These operations come on the heels of an increasing number of attacks perpetrated by the ISK against the Taliban, in particular since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, suggesting ongoing fragility and insecurity, as well as an ever more fractured jihadi landscape.

With the Taliban still struggling to establish themselves as the new rulers of Afghanistan, it appears that the ISK is attempting to fill the vacuum in transnational jihadism to represent itself as the truer, more Islamic alternative to the Taliban. In doing so, the group appears to be recruiting non-Pashtun jihadi fighters to its cause while exploiting the Taliban’s practical and ideological vulnerabilities.

The ISK Exploits the Taliban’s Ideological Weak-Points

Between August and November 2021, more than 50 attacks were claimed by the ISK, not only targeting Taliban military assets like checkpoints, but also civilian assets, especially those used by persecuted minorities like the Shia Hazara. Some of the attacks in November claimed high casualties across Kabul, Jalalabad, Ghazni, and Kandahar.

One would expect that Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan – given its status as a hardline jihadi group – would be a source of celebration for the jihadi cause as a whole, regardless of their ideological differences. However, in the jihadi world, the group has stood as an outlier in not only condemning the Taliban’s victory, but also attempting to discredit them. However, several factors are likely motivating the ISK’s ongoing hostility towards the Taliban.

First of all, since losing its so-called caliphate in Syria and Iraq (and smaller franchises elsewhere), and facing widespread condemnation from Islamic leaders for its actions, the IS has been trying to justify its continued existence. As such, the Taliban’s more nationally-oriented goals – with the clear favouring of the Pashtun ethnicity – stand in sharp contrast to the IS’ more transnational goals, allowing the ISK to present its Salafi Jihadi ideology as a purer, more authentic alternative to the Taliban’s Pashtun nationalism-inspired jihadism. Indeed, the IS already attempted this in Syria where it denigrated the more nationally-focused jihadi groups such as its one-time partner, Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra).

The fact that the Taliban has entered talks with the United States has further allowed the ISK to frame the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul not as a victory but as an “agreement” with what the IS refers to as the enemies of Islam.

Such views were further hardened after the Taliban expressed a desire to establish relations with China to appeal for aid and prevent the Afghan economy from collapsing. Beijing, seeing an opportunity to clamp down on possible Uyghur insurgents and looking to avoid instability that could strike its interests, reacted warmly.

While these choices by the Taliban were logical from a pragmatic point of view, they nevertheless enabled the ISK to launch ideological broadsides against the group.

Instead, the ISK presented itself as an alternative home for the mujahideen, or foreign fighters, especially those from the Central Asian republics who tend to be more hostile towards China than the US.

Tensions between the Taliban and other Central Asian jihadi factions are nothing new. As early as 2015, the Taliban clashed with non-Afghan jihadi factions like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) when the latter splintered in support of the ISK. Similar clashes erupted in 2018 between the Taliban and a faction of Central Asian militants who attempted to join the ISK.

Thus, it was expected that these tensions would come to a head following the Taliban’s capture of Kabul.

Enter Uyghurs

Given these tensions, a suicide attack claimed on a Shia mosque in Kunduz in October stands out. The attacker, as the ISK mentioned in its statement, was an Uyghur, a rarity in itself. As a result, the bombing was interpreted by some experts as the ISK “punishing” the Taliban for its attempts to build ties with Beijing. An excerpt allegedly from an India-focused IS-linked publication named The Voice of Hind, was cited as proof of this notion by some analysts, as the publication referred to the bomber as a “a knight of Allah from China”.

While one might balk at the ISK “punishing” the Taliban by attacking a mosque belonging to a minority that was persecuted under the Taliban as well, the attack makes more sense when one views it as a “warning shot” against the Taliban and China. Simultaneously, the ISK informed the world that:

• The ISK is recruiting Central Asians, especially Uyghurs, at the expense of the Taliban (regardless of how many Uyghurs are actually part of the ISK);
• It is capable of launching high-casualty attacks despite the Taliban’s efforts to consolidate the monopoly on violence;
• It has China in its crosshairs.

Many commentators have focused on the China angle, suggesting that the attack by an Uyghur operative heralds the transformation of transnational jihadism waging a war against China – and perhaps Russia – as opposed to the US. Such analyses undoubtedly have some validity. However, it risks overlooking local dynamics.

One such dynamic is economic: It is no secret that the withdrawal of the US and many Western aid organisations have left the Afghan economy on the verge of collapse. The budding ties between Beijing and Kabul under the Taliban were in part intended to stave off such collapse, with Beijing in particular making a big show of the resumption of Chinese imports of Afghan products like pine nuts.

However, such Afghan exports pale in comparison to the country’s prospective rare earth riches, towards which Beijing repeatedly expressed interest in exploring and developing. In the past, such prospective investments were hampered by chronic insecurity and instability in Afghanistan and it is unlikely that many Chinese firms, already facing strong economic challenges, will be willing to enter risky ventures in a country that can see Chinese citizens targeted. Indeed, tensions have been rising between Beijing and its erstwhile ally, Islamabad, over recurring attacks that have targeted Chinese staff and assets.

Thus, the attack in Kunduz and the use of Uyghur operatives can easily be viewed as an attempt by the ISK to spook Beijing out of Afghanistan, restrict one of the few economic outlets Kabul has under the Taliban, and frame the resulting instability as the Taliban’s fault to gain further legitimacy.

While we have little insights into the finances of the ISK, IS supporters as a whole have proven themselves adept at fundraising and crowdfunding even when driven underground. As it stands, an Afghan economic collapse could easily allow the group to recruit disaffected Afghans, just as it has used its coffers to recruit disaffected Iraqis and Syrians.

Indeed, China is already showing signs of disengagement from an increasingly-unstable Afghanistan. Behind the optimistic statements of cooperation between Beijing and Kabul, Chinese security officials have been bolstering counter-terrorism capacities around Afghanistan, especially in Tajikistan where they are reportedly financing a counter-terrorism base along the Afghan border.

There are few good options for Taliban: It can double-down on Pashtun nationalism and fight a war against the ISK and, potentially, other jihadi groups. In doing so, however, the Taliban will risk losing the goodwill it earned from the wider jihadi world following the US withdrawal and isolate it further, leaving the group even more beholden to the goodwill and demands on regional and global powers. This is unlikely, as the Taliban already indicated its unwillingness to conform to international demands when it appointed sanctioned individuals and hardline jihadi leaders to important positions including but not limited to the Ministry of Interior. The group can ill-afford a jihadi blowback as it works to consolidate its power in Afghanistan.

Conversely, the Taliban may attempt to placate the transnational jihadist currents by offering safe havens or, at the very least, enough space to operate on their own accord. This would appeal to the interests of both the ISK, as well as Taliban allies such as al-Qaeda while making Afghanistan a haven for international jihadis looking for a new base of operations. In this eventuality, however, the Taliban is unlikely to have full control over the armed factions and militants in the country, risking the growth of factions that can challenge its authority, as well as international retribution if one of these factions chooses to launch an overseas attack similar to 9/11. At best, it would still leave Afghanistan a pariah state, with the Taliban forced to contend with a restive population, an economy in tailspin and an unsteady geopolitical position surrounded by hostile powers.

All in all, the preservation of the Afghan state and internal stability will be the top priorities for the Taliban, as well as neighbouring states. Appeasing groups such as the ISK is more than unlikely to yield any benefits for the aforementioned actors and so few will regard it as a viable option. Moreover, the ISK is still relatively a very small group in terms of numbers within Afghanistan. Its attacks on civilians and military targets and the media attention they receive are not quite in proportion to the group’s numbers and political capacity. The Taliban and neighbouring superpowers, such as China and Russia, are likely going to clamp down on the ISK in an attempt to herald a period of stability for Afghanistan, even if it is under the rule of the Taliban. How these actors respond to these terrorist attacks and also to local populations who support the ISK will determine the success of the goal concerning stability.