Bi-Monthly MENA Report | July #1 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• BP awarded rights to explore gas in West Nile Delta area
• Protestors storm parliament in Tobruk, Libya
• Kais Saied confirms constitution referendum on 25 July in Tunisia
• Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman concludes tour of Middle East
• OPEC meet to discuss oil output arrangements
• Lebanon to import natural gas from Egypt via Syria
• Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi visits Saudi Arabia and Iran

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | June #2 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• Egypt signs MoU with Israel and EU on transporting gas
• Fresh military clashes take place in Tripoli, Libya
• Algeria cuts trade ties with Spain
• Saudi Arabia plans reduction in oil exports to China
• Kuwait set to experience budget surplus for first time since 2014
• Russia and Iran try to talk Turkey out of military operation in Syria
• Sadr orders his bloc to withdraw from Iraqi parliament

Background

Unilateral military interventions by Turkey, which have been absent since Northern Cyprus in the 1970s, have now become a frequent feature in its foreign policy towards Syria. Since 2015, Erdogan, whose ruling AKP had lost its majority in the elections, has expressed intent to create the 30-km “safe zone” in the north of Syria. The stated attempt is to prevent the formation of a Kurdish-majority state run by Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, now named the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Ankara regards AANES as a political extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), long regarded by the Turkish state as a threat to its territorial integrity due to its goal of creating a Kurdish state. A number of military operations were conducted between 2016 and 2020 in attempts to create the aforementioned “safe zone”. A watershed moment in this regard was Operation Euphrates Shield, launched in August 2016, which paved the way for Turkey’s direct interventions inside de jure Syrian territory. However, up until this point, those operations have led to the occupation of only certain pockets of territories in northern Syria, in tandem with Syrian rebel forces on the ground.

What is the Purpose of the “Safe Zone”?

Ankara’s primary stated aim in the creation of the “safe zone” is to prevent “terrorists” from conducting any attacks in Turkey. The predominant military force currently present in the north and east of Syria is the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with the primary faction being the People’s Defence Units (YPG), a group ideologically related to the PKK in Turkey. Kurdish separatism has been a concern of the Turkish state since its establishment and have been further amplified since the formation of the PKK in the 1980s. Cross-border interactions between Kurds (and other ethnic groups) in Turkey and Syria led to the formation of a common political culture among significant parts of these populations. As a result, numerous political and military forces, including Kurdish-dominated forces, emerged in the aftermath of Damascus losing authority in these regions since 2011. Turkey’s stated concerns are thus primarily political and ideological as it is wary of the political programme propagated by the aforementioned groups taking hold within Turkey.

Prior to the war in Syria, Damascus and Ankara regulated their mutual concerns regarding the Kurdish issue through the 1998 Adana Agreement, which aimed to uproot pro-PKK Kurdish political activism in Syria. However, the political disarray in Syria led to a perception in Ankara that Damascus was no longer capable of enforcing the agreement. As a result, Turkish officials cited unilateral actions as their main option. A similar pattern has also emerged regarding Turkish military operations in northern Iraq, where PKK elements have based themselves. Turkey has recently increased its aerial airstrikes on the PKK, as well as its efforts to get Baghdad to align with its goals.

Why Now?

With Ankara’s plan to create a 30km “safe zone” already in the works over the past years, the TSK has already been undertaking some of the more practical steps towards its objectives. However, such steps have slowed down and even outright paused over the past two years, suggesting that Ankara was done with military interventions. So, why is Erdogan now calling for renewed operations?

One reason is that shifts in the geopolitical map have aligned in such a way that Ankara feels more at ease launching another cross-border intervention. Perhaps most significantly, Russia’s own cross-border military operation in Ukraine has played a role in this shift. One of the main obstacles to Ankara’s wishes to go ahead with another military intervention in northern Syria has been Russia’s opposition to a further Turkish push into Syrian territory.

However, with the severing of diplomatic ties between several Western countries and Russia, as well as the Western sanctions on Russia, Moscow is keen to maintain its diplomatic relations with countries that have retained relations. Although Turkish-Russian relations have experienced bouts of tensions over the course of the Syrian war, Moscow is now demonstrating greater willingness to take Ankara’s interests into account. Early in June, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, expressed Russia’s opposition to Turkey’s military plans in northern Syria. However, only a week later, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that Russia “fully understands” Turkey’s concerns.

Another related development is Sweden and Finland’s proposed accession to NATO. Turkey is currently vehemently opposed to their accession, in particular that of Sweden’s. In recent years, Sweden accepted refugees from Turkey with sympathies towards, or expressing outright support for, the PKK and YPG. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has recently stated that Turkey’s concerns are “legitimate”, providing Turkey with further room to pursue its ambitions in northern Syria in the knowledge that NATO will not directly oppose those plans. In sum, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have increased Turkey’s geopolitical capital and bargaining chips both vis-à-vis Russia and NATO, allowing Turkey to take further unilateral action in Syria at this juncture.

Finally, perhaps the most significant internal reason that is pushing Ankara to take this step is the growing domestic political resentment in relation to the currency and debt crisis and increasing anti-refugee views. Although the two issues are not directly related, opposition forces are capitalising on general discontent and linking both issues in their accusations directed at the current government. Erdogan has consequently asserted that the proposed “safe zone” will accommodate a million Syrians who have sought refuge in Turkey. He added that their return will be “voluntary”, despite several accounts in recent years demonstrating that Syrian refugees have already been forcibly deported to other parts of northern Syria that have already been occupied by Turkey. Such domestic dissatisfaction has already led to AKP losing Ankara and Istanbul in 2019 local elections. Recent opinion polls point to the AKP haemorrhaging support, which bodes badly for the general elections in June 2023. With 2023 also being the centennial of Turkey’s founding, the timing of these renewed military operations appears, at least partially, to be related to the AKP’s need to maintain domestic legitimacy.

Possible Repercussions

Although the geopolitical winds are currently favouring Ankara, there are serious potential risks involved with a renewed military operation in northern Syria.

Firstly, in terms of potential geopolitical consequences, Turkey’s proposed military operation has met sustained criticism from the US and Iran. Washington has supported the SDF in their fight against the Islamic State (IS), something that already strained ties with Ankara. Although former US President Donald Trump ordered the withdrawal of US troops in northern Syria in 2020, a contingent has remained in the region and it continues to provide the SDF with support. American officials have warned that the Turkish intervention will lead to an emboldening of the IS in the region. Indeed, the IS prison outbreaks that took place earlier this year are testament to the threat that the group continues to pose. Although the US has previously attempted to prevent direct Turkish interventions into northern Syria, they have thus far failed to stop them, at best limiting Turkish-led advances and sending signals to Ankara through economic sanctions. The US’ partial withdrawal initiated in 2020, along with American reluctance to further deepen already tense diplomatic tensions with Turkey, will likely limit the US’ response to Turkey’s military operation to somewhat innocuous public criticisms.

Iran, on its part, has categorically expressed its opposition to the military operation. Iran and Turkey have thus far avoided direct confrontation in Syria; however, the villages of Zahra and Nubl will fall within the scope of Turkey’s proposed “safe zone”. These two villages have gained significant strategic importance for Damascus and pro-Shiite forces from Iran, Iraq and Lebanese, who have supported local forces against Sunni rebel groups throughout the conflict. Iran-backed groups directly coordinated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are allegedly already stationed in both towns. A Turkish-backed military offensive would thus risk Turkish-Iranian military clashes.

Iran has also regularly criticised the previous Turkish military operations in northern Syria and Turkey’s support for Syrian opposition groups. Turkey and Iran are more or less on the same page when it comes to the PKK and Kurdish rebels inside their respective state borders. However, both states are on opposite camps in Syria, with Tehran likely viewing Turkish-backed groups as a greater threat than the SDF. Thus, neither country is likely to seek a compromise on the matter as Turkey is insistent on creating the “safe zone” and Iran is reluctant to lose its influence within Syria that could threaten its belt of allies running across Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

Secondly, the political and military situation within Syria itself will undoubtedly change following any the potential Turkish operation. If Ankara insists on creating the 30-km “safe zone”, it will be its most ambitious intervention to date and will lead to the reconfiguration of relations between a host of internal actors, including the AANES (and its military wing, the SDF), Damascus, and the wide array of Syrian opposition groups. Indeed, the SDF leadership have already stated that they are willing to coordinate a defence with Damascus. While, Damascus has yet to openly announce its stance on any possible coordination with the SDF, the Syrian Army already has a history of collaboration with the SDF in anti-IS operations, and has in certain cases agreed to support the SDF against Turkish-backed advances. However, political negotiations between the AANES and Damascus has been stalled for years, and both sides have failed to reach any compromise on the question of autonomy in northern and eastern Syria. A potential Turkish-backed offensive will likely accelerate those talks and put the AANES in a more dependent position.

In addition, the main Opposition faction in Idlib, Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has recently been conducting military drills in anticipation of an alleged Syrian government offensive. HTS are considered rivals of other Syrian rebel groups, most notably of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), now known as the Syrian National Army (SNA). Both groups, which themselves are composed of various factions, have recently sought to mend their ties. However, such efforts have been hampered by factionalism and infighting within the FSA/SNA. There is a possibility that the proposed Turkish military operations against mutual enemies – the SDF and the Syrian Army – could help bring greater rapprochement between these factions.

Finally, the proposed military operations will inevitably lead to humanitarian consequences. There are a number of precedents to refer to in this regard from previous Turkish-led military operations in northern Syria. The occupation of Afrin in 2018 led to a string of human rights violations as documented by Human Rights Watch. Following the Operation Peace Spring in 2019, as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated that over 200,000 were displaced and civilian casualties directly resulted from the operation. Civilian populations continue to inhabit the area targeted by Erdogan as part of the “safe zone” and, consequently, mass displacements and civilian casualties are inevitable.

All in all, the Turkish government and TSK will have made both political and military calculations before stating its intent on going ahead with their attempt to create a “safe zone” in northern Syria. The current geopolitical climate seems to indicate that regional and global players are highly unlikely to make any counter-intervention, especially relevant in the case of Russia. The diplomatic relations with countries critical of the operation are in all likelihood going to maintain their status quo. The response from Damascus will be highly significant in affecting both geopolitical and internal dynamics. Military involvement from Damascus would effectively lead to an inter-state war between Turkey and Syria and this may prolong the conflict in the north.

In the case where the SDF will stand alone in the face of the Turkish-backed offensive, it is difficult to imagine how it will prevent the formation of the “safe zone”. However, Damascus is unlikely to remain silent on such a substantial incursion into its sovereign territory, and so Syrian-Turkish relations will in any case be dealt a further blow. Whatever the political implications of the potential Turkish military operation in northern Syria would be, the humanitarian cost is a priori undisputable.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | June #1 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• Egypt announces new “golden licenses” to attract investors
• Tunisia’s President announces constitutional referendum for July
• Algeria central bank governor dismissed
• Morocco increases security cooperation with Mauritania
• Gulf banking sector reports robust growth in 2021
• Yemen ceasefire extended by two months
• The UAE enters investment partnership with Jordan and Israel
• Lebanon’s Parliament holds first session
• Damascus reinforces its positions in northern Syria
• Iraq’s Parliament approves law criminalising normalisation with Israel

Following the first two attacks, the Egyptian military launched counter-terror offensives on May 11^th, particularly around Sheikh Zuweid and Rufah, where there are relatively higher levels of IS activity. The military announced that 10 IS militants were killed. In a subsequent operation on May 13^th, another 13 “terrorists” of unspecified affiliations were reportedly killed.

The number of terrorist attacks across Egypt had somewhat subsided since 2018. However, there has been a resurgence of attacks in February of this year. The uptick in attacks followed the IS prison attacks in Syria and the killing of IS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi. This form of guerrilla warfare employed by the IS in Sinai seems to replicate a general trend in IS strategy, as in Syria and Iraq, of maintaining a covert network that conducts sporadic attacks on military targets, rather than seeking to gain control of territories.

In the Egyptian case, the government has sought to not only eliminate terrorist groups military, but it has also employed a “developmental” approach by investing and residential projects in the Sinai. Although local allegiances in the Sinai to terrorist organisations such as the IS are partly explained as a reaction to the crackdown on Islamist groups following the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammed Morsi in 2013, as well as normalisation with Israel, economic negligence of the region is also known to be a significant factor. The Egyptian government’s developmental strategy aims to alleviate some of those grievances in tandem with their military operations, however, the state-centric nature of this strategy, which is intimately linked to military interests, does not necessarily represent local interests.

The vast desert landscape in the Sinai, much like in Syria and Iraq, allows for the IS and other terrorist groups to operate covertly and maintain a presence away from the watchful eye of the state. Thus far, eliminating the IS’ leaders and simply employing a direct military strategy has not led to the complete disbandment of the group. Whether Egypt’s developmental strategy will produce long-term results remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to eradicate the ideological basis of the IS and alleviate the structural political problems that brought in adherents in the first place.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | May #2 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• Egypt announces privatisation of 12 state and army-owned companies
• UN-backed Libya peace talks resume in Cairo
• President of Algeria meets Russia’s Foreign Minister
• Morocco reopens land borders with Spanish enclaves
• President of the UAE dies; Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed appointed President
• Saudi Arabia economy projected to surpass $1 trillion for the first time
• Yemen ceasefire holds; first commercial flight in six years departs Sanaa
• Lebanon elections see pro-Hezbollah bloc lose parliamentary majority
• Syria’s Bashar al-Assad holds surprise state visit to Iran
• Iraq battered by sandstorms; 5,000 hospitalised

The general elections offered citizens a chance to voice their political choices, albeit within the same political framework and confessional system as before. Have these developments translated into drastic changes in Lebanese politics and the government following the elections? Yes, and no.

What exactly happened in the elections?

The large majority of parties that participated in these elections are the very same parties that have prevailed in Lebanese politics for the past few decades. There has, nevertheless, been a shift in preferences as the bloc containing Hezbollah and its allies lost the majority it had gained in the 2018 elections.

Hezbollah itself retained all 13 seats in parliament it held since the 2018 elections. However, Hezbollah allies, including Amal, the Free Patriotic Movement and others (Sunni parties such as Al-Ahbash), saw fairly substantial losses, leading to an overall loss of majority for the bloc.

Out of the “establishment political parties, the greatest gains were made by the Lebanese Forces, winning six extra seats. The Lebanese Forces have now become the most dominant Christian party in the country, surpassing the Hezbollah-aligned Free Patriotic Movement. This may be an indication of grievances held by Christians following the Beirut Port blast, which predominantly struck Christian-inhabited areas.  In addition, the warehouse that exploded allegedly belonged to Hezbollah.

The most significant change came in the surge of independent candidates and political activists originating from civil society and the general protest movement. The seats held by independent candidates saw a fourfold rise, from seven seats in 2018 to 28 in 2022. At least five of the 19 MPs for Beirut are considered independents; and two candidates even won seats in southern Lebanon (Firas Hamdan and Elias Jarada, the Druze and Greek Orthodox candidates in the South 3 list), the traditional strongholds of Hezbollah and its allies. This is a clear indication of the changing attitudes in Lebanese society towards establishment politics and the traditional parties.

Following the elections, the media focused predominantly on the losses incurred by Hezbollah, as opposed to the gains made by independents and reformists. Such focus can lead to outsized expectations about the weakness of Hezbollah despite the party itself managing to retain all its seats.

Nevertheless, the influence held by the bloc that includes Hezbollah is likely to diminish as a result of their electoral losses. This was felt even before these elections as support for Hezbollah has notably waned in the past few years among both the Shia, but also Christians and others who supported, or at least tolerated, the group.

Iran in Iraq and Lebanon – any parallels?

The parliamentary elections in Iraq in 2021 represent an interesting parallel when it comes to political groups backed by Iran. The principal pro-Iran political group in that election, Fatah, led by Hadi al-Ameri, saw a significant loss (losing 31 of its 48 seats). The rival Sadrist Movement, critical of Iranian influence, received the highest number of seats and they are looking to form a majority government as part of the Saving the Homeland Alliance.

The election results were initially denounced by the pro-Iran parties, leading to protests by their followers. A subsequent assassination attempt against the Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, suspected to have been made by a pro-Iranian Iraqi militia in protest of the results, but these claims have yet to be confirmed. Regardless, such militia groups have also continued to commit attacks in both Iraq and Syria against American and other targets (often claimed to be linked to Israel). Such incidents were often followed by political wrangling between the pro and anti-Iran factions. Tehran has continued pushing Sadr to include its allied parties in the new government, while Sadr himself has attempted to limit this influence.

Despite these setbacks and rising political violence in the aftermath, Iran and parties that support Tehran have still shown some pragmatism to work within the system and (re-)consolidate their positions. Iran may be more inclined to use its geopolitical leverage (for instance when Iran sent fuel to Lebanon via Hezbollah during the country’s fuel shortage crisis in 2021) to maintain its influence, rather than relying as much on the actions of those parties. While there are grounds for comparisons, the situation in Lebanon is ultimately different than that in Iraq.

Iraq has been in a state of war for the better part of the past decade, especially during the war against the Islamic State that raged from 2013 to better part of 2018. Militia groups have sprouted in this environment and have at times taken political matters into their own hands. This is currently not so much the case in Lebanon. There is at present no internal state of war and any semblances of a shift towards inter-communal violence are approached in a sensitive manner in a country that experienced, and is still reeling from, a 15-year civil war between 1975-1990. Hezbollah has not shied away from using force within Lebanon, as was seen during the protests, however, it is highly unlikely that the group will respond militarily to the election results in order to not further destabilise the internal situation in Lebanon and, thus, lose more support.

Signs of Change

Hezbollah’s internal support in Lebanon has largely come from its ability to provide public services to poorer elements of Lebanese society, especially in the south of the country, in addition to its image as a “protector” of Lebanon against Israel as well as extremist Sunni Islamist groups, which has also attracted sympathy from certain Christians. The more or less disappearance of the extremist Sunni Islamist threat and the embroilment of Hezbollah (as well as other establishment parties) in corruption scandals amidst the economic crisis have largely contributed to the loss of faith in the Hezbollah-led bloc. This is in addition to the shift in support among pro-Hezbollah Sunni, Druze and Christian communities who have voted for independent reformists in these elections.

Hezbollah retains immense military, social and political capital and will not relinquish its influence anytime soon. In fact, the extent of the loss of its political influence is still undetermined, as the opposition have yet to form a unified coalition that would win a majority.

The independent candidates as of yet seem unlikely to join such a coalition as their platforms are based on opposition to established parties. There will be a battle to win the hearts and minds of Lebanese citizens in primary concerns such as the provision of public services and economic security.

Geopolitical alliances that have frequently determined the nature of support for parties in Lebanon in the past decades may have lost their importance since 2019. Moreover, the protest movement, which has attracted a significant proportion of the electorate, was forthright in its anti-sectarianism, seeking to reduce insecurities between ethno-religious communities and to foment solidarity across confessional lines. Internal political and economic issues seem to have trumped all other concerns, with the Hezbollah-led bloc being the first to suffer from this shift in public concerns.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | May #1 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• First direct flight between Egypt and Israel takes place
• Libya’s National Oil Corporation “temporarily” resumes operations
• Tunisia’s President Saied launches national dialogue but excludes the Ennahda Party
• Algeria threatens to scrap gas export deal to Spain
• Saudi Arabia sees fastest GDP growth in a decade
• The UN warns of worsening humanitarian situation in Yemen
• Jordanian tourism sector shows signs of rebound
• Saudi Arabia and France pledge new assistance package to Lebanon
• Clashes erupt in northern Iraq after security forces launch operations around Sinjar
• Syria’s Presidency announced appointment of new Minister of Defence, Ali Mahmoud Abbas

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | April #2 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• Egypt announces aid to Sudan following the visit of Sudanese Army General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo
• The IMF increases its growth projection for Egypt for FY 2021-22 despite the impact of the Ukraine-Russia war
• Militia groups once again stop production in Libya’s El Feel oilfield, evidencing growing splits between eastern and western regions in the country
• Algeria and Italy sign energy deal
• Saudi crude exports reach their highest level since April 2020
• The new presidential council in Yemen is inaugurated, with further signs that Saudi Arabia is looking to exit the conflict
• Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, reopen embassies in Lebanon, pointing to an easing of tensions
• The Islamic State (IS) conducted an attack on an Iraqi army outpost in Anbar Province
• The World Bank projects economic growth in Iraq of 8.9%, largely due to higher oil prices

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | April #1 2022

In this edition, we cover:

• Egypt adopts austerity measures to combat economic fallout of Ukraine war.
• Morocco intensifies diplomatic efforts for international recognition of its claims over Western Sahara.
• The IMF mulls economic support to Egypt and Tunisia.
• The Foreign Ministers of the UAE and Israel hold talks for the first time.
• President of Yemen’s internationally-recognised government relinquishes power to a council.
• Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar pledge economic support to Egypt.
• Government of Kuwait dissolves three month after formation.
• Iraq’s parliamentary vote to elect a new President deadlocked after no candidate gains majority.