Background

Unilateral military interventions by Turkey, which have been absent since Northern Cyprus in the 1970s, have now become a frequent feature in its foreign policy towards Syria. Since 2015, Erdogan, whose ruling AKP had lost its majority in the elections, has expressed intent to create the 30-km “safe zone” in the north of Syria. The stated attempt is to prevent the formation of a Kurdish-majority state run by Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, now named the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Ankara regards AANES as a political extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), long regarded by the Turkish state as a threat to its territorial integrity due to its goal of creating a Kurdish state. A number of military operations were conducted between 2016 and 2020 in attempts to create the aforementioned “safe zone”. A watershed moment in this regard was Operation Euphrates Shield, launched in August 2016, which paved the way for Turkey’s direct interventions inside de jure Syrian territory. However, up until this point, those operations have led to the occupation of only certain pockets of territories in northern Syria, in tandem with Syrian rebel forces on the ground.

What is the Purpose of the “Safe Zone”?

Ankara’s primary stated aim in the creation of the “safe zone” is to prevent “terrorists” from conducting any attacks in Turkey. The predominant military force currently present in the north and east of Syria is the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with the primary faction being the People’s Defence Units (YPG), a group ideologically related to the PKK in Turkey. Kurdish separatism has been a concern of the Turkish state since its establishment and have been further amplified since the formation of the PKK in the 1980s. Cross-border interactions between Kurds (and other ethnic groups) in Turkey and Syria led to the formation of a common political culture among significant parts of these populations. As a result, numerous political and military forces, including Kurdish-dominated forces, emerged in the aftermath of Damascus losing authority in these regions since 2011. Turkey’s stated concerns are thus primarily political and ideological as it is wary of the political programme propagated by the aforementioned groups taking hold within Turkey.

Prior to the war in Syria, Damascus and Ankara regulated their mutual concerns regarding the Kurdish issue through the 1998 Adana Agreement, which aimed to uproot pro-PKK Kurdish political activism in Syria. However, the political disarray in Syria led to a perception in Ankara that Damascus was no longer capable of enforcing the agreement. As a result, Turkish officials cited unilateral actions as their main option. A similar pattern has also emerged regarding Turkish military operations in northern Iraq, where PKK elements have based themselves. Turkey has recently increased its aerial airstrikes on the PKK, as well as its efforts to get Baghdad to align with its goals.

Why Now?

With Ankara’s plan to create a 30km “safe zone” already in the works over the past years, the TSK has already been undertaking some of the more practical steps towards its objectives. However, such steps have slowed down and even outright paused over the past two years, suggesting that Ankara was done with military interventions. So, why is Erdogan now calling for renewed operations?

One reason is that shifts in the geopolitical map have aligned in such a way that Ankara feels more at ease launching another cross-border intervention. Perhaps most significantly, Russia’s own cross-border military operation in Ukraine has played a role in this shift. One of the main obstacles to Ankara’s wishes to go ahead with another military intervention in northern Syria has been Russia’s opposition to a further Turkish push into Syrian territory.

However, with the severing of diplomatic ties between several Western countries and Russia, as well as the Western sanctions on Russia, Moscow is keen to maintain its diplomatic relations with countries that have retained relations. Although Turkish-Russian relations have experienced bouts of tensions over the course of the Syrian war, Moscow is now demonstrating greater willingness to take Ankara’s interests into account. Early in June, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, expressed Russia’s opposition to Turkey’s military plans in northern Syria. However, only a week later, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that Russia “fully understands” Turkey’s concerns.

Another related development is Sweden and Finland’s proposed accession to NATO. Turkey is currently vehemently opposed to their accession, in particular that of Sweden’s. In recent years, Sweden accepted refugees from Turkey with sympathies towards, or expressing outright support for, the PKK and YPG. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has recently stated that Turkey’s concerns are “legitimate”, providing Turkey with further room to pursue its ambitions in northern Syria in the knowledge that NATO will not directly oppose those plans. In sum, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have increased Turkey’s geopolitical capital and bargaining chips both vis-à-vis Russia and NATO, allowing Turkey to take further unilateral action in Syria at this juncture.

Finally, perhaps the most significant internal reason that is pushing Ankara to take this step is the growing domestic political resentment in relation to the currency and debt crisis and increasing anti-refugee views. Although the two issues are not directly related, opposition forces are capitalising on general discontent and linking both issues in their accusations directed at the current government. Erdogan has consequently asserted that the proposed “safe zone” will accommodate a million Syrians who have sought refuge in Turkey. He added that their return will be “voluntary”, despite several accounts in recent years demonstrating that Syrian refugees have already been forcibly deported to other parts of northern Syria that have already been occupied by Turkey. Such domestic dissatisfaction has already led to AKP losing Ankara and Istanbul in 2019 local elections. Recent opinion polls point to the AKP haemorrhaging support, which bodes badly for the general elections in June 2023. With 2023 also being the centennial of Turkey’s founding, the timing of these renewed military operations appears, at least partially, to be related to the AKP’s need to maintain domestic legitimacy.

Possible Repercussions

Although the geopolitical winds are currently favouring Ankara, there are serious potential risks involved with a renewed military operation in northern Syria.

Firstly, in terms of potential geopolitical consequences, Turkey’s proposed military operation has met sustained criticism from the US and Iran. Washington has supported the SDF in their fight against the Islamic State (IS), something that already strained ties with Ankara. Although former US President Donald Trump ordered the withdrawal of US troops in northern Syria in 2020, a contingent has remained in the region and it continues to provide the SDF with support. American officials have warned that the Turkish intervention will lead to an emboldening of the IS in the region. Indeed, the IS prison outbreaks that took place earlier this year are testament to the threat that the group continues to pose. Although the US has previously attempted to prevent direct Turkish interventions into northern Syria, they have thus far failed to stop them, at best limiting Turkish-led advances and sending signals to Ankara through economic sanctions. The US’ partial withdrawal initiated in 2020, along with American reluctance to further deepen already tense diplomatic tensions with Turkey, will likely limit the US’ response to Turkey’s military operation to somewhat innocuous public criticisms.

Iran, on its part, has categorically expressed its opposition to the military operation. Iran and Turkey have thus far avoided direct confrontation in Syria; however, the villages of Zahra and Nubl will fall within the scope of Turkey’s proposed “safe zone”. These two villages have gained significant strategic importance for Damascus and pro-Shiite forces from Iran, Iraq and Lebanese, who have supported local forces against Sunni rebel groups throughout the conflict. Iran-backed groups directly coordinated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are allegedly already stationed in both towns. A Turkish-backed military offensive would thus risk Turkish-Iranian military clashes.

Iran has also regularly criticised the previous Turkish military operations in northern Syria and Turkey’s support for Syrian opposition groups. Turkey and Iran are more or less on the same page when it comes to the PKK and Kurdish rebels inside their respective state borders. However, both states are on opposite camps in Syria, with Tehran likely viewing Turkish-backed groups as a greater threat than the SDF. Thus, neither country is likely to seek a compromise on the matter as Turkey is insistent on creating the “safe zone” and Iran is reluctant to lose its influence within Syria that could threaten its belt of allies running across Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

Secondly, the political and military situation within Syria itself will undoubtedly change following any the potential Turkish operation. If Ankara insists on creating the 30-km “safe zone”, it will be its most ambitious intervention to date and will lead to the reconfiguration of relations between a host of internal actors, including the AANES (and its military wing, the SDF), Damascus, and the wide array of Syrian opposition groups. Indeed, the SDF leadership have already stated that they are willing to coordinate a defence with Damascus. While, Damascus has yet to openly announce its stance on any possible coordination with the SDF, the Syrian Army already has a history of collaboration with the SDF in anti-IS operations, and has in certain cases agreed to support the SDF against Turkish-backed advances. However, political negotiations between the AANES and Damascus has been stalled for years, and both sides have failed to reach any compromise on the question of autonomy in northern and eastern Syria. A potential Turkish-backed offensive will likely accelerate those talks and put the AANES in a more dependent position.

In addition, the main Opposition faction in Idlib, Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has recently been conducting military drills in anticipation of an alleged Syrian government offensive. HTS are considered rivals of other Syrian rebel groups, most notably of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), now known as the Syrian National Army (SNA). Both groups, which themselves are composed of various factions, have recently sought to mend their ties. However, such efforts have been hampered by factionalism and infighting within the FSA/SNA. There is a possibility that the proposed Turkish military operations against mutual enemies – the SDF and the Syrian Army – could help bring greater rapprochement between these factions.

Finally, the proposed military operations will inevitably lead to humanitarian consequences. There are a number of precedents to refer to in this regard from previous Turkish-led military operations in northern Syria. The occupation of Afrin in 2018 led to a string of human rights violations as documented by Human Rights Watch. Following the Operation Peace Spring in 2019, as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated that over 200,000 were displaced and civilian casualties directly resulted from the operation. Civilian populations continue to inhabit the area targeted by Erdogan as part of the “safe zone” and, consequently, mass displacements and civilian casualties are inevitable.

All in all, the Turkish government and TSK will have made both political and military calculations before stating its intent on going ahead with their attempt to create a “safe zone” in northern Syria. The current geopolitical climate seems to indicate that regional and global players are highly unlikely to make any counter-intervention, especially relevant in the case of Russia. The diplomatic relations with countries critical of the operation are in all likelihood going to maintain their status quo. The response from Damascus will be highly significant in affecting both geopolitical and internal dynamics. Military involvement from Damascus would effectively lead to an inter-state war between Turkey and Syria and this may prolong the conflict in the north.

In the case where the SDF will stand alone in the face of the Turkish-backed offensive, it is difficult to imagine how it will prevent the formation of the “safe zone”. However, Damascus is unlikely to remain silent on such a substantial incursion into its sovereign territory, and so Syrian-Turkish relations will in any case be dealt a further blow. Whatever the political implications of the potential Turkish military operation in northern Syria would be, the humanitarian cost is a priori undisputable.

For much of the Syrian conflict, Suweida has been kept relatively safe through informal local arrangements that kept the region autonomous while leaving it still formally affiliated with the authorities in Damascus. However, it would appear that socio-economic conditions and Damascus’s desire to re-establish full authority over the region is rendering the status quo that lasted over the past years increasingly untenable.

Background to the Tensions

Located east of Daraa Province in southern Syria, Suweida Province has enjoyed a limited form of autonomy over the course of much of the Syrian conflict. The region, like others, witnessed protests in 2011. However, although many Druze leaders expressed sympathy for the Syrian Opposition, hostile clashes with some extremist groups linked to the Opposition – such as Jabhat al-Nusra, now known as Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham – stopped many locals from outright supporting it. Instead, Druze leaders practiced a form of neutrality that allowed Damascus to retain control of the region with a skeleton personnel. Under this arrangement, locals were held exempt from conscription while anti-government expressions in limited forms were permitted. Groups such as Rijal al-Karama (Sheikhs of Dignity) and Ahrar Jabal al-Arab (Free Men of the Arab Mountains) emerged during this period, with the goal of retaining their limited autonomy.

However, the arrangement did not rest on stable foundations. It was no secret that Damascus tried to expand its authority over the region at every opportunity. Locals from Suweida travelling elsewhere risked forced conscription, forcing many young men to remain in the region despite worsening economic conditions and lack of economic prospects. Sporadic clashes between local armed factions and pro-Government militias never fully subsided and have been picking up in recent months, alongside tit-for-tat kidnappings.

While local Druze tribal fighters did fight alongside the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) against Jabhat al-Nusra and, later, the Islamic State (IS), some local leaders regularly accused Damascus of enabling the movements of these extremist groups in order to justify the deployment of pro-Government forces in the region. Such was the case after the bloody IS attack in 2018 that saw more than 250 people killed and dozens abducted, which led to heavy criticisms levied against Damascus authorities by Druze leaders.

What Is Behind the New Bout of Tensions?

To an outsider, the repeating cycle of tensions followed by calm would seem as if the dynamics in the region are broadly static. However, the region has been seeing significant developments behind the scenes.

In particular, Druze factions have increased their political activism in the region. In 2021, a new political party, the Syrian Brigade Party, was founded. The party’s Secretary-General, Malik Abu al-Kheyr, heralded its secular nature and support for a political solution within a national framework, although Opposition outlets have been keen to frame the party as pro-Opposition.  A similar formation, the National Council of Suweida, was formed with the intent of “filling the political gap in Suweida”. In conjunction, armed groups such as Ahrar Jabal al-Arab have intensified their violent rhetoric against Damascus, expressing intent to confront the authorities.

These developments coincided with a sharp drop in living standards in the region since 2018. Local activists have been warning that the quality of services has dropped sharply even as violent crime and gang activity, including kidnappings, have acutely risen. Signs of other societal concerns are also increasingly visible amidst rising drug abuse and youth suicides. Indeed, the renewed rise in tensions over February 2022 coincided with numerous cuts in subsidies enacted by Damascus authorities.

Part of the economic difficulties and resulting decline in services can be attributed to the economic state of Syria as a whole, which has been impacted by more than a decade of war, the implementation of the Caesar Sanctions by the United States, as well as the economic collapse of neighbouring Lebanon. However, many locals have also accused Damascus of enabling and even funding criminal activity in order to justify increasing its control over the region. Some have even accused Damascus of enacting an “economic blockade” over the region, limiting the entry of resources and business in a bid to constrict the region.

These developments came alongside a steady uptick in security interventions against anti-government protests. Throughout April 2022, state authorities have attempted to set up new “settlements” in a bid to put an end to conscription evasion. Arrests over – often petty – criminal charges have also picked up, with some activists accusing authorities of using these arrests as a way to force through the aforementioned settlements. Interventions by security agencies against protests have also picked up during this period.

What Is Next for Suweida?

Although the status quo in Suweida continues to hold, there will be a limit as to how much longer this can continue. Damascus’s relative victory over Opposition factions in southern Syria and Idlib has likely emboldened authorities to put pressure on Suweida in a bid to re-establish full authority. However, Damascus has limited options. Although the SAA is much stronger than its near-disintegrated state in the mid-2010s, it is still facing serious equipment shortages and logistical challenges that would make an outright military offensive a fraught possibility. These risks are further compounded by Damascus’s economic troubles, on-going insurgencies in Daraa and Deir ez-Zour, a tense frontline along Idlib and Russia’s military troubles in Ukraine that might make support from Moscow less reliable. Despite these challenges, pro-Damascus factions have remained hawkish in their view of Suweida, with the National Defence Forces (NDF) militia issuing a statement in which it described the Syrian Brigade Party as “the new ISIS”. Rhetorical attacks such as these may be intended to deter the region from taking the side of the Opposition – which itself has often been equated to the IS by pro-Damascus voices – while building casus belli against those who are undeterred. However, they could easily lead to an anti-Damascus backlash.

Meanwhile, as mentioned above, armed local groups such as Ahrar Jabal al-Arab have increased their violent rhetoric against Damascus, threatening violence if authorities continue to put pressure on the region. Others, such as the Syrian Brigade Party, also mentioned that they are expanding their influence in Damascus-controlled regions like Daraa and Quneitra.

The newest bout of tensions Suweida is experiencing will likely not result in an overnight descent into conflict. However, it is apparent that the current set of arrangements have an expiry date. Preventing a descent into fighting will come through intense diplomatic efforts, political sensitivity, socio-economic stability, and strategic foresight. Unfortunately, Syria today has little of any of these.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | April #2 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• Egypt announces aid to Sudan following the visit of Sudanese Army General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo
• The IMF increases its growth projection for Egypt for FY 2021-22 despite the impact of the Ukraine-Russia war
• Militia groups once again stop production in Libya’s El Feel oilfield, evidencing growing splits between eastern and western regions in the country
• Algeria and Italy sign energy deal
• Saudi crude exports reach their highest level since April 2020
• The new presidential council in Yemen is inaugurated, with further signs that Saudi Arabia is looking to exit the conflict
• Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, reopen embassies in Lebanon, pointing to an easing of tensions
• The Islamic State (IS) conducted an attack on an Iraqi army outpost in Anbar Province
• The World Bank projects economic growth in Iraq of 8.9%, largely due to higher oil prices

The announcement came at a time when international attention was drawn away from the Middle East and North Africa region and instead focused on the escalating war between Russia and Ukraine. Alongside ongoing crises such as Covid-19, the news of the IS’ new leader was largely buried by the emerging conflict in Ukraine.

The relatively muted response to the selection of a new IS Caliph, however, is also telling about the group’s continued relevance after grabbing headlines over the 2010s. In this context, it would be fair to ask if the selection of a new leader is relevant at all.

In this article, we look into what we do and do not know about the IS’ new leader. In examining the announcement, as well as the facts and speculation around the man who now leads the group, we conclude that the IS’ main concern is threefold:

• To project a sense of resilience in light of ongoing (global) challenges;
• Maintain continuity between its past and present leadership;
• Generate a sense of legitimacy and inspiration for IS cells around the world while maintaining the independence of these cells through a broad guiding strategy.

We note that the IS strategy to rebuild itself resembles that of its strategy in the lead-up to 2014 and that the group has been investing in its resilience to continue its operations even after decapitation strikes targeting its leadership. We further note that while resilience and capacities of local communities against the IS improved, we warn that the current international climate may result in the erosion of these defences, allowing the IS to carve out a space for itself once again.

Background

The IS announced the selection of its new leader a little over a month after his predecessor, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, was killed in a raid by the US forces. Although the group did not acknowledge the US involvement in his killing, the statement did note that he died during a battle. The statement further noted that Abu Ibrahim handpicked his successor as Abu al-Hassan.

Over the month of relative quiet from the IS’ central command, there was some speculation that the group was experiencing a leadership struggle or was otherwise struggling to communicate between different cells in order to appoint a suitable leader. If this was the case, however, there were no visible internal clashes or reports of tensions within the group. Indeed, much of the group’s media retained a sense of casual calm during this period. When Abu al-Hassan was finally appointed as the group’s leader, IS franchises around the world were quick to acknowledge him. If there were internal tensions, the group was successful in hiding them.

Notably, little is known about the group’s new leader. The group did not share any photos of its new leader, nor did it reveal his name, instead referring to him only with his Nom-De-Guerre.

The inclusion of al-Hashimi al-Quraishi are possible indicators of Abu al-Hassan’s tribal background. Indeed, the IS has often sought to appoint leaders from the Quraish tribe, the original tribe of Prophet Muhammad and many early Islamic caliphs. This historical link is often held as a precondition for becoming a caliph by many modern Salafi Jihadis. When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared a Caliph, his connection to the Quraish bloodline was frequently emphasised in IS propaganda. His successor, Abu Ibrahim, was similarly given the “Quraishi” title despite him being widely believed to be a Turkman from Tal Afar. It is very possible that Abu al-Hassan does not actually belong to the Quraish tribe either and was bestowed the title for propaganda purposes.

However, given the lack of details around Abu al-Hassan, all such details remain speculative.

Ever since the IS announced the selection of its new leader, experts sought to decipher who he truly is. Citing Iraqi security officials, the Reuters news agency suggested that Abu al-Hassan is the brother of the group’s first caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

However, at least one claim has been made to cast doubts on that assertion, suggesting that Baghdadi’s brother is likely the group’s newly-announced spokesperson instead of the leader. Instead, it was suggested that the group’s new leader is Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaidai (also known as Ustath Zaid, Abu Khattab al-Iraqi, Abu al-Moez al-Iraqi and Abu Ishaq). He is believed to have been involved with the IS’ predecessor, Ansar al-Islam under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi during the 2000s before officially joining the IS in 2013. If these speculations are correct, this makes the IS’ new leader a veteran jihadi leader and one of the last remaining members of the IS’ original cadres.

What Does the Selection of a New Leader Mean?

Without knowing more about Abu al-Hassan and his background, it is difficult to ascertain how the new leadership will impact the group. However, some signs of the group’s main concerns and trajectory are apparent in the selection process as well as how this process was communicated with the wider public. Overall, the IS appears to be concerned with maintaining legitimacy among its supporters while offering a sense of continuity and resilience.

Just as the group is attempting to gain legitimacy from the distant past, it is also trying to connect itself to the jihadi struggles of the more recent times. If Abu al-Hassan truly is Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaidai, then his status as a veteran jihadi and a follower of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi would essentially confirm him as a hardliner who will not compromise or divert from the group’s ideological bedrock and virulent sectarianism. It is entirely possible that this was behind the group’s decision to message that Abu al-Hassan was handpicked as a successor by his predecessor.

Another message Abu al-Hassan’s selection sends is resilience. Although the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was met with some disbelief, concern and even panic among the group’s followers, the death of Abu Ibrahim drew little such reactions. In part, this was because he was not the leader of the group for a long time and was hardly visible. As far as the day-to-day affairs of the IS goes, his death appears to have had little impact.

Indeed, the group’s franchises around the world, especially in Africa, continued to launch and publish attacks, seemingly with little disruption. Overall, IS franchises from West Africa to Afghanistan appear to be committed to their objectives.

Following Abu Ibrahim’s death, experts noted that his death would likely have more symbolic consequences, as opposed to operational ones. This indeed appears to have been the case. However, even the morale damage predicted appear to have been limited. Instead, the group looks to have leveraged an orderly transition to show to the world that decapitation strikes will not end the group or dissuade its followers.

Ultimately, the IS’ goal to rebuild its strength by pursuing an insurgency will remain unchanged. In a bid to achieve this goal, the group will likely continue to follow tactics that resemble the tactics it pursued in the lead-up to its emergence as a territorial force in 2014. Such tactics include:

• To continue attacks on “apostate governments” in the MENA region to retain relevance and, where possible, free imprisoned supporters;
• To continue attacks on other jihadi factions deemed insufficiently devoted to Islam – such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda – to brandish its hard-line credentials;
• To continue attacking soft targets like community leaders to instil fear and suspicion in isolated communities;
• To exploit local grievances and failings in governance to gain supporters and recruits among local populations.

For a cell-based organisation, such tactics are easily achievable and do not require constant oversight from the leadership, reducing the need to engage in communications that could compromise the safety of the leaders. Instead, the leadership appears to be intended to serve as a source of inspiration, leaving cells capable of operating independently even in the aftermath of decapitation strikes.

After a US airstrike killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, the group that would become the IS was viewed as a spent force. His successor, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was similarly killed in a US raid in 2010, setting the stage for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the group’s eventual rise in Iraq and Syria.

Having experienced and emerged stronger from leadership losses, it is conceivable that the IS invested heavily into making the group more resilient against future strikes. Although the pool of the original jihadi leaders from the 2000s may be running low, the group retains large numbers of armed militants and supporters across Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It may also have as much as $50 million in reserves. Thus, viewing the group as a spent force on account of its reliance on jihadi symbolism to legitimise itself would be a mistake.

Regional and International Dynamics Will Influence the Actions of the IS

Although the IS’ inspiration and strategy may be drawing from the past, the group nevertheless finds itself in an environment quite different from when it rose to power nearly a decade ago.

Chief among such changes is the tone of caution among many experts about the group’s fortunes. Unlike the triumphalism seen in the 2000s and the early 2010s, experts today are adamant that the jihadi threat may resurge and that the elimination of the group’s leadership is not the end of the group itself. Unsurprisingly, post-conflict programmes in formerly IS-held areas have sought to address not only practical issues like reconstruction and services but also enhance community cohesion to make them more resilient against IS propaganda. The group may be employing its old playbook, but it will meet communities who are more aware of the group’s tricks.

The IS will also find the international jihadi scene a lot less welcoming compared to its emergence in the 2010s. When the group rose to power in Iraq and Syria in the 2010s, it did so through alliances with local factions, both jihadi and non-jihadi, before proceeding to co-opt or liquidate its former allies. Since then, the IS’ notoriety for violence was compounded by a reputation for picking fights with any faction that doesn’t pledge loyalty to the IS’ caliph. The IS has come into conflict with nearly every major jihadi faction around the world, with some local exceptions in West Africa and the Maghreb. As factions like the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria experiment with more pragmatic modes of governance, they will likely find the IS’ brand increasingly toxic.

However, other international developments may favour an IS resurgence. Chief among these is the on-going (and escalating) war between Ukraine and Russia. The world’s already-diminishing attention towards the MENA region was, practically overnight, turned towards Ukraine instead. With prospects of conventional, interstate war once again on the books, the preoccupation with counter-insurgency operations in the Middle East since 2001 may come to a gradual end. Indeed, even prior to the conflict in Ukraine, the US was drawing down its presence in Iraq, with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) conducting anti-IS operations with relative independence. Such improved capabilities are a far cry from the state of affairs when the IS emerged in 2014. Moving forward, it will be vital to ensure that local counter-terrorism and intelligence capabilities do not erode. Lulls in attacks, in particular, should not comfort security agencies into a false sense of comfort, as such lulls could be part of an IS subterfuge to wait for the world’s attention to fully move away from the group, allowing it to carve out a space in the MENA region more effectively.

More significantly is the possibility that the IS may exploit the war directly. In Syria, for example, IS militants remained highly active in the Syrian Desert, regularly attacking the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions and ambushing loyalist militias. Although Russian presence in eastern Syria is not widespread, Russian military and economic assistance nevertheless allowed the SAA to gain control of the region over the course of 2018, while the IS rule was collapsing. With the war in Ukraine potentially diminishing Russian assistance for the SAA, there is a possibility that IS’ insurgency may become ever-more brazen. Improved IS capabilities could then spillover into neighbouring regions such as those controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or across the border into Iraq.

Ultimately, much about the future of the IS remains uncertain, especially in light of lack of information surrounding the group’s new leader. The fact is that under the rule of Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, the IS faces a world that is both deeply changed from 2014, yet at the same time, worryingly similar.

One week after the launch of Russian operations, media outlets and analysts remain firmly focused on the events unfolding in Ukraine, attempting to make predictions and assess what they mean for the world writ large.

Although the Middle East and North Africa is removed geographically from the conflict, the fighting could have significant ramifications for numerous political, social and economic ties within the region. Both Russia and Ukraine have significant economic ties with MENA countries and supply numerous commodities, including food and hydrocarbon products.

Russia has also developed its engagement throughout the 2010s with a number of countries such as Libya, Israel and Egypt, and also backs the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, following Moscow’s direct intervention in the country in 2015.

In this article, we will be looking at some of the potential impacts of the Russian-Ukrainian War in the MENA region. While we do not anticipate any direct spillover of the conflict, there are numerous dynamics that can exacerbate social and economic concerns across much of the region, although some countries, especially oil-producing ones, may stand to benefit from the developments.

We also anticipate that armed groups in Syria and Libya will exploit any opportunity to target Russian interests while Moscow remains focused in Ukraine. These include Turkish-backed anti-Russian forces in both countries; however, it is likely that these groups will be bound by other geo-political limitations, such as the Turkey-Russia entente. Some specific groups, such as Chechens in Syria, may also view this period as an opportunity to target Russian interests, especially amidst growing Chechen involvement in Ukraine, on both a pro-Moscow and a pro-Kyiv capacity.

Background

On 24^th February 2022, the Russian Government announced that it would launch “special operations” against Ukraine. Justified in terms of protecting Russian security interests vis-à-vis NATO expansion and on grounds of “de-Nazifying” Ukraine, the first hours of the Russian military offensive saw a rapid push into Ukrainian territory in a bid to capture major cities including Kyiv. By all indications, however, the offensive progressed slower than expected amidst reports of numerous strategic and logistical mistakes.

Since the shock of the initial Russian offensive wore off and the Ukrainian resistance rallied, many countries around the world, especially the European Union and the United States, began targeting Russia with sanctions, causing the value of the Russian Rouble to plummet. Many Russian neighbours such as Finland also began reconsidering their long-standing policy of neutrality. Developments such as these signal that there will be significant geopolitical shifts in the coming weeks or months.

These initial pressures, however, have done little to deter Russia. Indeed, the day after talks between Russia and Ukraine concluded without success, there were reports of new Russian military movements towards Kyiv, as well as reports of increasing use of heavy artillery and rockets in contested cities such as Kharkiv and Mariupol. By most indications, fighting will continue in the coming days and even weeks.

Signs of Economic Troubles for Much of the MENA Region

In the immediate aftermath of the Russian declaration of military operations in Ukraine, global wheat prices – already on a 10-year-high – shot up significantly. This is unsurprising, given that they together make up for about 30% of global wheat production, rivalled only by the US, China and India.

In the MENA region, however, Russian and Ukrainian wheat plays a much more significant role. Yemen, already entirely reliant on food imports, buys 27% of its wheat from Ukraine and 8% from Russia. Both Turkey and Egypt import 85% of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine, with imports from Ukraine to Turkey rising significantly in recent years. Tunisia similarly relies on Ukraine for 50% to 60% of its wheat imports.

There are widespread fears that the disruption in Ukraine, compounded with sanctions on Russia and limits of Black Sea naval traffic could create a combination of factors that result in a famine across the MENA region. Indeed, the first day of the war already saw shortages of wheat products in Tunisia.

Already, vulnerable countries such as Lebanon are looking at alternative sellers, such as the United States. However, Lebanon is not alone in the pursuit for alternative sellers. With demand now concentrated to a smaller pool of sellers, chances of prices rising are especially high. Thus, even if a famine is averted, many poorer households face increased food insecurity as they will struggle to pay the market price for wheat products.

This, in turn, can have wide-ranging socio-political impacts. In the MENA region, bread carries deep social and economic meaning. Bread shortages and unavailability have been linked to periods of unrest, including the Arab Spring protests. As food prices rose since the 1980s, the so-called “Bread riots” became increasingly commonplace. Indeed, in Egypt, the eruption of the Arab Spring protests was preceded by stark increases in bread prices, with bread symbolism being a common element in protests across the Arab World. Many MENA countries are already suffering economically due to COVID-19. Thus, rising food prices could tip the situation to even further extremes.

Already-vulnerable countries like Yemen will be especially hard-hit. Not only will the country suffer due to rising food prices, it will also likely have to contend with global aid being directed to Ukraine, further limiting the already-diminishing pool of aid available to Yemen.

A similar concern is present with regards to commodities like oil and gas prices. In the aftermath of the eruption of the war, the price for Brent crude went past $113 per barrel. While many MENA countries are net producers of hydrocarbons and could benefit from a windfall, importers from Russia such as Turkey and Lebanon will likely face rising costs. As both countries are suffering from severe economic crises, the war could result in an additional layer of instability. Indeed, even countries like Iraq, which are expected to be among the beneficiaries of rising oil prices, are expected to pay three times what it paid last year for wheat as it substitutes Ukrainian wheat with wheat from other sellers.

Meanwhile, Egypt, which is deeply reliant on tourism from Russia and Ukraine, will likely see a quieter summer. Indeed, tourist bookings from both Ukraine and Russia had already fallen by 30% in early February, when tensions between the two countries were climbing. These numbers will likely fall further, dampening Egypt’s hopes for a fast summer recovery as it eases COVID-19 restrictions. Combined with the aforementioned food price spikes, the loss of tourism revenue can lead to several secondary impacts for Cairo.

MENA countries that have banked on Russian support may also find their fortunes diminished. Syria, detailed below, is a prime example. However, other MENA also saw growing Russian involvement. In Libya, Moscow supported the eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) government, as well as the dominant military force there, Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). In early February, when the HoR appointed former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha to replace the current, Tripoli-based Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh, Moscow backed Bashagha’s claim. With Russia preoccupied in Ukraine, such political support may dry up. While this will not seriously hinder the HoR and the LNA, as they also receive support from Egypt and many Gulf countries, the loss of the Russian military support which nearly allowed the LNA to take control of Tripoli over the past couple years may still make a difference to Libya’s strategic landscape.

The View from Syria

In the immediate aftermath of the launch of the Russian operations into Ukraine, the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, expressed support for Moscow, describing it as a “correction of history” in reference to similar statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The support from Damascus is unsurprising, given Moscow’s efforts since the outbreak of the war in Syria to ensure the survival of the Syrian President, including a direct intervention in 2015. Indeed, the parallels between Ukraine and Syria vis-à-vis Russian interests were picked up by numerous observers during the lead-up to the current conflict in Ukraine. In particular, observers noted that Russian military in Syria used its deployment there to tune its capacities and shore up any shortcomings. A number of newly-developed tools such as the refurbished Tupolev Tu-160 and Russia’s first aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, also saw their first combat deployments in Syria. There were also reports of Russia deploying Chechen soldiers into Ukraine, echoing the deployment of Chechen soldiers along the frontlines of Syria. In both Syria and Ukraine, the fearsome reputation of Chechens were highlighted.

As referenced above, both Ukraine and Russia are major wheat suppliers. Thus, the eruption of the war has led to price speculation that caused the price of wheat to shoot up. Unsurprisingly, this has had an effect on Syria. Like Egypt, Russia is Syria’s main wheat supplier. Thus, the country is unlikely to experience severe shortages in the short-to-medium term, with much of the production disruptions focused on Ukraine. With Syria already under heavy sanctions, it is unlikely the new sanctions on Russia will cause direct impacts. However, supplies may still be disrupted due to disruptions in the Black Sea trade lanes. Furthermore, rising prices may start squeezing many poorer Syrians out of the market, especially as Damascus works on lifting subsidies to manage a fraught economic position. With Russia now dealing with its own economic woes, Damascus may also struggle to obtain Russian wheat cheaply.

Beyond that, although Damascus entered some symbolic trade agreements with contested territories such as Crimea, the trade between Syria and such territories is too negligible to have a significant impact.

Instead, security and political developments will be of greater significance in Syria.

An Opening for the Syrian Opposition?

Although Russia has been involved in Syria since the start of the war in 2011, its involvement truly picked up in 2015 when it intervened directly on behalf of President Assad. Since then, Russia became Damascus’s most significant backer, eclipsing other backers like Iran. Russian military support, including intense and indiscriminate airstrikes on urban centres, cemented Damascus’s victory in a number of fronts including Aleppo. Although Russia maintained some role as a mediator, including in regions such as Daraa in southern Syria, the perceptions of Russia among the Syrian Opposition has been deeply negative, with Moscow seen as the main actor behind Assad’s survival.

As such, it is unsurprising that Opposition factions such as the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have been watching the developments with interest. Amidst mounting Russian losses in Ukraine and developments such as Turkey’s unprecedented decision to close the Bosporus to warships, some Opposition activists have mulled whether Russia will be able to reinforce the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and whether the situation creates an opening for Opposition factions.

However, such escalation is looking unlikely for the time being. Although Opposition supporters expressed support for Ukraine, there have been few signs of impending fighting in the Opposition-held Idlib. Prominent Opposition figures such Suheil Hammoud (better known as Abu TOW, in reference to his expertise with anti-tank TOW missiles) noted that there is little will for escalation in Idlib and little unity among the Opposition amidst continued infighting. He further added that Ankara, which predominantly backs the SNA, is unwilling to escalate in Idlib. Other Opposition activists noted that attempts by individual fighters or groups to break the ceasefire was swiftly punished by authorities, making it unlikely that Idlib may see a new round of military clashes.

Despite this, some fighters, including Abu TOW, say that they are exploring options to travel to Ukraine where they can fight under the umbrella of the recently-announced foreign legion of Ukraine.

One possible faction in Opposition-held Idlib that may be interested in moving their operations are the Chechens. When the war in Syria erupted, many Chechen fighters arrived in the country. Holding a reputation for being capable fighters, these fighters quickly rose through the ranks of armed groups, including extremist groups like the HTS or the Islamic State. However, many others also retained their affiliations to independent umbrella groups like Ajnad al-Kawkaz. In recent months, however, the HTS started clamping down on independent groups, requiring foreign fighters to either join it or leave the region.

Chechens of both pro-Moscow and pro-Kyiv affiliations have already clashed several times in Ukraine since 2014. In addition to the new deployments of pro-Moscow Chechens, the renewed conflict in Ukraine is also seeing the involvement of Chechen formations in the pro-Kyiv side. Those Chechens watching the conflict from Syria may conclude that their goals are now better served in Ukraine.

Iran and Israel Eye for Openings

For other countries and factions, the situation is less clear. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), for example, which operates in north and north-eastern Syria, receives crucial support from Washington, but it has also leaned on Moscow during its negotiations with Damascus, especially amidst fears of an impending US withdrawal from the Middle East as a whole.

With Moscow facing international isolation, its potential to contribute as a mediator will be constrained. If anything, rising tensions between the US and Russia may compel Moscow to fully disengage from the SDF due to Washington’s influence over the group. It is likely that the SDF may look towards other sources of support, such as the Gulf Kingdoms which are gradually normalising ties with Damascus and have already shown signs of engagement with the SDF.

Iran is another country whose fortunes in Syria could change. Since the Russian intervention in Syria, Russian and Iranian officials have often highlighted the positive aspects of their cooperation. However, it has been known that the two sides have been competing for influence, a fact that Assad has taken advantage of by jockeying their influence against each other.

Until recently, Iran was viewed as being on the back-foot. A combination of factors such as sanctions; the killing of Qassem Soleimani; growing détente between Damascus and the Gulf; and Iran’s mishandling of the first wave of COVID-19 have all contributed to the perception that the country is no longer able to support Damascus like Moscow or the Gulf can. Incidents such as the removal of Iran’s top commander in Syria, General Seyyed Javad Ghaffari, and his subsequent, puzzling death (allegedly due to COVID-19) have only fuelled these perceptions.

With Russia facing severe economic sanctions and an increasingly complex battlefield, its capacity for rebuilding the SAA or funding Syrian reconstruction will be limited, allowing Iran to once again flex its muscles in Syria. How much this influence can spread, however, will depend on how much involvement the Gulf Kingdoms choose to have in Syria.

One last country whose involvement may change in Syria is Israel. For much of the Syrian conflict, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) conducted regular airstrikes in Syria, ostensibly against Iranian-backed groups. These strikes continued after the Russian intervention, with speculation that the two sides entered a sort of “gentlemen’s agreement”, especially after a Russian plane was accidentally shot down during an IDF raid in 2018. The two sides have shown notable flexibility in balancing each other’s security interests. However, it was generally acknowledged that Russia would offer Israel a limited window for strikes, and this window was viewed to be closing after it was announced on January 2022 that Russia and Syria would hold joint air patrols.

In the aftermath of the Russian operations in Ukraine, Israel was among the countries that criticised Moscow for its conduct. Moscow hit back by referencing Israel’s control over the Golan Heights, suggesting that the matter could be held against Israel if criticisms continue. So far, Israel appears to be unconcerned with the ultimatum, with the IDF continuing to hit Syria after the Russian operations in Ukraine were launched.

It is unclear if these attest strikes were conducted with or without Moscow’s consent. If the former is the case, then it would suggest that the events in Ukraine are unlikely to significantly alter the Russian-Israeli interests in Syria.

If, however, the latest IDF raids were conducted against Russian acceptance, it could suggest that the agreement the two countries held in Syria is unravelling and both sides will, once again, pursue their interests unilaterally. This could result in increased hostile incidents between Russian and Israeli forces, likely accompanied by a wider escalation in southern Syria.

Overall, it is unlikely that the war in Ukraine will cause momentous changes to the landscape of the Syrian conflict. However, events in Ukraine will almost certainly factor into the actions of actors present in Syria. Such considerations may lead to shifts in the medium-to-long term, especially if the Russian forces in Ukraine falter.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | February #2 2022

In this edition, we cover:

• Political wrangling between Libyan capitals continues.
• The UN warns that aid to Yemen will run out in March without funds.
• Lebanese Government approves draft 2022 budget.
• State of Emergency in Tunisia extended until 2022.
• Damascus lifts subsidies in a sign of worsening economic conditions.
• Top Iraqi court deals blow to KRG’s bid for independent oil sales.
• Cairo positions itself as mediator in Sudan.
• Jordan’s King Abdullah implicated in Credit Suisse data leaks.

The circumstances of Al-Qurayshi’s death were curiously similar to that of his predecessor, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The raid on Al-Baghdadi took place in Barisha, only an hour’s drive away from Atmeh. Both raids occurred in territory largely controlled by the group Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and extremely close to the Turkish border.

Two questions arise following this set of events – one specific and one more general:

1. How did both raids take place in territory that is controlled by a group opposed to both the US and the IS?
2. Are the killings of jihadist group leaders all they are made out to be?

The HTS itself has stated that it was oblivious to the presence of Al-Qurayshi in Idlib and was not privy to details of the US operation, which it officially condemned, despite HTS’ antagonistic stance towards the IS. Unwitting residents of the town of Atmeh also claimed that they were unaware of Al-Qurayshi’s presence in the area. While there is as of yet no evidence to prove or disprove that the HTS or local residents were unaware of Al-Qurayshi’s presence, it still begs the question as to why both IS leaders, as well as other elements of the group, chose to base themselves particularly in that part of the country.

Most of Syria is now under the control of the government in Damascus, while a significant portion is governed by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. Both political entities hold fiercely belligerent stances against the IS, both in terms of ideology and realpolitik. The HTS and its representative Syrian Salvation Government based in Idlib, nevertheless, is ideologically the closest political entity to the IS. Although they have relatively stark differences between them in realpolitik attitudes and even jihadist goals – the former working more within a nationalist framework while the latter has, since its inception, espoused global goals.

The HTS condemnation of the US raid can be interpreted largely in two ways that are not necessarily mutually exclusive:

• HTS has more or less secured a relatively high level of political sovereignty in Idlib province and any external forces directly infringing upon that sovereignty, even if it is against enemies, is subject to condemnation;
• HTS has a hierarchy of enemies which gives certain jihadist groups leeway when in opposition to the US or other such non-jihadist forces.

The second point has, nevertheless, been called into question and some observers even made claims of US-HTS-Turkey cooperation over the matter.  HTS’ recent accommodation of modern modes of politics and its intent to develop relations with states such as Turkey as a means of self-legitimisation, however, is starting to lend more credence to such claims. The group’s leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, has made a number of public appearances over the past couple of years in an attempt to rework his image as a jihadist tyrant. For instance, he has appeared in Western-style clothing at the opening of the Aleppo-Bab al-Hawa road as well as on television in an interview with American journalist Martin Smith from PBS. HTS’ goal of legitimising its rule at least in Idlib, considering its recent drive to shed its image as a terrorist organisation in the eyes of the US, may have trumped any ideological convergences with the IS. The allegedly “softening” stances of HTS may have thus proven costly for Al-Qurayshi, who may have counted on a more hard-line jihadist scene in Idlib when he first entered the area.

Regarding the second question, there are doubts being raised by counter-terrorism experts as to the effectiveness of focusing energies on “neutralising” the leaders of jihadist, especially global, groups. The past decade or so has seen the high-profile deaths of Osama bin Laden, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and now Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, all a result of US military operations.

There is nevertheless some uncertainty as to the extent to which their deaths have had an impact on minimising the activities of jihadists groups. There is an element of these operations that is geared towards domestic audiences, especially in the US, taking into account the language used by US presidents in recent history regarding the protection of “national security” and “national interests”. However, US counterterrorism strategy, especially in its presentation to the public, has placed genuine importance on “cutting off the head of the snake”. It sees the removal of key leaders of terrorist groups as an important element of causing disarray among such groups, thus, weakening them in the short and long run. Nevertheless, jihadist groups have proven to act more like the many-headed Hydra of Greek mythology rather than a single-headed snake.

Support for jihadist groups at the local level in the Middle East and elsewhere comes from a mix of factors: real grievances against dictatorial governments and what is perceived to be nefarious external interference (focused mainly on the US); local cultural and inter-communal sensitivities; and economic, social and political marginalisation.

An overarching ideology that claims to address these real-life human experiences on the ground has pulled in hundreds of thousands of adherents. Killing the leaders of such groups without addressing the root causes of why these groups remain capable of recruiting adherents is not sufficient.

Despite its totalitarian, discriminatory and hierarchical ideology, the IS has shown itself to be a flexible and multi-layered organisation with several branches and leaderships across the globe. Its ideology remains headstrong in several parts of the world as it exploits real grievances that are perceived to be rooted in the rule of local dictatorial governments as well as foreign interventions. Jihadist groups such as the IS garner local support against those forces by attaching the source of all evil(s) to the latter.

This is not only the case in Syria and Iraq, but also most prominently in Afghanistan, South East Asia, the Horn of Africa and also other parts of the world, where people join the group for broadly similar reasons, despite the differing local contexts. Al-Qurayshi represents one head of a multi-headed Hydra.

Drug smuggling attempts along the Jordanian border with Syria have picked up significantly since the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) took full control of the southern provinces of Daraa and Quneitra in 2018. In addition to narcotics such as hashish, smugglers operating in Syria are best known for smuggling the amphetamine stimulant, Captagon. In recent months, authorities across the Middle East, Gulf and Europe have expressed concerns about the growing Captagon trade originating in Syria.

The conflict in Syria is no stranger to Captagon. Since the conflict erupted, Captagon production and trade in Syria has skyrocketed, with the pills bearing the iconic ‘C’ logo finding their way into every armed faction in the country, including the Islamic State (IS). However, the rapid rise in the production and trade of Captagon and similar substances have raised fears that Syria, beset with a shattered economy and sanctions, is rapidly becoming a “narco-state”.

The deeply-damaged state of the Syrian economy beset by sanctions and lack of comprehensive reconstruction is likely fuelling both the drug trade as well as drug use itself. Should these conditions not be addressed, Syria may face long-term social and public health crises relating to drug abuse, exacerbating the existing crises the country already faces due to a decade of war. Beyond that, organised crime, especially built on drugs, will make the re-emergence of conflict likelier as different factions squabble over production facilities and smuggling routes.

Rising Drugs Trade in Syria Fuelled by Conflict

Production and trade of illicit drugs in Syria and other countries in the Levant, such as Lebanon, have a long but relatively local history. In Lebanon, the cultivation of hashish, especially in the Beka’a Valley, grew in the 1960s and 1970s. The inventory of available drugs expanded to include opium poppies and cannabis, which became popular amidst the ‘warlordisation’ of the country. It is estimated that during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), drugs generated around $500 million annually for the local economy. The emergence of complex amphetamines such as Captagon, however, occurred in the more industrialised Syria, in the region between Homs and Latakia, where the availability of industrial chemicals and the facilities to process them enabled production. Although such drugs occasionally found their way to insurgents in Iraq during the 2000s, knowledge of the drugs, especially Captagon, remained relatively unknown until the Syrian conflict.

When the Syrian conflict broke out and the Syrian state withdrew from increasingly fragile areas amidst growing lawlessness, armed factions were able to capture factories with the capacity for drugs production and transform them for their own use.

As early as 2013, experts were warning that production in Syria was outpacing that in Lebanon. A combination of diminished civilian economic capacity and a need on the part of fighters to remain active during combat generated demand. At the time, pro-Government militias linked to Iran were largely implicated. However, there were signs that drugs were spreading to practically every faction, including jihadi factions that normally disavow drugs.

By 2015, the knowledge that Islamic State (IS) militants consumed Captagon and other substances was becoming commonly recognised. Captagon, in particular, was noted to make the militants feel “invincible” and offered an explanation for the rapid gains made by the militants during the earlier stages of the conflict in Iraq and Syria. Similarly, the irrational levels of violence displayed by the militants were attributed by the survivors of IS atrocities to the drugs they consumed. Anecdotal examples offered to the author by those who fought against IS cells in Iraq also referenced the prevalence of Captagon and other drugs in militant hideouts.

The current state of affairs, however, is linked to more recent developments. Over the latter half of the 2010s, the Syrian Government gradually regained control over the country’s borders with Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. The hope was that the resumption of trade and economic activity could help restore Syria’s embattled economy. However, factions that support the Syrian Government are believed to have taken advantage of Damascus’s expanded control over these border areas. Hezbollah in Lebanon, in particular, was often accused of facilitating drug production and trade alongside other, lesser-known factions backed by Iran. Amidst sanctions and destitution, the trade in drugs offered such groups a source of income, facilitating recruitment and patronage networks.

Syrian authorities have consistently denied that their country is facilitating the production and trade of drugs. Syrian state media frequently makes a show of drug busts in the areas under its control. Assuming such statements are truthful, however, belies the fact that much of Damascus’s control over the country, especially in the south, is facilitated by a smattering of armed non-state actors, local militias, loyalist warlords and other entities who have integrated themselves into state structures to facilitate their own business. It begs the question of whether Damascus could clamp down on such activities. Indeed, the emergence of the drugs trade in Myanmar’s rebellion-hit areas since 2021 shows that the phenomenon is directly linked to state weakness.

Meanwhile, the fact remains that the trade of drugs from Syria is picking up exponentially. In July 2020, Italy announced the largest seizure of Captagon from Syria, estimated at a street value of $1 billion. Similar busts were reported in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Greece.

The Impacts Are Far and Wide

While drugs may have poured gasoline onto the Syrian conflict, its transition to a frozen conflict is not going to put an end to the trade and production of illicit substances. Instead, the many challenges the country faces risk being exacerbated by an increasingly-entrenched drugs industry.

The most obvious and immediate factor is public health, especially with regards to mental health. Years of conflict have already taken a toll on the mental well-being of many Syrians. In a country whose healthcare system practically collapsed during the war and where psychological support was never particularly prevalent, the drugs offer a way to self-medicate the effects of PTSD and other ailments. However, such self-treatment can come with long-term psychological impacts. If the reports about the violence linked to Captagon use is correct, the impacts may be felt across whole swathes of Syrian society. Even absent such impacts, addiction will put further strain on medical services and, without rehabilitation services, can lead to increased criminality.

Indeed, criminality and conflict related to drugs is almost certainly the greatest destabilising factor Syria faces from continued drug trade. In addition to potentially turning users to crime, the drugs trade, especially those facilitated by warlords and militias, risks creating additional conflict. In the phenomenon referred to as “war for drugs”, rival criminal organisations vying for access to trade routes could engage in battles against one-another, resulting in the perpetuation of instability and incentives for continued fighting.

Having regained control over its territories on the backs of such militias, the Syrian state will likely find it difficult to clamp down on their activities even if it is pressured or incentivised to take action. In an extreme scenario, the Syrian state could end up with an open-ended drugs war in an increasingly-cartelised country.

Such effects would be deleterious on their own. However, in a geopolitical quagmire such as Syria, drugs activities will almost certainly have wider impacts. Endemic instability and recurring criminality along the Syria-Jordan border have already caused repeated border closures, hampering efforts to facilitate legitimate trade between the two countries. The matter was important enough to be brought before the two countries’ respective defence ministries and it forced direct meetings between Damascus and Amman. Jordanian officials have also become increasingly vocal about the impacts drugs from Syria are having on Jordan. Last week’s clashes along the border will almost certainly force Jordan to take firmer measures, impacting diplomatic relations between the two countries and side-tracking the Gulf efforts to bring Syria “back into the Arab fold”.

Such a rift already occurred between Lebanon and the Gulf after large quantities of Captagon hidden in agricultural produce was confiscated in Jeddah, prompting Saudi officials to impose a total ban on fruit and vegetable imports from the country at a time when Lebanon’s economy was spiralling. A similar scenario is highly likely in Syria despite the Gulf efforts to normalise relations with Damascus. For Damascus, which staked its credibility on its ability to bring order and stability to the areas it controls, the continued growth of the Syrian drugs trade represents a severe risk to its international objectives.

Ultimately, any efforts to clamp down on the drug trade will be an uphill battle and likely a violent process. Due to spiralling economies in Syria and Lebanon, there are now many factors to both pull and push individuals to drugs production, trade and use. Geopolitical factors that limit economic reconstruction such as sanctions, the impasse between Syrian factions that hampers cooperation, and the involvement of mutually-hostile foreign powers in the country will all complicate the actions taken against the drug production and trade.

There are measures that can help combat the effects of the drugs trade on Syrian society. Such measures include an effective and transparent law enforcement process, mental health support and rehabilitation for users, and the facilitation of reconstruction and gainful economic activity to reduce push factors. However, all of these measures are few and far between in Syria.

By all indications, the IS attack was intended to break out an estimated 3,500 IS militants, most of whom are foreigners. Among the prisoners are several high-ranking leaders of the group.

Although the SDF has managed to keep the situation from escalating, and numerous militants who escaped were captured, the situation nevertheless represents the exact type of nightmare scenario that SDF officials have been warning about since 2019. With an estimated 10,000 IS militants held in facilities across SDF-held territories in northern Syria, the attack on the Sinaa Prison once again highlights that the IS has not only remained a credible threat, but has now become emboldened enough to launch full-frontal assaults on high-security facilities.

Furthermore, the fact that the attack on the Sinaa Prison took place on the same day as an IS attack in an Iraqi outpost suggests some degree of coordination and could be a sign of future escalation of its insurgency operations.

While the fact that the IS attack on the prison was repelled is a positive development as far as local counter-terrorism capacities are concerned, the attack should nevertheless compel the authorities to reassess their capabilities and address any deficiencies in their response to the IS threat. Moving forward, members of the International Coalition should also address the lingering question of what to do with the captive IS militants. However, with numerous international crises diverting attention and resources away from Syria, implementing robust measures to manage these concerns will be an uphill task.

What Do We Know of the Attack?

Located in the Ghwayran District of Hasakah City, the Sinaa Prison (also known as Ghwayran Prison) holds about 3,500 IS militants, many of whom are foreigners. Like the al-Roj and al-Hol Camps, the prison has been long regarded as a tempting target for IS militants.

On the night of Thursday January 20^th, the IS detonated two car bombs along the walls of the prison before launching a ground attack on the prison itself in an attempt to free the inmates.

During the initial hours of the attack, the IS militants appear to have had success in taking control of parts of the facility. In the hours following the attack, IS militants posted videos showing freed militants, as well as some of the hostages they took.

Since then, however, the SDF and the International Coalition mobilised and established a cordon around the district, and announced a curfew across the whole city. The International Coalition carried out airstrikes around the prison, signifying the intensity of the fighting. The fighting remain sporadic as of Thursday, 27^th January as the SDF clears the last blocs still under militant control.

Overall, the SDF reported that 550 IS militants who escaped have surrendered or have been captured, while another 175 have been killed during the clashes. These numbers will almost certainly change as the toll of the attack becomes clearer in the aftermath. Among the most significant considerations will be whether the large majority of the prisoners managed to break out or not.

What Does This Bloody Day Signify?

The assault on Sinaa Prison took place on the same day as another bloody IS attack, this time in the Diyala Province of Iraq. There, suspected IS militants attacked an Iraqi army barracks in the al-Azim District 120 kilometres north of Baghdad, killing 11 soldiers. It was the deadliest attack of 2022 so far and one of the deadliest to take place since the group lost its territorial holdings in the country in 2017. The attack represented an upwards trend in high-casualty attacks, having followed another attack in the Makhmour Mountains last month in which ten people, including seven Peshmerga fighters, were killed. As a whole, the ISF warns that IS attacks around the Baghdad belt, especially around Tarmiyah and Taiji have picked up.

Overall, these attacks were some of the most brazen to be conducted by the militants. The International Coalition framed the attack as one of desperation. Indeed, the group was likely, in part, motivated by a need to grab the headlines after being eclipsed by a succession of developments around the world, including the Taliban victory in Afghanistan mid-2021. A high-profile attack on a secure compound aimed at freeing its militants would almost certainly have raised the group’s profile among the global jihadi scene.

Similarly, desperation can also be attributed to why the group launched such a high-profile attack to begin with. After all, it is entirely possible that the decision to free thousands of imprisoned militants was motivated by recruitment pools elsewhere drying up. However, framing the attack as being entirely motivated by desperation would be a grave mistake. The attack was, by all accounts, well-coordinated. Furthermore, it was able to proceed even after the authorities in Iraq busted an IS cell last November that was preparing for an attack on the prison.

Significantly, the attack did not take place in isolation but was rather a culmination of a years-long insurgency campaign in both Iraq and Syria that sought to keep security forces off-balance. Attacks targeting community leaders, checkpoints and other soft targets have been a regular feature, especially in areas controlled by the SDF. Although the group has remained weaker than it was during its peak, US military officials warned that the group’s operational capabilities are showing higher levels of “maturity”. In this sense, the attack on the prison, as well as the attack on the Iraqi army barracks in Diyala, may represent the next stage of the IS insurgency as it tries to make a comeback. Indeed, in our forecast for 2022, we noted prison break attempts as a possible sign of the group reconstituting itself.

Echoes of 2014?

At Integrity UK, we have frequently warned that the IS could go back to the insurgency model it pursued between 2008 and 2014.

During those six years following the IS’ defeat back when it was known as “Islamic State of Iraq”, the group waged a low-intensity but constant insurgency in northern Iraq, targeting security forces and community leaders while embedding itself among remote communities in the region. Prison breaks around Mosul and Tikrit were one of the hallmarks of this campaign and offered the group an easy source of loyal recruits. Already building strength, they have exploited the conflict in Syria, the political disorder in Iraq, and the withdrawal of the United States in order to operate openly, taking over large swathes of territory.

The situation today resembles that of 2008-2013 in many ways. Iraq is once again in the midst of a political crisis over endemic corruption and political deadlock that has triggered a major, nation-wide protest movement. The hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the on-going withdrawal in Iraq has similarly emboldened jihadi groups who are expecting a similar development to take place in Syria where the US-led Coalition continues to support the SDF. With international tensions also rising due to developments in Ukraine, it is possible that the IS saw the current situation ripe for the next stage of its insurgency.

These trends are certainly paying attention to, and are indicative of what the group may do next. However, the strategic and political landscape has changed significantly since the last decade.

First off, both Iraq and Syria have significantly improved counter-terrorism capabilities. In Iraq, in particular, years of intelligence and counter-terrorism development capabilities have allowed the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to become almost entirely self-sufficient. Although there remain many questions about operational capabilities and, in particular, coordination between the different branches, the skills, capabilities and morale of the ISF has improved significantly since 2014.

Similarly, the SDF and the US-led Coalition have spent the years since the destruction of IS’ territorial presence improving counter-terrorism capabilities. Although limited resources and a fraught political terrain limits the SDF’s capabilities, the group has nevertheless remained capable of busting IS cells. Furthermore, the fact that no significant breakouts have taken place from prisons despite repeated attempts by the militants – albeit none as ostentatious as last week’s attack – suggests that the SDF is, for now, capable of addressing security needs.

The jihadi scene is also far more fractured than it was in 2014 when the IS was able to build alliances with a smattering of other factions. Today, many other jihadi groups are mistrustful of the IS for their established track record of liquidating former allies. The success of more “nationalist” models of jihadi governance in Afghanistan and Syria’s Idlib may also make the IS model less attractive to prospective jihadi militants.

Moving Forwards

Any optimism to be had, however, needs to be tempered. With international attention gradually moving away from the Middle East, despite many of the structural factors that led to the rise of the IS remaining unaddressed, the group will almost certainly continue to exploit the so-called grey zones, deficiencies in governance or political instability to rebuild its brand and recoup its capabilities.

The most important matter to address will be that of the IS prisoners still being held in SDF facilities across Syria. Since capturing the IS stronghold of Baghuz almost exactly three years ago, the SDF has been adamant that it cannot keep the group’s foreign militants indefinitely. SDF officials have repeatedly called on countries around the world to repatriate their citizens to take the burden off the SDF while preventing the group from bolstering its ranks in the event of a prison break.

Thursday’s attack should be a wake-up call for any government around the world which still has citizens held in facilities across northern Syria. A recent sentencing of a German IS militant and his wife for their part in the Yazidi genocide may offer a legal precedent that can help other governments repatriate their own citizens and put them on trial. Achieving this, however, is contingent on creating an effective international framework that may simply not be possible in today’s fraught international climate.

Meanwhile, counting the cost in the aftermath of the attack is the most pressing priority for the SDF and the International Coalition. It is entirely possible that the IS attack on the Sinaa Prison ended up costing the group more than it gained. If that is the case, then security forces should take this as an opportunity to go on the offensive against IS sleeper cells.

If the IS, however, was successful in freeing large numbers of militants and absconding with captured equipment from the SDF, then the coming days will see intensified attacks on high-security installations. Developments around holding facilities such as al-Roj and al-Hol will be especially important to watch. The group may also launch more cross-border attacks in a bid to expand its operation range, denying the SDF, Baghdad and Damascus spaces to secure and govern along more remote areas.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | January #1 2022

In this edition, we cover:

• Libya grapples with the aftermath of its postponed elections.
• Tunisia launches the national consultation on constitutional reforms.
• Syria joins China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
• Frontlines around Marib in Yemen shift, move south amidst gains by the Saudi-led Coalition.
• Lebanon announces new elections for May 15 as the Lebanese Pound crashes again.
• Iraq holds “chaotic” first parliamentary session after election results are confirmed by the Federal Court.
• JPMorgan Chase & Co. predicts Egyptian bond windfall for investors.
• King Abdullah II meets Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz.