Following the first two attacks, the Egyptian military launched counter-terror offensives on May 11^th, particularly around Sheikh Zuweid and Rufah, where there are relatively higher levels of IS activity. The military announced that 10 IS militants were killed. In a subsequent operation on May 13^th, another 13 “terrorists” of unspecified affiliations were reportedly killed.

The number of terrorist attacks across Egypt had somewhat subsided since 2018. However, there has been a resurgence of attacks in February of this year. The uptick in attacks followed the IS prison attacks in Syria and the killing of IS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi. This form of guerrilla warfare employed by the IS in Sinai seems to replicate a general trend in IS strategy, as in Syria and Iraq, of maintaining a covert network that conducts sporadic attacks on military targets, rather than seeking to gain control of territories.

In the Egyptian case, the government has sought to not only eliminate terrorist groups military, but it has also employed a “developmental” approach by investing and residential projects in the Sinai. Although local allegiances in the Sinai to terrorist organisations such as the IS are partly explained as a reaction to the crackdown on Islamist groups following the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammed Morsi in 2013, as well as normalisation with Israel, economic negligence of the region is also known to be a significant factor. The Egyptian government’s developmental strategy aims to alleviate some of those grievances in tandem with their military operations, however, the state-centric nature of this strategy, which is intimately linked to military interests, does not necessarily represent local interests.

The vast desert landscape in the Sinai, much like in Syria and Iraq, allows for the IS and other terrorist groups to operate covertly and maintain a presence away from the watchful eye of the state. Thus far, eliminating the IS’ leaders and simply employing a direct military strategy has not led to the complete disbandment of the group. Whether Egypt’s developmental strategy will produce long-term results remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to eradicate the ideological basis of the IS and alleviate the structural political problems that brought in adherents in the first place.

The announcement came at a time when international attention was drawn away from the Middle East and North Africa region and instead focused on the escalating war between Russia and Ukraine. Alongside ongoing crises such as Covid-19, the news of the IS’ new leader was largely buried by the emerging conflict in Ukraine.

The relatively muted response to the selection of a new IS Caliph, however, is also telling about the group’s continued relevance after grabbing headlines over the 2010s. In this context, it would be fair to ask if the selection of a new leader is relevant at all.

In this article, we look into what we do and do not know about the IS’ new leader. In examining the announcement, as well as the facts and speculation around the man who now leads the group, we conclude that the IS’ main concern is threefold:

• To project a sense of resilience in light of ongoing (global) challenges;
• Maintain continuity between its past and present leadership;
• Generate a sense of legitimacy and inspiration for IS cells around the world while maintaining the independence of these cells through a broad guiding strategy.

We note that the IS strategy to rebuild itself resembles that of its strategy in the lead-up to 2014 and that the group has been investing in its resilience to continue its operations even after decapitation strikes targeting its leadership. We further note that while resilience and capacities of local communities against the IS improved, we warn that the current international climate may result in the erosion of these defences, allowing the IS to carve out a space for itself once again.

Background

The IS announced the selection of its new leader a little over a month after his predecessor, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, was killed in a raid by the US forces. Although the group did not acknowledge the US involvement in his killing, the statement did note that he died during a battle. The statement further noted that Abu Ibrahim handpicked his successor as Abu al-Hassan.

Over the month of relative quiet from the IS’ central command, there was some speculation that the group was experiencing a leadership struggle or was otherwise struggling to communicate between different cells in order to appoint a suitable leader. If this was the case, however, there were no visible internal clashes or reports of tensions within the group. Indeed, much of the group’s media retained a sense of casual calm during this period. When Abu al-Hassan was finally appointed as the group’s leader, IS franchises around the world were quick to acknowledge him. If there were internal tensions, the group was successful in hiding them.

Notably, little is known about the group’s new leader. The group did not share any photos of its new leader, nor did it reveal his name, instead referring to him only with his Nom-De-Guerre.

The inclusion of al-Hashimi al-Quraishi are possible indicators of Abu al-Hassan’s tribal background. Indeed, the IS has often sought to appoint leaders from the Quraish tribe, the original tribe of Prophet Muhammad and many early Islamic caliphs. This historical link is often held as a precondition for becoming a caliph by many modern Salafi Jihadis. When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared a Caliph, his connection to the Quraish bloodline was frequently emphasised in IS propaganda. His successor, Abu Ibrahim, was similarly given the “Quraishi” title despite him being widely believed to be a Turkman from Tal Afar. It is very possible that Abu al-Hassan does not actually belong to the Quraish tribe either and was bestowed the title for propaganda purposes.

However, given the lack of details around Abu al-Hassan, all such details remain speculative.

Ever since the IS announced the selection of its new leader, experts sought to decipher who he truly is. Citing Iraqi security officials, the Reuters news agency suggested that Abu al-Hassan is the brother of the group’s first caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

However, at least one claim has been made to cast doubts on that assertion, suggesting that Baghdadi’s brother is likely the group’s newly-announced spokesperson instead of the leader. Instead, it was suggested that the group’s new leader is Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaidai (also known as Ustath Zaid, Abu Khattab al-Iraqi, Abu al-Moez al-Iraqi and Abu Ishaq). He is believed to have been involved with the IS’ predecessor, Ansar al-Islam under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi during the 2000s before officially joining the IS in 2013. If these speculations are correct, this makes the IS’ new leader a veteran jihadi leader and one of the last remaining members of the IS’ original cadres.

What Does the Selection of a New Leader Mean?

Without knowing more about Abu al-Hassan and his background, it is difficult to ascertain how the new leadership will impact the group. However, some signs of the group’s main concerns and trajectory are apparent in the selection process as well as how this process was communicated with the wider public. Overall, the IS appears to be concerned with maintaining legitimacy among its supporters while offering a sense of continuity and resilience.

Just as the group is attempting to gain legitimacy from the distant past, it is also trying to connect itself to the jihadi struggles of the more recent times. If Abu al-Hassan truly is Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaidai, then his status as a veteran jihadi and a follower of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi would essentially confirm him as a hardliner who will not compromise or divert from the group’s ideological bedrock and virulent sectarianism. It is entirely possible that this was behind the group’s decision to message that Abu al-Hassan was handpicked as a successor by his predecessor.

Another message Abu al-Hassan’s selection sends is resilience. Although the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was met with some disbelief, concern and even panic among the group’s followers, the death of Abu Ibrahim drew little such reactions. In part, this was because he was not the leader of the group for a long time and was hardly visible. As far as the day-to-day affairs of the IS goes, his death appears to have had little impact.

Indeed, the group’s franchises around the world, especially in Africa, continued to launch and publish attacks, seemingly with little disruption. Overall, IS franchises from West Africa to Afghanistan appear to be committed to their objectives.

Following Abu Ibrahim’s death, experts noted that his death would likely have more symbolic consequences, as opposed to operational ones. This indeed appears to have been the case. However, even the morale damage predicted appear to have been limited. Instead, the group looks to have leveraged an orderly transition to show to the world that decapitation strikes will not end the group or dissuade its followers.

Ultimately, the IS’ goal to rebuild its strength by pursuing an insurgency will remain unchanged. In a bid to achieve this goal, the group will likely continue to follow tactics that resemble the tactics it pursued in the lead-up to its emergence as a territorial force in 2014. Such tactics include:

• To continue attacks on “apostate governments” in the MENA region to retain relevance and, where possible, free imprisoned supporters;
• To continue attacks on other jihadi factions deemed insufficiently devoted to Islam – such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda – to brandish its hard-line credentials;
• To continue attacking soft targets like community leaders to instil fear and suspicion in isolated communities;
• To exploit local grievances and failings in governance to gain supporters and recruits among local populations.

For a cell-based organisation, such tactics are easily achievable and do not require constant oversight from the leadership, reducing the need to engage in communications that could compromise the safety of the leaders. Instead, the leadership appears to be intended to serve as a source of inspiration, leaving cells capable of operating independently even in the aftermath of decapitation strikes.

After a US airstrike killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, the group that would become the IS was viewed as a spent force. His successor, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was similarly killed in a US raid in 2010, setting the stage for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the group’s eventual rise in Iraq and Syria.

Having experienced and emerged stronger from leadership losses, it is conceivable that the IS invested heavily into making the group more resilient against future strikes. Although the pool of the original jihadi leaders from the 2000s may be running low, the group retains large numbers of armed militants and supporters across Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It may also have as much as $50 million in reserves. Thus, viewing the group as a spent force on account of its reliance on jihadi symbolism to legitimise itself would be a mistake.

Regional and International Dynamics Will Influence the Actions of the IS

Although the IS’ inspiration and strategy may be drawing from the past, the group nevertheless finds itself in an environment quite different from when it rose to power nearly a decade ago.

Chief among such changes is the tone of caution among many experts about the group’s fortunes. Unlike the triumphalism seen in the 2000s and the early 2010s, experts today are adamant that the jihadi threat may resurge and that the elimination of the group’s leadership is not the end of the group itself. Unsurprisingly, post-conflict programmes in formerly IS-held areas have sought to address not only practical issues like reconstruction and services but also enhance community cohesion to make them more resilient against IS propaganda. The group may be employing its old playbook, but it will meet communities who are more aware of the group’s tricks.

The IS will also find the international jihadi scene a lot less welcoming compared to its emergence in the 2010s. When the group rose to power in Iraq and Syria in the 2010s, it did so through alliances with local factions, both jihadi and non-jihadi, before proceeding to co-opt or liquidate its former allies. Since then, the IS’ notoriety for violence was compounded by a reputation for picking fights with any faction that doesn’t pledge loyalty to the IS’ caliph. The IS has come into conflict with nearly every major jihadi faction around the world, with some local exceptions in West Africa and the Maghreb. As factions like the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria experiment with more pragmatic modes of governance, they will likely find the IS’ brand increasingly toxic.

However, other international developments may favour an IS resurgence. Chief among these is the on-going (and escalating) war between Ukraine and Russia. The world’s already-diminishing attention towards the MENA region was, practically overnight, turned towards Ukraine instead. With prospects of conventional, interstate war once again on the books, the preoccupation with counter-insurgency operations in the Middle East since 2001 may come to a gradual end. Indeed, even prior to the conflict in Ukraine, the US was drawing down its presence in Iraq, with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) conducting anti-IS operations with relative independence. Such improved capabilities are a far cry from the state of affairs when the IS emerged in 2014. Moving forward, it will be vital to ensure that local counter-terrorism and intelligence capabilities do not erode. Lulls in attacks, in particular, should not comfort security agencies into a false sense of comfort, as such lulls could be part of an IS subterfuge to wait for the world’s attention to fully move away from the group, allowing it to carve out a space in the MENA region more effectively.

More significantly is the possibility that the IS may exploit the war directly. In Syria, for example, IS militants remained highly active in the Syrian Desert, regularly attacking the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions and ambushing loyalist militias. Although Russian presence in eastern Syria is not widespread, Russian military and economic assistance nevertheless allowed the SAA to gain control of the region over the course of 2018, while the IS rule was collapsing. With the war in Ukraine potentially diminishing Russian assistance for the SAA, there is a possibility that IS’ insurgency may become ever-more brazen. Improved IS capabilities could then spillover into neighbouring regions such as those controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or across the border into Iraq.

Ultimately, much about the future of the IS remains uncertain, especially in light of lack of information surrounding the group’s new leader. The fact is that under the rule of Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, the IS faces a world that is both deeply changed from 2014, yet at the same time, worryingly similar.

The circumstances of Al-Qurayshi’s death were curiously similar to that of his predecessor, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The raid on Al-Baghdadi took place in Barisha, only an hour’s drive away from Atmeh. Both raids occurred in territory largely controlled by the group Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and extremely close to the Turkish border.

Two questions arise following this set of events – one specific and one more general:

1. How did both raids take place in territory that is controlled by a group opposed to both the US and the IS?
2. Are the killings of jihadist group leaders all they are made out to be?

The HTS itself has stated that it was oblivious to the presence of Al-Qurayshi in Idlib and was not privy to details of the US operation, which it officially condemned, despite HTS’ antagonistic stance towards the IS. Unwitting residents of the town of Atmeh also claimed that they were unaware of Al-Qurayshi’s presence in the area. While there is as of yet no evidence to prove or disprove that the HTS or local residents were unaware of Al-Qurayshi’s presence, it still begs the question as to why both IS leaders, as well as other elements of the group, chose to base themselves particularly in that part of the country.

Most of Syria is now under the control of the government in Damascus, while a significant portion is governed by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. Both political entities hold fiercely belligerent stances against the IS, both in terms of ideology and realpolitik. The HTS and its representative Syrian Salvation Government based in Idlib, nevertheless, is ideologically the closest political entity to the IS. Although they have relatively stark differences between them in realpolitik attitudes and even jihadist goals – the former working more within a nationalist framework while the latter has, since its inception, espoused global goals.

The HTS condemnation of the US raid can be interpreted largely in two ways that are not necessarily mutually exclusive:

• HTS has more or less secured a relatively high level of political sovereignty in Idlib province and any external forces directly infringing upon that sovereignty, even if it is against enemies, is subject to condemnation;
• HTS has a hierarchy of enemies which gives certain jihadist groups leeway when in opposition to the US or other such non-jihadist forces.

The second point has, nevertheless, been called into question and some observers even made claims of US-HTS-Turkey cooperation over the matter.  HTS’ recent accommodation of modern modes of politics and its intent to develop relations with states such as Turkey as a means of self-legitimisation, however, is starting to lend more credence to such claims. The group’s leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, has made a number of public appearances over the past couple of years in an attempt to rework his image as a jihadist tyrant. For instance, he has appeared in Western-style clothing at the opening of the Aleppo-Bab al-Hawa road as well as on television in an interview with American journalist Martin Smith from PBS. HTS’ goal of legitimising its rule at least in Idlib, considering its recent drive to shed its image as a terrorist organisation in the eyes of the US, may have trumped any ideological convergences with the IS. The allegedly “softening” stances of HTS may have thus proven costly for Al-Qurayshi, who may have counted on a more hard-line jihadist scene in Idlib when he first entered the area.

Regarding the second question, there are doubts being raised by counter-terrorism experts as to the effectiveness of focusing energies on “neutralising” the leaders of jihadist, especially global, groups. The past decade or so has seen the high-profile deaths of Osama bin Laden, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and now Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, all a result of US military operations.

There is nevertheless some uncertainty as to the extent to which their deaths have had an impact on minimising the activities of jihadists groups. There is an element of these operations that is geared towards domestic audiences, especially in the US, taking into account the language used by US presidents in recent history regarding the protection of “national security” and “national interests”. However, US counterterrorism strategy, especially in its presentation to the public, has placed genuine importance on “cutting off the head of the snake”. It sees the removal of key leaders of terrorist groups as an important element of causing disarray among such groups, thus, weakening them in the short and long run. Nevertheless, jihadist groups have proven to act more like the many-headed Hydra of Greek mythology rather than a single-headed snake.

Support for jihadist groups at the local level in the Middle East and elsewhere comes from a mix of factors: real grievances against dictatorial governments and what is perceived to be nefarious external interference (focused mainly on the US); local cultural and inter-communal sensitivities; and economic, social and political marginalisation.

An overarching ideology that claims to address these real-life human experiences on the ground has pulled in hundreds of thousands of adherents. Killing the leaders of such groups without addressing the root causes of why these groups remain capable of recruiting adherents is not sufficient.

Despite its totalitarian, discriminatory and hierarchical ideology, the IS has shown itself to be a flexible and multi-layered organisation with several branches and leaderships across the globe. Its ideology remains headstrong in several parts of the world as it exploits real grievances that are perceived to be rooted in the rule of local dictatorial governments as well as foreign interventions. Jihadist groups such as the IS garner local support against those forces by attaching the source of all evil(s) to the latter.

This is not only the case in Syria and Iraq, but also most prominently in Afghanistan, South East Asia, the Horn of Africa and also other parts of the world, where people join the group for broadly similar reasons, despite the differing local contexts. Al-Qurayshi represents one head of a multi-headed Hydra.

By all indications, the IS attack was intended to break out an estimated 3,500 IS militants, most of whom are foreigners. Among the prisoners are several high-ranking leaders of the group.

Although the SDF has managed to keep the situation from escalating, and numerous militants who escaped were captured, the situation nevertheless represents the exact type of nightmare scenario that SDF officials have been warning about since 2019. With an estimated 10,000 IS militants held in facilities across SDF-held territories in northern Syria, the attack on the Sinaa Prison once again highlights that the IS has not only remained a credible threat, but has now become emboldened enough to launch full-frontal assaults on high-security facilities.

Furthermore, the fact that the attack on the Sinaa Prison took place on the same day as an IS attack in an Iraqi outpost suggests some degree of coordination and could be a sign of future escalation of its insurgency operations.

While the fact that the IS attack on the prison was repelled is a positive development as far as local counter-terrorism capacities are concerned, the attack should nevertheless compel the authorities to reassess their capabilities and address any deficiencies in their response to the IS threat. Moving forward, members of the International Coalition should also address the lingering question of what to do with the captive IS militants. However, with numerous international crises diverting attention and resources away from Syria, implementing robust measures to manage these concerns will be an uphill task.

What Do We Know of the Attack?

Located in the Ghwayran District of Hasakah City, the Sinaa Prison (also known as Ghwayran Prison) holds about 3,500 IS militants, many of whom are foreigners. Like the al-Roj and al-Hol Camps, the prison has been long regarded as a tempting target for IS militants.

On the night of Thursday January 20^th, the IS detonated two car bombs along the walls of the prison before launching a ground attack on the prison itself in an attempt to free the inmates.

During the initial hours of the attack, the IS militants appear to have had success in taking control of parts of the facility. In the hours following the attack, IS militants posted videos showing freed militants, as well as some of the hostages they took.

Since then, however, the SDF and the International Coalition mobilised and established a cordon around the district, and announced a curfew across the whole city. The International Coalition carried out airstrikes around the prison, signifying the intensity of the fighting. The fighting remain sporadic as of Thursday, 27^th January as the SDF clears the last blocs still under militant control.

Overall, the SDF reported that 550 IS militants who escaped have surrendered or have been captured, while another 175 have been killed during the clashes. These numbers will almost certainly change as the toll of the attack becomes clearer in the aftermath. Among the most significant considerations will be whether the large majority of the prisoners managed to break out or not.

What Does This Bloody Day Signify?

The assault on Sinaa Prison took place on the same day as another bloody IS attack, this time in the Diyala Province of Iraq. There, suspected IS militants attacked an Iraqi army barracks in the al-Azim District 120 kilometres north of Baghdad, killing 11 soldiers. It was the deadliest attack of 2022 so far and one of the deadliest to take place since the group lost its territorial holdings in the country in 2017. The attack represented an upwards trend in high-casualty attacks, having followed another attack in the Makhmour Mountains last month in which ten people, including seven Peshmerga fighters, were killed. As a whole, the ISF warns that IS attacks around the Baghdad belt, especially around Tarmiyah and Taiji have picked up.

Overall, these attacks were some of the most brazen to be conducted by the militants. The International Coalition framed the attack as one of desperation. Indeed, the group was likely, in part, motivated by a need to grab the headlines after being eclipsed by a succession of developments around the world, including the Taliban victory in Afghanistan mid-2021. A high-profile attack on a secure compound aimed at freeing its militants would almost certainly have raised the group’s profile among the global jihadi scene.

Similarly, desperation can also be attributed to why the group launched such a high-profile attack to begin with. After all, it is entirely possible that the decision to free thousands of imprisoned militants was motivated by recruitment pools elsewhere drying up. However, framing the attack as being entirely motivated by desperation would be a grave mistake. The attack was, by all accounts, well-coordinated. Furthermore, it was able to proceed even after the authorities in Iraq busted an IS cell last November that was preparing for an attack on the prison.

Significantly, the attack did not take place in isolation but was rather a culmination of a years-long insurgency campaign in both Iraq and Syria that sought to keep security forces off-balance. Attacks targeting community leaders, checkpoints and other soft targets have been a regular feature, especially in areas controlled by the SDF. Although the group has remained weaker than it was during its peak, US military officials warned that the group’s operational capabilities are showing higher levels of “maturity”. In this sense, the attack on the prison, as well as the attack on the Iraqi army barracks in Diyala, may represent the next stage of the IS insurgency as it tries to make a comeback. Indeed, in our forecast for 2022, we noted prison break attempts as a possible sign of the group reconstituting itself.

Echoes of 2014?

At Integrity UK, we have frequently warned that the IS could go back to the insurgency model it pursued between 2008 and 2014.

During those six years following the IS’ defeat back when it was known as “Islamic State of Iraq”, the group waged a low-intensity but constant insurgency in northern Iraq, targeting security forces and community leaders while embedding itself among remote communities in the region. Prison breaks around Mosul and Tikrit were one of the hallmarks of this campaign and offered the group an easy source of loyal recruits. Already building strength, they have exploited the conflict in Syria, the political disorder in Iraq, and the withdrawal of the United States in order to operate openly, taking over large swathes of territory.

The situation today resembles that of 2008-2013 in many ways. Iraq is once again in the midst of a political crisis over endemic corruption and political deadlock that has triggered a major, nation-wide protest movement. The hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the on-going withdrawal in Iraq has similarly emboldened jihadi groups who are expecting a similar development to take place in Syria where the US-led Coalition continues to support the SDF. With international tensions also rising due to developments in Ukraine, it is possible that the IS saw the current situation ripe for the next stage of its insurgency.

These trends are certainly paying attention to, and are indicative of what the group may do next. However, the strategic and political landscape has changed significantly since the last decade.

First off, both Iraq and Syria have significantly improved counter-terrorism capabilities. In Iraq, in particular, years of intelligence and counter-terrorism development capabilities have allowed the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to become almost entirely self-sufficient. Although there remain many questions about operational capabilities and, in particular, coordination between the different branches, the skills, capabilities and morale of the ISF has improved significantly since 2014.

Similarly, the SDF and the US-led Coalition have spent the years since the destruction of IS’ territorial presence improving counter-terrorism capabilities. Although limited resources and a fraught political terrain limits the SDF’s capabilities, the group has nevertheless remained capable of busting IS cells. Furthermore, the fact that no significant breakouts have taken place from prisons despite repeated attempts by the militants – albeit none as ostentatious as last week’s attack – suggests that the SDF is, for now, capable of addressing security needs.

The jihadi scene is also far more fractured than it was in 2014 when the IS was able to build alliances with a smattering of other factions. Today, many other jihadi groups are mistrustful of the IS for their established track record of liquidating former allies. The success of more “nationalist” models of jihadi governance in Afghanistan and Syria’s Idlib may also make the IS model less attractive to prospective jihadi militants.

Moving Forwards

Any optimism to be had, however, needs to be tempered. With international attention gradually moving away from the Middle East, despite many of the structural factors that led to the rise of the IS remaining unaddressed, the group will almost certainly continue to exploit the so-called grey zones, deficiencies in governance or political instability to rebuild its brand and recoup its capabilities.

The most important matter to address will be that of the IS prisoners still being held in SDF facilities across Syria. Since capturing the IS stronghold of Baghuz almost exactly three years ago, the SDF has been adamant that it cannot keep the group’s foreign militants indefinitely. SDF officials have repeatedly called on countries around the world to repatriate their citizens to take the burden off the SDF while preventing the group from bolstering its ranks in the event of a prison break.

Thursday’s attack should be a wake-up call for any government around the world which still has citizens held in facilities across northern Syria. A recent sentencing of a German IS militant and his wife for their part in the Yazidi genocide may offer a legal precedent that can help other governments repatriate their own citizens and put them on trial. Achieving this, however, is contingent on creating an effective international framework that may simply not be possible in today’s fraught international climate.

Meanwhile, counting the cost in the aftermath of the attack is the most pressing priority for the SDF and the International Coalition. It is entirely possible that the IS attack on the Sinaa Prison ended up costing the group more than it gained. If that is the case, then security forces should take this as an opportunity to go on the offensive against IS sleeper cells.

If the IS, however, was successful in freeing large numbers of militants and absconding with captured equipment from the SDF, then the coming days will see intensified attacks on high-security installations. Developments around holding facilities such as al-Roj and al-Hol will be especially important to watch. The group may also launch more cross-border attacks in a bid to expand its operation range, denying the SDF, Baghdad and Damascus spaces to secure and govern along more remote areas.