The general elections offered citizens a chance to voice their political choices, albeit within the same political framework and confessional system as before. Have these developments translated into drastic changes in Lebanese politics and the government following the elections? Yes, and no.

What exactly happened in the elections?

The large majority of parties that participated in these elections are the very same parties that have prevailed in Lebanese politics for the past few decades. There has, nevertheless, been a shift in preferences as the bloc containing Hezbollah and its allies lost the majority it had gained in the 2018 elections.

Hezbollah itself retained all 13 seats in parliament it held since the 2018 elections. However, Hezbollah allies, including Amal, the Free Patriotic Movement and others (Sunni parties such as Al-Ahbash), saw fairly substantial losses, leading to an overall loss of majority for the bloc.

Out of the “establishment political parties, the greatest gains were made by the Lebanese Forces, winning six extra seats. The Lebanese Forces have now become the most dominant Christian party in the country, surpassing the Hezbollah-aligned Free Patriotic Movement. This may be an indication of grievances held by Christians following the Beirut Port blast, which predominantly struck Christian-inhabited areas.  In addition, the warehouse that exploded allegedly belonged to Hezbollah.

The most significant change came in the surge of independent candidates and political activists originating from civil society and the general protest movement. The seats held by independent candidates saw a fourfold rise, from seven seats in 2018 to 28 in 2022. At least five of the 19 MPs for Beirut are considered independents; and two candidates even won seats in southern Lebanon (Firas Hamdan and Elias Jarada, the Druze and Greek Orthodox candidates in the South 3 list), the traditional strongholds of Hezbollah and its allies. This is a clear indication of the changing attitudes in Lebanese society towards establishment politics and the traditional parties.

Following the elections, the media focused predominantly on the losses incurred by Hezbollah, as opposed to the gains made by independents and reformists. Such focus can lead to outsized expectations about the weakness of Hezbollah despite the party itself managing to retain all its seats.

Nevertheless, the influence held by the bloc that includes Hezbollah is likely to diminish as a result of their electoral losses. This was felt even before these elections as support for Hezbollah has notably waned in the past few years among both the Shia, but also Christians and others who supported, or at least tolerated, the group.

Iran in Iraq and Lebanon – any parallels?

The parliamentary elections in Iraq in 2021 represent an interesting parallel when it comes to political groups backed by Iran. The principal pro-Iran political group in that election, Fatah, led by Hadi al-Ameri, saw a significant loss (losing 31 of its 48 seats). The rival Sadrist Movement, critical of Iranian influence, received the highest number of seats and they are looking to form a majority government as part of the Saving the Homeland Alliance.

The election results were initially denounced by the pro-Iran parties, leading to protests by their followers. A subsequent assassination attempt against the Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, suspected to have been made by a pro-Iranian Iraqi militia in protest of the results, but these claims have yet to be confirmed. Regardless, such militia groups have also continued to commit attacks in both Iraq and Syria against American and other targets (often claimed to be linked to Israel). Such incidents were often followed by political wrangling between the pro and anti-Iran factions. Tehran has continued pushing Sadr to include its allied parties in the new government, while Sadr himself has attempted to limit this influence.

Despite these setbacks and rising political violence in the aftermath, Iran and parties that support Tehran have still shown some pragmatism to work within the system and (re-)consolidate their positions. Iran may be more inclined to use its geopolitical leverage (for instance when Iran sent fuel to Lebanon via Hezbollah during the country’s fuel shortage crisis in 2021) to maintain its influence, rather than relying as much on the actions of those parties. While there are grounds for comparisons, the situation in Lebanon is ultimately different than that in Iraq.

Iraq has been in a state of war for the better part of the past decade, especially during the war against the Islamic State that raged from 2013 to better part of 2018. Militia groups have sprouted in this environment and have at times taken political matters into their own hands. This is currently not so much the case in Lebanon. There is at present no internal state of war and any semblances of a shift towards inter-communal violence are approached in a sensitive manner in a country that experienced, and is still reeling from, a 15-year civil war between 1975-1990. Hezbollah has not shied away from using force within Lebanon, as was seen during the protests, however, it is highly unlikely that the group will respond militarily to the election results in order to not further destabilise the internal situation in Lebanon and, thus, lose more support.

Signs of Change

Hezbollah’s internal support in Lebanon has largely come from its ability to provide public services to poorer elements of Lebanese society, especially in the south of the country, in addition to its image as a “protector” of Lebanon against Israel as well as extremist Sunni Islamist groups, which has also attracted sympathy from certain Christians. The more or less disappearance of the extremist Sunni Islamist threat and the embroilment of Hezbollah (as well as other establishment parties) in corruption scandals amidst the economic crisis have largely contributed to the loss of faith in the Hezbollah-led bloc. This is in addition to the shift in support among pro-Hezbollah Sunni, Druze and Christian communities who have voted for independent reformists in these elections.

Hezbollah retains immense military, social and political capital and will not relinquish its influence anytime soon. In fact, the extent of the loss of its political influence is still undetermined, as the opposition have yet to form a unified coalition that would win a majority.

The independent candidates as of yet seem unlikely to join such a coalition as their platforms are based on opposition to established parties. There will be a battle to win the hearts and minds of Lebanese citizens in primary concerns such as the provision of public services and economic security.

Geopolitical alliances that have frequently determined the nature of support for parties in Lebanon in the past decades may have lost their importance since 2019. Moreover, the protest movement, which has attracted a significant proportion of the electorate, was forthright in its anti-sectarianism, seeking to reduce insecurities between ethno-religious communities and to foment solidarity across confessional lines. Internal political and economic issues seem to have trumped all other concerns, with the Hezbollah-led bloc being the first to suffer from this shift in public concerns.