For observers of democratic backsliding and rising violent extremism in India, the monk’s statements were hardly surprising. Over the 2010s, the secular model of civic nationalism that had been the hallmark of India’s ruling parties gradually eroded. Instead, there emerged a new strand of nationalism focused on Hindu ethnic and religious majoritarianism. Commonly known as Hindutva, Hindu nationalist movements have a long history in India. However, they had little political success until the election of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014. Since the election, India has seen a rise in hostile rhetoric against non-Hindu minorities, especially Muslims. Although the BJP itself balanced its rhetoric carefully to avoid accusations of discriminatory behaviour, many of the party’s supporters have engaged in increasingly aggressive behaviour.

Indeed, the conference in Haridwar, which is located in the BJP stronghold state of Uttarakhand, saw many prominent supporters of BJP engage in some of the most aggressive anti-Muslim rhetoric yet. In addition to Narsinghanand Giri, a Hindu nationalist leader by the name of Pooja Shakun Pandey called for a massacre of Muslims. Like Narsinghanand Giri, Pandey is now under police investigation.

The rising violent rhetoric has been accompanied by increased attacks on not just Muslims but wider minority communities. Indeed, the start of 2022 saw attacks against India’s Christians pick up. The rise in increasingly aggressive rhetoric and incidents has elicited warnings from Gregory Stanton, the director of Genocide Watch that India could witness a “genocide” against Muslims, especially in the state of Assam and the Indian-administered Kashmir. Stanton, who predicted the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda two years ahead, noted in a briefing that there were early “signs and processes” in India.

The BJP’s Balancing Act

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the country moved away from its traditional, non-aligned position in the international arena and sought to bolster its bilateral ties with the United States. The timing was auspicious for Modi, as the US, then under President Barack Obama, was increasingly pivoting towards Asia as part of its growing concerns with Chinese activities. A rising number of violent incidents between China and India, most notably clashes along the disputed regions of the Indian-Chinese Border in 2021, made such realignment an even greater priority for New Delhi. The growing ties are apparent in the increased attention given towards the Indian diaspora in the US by politicians and presidential candidates.

At a time when President Joe Biden is emphasising the need to counter the threat from the far-right, growing far-right extremism in India risks complicating bilateral ties. While the growing significance of bilateral ties between the two countries can offer New Delhi some protection from criticism, the Biden administration, already dealing with foreign policy crises from Ukraine to Afghanistan, can ill-afford violent social upheaval in a regional partner.

Thus, the escalation of violent extremism in India presents a challenge for the ruling BJP: BJP leaders face the need to counter the most virulent of extremist rhetoric in order to allay growing international criticism. But doing so will risk backlash from the BJP’s more extreme constituents whose actions and views have been tacitly endorsed by BJP’s “silence” over the years. While such challenges were easier to manage under the administration of President Donald Trump, in part due to linkages between the supporters between Trump and Modi, they will be far more challenging to manage under Biden.

These challenges, as well as the sheer virulence of the extremist rhetoric emerging from India, may be why authorities chose to take action against Yati Narsinghanand Giri and Pooja Shakun Pandey. Around the same time, India had already come under fire for enabling anti-Muslim extremism following the emergence of an app, Bulli Bai, that shared photos of Muslim women for “sale”. Authorities in India have since taken action against the app as well.

Through these investigations and criminal charges, New Delhi is likely attempting to draw the line in how much is permitted in the public discourse and to regain control of the nationalist currents.

Riding the Tiger of Nationalism

There is an old Chinese phrase that posits that “When you ride a tiger, it is hard to dismount.” Observers of nationalism frequently applied this phrase in reference to the cynical utilisation of nationalist fervour by opportunistic politicians and parties around the globe. Observers note that given enough rein, the nationalist public can instead force politicians and parties to act more ideologically even when a more pragmatic course of action would be in the national interest. The “rider”, in effect, ends up at the mercy of the “tiger”.

China itself has been cited as an example of such dynamics. During moments of international tension, the Chinese Government utilised nationalist rhetoric for legitimacy but found itself having to constrain nationalist movements in the country when they became too aggressive to benefit Beijing’s pursuits of its interests.

There is a risk that the same thing could happen in India. Although India’s foreign relations needs makes clamping down on violent far-right rhetoric a pragmatic priority, such priorities will clash headlong with the domestic needs for the BJP to retain its supporters. If the “true believers” of Hindutva feel Prime Minister Modi is turning his back on their cause, they may threaten to back a leader who will be more willing to pursue it and push it even further.

Unfortunately for the BJP, such shifts come at a time when it is already struggling to retain its supporters. With general elections due 2024, there are signs that the party may not be able to repeat its successes in 2014 and 2019. After all, the years under the BJP have not only seen attacks against non-Hindu minorities, but Hindus of left, secular or progressive convictions as well, resulting in a fairly broad opposition that the BJP will not be able to woo before the next election. This leaves the BJP with few options outside digging its heels on populist nationalism.

Past research shows that when populists start losing power, they begin eroding the democratic structures and damage the systems of checks and balances within governmental institutions. There are some Indian pundits who fear this may take place in India if the BJP senses an impending electoral defeat in critical states, such as Punjab. Such a course of action will almost certainly polarise the country even further, empowering domestic extremists even as the country may find itself in increased international isolation akin to the likes of Turkey, Poland or Brazil.

Indeed, the cases of Turkey, Poland, Brazil and several other countries show that India is not an isolated case when it comes to democratic backsliding and rising extremist rhetoric. It is merely part of the trend that has defined the on-going dynamics in many liberal democracies since the mid-2010s. As 2022 rolls, however, India is reaching the point where both extremist rhetoric and violence are becoming commonplace. The far-right of Indian politics and society have been exploited by the rhetoric and policies of opportunistic politicians, leaving them more space to act according to the tenets of a strictly Hindu-based nationalism. Should Indian officials not intervene and de-escalate the situation, however, they may find violence across the country escalating, forcing them to take action under far more serious circumstances, which they may eventually be incapable of controlling.