Bi-Monthly MENA Report | July #1 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• BP awarded rights to explore gas in West Nile Delta area
• Protestors storm parliament in Tobruk, Libya
• Kais Saied confirms constitution referendum on 25 July in Tunisia
• Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman concludes tour of Middle East
• OPEC meet to discuss oil output arrangements
• Lebanon to import natural gas from Egypt via Syria
• Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi visits Saudi Arabia and Iran

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | June #2 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• Egypt signs MoU with Israel and EU on transporting gas
• Fresh military clashes take place in Tripoli, Libya
• Algeria cuts trade ties with Spain
• Saudi Arabia plans reduction in oil exports to China
• Kuwait set to experience budget surplus for first time since 2014
• Russia and Iran try to talk Turkey out of military operation in Syria
• Sadr orders his bloc to withdraw from Iraqi parliament

Background

Unilateral military interventions by Turkey, which have been absent since Northern Cyprus in the 1970s, have now become a frequent feature in its foreign policy towards Syria. Since 2015, Erdogan, whose ruling AKP had lost its majority in the elections, has expressed intent to create the 30-km “safe zone” in the north of Syria. The stated attempt is to prevent the formation of a Kurdish-majority state run by Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, now named the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Ankara regards AANES as a political extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), long regarded by the Turkish state as a threat to its territorial integrity due to its goal of creating a Kurdish state. A number of military operations were conducted between 2016 and 2020 in attempts to create the aforementioned “safe zone”. A watershed moment in this regard was Operation Euphrates Shield, launched in August 2016, which paved the way for Turkey’s direct interventions inside de jure Syrian territory. However, up until this point, those operations have led to the occupation of only certain pockets of territories in northern Syria, in tandem with Syrian rebel forces on the ground.

What is the Purpose of the “Safe Zone”?

Ankara’s primary stated aim in the creation of the “safe zone” is to prevent “terrorists” from conducting any attacks in Turkey. The predominant military force currently present in the north and east of Syria is the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with the primary faction being the People’s Defence Units (YPG), a group ideologically related to the PKK in Turkey. Kurdish separatism has been a concern of the Turkish state since its establishment and have been further amplified since the formation of the PKK in the 1980s. Cross-border interactions between Kurds (and other ethnic groups) in Turkey and Syria led to the formation of a common political culture among significant parts of these populations. As a result, numerous political and military forces, including Kurdish-dominated forces, emerged in the aftermath of Damascus losing authority in these regions since 2011. Turkey’s stated concerns are thus primarily political and ideological as it is wary of the political programme propagated by the aforementioned groups taking hold within Turkey.

Prior to the war in Syria, Damascus and Ankara regulated their mutual concerns regarding the Kurdish issue through the 1998 Adana Agreement, which aimed to uproot pro-PKK Kurdish political activism in Syria. However, the political disarray in Syria led to a perception in Ankara that Damascus was no longer capable of enforcing the agreement. As a result, Turkish officials cited unilateral actions as their main option. A similar pattern has also emerged regarding Turkish military operations in northern Iraq, where PKK elements have based themselves. Turkey has recently increased its aerial airstrikes on the PKK, as well as its efforts to get Baghdad to align with its goals.

Why Now?

With Ankara’s plan to create a 30km “safe zone” already in the works over the past years, the TSK has already been undertaking some of the more practical steps towards its objectives. However, such steps have slowed down and even outright paused over the past two years, suggesting that Ankara was done with military interventions. So, why is Erdogan now calling for renewed operations?

One reason is that shifts in the geopolitical map have aligned in such a way that Ankara feels more at ease launching another cross-border intervention. Perhaps most significantly, Russia’s own cross-border military operation in Ukraine has played a role in this shift. One of the main obstacles to Ankara’s wishes to go ahead with another military intervention in northern Syria has been Russia’s opposition to a further Turkish push into Syrian territory.

However, with the severing of diplomatic ties between several Western countries and Russia, as well as the Western sanctions on Russia, Moscow is keen to maintain its diplomatic relations with countries that have retained relations. Although Turkish-Russian relations have experienced bouts of tensions over the course of the Syrian war, Moscow is now demonstrating greater willingness to take Ankara’s interests into account. Early in June, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, expressed Russia’s opposition to Turkey’s military plans in northern Syria. However, only a week later, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that Russia “fully understands” Turkey’s concerns.

Another related development is Sweden and Finland’s proposed accession to NATO. Turkey is currently vehemently opposed to their accession, in particular that of Sweden’s. In recent years, Sweden accepted refugees from Turkey with sympathies towards, or expressing outright support for, the PKK and YPG. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has recently stated that Turkey’s concerns are “legitimate”, providing Turkey with further room to pursue its ambitions in northern Syria in the knowledge that NATO will not directly oppose those plans. In sum, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have increased Turkey’s geopolitical capital and bargaining chips both vis-à-vis Russia and NATO, allowing Turkey to take further unilateral action in Syria at this juncture.

Finally, perhaps the most significant internal reason that is pushing Ankara to take this step is the growing domestic political resentment in relation to the currency and debt crisis and increasing anti-refugee views. Although the two issues are not directly related, opposition forces are capitalising on general discontent and linking both issues in their accusations directed at the current government. Erdogan has consequently asserted that the proposed “safe zone” will accommodate a million Syrians who have sought refuge in Turkey. He added that their return will be “voluntary”, despite several accounts in recent years demonstrating that Syrian refugees have already been forcibly deported to other parts of northern Syria that have already been occupied by Turkey. Such domestic dissatisfaction has already led to AKP losing Ankara and Istanbul in 2019 local elections. Recent opinion polls point to the AKP haemorrhaging support, which bodes badly for the general elections in June 2023. With 2023 also being the centennial of Turkey’s founding, the timing of these renewed military operations appears, at least partially, to be related to the AKP’s need to maintain domestic legitimacy.

Possible Repercussions

Although the geopolitical winds are currently favouring Ankara, there are serious potential risks involved with a renewed military operation in northern Syria.

Firstly, in terms of potential geopolitical consequences, Turkey’s proposed military operation has met sustained criticism from the US and Iran. Washington has supported the SDF in their fight against the Islamic State (IS), something that already strained ties with Ankara. Although former US President Donald Trump ordered the withdrawal of US troops in northern Syria in 2020, a contingent has remained in the region and it continues to provide the SDF with support. American officials have warned that the Turkish intervention will lead to an emboldening of the IS in the region. Indeed, the IS prison outbreaks that took place earlier this year are testament to the threat that the group continues to pose. Although the US has previously attempted to prevent direct Turkish interventions into northern Syria, they have thus far failed to stop them, at best limiting Turkish-led advances and sending signals to Ankara through economic sanctions. The US’ partial withdrawal initiated in 2020, along with American reluctance to further deepen already tense diplomatic tensions with Turkey, will likely limit the US’ response to Turkey’s military operation to somewhat innocuous public criticisms.

Iran, on its part, has categorically expressed its opposition to the military operation. Iran and Turkey have thus far avoided direct confrontation in Syria; however, the villages of Zahra and Nubl will fall within the scope of Turkey’s proposed “safe zone”. These two villages have gained significant strategic importance for Damascus and pro-Shiite forces from Iran, Iraq and Lebanese, who have supported local forces against Sunni rebel groups throughout the conflict. Iran-backed groups directly coordinated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are allegedly already stationed in both towns. A Turkish-backed military offensive would thus risk Turkish-Iranian military clashes.

Iran has also regularly criticised the previous Turkish military operations in northern Syria and Turkey’s support for Syrian opposition groups. Turkey and Iran are more or less on the same page when it comes to the PKK and Kurdish rebels inside their respective state borders. However, both states are on opposite camps in Syria, with Tehran likely viewing Turkish-backed groups as a greater threat than the SDF. Thus, neither country is likely to seek a compromise on the matter as Turkey is insistent on creating the “safe zone” and Iran is reluctant to lose its influence within Syria that could threaten its belt of allies running across Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

Secondly, the political and military situation within Syria itself will undoubtedly change following any the potential Turkish operation. If Ankara insists on creating the 30-km “safe zone”, it will be its most ambitious intervention to date and will lead to the reconfiguration of relations between a host of internal actors, including the AANES (and its military wing, the SDF), Damascus, and the wide array of Syrian opposition groups. Indeed, the SDF leadership have already stated that they are willing to coordinate a defence with Damascus. While, Damascus has yet to openly announce its stance on any possible coordination with the SDF, the Syrian Army already has a history of collaboration with the SDF in anti-IS operations, and has in certain cases agreed to support the SDF against Turkish-backed advances. However, political negotiations between the AANES and Damascus has been stalled for years, and both sides have failed to reach any compromise on the question of autonomy in northern and eastern Syria. A potential Turkish-backed offensive will likely accelerate those talks and put the AANES in a more dependent position.

In addition, the main Opposition faction in Idlib, Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has recently been conducting military drills in anticipation of an alleged Syrian government offensive. HTS are considered rivals of other Syrian rebel groups, most notably of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), now known as the Syrian National Army (SNA). Both groups, which themselves are composed of various factions, have recently sought to mend their ties. However, such efforts have been hampered by factionalism and infighting within the FSA/SNA. There is a possibility that the proposed Turkish military operations against mutual enemies – the SDF and the Syrian Army – could help bring greater rapprochement between these factions.

Finally, the proposed military operations will inevitably lead to humanitarian consequences. There are a number of precedents to refer to in this regard from previous Turkish-led military operations in northern Syria. The occupation of Afrin in 2018 led to a string of human rights violations as documented by Human Rights Watch. Following the Operation Peace Spring in 2019, as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated that over 200,000 were displaced and civilian casualties directly resulted from the operation. Civilian populations continue to inhabit the area targeted by Erdogan as part of the “safe zone” and, consequently, mass displacements and civilian casualties are inevitable.

All in all, the Turkish government and TSK will have made both political and military calculations before stating its intent on going ahead with their attempt to create a “safe zone” in northern Syria. The current geopolitical climate seems to indicate that regional and global players are highly unlikely to make any counter-intervention, especially relevant in the case of Russia. The diplomatic relations with countries critical of the operation are in all likelihood going to maintain their status quo. The response from Damascus will be highly significant in affecting both geopolitical and internal dynamics. Military involvement from Damascus would effectively lead to an inter-state war between Turkey and Syria and this may prolong the conflict in the north.

In the case where the SDF will stand alone in the face of the Turkish-backed offensive, it is difficult to imagine how it will prevent the formation of the “safe zone”. However, Damascus is unlikely to remain silent on such a substantial incursion into its sovereign territory, and so Syrian-Turkish relations will in any case be dealt a further blow. Whatever the political implications of the potential Turkish military operation in northern Syria would be, the humanitarian cost is a priori undisputable.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | June #1 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• Egypt announces new “golden licenses” to attract investors
• Tunisia’s President announces constitutional referendum for July
• Algeria central bank governor dismissed
• Morocco increases security cooperation with Mauritania
• Gulf banking sector reports robust growth in 2021
• Yemen ceasefire extended by two months
• The UAE enters investment partnership with Jordan and Israel
• Lebanon’s Parliament holds first session
• Damascus reinforces its positions in northern Syria
• Iraq’s Parliament approves law criminalising normalisation with Israel

Following the first two attacks, the Egyptian military launched counter-terror offensives on May 11^th, particularly around Sheikh Zuweid and Rufah, where there are relatively higher levels of IS activity. The military announced that 10 IS militants were killed. In a subsequent operation on May 13^th, another 13 “terrorists” of unspecified affiliations were reportedly killed.

The number of terrorist attacks across Egypt had somewhat subsided since 2018. However, there has been a resurgence of attacks in February of this year. The uptick in attacks followed the IS prison attacks in Syria and the killing of IS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi. This form of guerrilla warfare employed by the IS in Sinai seems to replicate a general trend in IS strategy, as in Syria and Iraq, of maintaining a covert network that conducts sporadic attacks on military targets, rather than seeking to gain control of territories.

In the Egyptian case, the government has sought to not only eliminate terrorist groups military, but it has also employed a “developmental” approach by investing and residential projects in the Sinai. Although local allegiances in the Sinai to terrorist organisations such as the IS are partly explained as a reaction to the crackdown on Islamist groups following the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammed Morsi in 2013, as well as normalisation with Israel, economic negligence of the region is also known to be a significant factor. The Egyptian government’s developmental strategy aims to alleviate some of those grievances in tandem with their military operations, however, the state-centric nature of this strategy, which is intimately linked to military interests, does not necessarily represent local interests.

The vast desert landscape in the Sinai, much like in Syria and Iraq, allows for the IS and other terrorist groups to operate covertly and maintain a presence away from the watchful eye of the state. Thus far, eliminating the IS’ leaders and simply employing a direct military strategy has not led to the complete disbandment of the group. Whether Egypt’s developmental strategy will produce long-term results remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to eradicate the ideological basis of the IS and alleviate the structural political problems that brought in adherents in the first place.

World Government Conspiracy

The COVID-19 pandemic saw governments across the world implement vaccine programmes in order to halt the spread of the virus. Far-right groups across the world viewed the enforcement of this programme as an infringement on civil liberties, personal health (due to fabricated concerns around the vaccine), and personal choices – a common trope among such groups, emphasising the political disenfranchisement of individuals and local communities.

There are claims being propagated that the monkeypox outbreak is simply another excuse used by supranational groups in their supposed plan to transgress the national sovereignty of nation-states and form a single world government. As with COVID-19, this plan is being labelled as the “monkeypox plandemic” and it is being orchestrated by so-called elites in Davos, where the World Economic Forum (WEF) hosts its annual meeting, and organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and World Health Organisation (WHO). InfoWars, a website launched by far-right commentator Alex Jones, has claimed that the current health outbreak represents the “second phase” of the UN and WHO “plan”, embodied in the so-called “pandemic treaty” being proposed by the WHO. This implies a first phase, likely referring to the actions planned and implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. How national governments and international organisations harmonise their efforts, however, is not mentioned.

The actions and intentions of governments and international organisations are often complemented with those of multinational corporations. Far-right news website The Gateway Pundit has made an unsubstantiated claim that the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved a drug treatment for monkeypox developed by “Pfizer-linked” SIGA Technologies. The logic is that such corporations are profiting from global crises and governments/international organisations are moving towards the formation of a single global government hand-in-hand. Of course, Pfizer has been one of the main producers of the COVID-19 vaccine and so this supposed association creates an imagined causal link, if one is to accept that their actions during the COVID-19 and then the monkeypox outbreaks were pre-planned. Claims have even been made that the COVID-19 vaccine is causing monkeypox symptoms.

Sexualism

Criticisms of globalisation, political disenfranchisement and corporate profiteering are not limited to the far-right, but are also prevalent among elements of the left. However, one stark aspect that differentiates the far-right, especially at such times of health, economic or political crises, is their focus on shifting the blame towards “otherised” groups in Western societies based on race and sexual orientation.

The current outbreak of monkeypox is known to have originated in west Africa and the WHO has claimed that most cases of the disease have been identified among “men who have sex with men (MSM)”, wording which has been the subject of criticism, but which has been echoed by far-right sympathisers. This emphasis is closely related to the far-right’s general grievances against “liberal” lifestyles and so-called “cultural Marxism”, the alleged ideology that promotes positive discrimination and places excessive attention on the sufferings of marginalised and oppressed groups. Sexualism is the discrimination against people on the basis of their sexual orientation. The far-right is linking news about the spread of monkeypox through sex at raves in Europe with their general discontent about “woke” and liberal culture.

Racism

In terms of racism, just as was the case with COVID-19 and its origins in China, much is being made of the African origins of monkeypox. Far-right British commentator Paul Joseph Watson posted news about the Nigerian Centre of Disease and Control calling on people in the country to avoid eating the meat of monkeys and rats in order to prevent the spread of monkeypox. Watson commented on this news stating that “some cultures are better than others”.

Indeed, while far-right groups are being criticised for the open racism and sexualism, mainstream media is also being accused of fuelling the fire of prejudices against the aforementioned “otherised” groups. Similar xenophobic commentaries and even physical attacks were witnessed against Chinese and, in general, East Asians in western countries at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The current monkeypox outbreak is revitalising those xenophobic sentiments among far-right groups, who, as mentioned above, take advantage of times of crises to propel their ideological agenda.

Broken cassette tape

At moments of political, social and/or economic crises, the far-right reproduces the same narratives from the past and, by and large, finds the same scapegoats for the problems that arise during these crises. In addition, these narratives are often based on unsubstantiated conspiratorial theories that neatly fit into their ideological framework, but frequently do not reflect reality.

An interesting, and worrying, parallel can be made with the AIDS pandemic from the 1980s. Stigmatisation of certain groups of people, especially of the LGBTQ+ communities, was rife not only among far-right groups, but also the mainstream media, which had even referred to the pandemic as a “gay plague”, somewhat similar to the racialist naming of COVID-19 as the “China virus”.

The political class and media are at times feedings the arguments made by the far-right, despite the latter’s defiance of mainstream politics. One recent example of this in the UK is the conclusion of the UK-Rwanda asylum agreement, which seeks to deport asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda. The announcement of the deal was hailed by the far-right as a move that will help to curtail illegal immigration to the UK. In the US context, the presidency of Donald Trump was deemed to be a boost for the far-right in that country, a situation which has now changed with the election of Joe Biden, which led to the 2021 Capitol attack by far-right figures.

The mixture of a failure to address the social conditions that produce the far-right and the actions of the political elite that are at times harmonised with far-right ideology feed the broken cassette tape that repeat and, at times of crises, amplify rhetoric that does not shy away from racism, sexism and other forms of identity-based discrimination. In the contemporary context of social media, arguments and conspiracy theories made by the far-right are shared and disseminated all the more frequently within such networks at blistering speed. Certain social media companies, such as Twitter, have sought to crackdown on far-right groups online; however, such groups have circumvented these bans and have moved to other platforms, such as Telegram, where they share and forward content.

The interlinkage between conspiracy theories, discriminatory ideology and real-life crises embolden the far-right in the propagation of the aforementioned views. This is compounded by a lack of factual and structural analysis of the problems that are discussed. Although tackling the factual inconsistencies of far-right narratives is an important task in and of itself, it is not enough to address the emotive and structural issues that underpins far-right arguments. A political strategy that focuses on empowering local communities to confront the far-right’s prejudicial stances through participation in political processes and economic empowerment can help to alleviate these issues. Whether there is a political will to do so is another matter.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | May #2 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• Egypt announces privatisation of 12 state and army-owned companies
• UN-backed Libya peace talks resume in Cairo
• President of Algeria meets Russia’s Foreign Minister
• Morocco reopens land borders with Spanish enclaves
• President of the UAE dies; Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed appointed President
• Saudi Arabia economy projected to surpass $1 trillion for the first time
• Yemen ceasefire holds; first commercial flight in six years departs Sanaa
• Lebanon elections see pro-Hezbollah bloc lose parliamentary majority
• Syria’s Bashar al-Assad holds surprise state visit to Iran
• Iraq battered by sandstorms; 5,000 hospitalised

The general elections offered citizens a chance to voice their political choices, albeit within the same political framework and confessional system as before. Have these developments translated into drastic changes in Lebanese politics and the government following the elections? Yes, and no.

What exactly happened in the elections?

The large majority of parties that participated in these elections are the very same parties that have prevailed in Lebanese politics for the past few decades. There has, nevertheless, been a shift in preferences as the bloc containing Hezbollah and its allies lost the majority it had gained in the 2018 elections.

Hezbollah itself retained all 13 seats in parliament it held since the 2018 elections. However, Hezbollah allies, including Amal, the Free Patriotic Movement and others (Sunni parties such as Al-Ahbash), saw fairly substantial losses, leading to an overall loss of majority for the bloc.

Out of the “establishment political parties, the greatest gains were made by the Lebanese Forces, winning six extra seats. The Lebanese Forces have now become the most dominant Christian party in the country, surpassing the Hezbollah-aligned Free Patriotic Movement. This may be an indication of grievances held by Christians following the Beirut Port blast, which predominantly struck Christian-inhabited areas.  In addition, the warehouse that exploded allegedly belonged to Hezbollah.

The most significant change came in the surge of independent candidates and political activists originating from civil society and the general protest movement. The seats held by independent candidates saw a fourfold rise, from seven seats in 2018 to 28 in 2022. At least five of the 19 MPs for Beirut are considered independents; and two candidates even won seats in southern Lebanon (Firas Hamdan and Elias Jarada, the Druze and Greek Orthodox candidates in the South 3 list), the traditional strongholds of Hezbollah and its allies. This is a clear indication of the changing attitudes in Lebanese society towards establishment politics and the traditional parties.

Following the elections, the media focused predominantly on the losses incurred by Hezbollah, as opposed to the gains made by independents and reformists. Such focus can lead to outsized expectations about the weakness of Hezbollah despite the party itself managing to retain all its seats.

Nevertheless, the influence held by the bloc that includes Hezbollah is likely to diminish as a result of their electoral losses. This was felt even before these elections as support for Hezbollah has notably waned in the past few years among both the Shia, but also Christians and others who supported, or at least tolerated, the group.

Iran in Iraq and Lebanon – any parallels?

The parliamentary elections in Iraq in 2021 represent an interesting parallel when it comes to political groups backed by Iran. The principal pro-Iran political group in that election, Fatah, led by Hadi al-Ameri, saw a significant loss (losing 31 of its 48 seats). The rival Sadrist Movement, critical of Iranian influence, received the highest number of seats and they are looking to form a majority government as part of the Saving the Homeland Alliance.

The election results were initially denounced by the pro-Iran parties, leading to protests by their followers. A subsequent assassination attempt against the Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, suspected to have been made by a pro-Iranian Iraqi militia in protest of the results, but these claims have yet to be confirmed. Regardless, such militia groups have also continued to commit attacks in both Iraq and Syria against American and other targets (often claimed to be linked to Israel). Such incidents were often followed by political wrangling between the pro and anti-Iran factions. Tehran has continued pushing Sadr to include its allied parties in the new government, while Sadr himself has attempted to limit this influence.

Despite these setbacks and rising political violence in the aftermath, Iran and parties that support Tehran have still shown some pragmatism to work within the system and (re-)consolidate their positions. Iran may be more inclined to use its geopolitical leverage (for instance when Iran sent fuel to Lebanon via Hezbollah during the country’s fuel shortage crisis in 2021) to maintain its influence, rather than relying as much on the actions of those parties. While there are grounds for comparisons, the situation in Lebanon is ultimately different than that in Iraq.

Iraq has been in a state of war for the better part of the past decade, especially during the war against the Islamic State that raged from 2013 to better part of 2018. Militia groups have sprouted in this environment and have at times taken political matters into their own hands. This is currently not so much the case in Lebanon. There is at present no internal state of war and any semblances of a shift towards inter-communal violence are approached in a sensitive manner in a country that experienced, and is still reeling from, a 15-year civil war between 1975-1990. Hezbollah has not shied away from using force within Lebanon, as was seen during the protests, however, it is highly unlikely that the group will respond militarily to the election results in order to not further destabilise the internal situation in Lebanon and, thus, lose more support.

Signs of Change

Hezbollah’s internal support in Lebanon has largely come from its ability to provide public services to poorer elements of Lebanese society, especially in the south of the country, in addition to its image as a “protector” of Lebanon against Israel as well as extremist Sunni Islamist groups, which has also attracted sympathy from certain Christians. The more or less disappearance of the extremist Sunni Islamist threat and the embroilment of Hezbollah (as well as other establishment parties) in corruption scandals amidst the economic crisis have largely contributed to the loss of faith in the Hezbollah-led bloc. This is in addition to the shift in support among pro-Hezbollah Sunni, Druze and Christian communities who have voted for independent reformists in these elections.

Hezbollah retains immense military, social and political capital and will not relinquish its influence anytime soon. In fact, the extent of the loss of its political influence is still undetermined, as the opposition have yet to form a unified coalition that would win a majority.

The independent candidates as of yet seem unlikely to join such a coalition as their platforms are based on opposition to established parties. There will be a battle to win the hearts and minds of Lebanese citizens in primary concerns such as the provision of public services and economic security.

Geopolitical alliances that have frequently determined the nature of support for parties in Lebanon in the past decades may have lost their importance since 2019. Moreover, the protest movement, which has attracted a significant proportion of the electorate, was forthright in its anti-sectarianism, seeking to reduce insecurities between ethno-religious communities and to foment solidarity across confessional lines. Internal political and economic issues seem to have trumped all other concerns, with the Hezbollah-led bloc being the first to suffer from this shift in public concerns.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | May #1 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• First direct flight between Egypt and Israel takes place
• Libya’s National Oil Corporation “temporarily” resumes operations
• Tunisia’s President Saied launches national dialogue but excludes the Ennahda Party
• Algeria threatens to scrap gas export deal to Spain
• Saudi Arabia sees fastest GDP growth in a decade
• The UN warns of worsening humanitarian situation in Yemen
• Jordanian tourism sector shows signs of rebound
• Saudi Arabia and France pledge new assistance package to Lebanon
• Clashes erupt in northern Iraq after security forces launch operations around Sinjar
• Syria’s Presidency announced appointment of new Minister of Defence, Ali Mahmoud Abbas

For much of the Syrian conflict, Suweida has been kept relatively safe through informal local arrangements that kept the region autonomous while leaving it still formally affiliated with the authorities in Damascus. However, it would appear that socio-economic conditions and Damascus’s desire to re-establish full authority over the region is rendering the status quo that lasted over the past years increasingly untenable.

Background to the Tensions

Located east of Daraa Province in southern Syria, Suweida Province has enjoyed a limited form of autonomy over the course of much of the Syrian conflict. The region, like others, witnessed protests in 2011. However, although many Druze leaders expressed sympathy for the Syrian Opposition, hostile clashes with some extremist groups linked to the Opposition – such as Jabhat al-Nusra, now known as Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham – stopped many locals from outright supporting it. Instead, Druze leaders practiced a form of neutrality that allowed Damascus to retain control of the region with a skeleton personnel. Under this arrangement, locals were held exempt from conscription while anti-government expressions in limited forms were permitted. Groups such as Rijal al-Karama (Sheikhs of Dignity) and Ahrar Jabal al-Arab (Free Men of the Arab Mountains) emerged during this period, with the goal of retaining their limited autonomy.

However, the arrangement did not rest on stable foundations. It was no secret that Damascus tried to expand its authority over the region at every opportunity. Locals from Suweida travelling elsewhere risked forced conscription, forcing many young men to remain in the region despite worsening economic conditions and lack of economic prospects. Sporadic clashes between local armed factions and pro-Government militias never fully subsided and have been picking up in recent months, alongside tit-for-tat kidnappings.

While local Druze tribal fighters did fight alongside the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) against Jabhat al-Nusra and, later, the Islamic State (IS), some local leaders regularly accused Damascus of enabling the movements of these extremist groups in order to justify the deployment of pro-Government forces in the region. Such was the case after the bloody IS attack in 2018 that saw more than 250 people killed and dozens abducted, which led to heavy criticisms levied against Damascus authorities by Druze leaders.

What Is Behind the New Bout of Tensions?

To an outsider, the repeating cycle of tensions followed by calm would seem as if the dynamics in the region are broadly static. However, the region has been seeing significant developments behind the scenes.

In particular, Druze factions have increased their political activism in the region. In 2021, a new political party, the Syrian Brigade Party, was founded. The party’s Secretary-General, Malik Abu al-Kheyr, heralded its secular nature and support for a political solution within a national framework, although Opposition outlets have been keen to frame the party as pro-Opposition.  A similar formation, the National Council of Suweida, was formed with the intent of “filling the political gap in Suweida”. In conjunction, armed groups such as Ahrar Jabal al-Arab have intensified their violent rhetoric against Damascus, expressing intent to confront the authorities.

These developments coincided with a sharp drop in living standards in the region since 2018. Local activists have been warning that the quality of services has dropped sharply even as violent crime and gang activity, including kidnappings, have acutely risen. Signs of other societal concerns are also increasingly visible amidst rising drug abuse and youth suicides. Indeed, the renewed rise in tensions over February 2022 coincided with numerous cuts in subsidies enacted by Damascus authorities.

Part of the economic difficulties and resulting decline in services can be attributed to the economic state of Syria as a whole, which has been impacted by more than a decade of war, the implementation of the Caesar Sanctions by the United States, as well as the economic collapse of neighbouring Lebanon. However, many locals have also accused Damascus of enabling and even funding criminal activity in order to justify increasing its control over the region. Some have even accused Damascus of enacting an “economic blockade” over the region, limiting the entry of resources and business in a bid to constrict the region.

These developments came alongside a steady uptick in security interventions against anti-government protests. Throughout April 2022, state authorities have attempted to set up new “settlements” in a bid to put an end to conscription evasion. Arrests over – often petty – criminal charges have also picked up, with some activists accusing authorities of using these arrests as a way to force through the aforementioned settlements. Interventions by security agencies against protests have also picked up during this period.

What Is Next for Suweida?

Although the status quo in Suweida continues to hold, there will be a limit as to how much longer this can continue. Damascus’s relative victory over Opposition factions in southern Syria and Idlib has likely emboldened authorities to put pressure on Suweida in a bid to re-establish full authority. However, Damascus has limited options. Although the SAA is much stronger than its near-disintegrated state in the mid-2010s, it is still facing serious equipment shortages and logistical challenges that would make an outright military offensive a fraught possibility. These risks are further compounded by Damascus’s economic troubles, on-going insurgencies in Daraa and Deir ez-Zour, a tense frontline along Idlib and Russia’s military troubles in Ukraine that might make support from Moscow less reliable. Despite these challenges, pro-Damascus factions have remained hawkish in their view of Suweida, with the National Defence Forces (NDF) militia issuing a statement in which it described the Syrian Brigade Party as “the new ISIS”. Rhetorical attacks such as these may be intended to deter the region from taking the side of the Opposition – which itself has often been equated to the IS by pro-Damascus voices – while building casus belli against those who are undeterred. However, they could easily lead to an anti-Damascus backlash.

Meanwhile, as mentioned above, armed local groups such as Ahrar Jabal al-Arab have increased their violent rhetoric against Damascus, threatening violence if authorities continue to put pressure on the region. Others, such as the Syrian Brigade Party, also mentioned that they are expanding their influence in Damascus-controlled regions like Daraa and Quneitra.

The newest bout of tensions Suweida is experiencing will likely not result in an overnight descent into conflict. However, it is apparent that the current set of arrangements have an expiry date. Preventing a descent into fighting will come through intense diplomatic efforts, political sensitivity, socio-economic stability, and strategic foresight. Unfortunately, Syria today has little of any of these.