World Government Conspiracy

The COVID-19 pandemic saw governments across the world implement vaccine programmes in order to halt the spread of the virus. Far-right groups across the world viewed the enforcement of this programme as an infringement on civil liberties, personal health (due to fabricated concerns around the vaccine), and personal choices – a common trope among such groups, emphasising the political disenfranchisement of individuals and local communities.

There are claims being propagated that the monkeypox outbreak is simply another excuse used by supranational groups in their supposed plan to transgress the national sovereignty of nation-states and form a single world government. As with COVID-19, this plan is being labelled as the “monkeypox plandemic” and it is being orchestrated by so-called elites in Davos, where the World Economic Forum (WEF) hosts its annual meeting, and organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and World Health Organisation (WHO). InfoWars, a website launched by far-right commentator Alex Jones, has claimed that the current health outbreak represents the “second phase” of the UN and WHO “plan”, embodied in the so-called “pandemic treaty” being proposed by the WHO. This implies a first phase, likely referring to the actions planned and implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. How national governments and international organisations harmonise their efforts, however, is not mentioned.

The actions and intentions of governments and international organisations are often complemented with those of multinational corporations. Far-right news website The Gateway Pundit has made an unsubstantiated claim that the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved a drug treatment for monkeypox developed by “Pfizer-linked” SIGA Technologies. The logic is that such corporations are profiting from global crises and governments/international organisations are moving towards the formation of a single global government hand-in-hand. Of course, Pfizer has been one of the main producers of the COVID-19 vaccine and so this supposed association creates an imagined causal link, if one is to accept that their actions during the COVID-19 and then the monkeypox outbreaks were pre-planned. Claims have even been made that the COVID-19 vaccine is causing monkeypox symptoms.

Sexualism

Criticisms of globalisation, political disenfranchisement and corporate profiteering are not limited to the far-right, but are also prevalent among elements of the left. However, one stark aspect that differentiates the far-right, especially at such times of health, economic or political crises, is their focus on shifting the blame towards “otherised” groups in Western societies based on race and sexual orientation.

The current outbreak of monkeypox is known to have originated in west Africa and the WHO has claimed that most cases of the disease have been identified among “men who have sex with men (MSM)”, wording which has been the subject of criticism, but which has been echoed by far-right sympathisers. This emphasis is closely related to the far-right’s general grievances against “liberal” lifestyles and so-called “cultural Marxism”, the alleged ideology that promotes positive discrimination and places excessive attention on the sufferings of marginalised and oppressed groups. Sexualism is the discrimination against people on the basis of their sexual orientation. The far-right is linking news about the spread of monkeypox through sex at raves in Europe with their general discontent about “woke” and liberal culture.

Racism

In terms of racism, just as was the case with COVID-19 and its origins in China, much is being made of the African origins of monkeypox. Far-right British commentator Paul Joseph Watson posted news about the Nigerian Centre of Disease and Control calling on people in the country to avoid eating the meat of monkeys and rats in order to prevent the spread of monkeypox. Watson commented on this news stating that “some cultures are better than others”.

Indeed, while far-right groups are being criticised for the open racism and sexualism, mainstream media is also being accused of fuelling the fire of prejudices against the aforementioned “otherised” groups. Similar xenophobic commentaries and even physical attacks were witnessed against Chinese and, in general, East Asians in western countries at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The current monkeypox outbreak is revitalising those xenophobic sentiments among far-right groups, who, as mentioned above, take advantage of times of crises to propel their ideological agenda.

Broken cassette tape

At moments of political, social and/or economic crises, the far-right reproduces the same narratives from the past and, by and large, finds the same scapegoats for the problems that arise during these crises. In addition, these narratives are often based on unsubstantiated conspiratorial theories that neatly fit into their ideological framework, but frequently do not reflect reality.

An interesting, and worrying, parallel can be made with the AIDS pandemic from the 1980s. Stigmatisation of certain groups of people, especially of the LGBTQ+ communities, was rife not only among far-right groups, but also the mainstream media, which had even referred to the pandemic as a “gay plague”, somewhat similar to the racialist naming of COVID-19 as the “China virus”.

The political class and media are at times feedings the arguments made by the far-right, despite the latter’s defiance of mainstream politics. One recent example of this in the UK is the conclusion of the UK-Rwanda asylum agreement, which seeks to deport asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda. The announcement of the deal was hailed by the far-right as a move that will help to curtail illegal immigration to the UK. In the US context, the presidency of Donald Trump was deemed to be a boost for the far-right in that country, a situation which has now changed with the election of Joe Biden, which led to the 2021 Capitol attack by far-right figures.

The mixture of a failure to address the social conditions that produce the far-right and the actions of the political elite that are at times harmonised with far-right ideology feed the broken cassette tape that repeat and, at times of crises, amplify rhetoric that does not shy away from racism, sexism and other forms of identity-based discrimination. In the contemporary context of social media, arguments and conspiracy theories made by the far-right are shared and disseminated all the more frequently within such networks at blistering speed. Certain social media companies, such as Twitter, have sought to crackdown on far-right groups online; however, such groups have circumvented these bans and have moved to other platforms, such as Telegram, where they share and forward content.

The interlinkage between conspiracy theories, discriminatory ideology and real-life crises embolden the far-right in the propagation of the aforementioned views. This is compounded by a lack of factual and structural analysis of the problems that are discussed. Although tackling the factual inconsistencies of far-right narratives is an important task in and of itself, it is not enough to address the emotive and structural issues that underpins far-right arguments. A political strategy that focuses on empowering local communities to confront the far-right’s prejudicial stances through participation in political processes and economic empowerment can help to alleviate these issues. Whether there is a political will to do so is another matter.

Through it all, extremist groups and movements have been highly active, either taking advantage of pandemic-related shifts in priorities to recoup their strength or outright use the pandemic for their own benefits.

Despite initial hopes that extremist groups and organisations would struggle to maintain relevance amidst the pandemic, such groups have found fertile ground for support as a result of an increased reach in online communications over the past two years. Today, they are leveraging a mix of conspiratorial misinformation and public dissatisfaction with the status-quo to drum up support.

In this report, we identify six regions that are of interest to practitioners of research on violent extremism. These regions consist of:

• The United States and Western Europe, which continue to see the proliferation of far-right groups focused predominantly on “multiculturalism” and non-White migration.
• The Post-Soviet Space which is seeing rising “alt-right” groups who emphasise their white, European and Christian identities and espouse an explicitly “illiberal” model of governance, especially on matters of minorities, women and LGBT+ people.
• Afghanistan where a violent jihadi group, the Taliban, ousted the US, galvanising similar extremist movements elsewhere.
• Iraq and Syria, which continue to witness activities by Salafist-Jihadi groups who are looking to recoup their strength after being driven underground during the 2010s.
• The Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa region where jihadist groups of several affiliations are in competition against one-another even as they ramp up their attacks on weak governments.
• Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia where the rise of Hindu and Buddhist extremism is threatening other, smaller minorities.

In each region, we will assess the prevalent extremist risk and look at past and present trends to estimate their trajectories in 2022.

Overall, our findings suggest that various manifestations of right-wing extremism are the most prevalent flashpoint. The United States and Western Europe, the Post-Soviet Space, and the Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia are all seeing manifestations of nationalistic or religious right-wing extremism.

Meanwhile, the threat from jihadi groups remain prevalent, especially in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and the Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa. However, each of these movements will likely spend 2022 focused on recuperation and consolidation as they recover from the 2010s which saw many such groups’ capabilities eroded by security operations. Infighting among these groups will likely reduce their immediate threat. Developments around renewed recruitment, fundraising, and mergers should be observed as a possible prelude to renewal of the jihadi threat.

The United States and Western Europe

For much of the first two decades of the 21^st century, concerns around extremism in the US and Western Europe were focused firmly on Islamic fundamentalist extremism. The September 11 attacks in 2001; the resulting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the emergence of Al Qaeda affiliates and later the Islamic State (IS) in 2014; and the resulting global terrorist attacks by the group’s supporters all contributed to such preoccupations.

While the attention on white-supremacist and far-right extremism remained relatively unfocused during this period, there was also increased mainstreaming of far-right voices whose rhetoric focused on anti-Islam, anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism, especially in the US where such rhetoric was often justified as protected on the basis of freedom of speech. Although high-profile far-right attacks, such as the massacre perpetrated by Anders Breivik in 2011, occurred, these were usually seen as aberrations.

The 2015 refugee crisis, however, reinvigorated the Western far-right while mainstreaming previously fringe theories such as the “Great Replacement” which posits that immigration is being used by a vague group of “globalist elites” to “replace” the white European population. Indeed, violent activities by such groups increased exponentially since 2015, especially in Europe. The electoral wins of populist nationalists in Europe and the US were also linked to this phenomenon.

Landmark developments in 2020, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic, further bolstered far-right movements. Reframing their ideologies around personal freedoms, such movements came to vehemently oppose COVID-19 restrictions, decrying them as a means of social control. As part of such reframing, they sought to present themselves as “champions of personal freedoms.”

A combination of other factors, including social tensions following the worldwide Black Lives Matter protests and the polarising rhetoric around the 2020 US presidential election, further increased tensions, culminating in the violent riots in the US Capitol where protesters of mostly far-right affiliations attempted to prevent the certification of the electoral win of the then-candidate Joe Biden.

The Western far-right has been on the defensive since the events of January 6^th a year ago. Despite some efforts to disavow the conspiratorial rhetoric and the de-platforming of some of the most vocal and extreme ideologues, the prevalent trend in the mainstream right has been one towards reframing the events of that day. Meanwhile, they have turned their attention towards single-issues that tend to be in the interest of minorities, such as reproductive and LGBT+ rights, while ensuring that any legislation that could hamper future electoral gains – such as voting reform – are deadlocked. In 2022, such efforts will likely gain further momentum.

The Western far-right is also showing signs of becoming more “modular” and more ideologically pragmatic. The COVID-19 pandemic and opposition to pandemic-related restrictions, for example, have brought the far-right in contact with previously-unrelated movements such as wellness and anti-vaccination movements. Such hybrid, “intersectional”, “single-issue” far-right movements appear to be gaining favour among those following cohesive but often-dogmatic movements such as neo-Nazis, and this process will likely continue in 2022.

The Post-Soviet Space

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the post-Soviet space has seen the proliferation of nationalist parties. On the whole, this is unsurprising, as nationalists such as Hungary’s current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, had been highly active in the anti-communist opposition movements. Across the post-Soviet space (as well as non-Soviet states such as Yugoslavia), nationalism was often instrumentalised as a unifying ideological foundation for societies who had lost their main unifying pillar. Such exploitation of ethnic and national tensions was instrumental in the breakout of the Balkan Wars. The radicalising aftereffects of those wars continue to inform the far-right movements in the post-Soviet space.

As early as 2013, it was estimated that Russia was home to the world’s largest neo-Nazi population at about 50,000 to 70,000, making up about half the global neo-Nazi population. Although the Russian Government officially opposed neo-Nazi groups, such groups nevertheless found an enabling environment in Russia owing to Moscow’s own opposition to so-called “Western values”, especially within the context of the rights for women and LGBT+ peoples; as well as immigration and multiculturalism vis-à-vis Islam. Tropes and slurs used against Bosnian Muslims in Balkan Wars have seen a revival in their application against to Muslims as a whole. With anti-Islam a driving force of the European far-right as well, there have been increased linkages between far-right groups in Western and Eastern Europe. German officials warned in 2020 that German neo-Nazis were training at the camps operated by the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), an organisation identified as a terrorist group by the US.

However, it would be a mistake to frame far-right in the post-Soviet space as exclusively Russian-aligned. In Ukraine, the Azov movement (or Azov Battalion), known for its recruitment of neo-Nazis and assault by its members on feminist, LGBT+ and left-wing activists, has come into conflict with the Russian-backed forces in eastern Ukraine. While the European far-right may have more links with Russia-based far-right groups, Azov has gained support among the far-right in the US.

The Caucasus has also seen increased manifestations of far-right movement. In Georgia, where far-right parties struggled to gain electoral traction, an enabling environment nevertheless allowed them to act with relative impunity. When far-right activists attacked the Tbilisi Pride rally in 2021, Georgian nationalist and religious politicians denounced the members of the rally for “provocation” instead of the far-right. Armenia, a relative outlier as far as far-right activity goes, has also seen the emergence of far-right movements such as Adekvad, which has, like its counterparts, supported “traditional” values and espoused illiberal, anti-feminist and anti-LGBT+ views. The country’s fresh conflict with Azerbaijan also allowed for anti-Muslim rhetoric to gain traction. While far-right movements in both countries have been accused of having links to Russia, their goals and means of gaining support have been decidedly local.

In 2022, such movements will contend with several dynamics. The Russian and Ukrainian far-right may be preparing for a new confrontation as tensions in eastern Ukraine rise once more. How such groups reconcile – or gloss over – their mutual hostility despite wider ideological alignments on a global scale may inform far-right movements around the world.

Furthermore, the increasing visibility of far-right movements in countries like Georgia and Armenia, which have been comparatively more successful in their democratic experiments, raises concerns for the health of their democracies and the future of their civil societies. Far-right groups in these countries had a relatively good year in 2021 owing to increased political tensions and rising polarisation against a backdrop of on-going COVID-19 outbreaks. As such, they will seek to retain momentum in 2022 by looking for ways to remain relevant, likely resorting to violent confrontations if all else fails.

Afghanistan

2021 was marked with the end of the US mission in Afghanistan. The mission which started in 2002 in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, ended with the rapid collapse of Afghan security forces following the US withdrawal, resulting in the Taliban gaining control of the entire country.

The Taliban’s renewed ascent to power has led many experts around the world to speculate that the country would, once again, become a hub of transnational jihadism as it was in the 1990s. Although the Taliban have vowed to not let terrorists use Afghan soil to launch attacks elsewhere again, the appointment of senior figures from the Haqqani Network – known for its close ties al-Qaeda and recognised as Taliban’s hard-line faction – to positions of power in the new Afghan Government suggest that the new Taliban rule will be hardly different than the old.

However, although victorious, the Taliban will face a tough challenge unifying and governing the many jihadist factions that operate in the country. How this threat is managed will, in turn, determine how the extremist threat in Afghanistan will develop in 2022 and beyond.

To begin with, although victorious, the Taliban is not unified. Although the exact dynamics are hard to predict, the group is known to have a more pragmatic “nationalist” wing and a more ideologically jihadi hard-line faction, the latter represented by the aforementioned Haqqani Network. In the aftermath of the fall of Kabul, there were reports of clashes between the two factions. Although the exact details of what took place were never confirmed, the ascent of Haqqani Network officials to senior positions and the resumption of the extreme practices that characterised the Taliban rule in the 1990s, suggest that Afghanistan’s new rulers have little interest in moderating their actions, even for token or pragmatic purposes. While they may shy away openly hosting transnational violent extremist groups, the Taliban, as a supporter of an anti-Western, hard-line fundamentalist ideology, will offer groups with similar ideologies an enabling environment.

Indeed, since the Taliban’s capture of Kabul, the previously frosty relations with Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the so-called “Pakistani Taliban”, have improved noticeably in 2021. Attacks by the group against Pakistani security forces rose concurrently. In 2022, observing such attacks and how the Taliban leverages them against its relatively-cordial ties with Islamabad will be vital towards determining the future direction of transnational jihadism in the country.

On the other side is Islamic State – Khorasan (ISK), an IS franchise that has waged a constant war against the Taliban even as both groups fought an insurgency against the US. The ISK has bucked the trend in the jihadist world by not congratulating the Taliban on its victory, but instead denouncing it as a fake victory. Since then, the ISK has increased its physical and propaganda attacks against the Taliban. There have also been signs of the ISK poaching support from the Taliban through accusations that the Taliban, by focusing on a more national agenda, has failed to adhere to true jihadi goals. If the ISK continues to gain support for its hard-line stance, it might force the Taliban follow through with similar hard-line actions.

Somewhere in between these groups lies al-Qaeda. Although the group lost significant credibility and capacity in the 2010s after initial gains during the starting years of the Arab Uprisings, it remains a credible actor with a recognised brand. Furthermore, the group retains its connection to the Taliban via the Haqqani Network. As such, despite the Taliban’s promise to not let Afghanistan be used as a springboard for transnational jihadism, there is a significant likelihood that al-Qaeda will use Afghanistan as a base of operations, albeit more covertly.

Lastly, there are the myriad jihadi factions who are broadly aligned with the Taliban but have differing specific concerns. Some of these groups such as Lashkar-e Taliba, Hizb-ul-Ahrar, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Turkestan Islamic Party and others, are too small to become major players. However, they can nevertheless act as spoilers or kingmakers, giving the larger groups incentives appeal for their support. Should these groups, like the TTP, escalate their attacks on their enemies outside Afghanistan, they can also bring attention from wider foreign powers that can complicate the Taliban’s calculations.

Come 2022, the goals of the Taliban and al-Qaeda will be consolidating their gains and manage a fractious militant landscape even as the country faces economic collapse and possible famine over the winter. Suppressing dissent and retaining stability while rebuilding capabilities will likely be their main goals, limiting their ideological investment to extremist causes. The ISK, on the other hand, will likely continue the trend of escalating its attacks on the Taliban to keep the group off balance.

It is unlikely that Afghanistan’s extremist landscape will see any significant developments in 2022. However, the trends that could lead to significant developments past 2022 will become apparent this year.

Developments outside Afghanistan are likelier to impact the extremist landscape in the country. In particular, many jihadi groups around the world experienced a boost to their morale following the US withdrawal. Jihadi ideologues around the world are now looking at the Afghan model to experiment with local governance within a national framework. Some foreign jihadi fighters in regions like Syria even expressed interest in travelling to Afghanistan.

Going forward, it will be important to watch for the movements of jihadi fighters into the country and understand which group they are supporting and why. Another item to watch will be on whether the Taliban will utilise its governance as a model for other jihadi groups as an instrument of soft power.

Syria and Iraq

For better part of the last decade, much of the attention of international security experts were dominated by the events in Iraq and Syria. Since the breakout of the Arab Spring and especially since the breakout of the Syrian Civil War, the region has witnessed immense radicalisation. Such radicalisation was facilitated by the severe violence of the conflicts after the Arab Uprisings that pushed people into a more radical path, alongside the flow of weapons, money and fighters into Iraq and Syria that also made the most extreme groups also the best equipped ones, pushing out the more moderate views.

The IS was the most severe manifestation of this phenomenon. The group not only took control of large swathes of Iraq and Syria, committing genocide against non-Sunni Muslims under its rule; it also went through great lengths to ensure that its ideology and method of governance would persist. Although the group’s holdings in Iraq and Syria were eliminated, IS supporters in these countries have proven themselves to be adept at evading capture and keeping the group alive in some capacity. Insurgent attacks, especially in areas lacking governance, are common. Civilian supporters of the group have also engaged in crowdfunding projects to help secure the release of IS captives in holding zones such as the al-Hol Camp in Syria while ensuring that the children held there are raised with the group’s ideology.

The IS isn’t the only extremist group whose activities threaten further instability. Opposition-controlled Syria, in particular, has become home to a host of groups of varying jihadi persuasions. During the earlier years of the Syrian Civil War, al-Qaeda, which had been whittled down in the previous decade, managed to re-establish itself with groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra representing its cause. Although Jabhat al-Nusra, now rebranded to of Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has broken off from al-Qaeda, it retains its jihadist, fundamentalist ideology and appears to be looking to emulate a Taliban-style national governance model. Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, retains the loyalty of some smaller groups.

Further groups operating in the region include groups who draw inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood (such as the once-significant Ahrar al-Sham); conventional Salafi Jihadism (such as another once-significant group, Jaish al-Islam); or foreign jihadist groups with national goals (such as Uyghur or Chechen factions). The prevalence of such groups in a small stretch of region consisting of parts of Idlib and Aleppo, means that groups of jihadist persuasions have essentially squeezed out any other competition and frequently engage in infighting for resources and influence.

Since the campaigns against the IS, as well as Russian-backed efforts to help regain Damascus wrestle territorial control from the Syrian Opposition, jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria have been on the backfoot. In Iraq in particular, successive attempts by smaller insurgent groups to fill the vacuum, such as the brief insurgency by the White Flags organisation, were quashed with relative ease.

However, IS-linked insurgent attacks in both Iraq and Syria are picking up. The group is following patterns similar to its insurgency between 2008 and 2013, hitting soft targets, operating in ungoverned spaces and inciting intercommunal tensions. With Damascus focused on consolidating its control amidst a severe economic crisis and Baghdad focused on resolving the state of political flux in the country, there is a risk that the fight against violent extremist groups will take a backseat.

While 2022 is unlikely to see any major developments to the jihadi landscape in either country, observers should keep an eye open for continued attacks and signs for jihadi groups, especially the IS, reconstituting themselves. As was the case in the lead-up to 2013, developments such as prison breaks and assassination of security personnel will be especially pertinent as a prelude to wider jihadi violence.

In the Idlib and Aleppo regions of Syria, observers should watch the efforts of the HTS to mainstream itself and the reactions of other jihadi factions. Although the jihadist landscape in Syria is deeply fractured, the Taliban victory in Afghanistan appears to have inspired some groups, including the HTS, to reassess their approaches to governance and influence. Such Taliban-inspired methods of governance, already in progress in Idlib where the HTS backs a civilian government by the name of the Syrian Salvation Government, will be essential to understanding the nature of the extremist threat in Syria over 2022.

Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa

Many jihadi groups traditionally considered the Sahel, Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa regions as low priority backwaters. Although the region has been home to some jihadi factions, including in Algeria where they were party to a civil war in the 1990s, such groups rarely rose to significant prominence and their activities seldom elicited international attention.

The last decade saw this dynamic changing. Sustained pressure on al-Qaeda and IS operatives in the Middle East, Europe, Caucuses and Afghanistan forced many of these groups to turn their attention and resources to other theatres to retain relevance. Regional and local dynamics, such as the spill over of the Libyan conflict following the collapse of the Gaddafi rule.

Today, Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, is emerging as one of the hotspots of Salafi jihadi activity. Exploiting weak governance, corruption, proliferation of weapons and widespread poverty are all allowing jihadi groups to gain influence in these regions.

Indeed, even before the COVID-19 pandemic, there were signs that extremist groups such as the IS were directing their attention to the region. In 2019, attacks claimed by the IS in West Africa inflicted casualties (dead and injured) just barely short of the casualties inflicted in Iraq and Syria. While IS claims are often dubious, the United Nations similarly warned of “unprecedented” rise in terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, with 4,000 terrorism-related deaths in 2019 alone. The growing prevalence of Africa in IS propaganda also represented a shift as the group attempted to justify its continued existence in the aftermath of its losses in Iraq, Syria and Libya. This trend continued in 2020 which marked the deadliest year across the Sahel, West, Central and East Africa. Today, experts warn that the region could become the new focus of global counter-terror operations. Such developments are even more significant amidst an on-going drawdown by Western powers that could offer violent extremist groups a vacuum that they could fill.

Perhaps the main factor that prevented such groups from becoming an even more tangible threat is their disunity. No single group holds sway over the jihadi activities in the region. Instead, there are many factions, some of which are independent while others have loose affiliations with the IS or al-Qaeda. Although these groups cooperate with one-another more often than their counterparts in other theatres, factionalism is nevertheless taking its toll. For example, the summer of 2021 saw the death of a jihadi leader of legendary status, Abubakar Shekau, the former leader of the Nigeria-based jihadi group Boko Haram. Although Shekau allied the group with the IS and declared his group as the West Africa Province of the IS (ISWAP), disputes over leadership led him to leave the group with his core followers and he was subsequently killed by his former allies. Overall, experts have noted that transnational jihadi groups have become entangled in local rivalries at the expense of wider jihadi unity.

Overall, however, even the jihadi disunity is coming at the expense of local governance. Both ISWAP and a local al-Qaeda affiliate, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), have continued their attacks on security forces. They are also engaging in other, soft-power manoeuvres such as providing governance, water, sanitation and education to areas under their influence, functions that national governments in the region often struggled with. Indeed, at present, failures in governance and lack of opportunities appear, as well as heavily-securitised state responses appear to be leading the push factors for local populations to support these groups, as opposed to anything novel these groups offer.

Come 2022, violent extremist factions, regardless of whether they are independent or linked with the IS or al-Qaeda, will work to entrench themselves in the areas under control. Acts of propaganda, both in the forms of attacks but also services and education in their extremist ideologies, will aim to gather more support for each individual group. While infighting will be the main obstacle to jihadi unity, mergers between factions or shifting of allegiances that characterise the factional dynamics in the region may form the basis of a more unified front.

Extremist factions will likely be galvanised by the Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Western troops from the region and may seek to avoid actions that may jeopardise the wider jihadi movement, even if they don’t formally end their hostilities. The recent deployment of Russian troops in Mali following the withdrawal of French troops may also factor into the calculations of these groups, given Russia’s recent actions against jihadi groups in Syria.

The Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia

As a central flashpoint in anti-colonial struggles, a major theatre during the Cold War, and the scene of various regional power rivalries, the Indian Subcontinent as well as the wider South and Southeast Asia regions have witnessed numerous waves of armed insurgencies of various levels of extremism. Towards the end of the Cold War and their aftermath, a number of Muslim insurgencies have emerged across the region, turning more extreme amidst the emergence of the wider global jihadi movement. In the 2010s, the extremist landscape of the region was further complicated by the proliferation of Hindu and Buddhist extremists.

In India, the Maoist Naxalite insurgency present since the 1970s is still considered the “gravest threat” to India’s internal security. Although the group’s stature has diminished since the 2000s, it remains entrenched in its strongholds such as Chhattisgarh. Although the group has tried to take advantage of the farmer protests in India, it has yet to make a sizeable impact and there are presently no signs that this will take place in 2022.

Indeed, to outsiders, groups such as the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba are better known than the Naxalite insurgency, being responsible for the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. The clampdowns that followed the 2008 attacks, however, diminished the group’s abilities. Much of the group’s activities since then have been limited to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indian-administered Jammu Kashmir. Although the group did conduct attacks on the security forces in Jammu Kashmir, it has not performed a high-profile attack since 2008. The group may continue its attacks in Kashmir and may even engage in provocations between India and Pakistan, similar to the attacks by Jaish e-Mohammed in 2019 that nearly led to an Indian-Pakistani military escalation. Although the situation in Afghanistan where the Taliban have been victorious may benefit the group, it is unlikely to be highly active in 2022.

Across the wider region, although Islamic insurgencies exist, many of them, such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid in Indonesia; Jemaah Islamiyah, Darul Islam Sabah in Malaysia; Patani United Liberation Organisation, Barisan Revolusi Nasional – Koordinasi in Thailand have only been active sporadically.

Of all the jihadi groups present, Abu Sayyaf, an IS affiliate also known as the group’s East Asia Province, represents the most significant jihadi faction. The group was responsible for the capture of the city of Marawi in the Philippines in 2016. Although the group was ousted since, with its leader killed, there are on-going concerns among experts that the relative lack of reconstruction in the region and low levels of sustained counterinsurgency efforts are allowing supporters of the group keep up recruitment. Indeed, a 2019 bombing at a church in Jolo, southern Phillipines, which was claimed by the IS, shows that the group remains a threat. However, the relative lack of activity surrounding the group over the past couple years could suggest that 2022 will be mostly dormant for the IS as it recoups its losses. Recruitment of foreign militants from the region and attempts to elicit support of other dormant jihadi factions will likely be key indicators of Abu Sayyaf activity in 2022.

Indeed, today, the main source of extremist activity in the Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia does not come from Muslim or Maoist extremists but Hindu and Buddhist extremists. Although Hindu nationalist groups such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have a long history in India, this group – alongside Buddhist groups motivated by similar goals such as Bodu Bolu Sena (BBS) in Sri Lanka and Ma Ba Tha in Myanmar – have gained popularity in the 2010s. These groups have often incited hatred against their respective countries’ Muslim minorities, espousing majoritarian ideologies that explicitly “othered” Muslims. Anti-leftism, femonationalism[1] and anti-multiculturalism are frequent hallmarks of such ideologies. Thus, some experts have framed Hindu and Buddhist extremist movements as local variants of the alt-right movements present in Western Europe and the US. Indeed, the two sides, at times, attempted to cooperate towards mutual goals such as supporting the election of Donald Trump.

Myanmar, in particular, has seen the most violent manifestation of such extremism. After fighting between security forces and a local insurgent group claiming to represent the Rohingya Muslims in the country erupted in 2012, the government of Myanmar engaged in what has described as “ethnic cleansing” against the Rohingya population. Militant Buddhist nationalism and anti-Muslim rhetoric that othered the Rohingya people as foreigners was a common part of the campaign. However, both India and Sri Lanka have seen similar manifestations. Violent attacks against Muslims in India have become commonplace and the community has been subjected to numerous moral panics including conspiracies of a “Corona Jihad” involving Muslims deliberately spreading COVID-19. In all three countries, high-ranking government figures have remained noticeably quiet about attacks on Muslims and acquittals of those who attacked Muslims remain common. Internationally, such attacks drew little attention owing to the preoccupation with Islamic extremism over the 2010s, which has allowed Hindu and Buddhist extremists to frame their actions as defensive.

Come 2022, these extremist movements appear to be growing more volatile. In Myanmar, the country’s military forces have begun attacking Christian towns and villages following activities by rebels in these areas. Eyewitnesses reported that the language and tactics used by the military in Christian areas were similar to those used against the Rohingya, suggesting that the extremist narratives that targeted one minority is now being used to target another.

A similar dynamic is playing out in India where anti-Christian mobs have picked up their attacks against the country’s much smaller Christian population. Prominent Indian politicians have remained quiet or outright denied that such attacks are taking place.

Come 2022, this trend will likely continue amidst the continued conflict in Myanmar and rising polarisation in India and Sri Lanka. Geopolitical concerns, such as Washington’s need to keep India close as part of its pivot against China, will likely mean that international pressure over such attacks will be muted, emboldening the extremists in these countries.

[1] Defined as using the cause of feminism and the protection of women against “dangerous” foreigners.

Using the Syrian resettlement programme from the mid-2010s as a template, the UK government launched an Afghan resettlement scheme intending to house and integrate an estimated 15,000 Afghans who have been evacuated so far. To this end, the UK government is working with charities and local councils to smoothen the process.

However, the scheme is already attracting backlash from the British right, especially the far-right. Many of the criticisms and narratives around Afghans in this context resemble those about the Syrians during the refugee crisis between 2014 and 2016. There is now a risk that the Afghan crisis could reinvigorate the far-right groups similar to how the Syrian refugee crisis reinvigorated them, allowing them to take their politics further mainstream.

This paper makes a comparative analysis between the Syrian and Afghan refugee crises. In doing so, it looks at the far-right narratives between the two crises, highlighting the similarities and differences.

The author notes that far-right narratives tend to come pre-packaged, following similar patterns and allegations with each refugee or migration crisis. These are then moulded around actual developments on the ground to further the far-right agenda. As such, this paper recommends that the UK government remain alert and responsive to any development that can be capitalised on by the far-right, including petty crimes with no terrorism links or political motives.

This paper also recommends that the UK government cooperates with Afghan organisations already present in the country to ensure accurate assessment of demands and needs, as well as better understand the difficulties the new arrivals face in order to formulate more effective responses. This will reduce the chances of individuals falling through the cracks in the system.

Background

Over the summer of 2021, Afghanistan witnessed a severe shift in fortunes. In the aftermath of the United States proceeding with the withdrawal of its forces, the Taliban made rapid gains across the country, systematically capturing provincial capitals across the country, culminating in the capture of Kabul City on August 15^th.

One of the most enduring questions of the Coalition presence over the past 20 years was about the fates of the Afghans who sided with the Coalition (or against the Taliban) and have earned the group’s enmity. For many officials in the West, ensuring that their local allies were not targeted by the Taliban was a pressing concern.

Thus, the daunting scenes of Afghans – many of whom feared such Taliban retribution – clamouring to leave the country and the resulting chaos at the Hamid Karzai Airport was emblematic of such fears. The rapid Taliban victory forced many countries, including the United Kingdom, to scramble their resources in a bid to evacuate as many people as they can.

As of early September 2021, it is estimated that the UK evacuated about 15,000 Afghans, with many of them due to be settled in the UK[1]. Dubbed ‘Operation Warm Welcome’, the resettlement initiative is modelled after the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme which was launched in 2014[2]. Across the UK, more than 100 councils have agreed to take Afghan refugees, with councils being offered grants to buy homes for larger families[3].

As part of the relocation scheme, the Afghan arrivals will be offered;

• Indefinite leave to remain, including the right to work immediately and the option to apply for British citizenship.
• The right to send their children to school right away.
• Access to a new portal where members of the public will be able to share offers of housing, work and donations.
• Access to NHS services and GP registration.
• Help with getting a national insurance number and finding accommodation.
• Immediate COVID-19 Vaccination[4].

It is expected the whole process could cost as much as £2.5billion, with many local councils likely to require additional funding to cope with the situation[5].

Reactions from the Public, British Right and the Far-Right

Overall, the mood regarding the situation has been cautious. The government has emphasised the need for giving a “warm welcome”, with mainstream right-wing media outlets like the Daily Mail emphasising the status of these individuals as “allies”[6], likely in an attempt to blunt criticism towards Boris Johnson’s Conservative government[7].

However, reactions in the public have been more mixed. While a very significant majority of the public does not see the crisis as being Boris Johnson’s fault[8], there is nevertheless some trepidation over how Downing Street will respond to the crisis. Already experiencing a severe economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic and ancillary impacts from Brexit, members of the public on social media expressed concerns about Afghan refugees being given homes even as the country continues to grapple with a housing crisis[9].

Others highlighted the apparent contradictions between the government’s anti-migrant stance with accepting refugees[10].

While such grievances themselves are not far-right talking points themselves, they do cover issues the far-right tends to capitalise on. Oftentimes, such narratives will then be joined into the dehumanising narratives about Afghans (or Muslims, or other foreigners) themselves.

For instance, posting on its Telegram channel, the far-right group Patriotic Alternative accused the Conservatives of being “traitors” for accepting refugees despite their claims that they want to prevent immigration, presenting themselves as the “Alternative”[11].

Similarly, Britain First’s Telegram channel capitalised on the housing crisis, with a sarcastic remark that Britain “is a massive country and [it has] plenty of room[12]. Britain First, alongside the former founder of the English Defence League, Tommy Robinson, also attacked the men who have arrived for not fighting the Taliban[13].

Other, more fringe groups, like Resistance England, opted for downright conspiracies, claiming that all the 25,000 Afghans due to arrive in the UK are men. The group’s statement claimed that they had left their families behind despite plenty of evidence in the media to the contrary[14].

Meanwhile, former UKIP and Brexit Party leader, Nigel Farage, stoked fears that the arrivals could harbour potential terrorists as well as encourage the arrival of economic migrants from other countries[15].

Comparisons to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

There are many different dynamics between the Syrian and Afghan refugee crises. However, especially in the domestic UK context, parallels can be drawn easily. This is evidenced by the fact that the Syrian refugee resettlement scheme has been reactivated.

Indeed, when one compares the narratives of the far-right between the Syrian and Afghan crises, one can see many parallels.

For example, Nigel Farage’s claims about the arrivals harbouring potential terrorists is a rehash of his claims about the Syrians refugees in 2016. Back then, Farage claimed that the refugees could include terrorists belonging to the Islamic State (IS)[16]. In warning about potential security risks, however, Farage took to dehumanising refugees as a whole, using the issue as a rallying point to support the then-ongoing Brexit campaign[17]. Indeed, Farage’s claim back then that the refugees consisted predominantly of men reflects Resistance England’s claims of a similar nature today.

Other alarmist parallels can also be drawn. Responding to the arrival of the Afghan refugees, the far-right group, For Britain, claimed that Muslims would bring Sharia law into the country and that Muslims would rape European women, describing the situation as “hell on Earth”[18]. Such descriptions harken back to the words of politicians across Europe in 2015 wherein they warned of “swarms” of refugees, citing their Muslim religion as a reason to deny them entry[19] or when members of far-right groups rioted in Dover against “third world scum”[20].

Such narratives are typical of the far-right. Indeed, narratives of a similar nature crop up periodically whenever there is instability in a Muslim-majority country with access to Europe, as was seen during the Libyan refugee crisis[21]. This highlights that far-right ideologues don’t so much form their narratives around real events, but rather formulate their narratives to fit them around real events.

This explains why anti-refugee sentiments in Europe and the rest of the West did not become mainstream until several high-profile incidents. For example, the German Eurosceptic and anti-refugee party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) did not surge in support until after the incidents in Cologne in the New Year of 2016 during which numerous women were attacked, allegedly by refugees[22]. The events then were seen as a watershed moment for Germany’s open-door policy and they were followed by not only a drop in refugee acceptance in Germany[23], but also numerous vigilante attacks on uninvolved individuals.

Such shifts had further effects around Europe, including the UK, where a 15-year-old Syrian refugee was racially assaulted by a British boy[24].

During such incidents, far-right figures such as Tommy Robinson stoked the flames by posting unsubstantiated and downright fake information about the Syrian boy[25]. Similar unsubstantiated claims about refugees also erupted in the aftermath of criminal incidents involving refugees, whether it was real or supposed. In the German town of Chemnitz, allegations of a shopkeeper’s murderer being a refugee were enough for the far-right to exploit the incident and stage a protest that descended into violent rioting[26].

Implications and Recommendations

The fact that the far-right does not react to real developments, but rather pre-packages its narratives, which it then moulds to developments on the ground, is significant and may hold the key to the UK government avoiding a far-right backlash to its Afghan refugee policy.

In particular, the far-right narratives at present appear to be purely anticipatory, with little to no actual events to capitalise on. Thus, if work is done to prevent the occurrence of any dubious incidents involving Afghan refugees in the UK then we are likely to see a waning of the far-right’s focus on them. This work must involve an integration process that will provide the Afghan refugees with the means to socially and economically integrate into the local geographies across the country where they are being settled. As the experiences in Chemnitz show, crime relating to refugees, even petty crime with no political or terroristic motivations, can be explosive. Thus, ensuring that such refugees do not fall through the cracks of the social care system will be essential, especially amidst reports that some Afghan refugees are already struggling with the Home Office integration system, as well as access to essentials[27].

However, even in the absence of incidents that the far-right can capitalise on, there is a risk that members of far-right groups can engage in provocations such as the numerous incidents involving far-right ringleaders “raiding” hotels where suspected refugees and asylum seekers were housed[28]. While such tactics were not commonplace during the Syrian refugee crisis, they have become a favoured tactic by the far-right in the years since and could stoke tensions even further.

It is also recommended that local councils hosting the Afghan refugees hold welcome events that include members of the local community. Past experiences in Germany during the Syrian refugee crisis showed that direct interaction and exposure between the local community and the refugees can improve relations and reduce anti-refugee sentiments[29].

In addition, cooperation with the media to present the Afghan refugees in a positive light may yield fruitful results. Initial conversations with the refugees have shown that a large proportion of the men are ready and eager to start working and that they have brought with them skills from Afghanistan that have the potential to contribute to economic prosperity.

The fact that many of the arrivals consist of Afghans who have been cooperating with British personnel in Afghanistan can be highlighted in order to rebut claims made by the far-right that the refugees are intent on acting against British interests. Indeed, given that the far-right tends to lionise the armed forces, positive testaments about the Afghan arrivals from the members of the armed forces who worked with the Afghans could be of immense value in countering far-right narratives.

The fact that far-right figures like Tommy Robinson voiced support for the pension rights of the Gurkha soldiers[30] suggests there is room for some – albeit limited – acceptance for non-British individuals who have nevertheless helped the armed forces. While Robinson framed the rights of the Gurkhas as mutually exclusive with support for the Afghans, showing that both issues are on the same side of the fence could yield positive results.

Through it all, responding timely and effectively to public concerns about the crisis, as well as ensuring that the far-right cannot capitalise on any incidents that may take place in the UK or elsewhere will be vital towards preventing any flare-ups of tensions and violence.

___

[1] https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9954421/Resettling-Afghan-refugees-cost-British-taxpayer-2-5billion.html

[2] https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9921315/Councils-given-grants-rent-buy-family-homes-house-Afghan-evacuees-families.html

[3] Ibid.

[4] https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9954421/Resettling-Afghan-refugees-cost-British-taxpayer-2-5billion.html

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/16053161/dominic-raab-poll-afghanistan-crisis/

[8] Ibid.

[9]https://m.facebook.com/login.php?next=https%3A%2F%2Fm.facebook.com%2FTheIndependentOnline%2Fposts%2F10159662373451636&refsrc=deprecated&_rdr

[10] https://www.facebook.com/10downingstreet/posts/10159810298223453

[11] https://t.me/PatrioticAlternativeOfficial

[12] https://t.me/BritainFirst

[13] https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/uk-right-wing-angry-plans-resettle-afghan-refugees

[14] https://t.me/theresistanceengland

[15] https://www.thenational.scot/news/19517196.gb-news-nigel-farage-condemned-divisive-rhetoric-afghanistan-refugees/

[16] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants

[17] Ibid.

[18] https://www.forbritain.uk/2021/08/22/sunday-column-afghan-refugees-will-bring-hell-on-earth

[19] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-far-right-s-rise-and-dehumanising-conflict-victims-are-greatest-barriers-joint-european-action-10492109.html

[20] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/fascist-anti-fascists-violent-clash-dover-immigration-refugee-demonstrations-a6843596.html

[21] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/01/refugee-crisis-europe-mediterranean-racism-incarceration

[22] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/germany-s-right-wing-afd-party-surges-new-high-concern-refugee-rises-a6810726.html

[23] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/cologne-attacks-support-refugees-germany-plummeting-amid-far-right-protests-and-vigilante-attacks-a6808616.html

[24] https://www.thesun.ie/news/3463696/teen-suspected-of-waterboarding-15-year-old-syrian-refugee-jamal-comes-from-a-family-with-convictions-for-far-right-offences/

[25] https://www.thesun.ie/news/3463696/teen-suspected-of-waterboarding-15-year-old-syrian-refugee-jamal-comes-from-a-family-with-convictions-for-far-right-offences/

[26] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/8/28/far-right-anti-fascists-clash-in-east-german-town-of-chemnitz

[27] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/afghan-refugees-toorhpaste-nappies-hotels-home-office-uk-b1915908.html

[28] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/asylum-seekers-housing-coronavirus-far-right-migrant-hotels-channel-crossing-a9687811.html

[29] https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/dice-report-2017-4-steinmayr-december.pdf

[30] https://tlgrm.eu/channels/@TommyRobinsonNews/23836