical concerns, such as Washington’s need to keep India close as part of its pivot against China, will likely mean that international pressure over such attacks will be muted, emboldening the extremists in these countries.

[1] Defined as using the cause of feminism and the protection of women against “dangerous” foreigners.