Following the first two attacks, the Egyptian military launched counter-terror offensives on May 11^th, particularly around Sheikh Zuweid and Rufah, where there are relatively higher levels of IS activity. The military announced that 10 IS militants were killed. In a subsequent operation on May 13^th, another 13 “terrorists” of unspecified affiliations were reportedly killed.

The number of terrorist attacks across Egypt had somewhat subsided since 2018. However, there has been a resurgence of attacks in February of this year. The uptick in attacks followed the IS prison attacks in Syria and the killing of IS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi. This form of guerrilla warfare employed by the IS in Sinai seems to replicate a general trend in IS strategy, as in Syria and Iraq, of maintaining a covert network that conducts sporadic attacks on military targets, rather than seeking to gain control of territories.

In the Egyptian case, the government has sought to not only eliminate terrorist groups military, but it has also employed a “developmental” approach by investing and residential projects in the Sinai. Although local allegiances in the Sinai to terrorist organisations such as the IS are partly explained as a reaction to the crackdown on Islamist groups following the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammed Morsi in 2013, as well as normalisation with Israel, economic negligence of the region is also known to be a significant factor. The Egyptian government’s developmental strategy aims to alleviate some of those grievances in tandem with their military operations, however, the state-centric nature of this strategy, which is intimately linked to military interests, does not necessarily represent local interests.

The vast desert landscape in the Sinai, much like in Syria and Iraq, allows for the IS and other terrorist groups to operate covertly and maintain a presence away from the watchful eye of the state. Thus far, eliminating the IS’ leaders and simply employing a direct military strategy has not led to the complete disbandment of the group. Whether Egypt’s developmental strategy will produce long-term results remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to eradicate the ideological basis of the IS and alleviate the structural political problems that brought in adherents in the first place.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | April #2 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• Egypt announces aid to Sudan following the visit of Sudanese Army General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo
• The IMF increases its growth projection for Egypt for FY 2021-22 despite the impact of the Ukraine-Russia war
• Militia groups once again stop production in Libya’s El Feel oilfield, evidencing growing splits between eastern and western regions in the country
• Algeria and Italy sign energy deal
• Saudi crude exports reach their highest level since April 2020
• The new presidential council in Yemen is inaugurated, with further signs that Saudi Arabia is looking to exit the conflict
• Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, reopen embassies in Lebanon, pointing to an easing of tensions
• The Islamic State (IS) conducted an attack on an Iraqi army outpost in Anbar Province
• The World Bank projects economic growth in Iraq of 8.9%, largely due to higher oil prices

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | December #2 2021

In this edition, we cover:

• Postponement of elections in Libya amidst further signs of renewed conflict across the country.
• Iran’s Ambassador to Sana’a recalled to Tehran before passing away from Covid-19.
• UN Secretary General meets Lebanon’s President, Michel Aoun, to discuss the ongoing social, political and economic crises, as well as assurances that elections will be held in March 2022.
• The Syrian Government publishes its 2022 budget, with a large year-on-year drop, attributed to Damascus’s ongoing economic woes.
• Muqtada al-Sadr reaches out to rival Shia parties in an attempt to build a political consensus.
• Egypt’s trade picks up with China and East African states.
• Jordanian officials host Saudi-Iranian talks amidst a sign of thaw in relations.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | December #1 2021

In this edition, we are covering:

• The UN warns that the situation in Libya may become too unstable for elections, amidst polarising candidates and growing militia impunity
• Further details emerge about the attempted assassination of Iraq PM al-Kadhimi
• Israel and Egypt Foreign Ministers meet in Cairo

• The removal of the Grand Mufti of Syria and the IRGC Head in Syria from their positions – what are the implications for their removal in Syria and the wider region?
• Libya’s updated candidate list for the country’s December 24th elections – who has been approved and rejected by the electoral commission?
• Jordan’s energy and water agreement with Israel, the UAE and the US – what were the responses from Palestinians in the country and the implications for the Saudi-UAE rivalry?

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | November #2 2021

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | November #1 2021

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | October #2 2021

MENA Geo-Political Risk | October 2021 | Integrity UK

In this report, we focus on Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan.

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