Bi-Monthly MENA Report | April #2 2022

Among the stories that we cover in this edition:

• Egypt announces aid to Sudan following the visit of Sudanese Army General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo
• The IMF increases its growth projection for Egypt for FY 2021-22 despite the impact of the Ukraine-Russia war
• Militia groups once again stop production in Libya’s El Feel oilfield, evidencing growing splits between eastern and western regions in the country
• Algeria and Italy sign energy deal
• Saudi crude exports reach their highest level since April 2020
• The new presidential council in Yemen is inaugurated, with further signs that Saudi Arabia is looking to exit the conflict
• Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, reopen embassies in Lebanon, pointing to an easing of tensions
• The Islamic State (IS) conducted an attack on an Iraqi army outpost in Anbar Province
• The World Bank projects economic growth in Iraq of 8.9%, largely due to higher oil prices

The announcement came at a time when international attention was drawn away from the Middle East and North Africa region and instead focused on the escalating war between Russia and Ukraine. Alongside ongoing crises such as Covid-19, the news of the IS’ new leader was largely buried by the emerging conflict in Ukraine.

The relatively muted response to the selection of a new IS Caliph, however, is also telling about the group’s continued relevance after grabbing headlines over the 2010s. In this context, it would be fair to ask if the selection of a new leader is relevant at all.

In this article, we look into what we do and do not know about the IS’ new leader. In examining the announcement, as well as the facts and speculation around the man who now leads the group, we conclude that the IS’ main concern is threefold:

• To project a sense of resilience in light of ongoing (global) challenges;
• Maintain continuity between its past and present leadership;
• Generate a sense of legitimacy and inspiration for IS cells around the world while maintaining the independence of these cells through a broad guiding strategy.

We note that the IS strategy to rebuild itself resembles that of its strategy in the lead-up to 2014 and that the group has been investing in its resilience to continue its operations even after decapitation strikes targeting its leadership. We further note that while resilience and capacities of local communities against the IS improved, we warn that the current international climate may result in the erosion of these defences, allowing the IS to carve out a space for itself once again.

Background

The IS announced the selection of its new leader a little over a month after his predecessor, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, was killed in a raid by the US forces. Although the group did not acknowledge the US involvement in his killing, the statement did note that he died during a battle. The statement further noted that Abu Ibrahim handpicked his successor as Abu al-Hassan.

Over the month of relative quiet from the IS’ central command, there was some speculation that the group was experiencing a leadership struggle or was otherwise struggling to communicate between different cells in order to appoint a suitable leader. If this was the case, however, there were no visible internal clashes or reports of tensions within the group. Indeed, much of the group’s media retained a sense of casual calm during this period. When Abu al-Hassan was finally appointed as the group’s leader, IS franchises around the world were quick to acknowledge him. If there were internal tensions, the group was successful in hiding them.

Notably, little is known about the group’s new leader. The group did not share any photos of its new leader, nor did it reveal his name, instead referring to him only with his Nom-De-Guerre.

The inclusion of al-Hashimi al-Quraishi are possible indicators of Abu al-Hassan’s tribal background. Indeed, the IS has often sought to appoint leaders from the Quraish tribe, the original tribe of Prophet Muhammad and many early Islamic caliphs. This historical link is often held as a precondition for becoming a caliph by many modern Salafi Jihadis. When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared a Caliph, his connection to the Quraish bloodline was frequently emphasised in IS propaganda. His successor, Abu Ibrahim, was similarly given the “Quraishi” title despite him being widely believed to be a Turkman from Tal Afar. It is very possible that Abu al-Hassan does not actually belong to the Quraish tribe either and was bestowed the title for propaganda purposes.

However, given the lack of details around Abu al-Hassan, all such details remain speculative.

Ever since the IS announced the selection of its new leader, experts sought to decipher who he truly is. Citing Iraqi security officials, the Reuters news agency suggested that Abu al-Hassan is the brother of the group’s first caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

However, at least one claim has been made to cast doubts on that assertion, suggesting that Baghdadi’s brother is likely the group’s newly-announced spokesperson instead of the leader. Instead, it was suggested that the group’s new leader is Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaidai (also known as Ustath Zaid, Abu Khattab al-Iraqi, Abu al-Moez al-Iraqi and Abu Ishaq). He is believed to have been involved with the IS’ predecessor, Ansar al-Islam under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi during the 2000s before officially joining the IS in 2013. If these speculations are correct, this makes the IS’ new leader a veteran jihadi leader and one of the last remaining members of the IS’ original cadres.

What Does the Selection of a New Leader Mean?

Without knowing more about Abu al-Hassan and his background, it is difficult to ascertain how the new leadership will impact the group. However, some signs of the group’s main concerns and trajectory are apparent in the selection process as well as how this process was communicated with the wider public. Overall, the IS appears to be concerned with maintaining legitimacy among its supporters while offering a sense of continuity and resilience.

Just as the group is attempting to gain legitimacy from the distant past, it is also trying to connect itself to the jihadi struggles of the more recent times. If Abu al-Hassan truly is Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaidai, then his status as a veteran jihadi and a follower of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi would essentially confirm him as a hardliner who will not compromise or divert from the group’s ideological bedrock and virulent sectarianism. It is entirely possible that this was behind the group’s decision to message that Abu al-Hassan was handpicked as a successor by his predecessor.

Another message Abu al-Hassan’s selection sends is resilience. Although the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was met with some disbelief, concern and even panic among the group’s followers, the death of Abu Ibrahim drew little such reactions. In part, this was because he was not the leader of the group for a long time and was hardly visible. As far as the day-to-day affairs of the IS goes, his death appears to have had little impact.

Indeed, the group’s franchises around the world, especially in Africa, continued to launch and publish attacks, seemingly with little disruption. Overall, IS franchises from West Africa to Afghanistan appear to be committed to their objectives.

Following Abu Ibrahim’s death, experts noted that his death would likely have more symbolic consequences, as opposed to operational ones. This indeed appears to have been the case. However, even the morale damage predicted appear to have been limited. Instead, the group looks to have leveraged an orderly transition to show to the world that decapitation strikes will not end the group or dissuade its followers.

Ultimately, the IS’ goal to rebuild its strength by pursuing an insurgency will remain unchanged. In a bid to achieve this goal, the group will likely continue to follow tactics that resemble the tactics it pursued in the lead-up to its emergence as a territorial force in 2014. Such tactics include:

• To continue attacks on “apostate governments” in the MENA region to retain relevance and, where possible, free imprisoned supporters;
• To continue attacks on other jihadi factions deemed insufficiently devoted to Islam – such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda – to brandish its hard-line credentials;
• To continue attacking soft targets like community leaders to instil fear and suspicion in isolated communities;
• To exploit local grievances and failings in governance to gain supporters and recruits among local populations.

For a cell-based organisation, such tactics are easily achievable and do not require constant oversight from the leadership, reducing the need to engage in communications that could compromise the safety of the leaders. Instead, the leadership appears to be intended to serve as a source of inspiration, leaving cells capable of operating independently even in the aftermath of decapitation strikes.

After a US airstrike killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, the group that would become the IS was viewed as a spent force. His successor, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was similarly killed in a US raid in 2010, setting the stage for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the group’s eventual rise in Iraq and Syria.

Having experienced and emerged stronger from leadership losses, it is conceivable that the IS invested heavily into making the group more resilient against future strikes. Although the pool of the original jihadi leaders from the 2000s may be running low, the group retains large numbers of armed militants and supporters across Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It may also have as much as $50 million in reserves. Thus, viewing the group as a spent force on account of its reliance on jihadi symbolism to legitimise itself would be a mistake.

Regional and International Dynamics Will Influence the Actions of the IS

Although the IS’ inspiration and strategy may be drawing from the past, the group nevertheless finds itself in an environment quite different from when it rose to power nearly a decade ago.

Chief among such changes is the tone of caution among many experts about the group’s fortunes. Unlike the triumphalism seen in the 2000s and the early 2010s, experts today are adamant that the jihadi threat may resurge and that the elimination of the group’s leadership is not the end of the group itself. Unsurprisingly, post-conflict programmes in formerly IS-held areas have sought to address not only practical issues like reconstruction and services but also enhance community cohesion to make them more resilient against IS propaganda. The group may be employing its old playbook, but it will meet communities who are more aware of the group’s tricks.

The IS will also find the international jihadi scene a lot less welcoming compared to its emergence in the 2010s. When the group rose to power in Iraq and Syria in the 2010s, it did so through alliances with local factions, both jihadi and non-jihadi, before proceeding to co-opt or liquidate its former allies. Since then, the IS’ notoriety for violence was compounded by a reputation for picking fights with any faction that doesn’t pledge loyalty to the IS’ caliph. The IS has come into conflict with nearly every major jihadi faction around the world, with some local exceptions in West Africa and the Maghreb. As factions like the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria experiment with more pragmatic modes of governance, they will likely find the IS’ brand increasingly toxic.

However, other international developments may favour an IS resurgence. Chief among these is the on-going (and escalating) war between Ukraine and Russia. The world’s already-diminishing attention towards the MENA region was, practically overnight, turned towards Ukraine instead. With prospects of conventional, interstate war once again on the books, the preoccupation with counter-insurgency operations in the Middle East since 2001 may come to a gradual end. Indeed, even prior to the conflict in Ukraine, the US was drawing down its presence in Iraq, with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) conducting anti-IS operations with relative independence. Such improved capabilities are a far cry from the state of affairs when the IS emerged in 2014. Moving forward, it will be vital to ensure that local counter-terrorism and intelligence capabilities do not erode. Lulls in attacks, in particular, should not comfort security agencies into a false sense of comfort, as such lulls could be part of an IS subterfuge to wait for the world’s attention to fully move away from the group, allowing it to carve out a space in the MENA region more effectively.

More significantly is the possibility that the IS may exploit the war directly. In Syria, for example, IS militants remained highly active in the Syrian Desert, regularly attacking the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions and ambushing loyalist militias. Although Russian presence in eastern Syria is not widespread, Russian military and economic assistance nevertheless allowed the SAA to gain control of the region over the course of 2018, while the IS rule was collapsing. With the war in Ukraine potentially diminishing Russian assistance for the SAA, there is a possibility that IS’ insurgency may become ever-more brazen. Improved IS capabilities could then spillover into neighbouring regions such as those controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or across the border into Iraq.

Ultimately, much about the future of the IS remains uncertain, especially in light of lack of information surrounding the group’s new leader. The fact is that under the rule of Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, the IS faces a world that is both deeply changed from 2014, yet at the same time, worryingly similar.

One week after the launch of Russian operations, media outlets and analysts remain firmly focused on the events unfolding in Ukraine, attempting to make predictions and assess what they mean for the world writ large.

Although the Middle East and North Africa is removed geographically from the conflict, the fighting could have significant ramifications for numerous political, social and economic ties within the region. Both Russia and Ukraine have significant economic ties with MENA countries and supply numerous commodities, including food and hydrocarbon products.

Russia has also developed its engagement throughout the 2010s with a number of countries such as Libya, Israel and Egypt, and also backs the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, following Moscow’s direct intervention in the country in 2015.

In this article, we will be looking at some of the potential impacts of the Russian-Ukrainian War in the MENA region. While we do not anticipate any direct spillover of the conflict, there are numerous dynamics that can exacerbate social and economic concerns across much of the region, although some countries, especially oil-producing ones, may stand to benefit from the developments.

We also anticipate that armed groups in Syria and Libya will exploit any opportunity to target Russian interests while Moscow remains focused in Ukraine. These include Turkish-backed anti-Russian forces in both countries; however, it is likely that these groups will be bound by other geo-political limitations, such as the Turkey-Russia entente. Some specific groups, such as Chechens in Syria, may also view this period as an opportunity to target Russian interests, especially amidst growing Chechen involvement in Ukraine, on both a pro-Moscow and a pro-Kyiv capacity.

Background

On 24^th February 2022, the Russian Government announced that it would launch “special operations” against Ukraine. Justified in terms of protecting Russian security interests vis-à-vis NATO expansion and on grounds of “de-Nazifying” Ukraine, the first hours of the Russian military offensive saw a rapid push into Ukrainian territory in a bid to capture major cities including Kyiv. By all indications, however, the offensive progressed slower than expected amidst reports of numerous strategic and logistical mistakes.

Since the shock of the initial Russian offensive wore off and the Ukrainian resistance rallied, many countries around the world, especially the European Union and the United States, began targeting Russia with sanctions, causing the value of the Russian Rouble to plummet. Many Russian neighbours such as Finland also began reconsidering their long-standing policy of neutrality. Developments such as these signal that there will be significant geopolitical shifts in the coming weeks or months.

These initial pressures, however, have done little to deter Russia. Indeed, the day after talks between Russia and Ukraine concluded without success, there were reports of new Russian military movements towards Kyiv, as well as reports of increasing use of heavy artillery and rockets in contested cities such as Kharkiv and Mariupol. By most indications, fighting will continue in the coming days and even weeks.

Signs of Economic Troubles for Much of the MENA Region

In the immediate aftermath of the Russian declaration of military operations in Ukraine, global wheat prices – already on a 10-year-high – shot up significantly. This is unsurprising, given that they together make up for about 30% of global wheat production, rivalled only by the US, China and India.

In the MENA region, however, Russian and Ukrainian wheat plays a much more significant role. Yemen, already entirely reliant on food imports, buys 27% of its wheat from Ukraine and 8% from Russia. Both Turkey and Egypt import 85% of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine, with imports from Ukraine to Turkey rising significantly in recent years. Tunisia similarly relies on Ukraine for 50% to 60% of its wheat imports.

There are widespread fears that the disruption in Ukraine, compounded with sanctions on Russia and limits of Black Sea naval traffic could create a combination of factors that result in a famine across the MENA region. Indeed, the first day of the war already saw shortages of wheat products in Tunisia.

Already, vulnerable countries such as Lebanon are looking at alternative sellers, such as the United States. However, Lebanon is not alone in the pursuit for alternative sellers. With demand now concentrated to a smaller pool of sellers, chances of prices rising are especially high. Thus, even if a famine is averted, many poorer households face increased food insecurity as they will struggle to pay the market price for wheat products.

This, in turn, can have wide-ranging socio-political impacts. In the MENA region, bread carries deep social and economic meaning. Bread shortages and unavailability have been linked to periods of unrest, including the Arab Spring protests. As food prices rose since the 1980s, the so-called “Bread riots” became increasingly commonplace. Indeed, in Egypt, the eruption of the Arab Spring protests was preceded by stark increases in bread prices, with bread symbolism being a common element in protests across the Arab World. Many MENA countries are already suffering economically due to COVID-19. Thus, rising food prices could tip the situation to even further extremes.

Already-vulnerable countries like Yemen will be especially hard-hit. Not only will the country suffer due to rising food prices, it will also likely have to contend with global aid being directed to Ukraine, further limiting the already-diminishing pool of aid available to Yemen.

A similar concern is present with regards to commodities like oil and gas prices. In the aftermath of the eruption of the war, the price for Brent crude went past $113 per barrel. While many MENA countries are net producers of hydrocarbons and could benefit from a windfall, importers from Russia such as Turkey and Lebanon will likely face rising costs. As both countries are suffering from severe economic crises, the war could result in an additional layer of instability. Indeed, even countries like Iraq, which are expected to be among the beneficiaries of rising oil prices, are expected to pay three times what it paid last year for wheat as it substitutes Ukrainian wheat with wheat from other sellers.

Meanwhile, Egypt, which is deeply reliant on tourism from Russia and Ukraine, will likely see a quieter summer. Indeed, tourist bookings from both Ukraine and Russia had already fallen by 30% in early February, when tensions between the two countries were climbing. These numbers will likely fall further, dampening Egypt’s hopes for a fast summer recovery as it eases COVID-19 restrictions. Combined with the aforementioned food price spikes, the loss of tourism revenue can lead to several secondary impacts for Cairo.

MENA countries that have banked on Russian support may also find their fortunes diminished. Syria, detailed below, is a prime example. However, other MENA also saw growing Russian involvement. In Libya, Moscow supported the eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) government, as well as the dominant military force there, Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). In early February, when the HoR appointed former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha to replace the current, Tripoli-based Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh, Moscow backed Bashagha’s claim. With Russia preoccupied in Ukraine, such political support may dry up. While this will not seriously hinder the HoR and the LNA, as they also receive support from Egypt and many Gulf countries, the loss of the Russian military support which nearly allowed the LNA to take control of Tripoli over the past couple years may still make a difference to Libya’s strategic landscape.

The View from Syria

In the immediate aftermath of the launch of the Russian operations into Ukraine, the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, expressed support for Moscow, describing it as a “correction of history” in reference to similar statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The support from Damascus is unsurprising, given Moscow’s efforts since the outbreak of the war in Syria to ensure the survival of the Syrian President, including a direct intervention in 2015. Indeed, the parallels between Ukraine and Syria vis-à-vis Russian interests were picked up by numerous observers during the lead-up to the current conflict in Ukraine. In particular, observers noted that Russian military in Syria used its deployment there to tune its capacities and shore up any shortcomings. A number of newly-developed tools such as the refurbished Tupolev Tu-160 and Russia’s first aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, also saw their first combat deployments in Syria. There were also reports of Russia deploying Chechen soldiers into Ukraine, echoing the deployment of Chechen soldiers along the frontlines of Syria. In both Syria and Ukraine, the fearsome reputation of Chechens were highlighted.

As referenced above, both Ukraine and Russia are major wheat suppliers. Thus, the eruption of the war has led to price speculation that caused the price of wheat to shoot up. Unsurprisingly, this has had an effect on Syria. Like Egypt, Russia is Syria’s main wheat supplier. Thus, the country is unlikely to experience severe shortages in the short-to-medium term, with much of the production disruptions focused on Ukraine. With Syria already under heavy sanctions, it is unlikely the new sanctions on Russia will cause direct impacts. However, supplies may still be disrupted due to disruptions in the Black Sea trade lanes. Furthermore, rising prices may start squeezing many poorer Syrians out of the market, especially as Damascus works on lifting subsidies to manage a fraught economic position. With Russia now dealing with its own economic woes, Damascus may also struggle to obtain Russian wheat cheaply.

Beyond that, although Damascus entered some symbolic trade agreements with contested territories such as Crimea, the trade between Syria and such territories is too negligible to have a significant impact.

Instead, security and political developments will be of greater significance in Syria.

An Opening for the Syrian Opposition?

Although Russia has been involved in Syria since the start of the war in 2011, its involvement truly picked up in 2015 when it intervened directly on behalf of President Assad. Since then, Russia became Damascus’s most significant backer, eclipsing other backers like Iran. Russian military support, including intense and indiscriminate airstrikes on urban centres, cemented Damascus’s victory in a number of fronts including Aleppo. Although Russia maintained some role as a mediator, including in regions such as Daraa in southern Syria, the perceptions of Russia among the Syrian Opposition has been deeply negative, with Moscow seen as the main actor behind Assad’s survival.

As such, it is unsurprising that Opposition factions such as the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have been watching the developments with interest. Amidst mounting Russian losses in Ukraine and developments such as Turkey’s unprecedented decision to close the Bosporus to warships, some Opposition activists have mulled whether Russia will be able to reinforce the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and whether the situation creates an opening for Opposition factions.

However, such escalation is looking unlikely for the time being. Although Opposition supporters expressed support for Ukraine, there have been few signs of impending fighting in the Opposition-held Idlib. Prominent Opposition figures such Suheil Hammoud (better known as Abu TOW, in reference to his expertise with anti-tank TOW missiles) noted that there is little will for escalation in Idlib and little unity among the Opposition amidst continued infighting. He further added that Ankara, which predominantly backs the SNA, is unwilling to escalate in Idlib. Other Opposition activists noted that attempts by individual fighters or groups to break the ceasefire was swiftly punished by authorities, making it unlikely that Idlib may see a new round of military clashes.

Despite this, some fighters, including Abu TOW, say that they are exploring options to travel to Ukraine where they can fight under the umbrella of the recently-announced foreign legion of Ukraine.

One possible faction in Opposition-held Idlib that may be interested in moving their operations are the Chechens. When the war in Syria erupted, many Chechen fighters arrived in the country. Holding a reputation for being capable fighters, these fighters quickly rose through the ranks of armed groups, including extremist groups like the HTS or the Islamic State. However, many others also retained their affiliations to independent umbrella groups like Ajnad al-Kawkaz. In recent months, however, the HTS started clamping down on independent groups, requiring foreign fighters to either join it or leave the region.

Chechens of both pro-Moscow and pro-Kyiv affiliations have already clashed several times in Ukraine since 2014. In addition to the new deployments of pro-Moscow Chechens, the renewed conflict in Ukraine is also seeing the involvement of Chechen formations in the pro-Kyiv side. Those Chechens watching the conflict from Syria may conclude that their goals are now better served in Ukraine.

Iran and Israel Eye for Openings

For other countries and factions, the situation is less clear. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), for example, which operates in north and north-eastern Syria, receives crucial support from Washington, but it has also leaned on Moscow during its negotiations with Damascus, especially amidst fears of an impending US withdrawal from the Middle East as a whole.

With Moscow facing international isolation, its potential to contribute as a mediator will be constrained. If anything, rising tensions between the US and Russia may compel Moscow to fully disengage from the SDF due to Washington’s influence over the group. It is likely that the SDF may look towards other sources of support, such as the Gulf Kingdoms which are gradually normalising ties with Damascus and have already shown signs of engagement with the SDF.

Iran is another country whose fortunes in Syria could change. Since the Russian intervention in Syria, Russian and Iranian officials have often highlighted the positive aspects of their cooperation. However, it has been known that the two sides have been competing for influence, a fact that Assad has taken advantage of by jockeying their influence against each other.

Until recently, Iran was viewed as being on the back-foot. A combination of factors such as sanctions; the killing of Qassem Soleimani; growing détente between Damascus and the Gulf; and Iran’s mishandling of the first wave of COVID-19 have all contributed to the perception that the country is no longer able to support Damascus like Moscow or the Gulf can. Incidents such as the removal of Iran’s top commander in Syria, General Seyyed Javad Ghaffari, and his subsequent, puzzling death (allegedly due to COVID-19) have only fuelled these perceptions.

With Russia facing severe economic sanctions and an increasingly complex battlefield, its capacity for rebuilding the SAA or funding Syrian reconstruction will be limited, allowing Iran to once again flex its muscles in Syria. How much this influence can spread, however, will depend on how much involvement the Gulf Kingdoms choose to have in Syria.

One last country whose involvement may change in Syria is Israel. For much of the Syrian conflict, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) conducted regular airstrikes in Syria, ostensibly against Iranian-backed groups. These strikes continued after the Russian intervention, with speculation that the two sides entered a sort of “gentlemen’s agreement”, especially after a Russian plane was accidentally shot down during an IDF raid in 2018. The two sides have shown notable flexibility in balancing each other’s security interests. However, it was generally acknowledged that Russia would offer Israel a limited window for strikes, and this window was viewed to be closing after it was announced on January 2022 that Russia and Syria would hold joint air patrols.

In the aftermath of the Russian operations in Ukraine, Israel was among the countries that criticised Moscow for its conduct. Moscow hit back by referencing Israel’s control over the Golan Heights, suggesting that the matter could be held against Israel if criticisms continue. So far, Israel appears to be unconcerned with the ultimatum, with the IDF continuing to hit Syria after the Russian operations in Ukraine were launched.

It is unclear if these attest strikes were conducted with or without Moscow’s consent. If the former is the case, then it would suggest that the events in Ukraine are unlikely to significantly alter the Russian-Israeli interests in Syria.

If, however, the latest IDF raids were conducted against Russian acceptance, it could suggest that the agreement the two countries held in Syria is unravelling and both sides will, once again, pursue their interests unilaterally. This could result in increased hostile incidents between Russian and Israeli forces, likely accompanied by a wider escalation in southern Syria.

Overall, it is unlikely that the war in Ukraine will cause momentous changes to the landscape of the Syrian conflict. However, events in Ukraine will almost certainly factor into the actions of actors present in Syria. Such considerations may lead to shifts in the medium-to-long term, especially if the Russian forces in Ukraine falter.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | February #2 2022

In this edition, we cover:

• Political wrangling between Libyan capitals continues.
• The UN warns that aid to Yemen will run out in March without funds.
• Lebanese Government approves draft 2022 budget.
• State of Emergency in Tunisia extended until 2022.
• Damascus lifts subsidies in a sign of worsening economic conditions.
• Top Iraqi court deals blow to KRG’s bid for independent oil sales.
• Cairo positions itself as mediator in Sudan.
• Jordan’s King Abdullah implicated in Credit Suisse data leaks.

By all indications, the IS attack was intended to break out an estimated 3,500 IS militants, most of whom are foreigners. Among the prisoners are several high-ranking leaders of the group.

Although the SDF has managed to keep the situation from escalating, and numerous militants who escaped were captured, the situation nevertheless represents the exact type of nightmare scenario that SDF officials have been warning about since 2019. With an estimated 10,000 IS militants held in facilities across SDF-held territories in northern Syria, the attack on the Sinaa Prison once again highlights that the IS has not only remained a credible threat, but has now become emboldened enough to launch full-frontal assaults on high-security facilities.

Furthermore, the fact that the attack on the Sinaa Prison took place on the same day as an IS attack in an Iraqi outpost suggests some degree of coordination and could be a sign of future escalation of its insurgency operations.

While the fact that the IS attack on the prison was repelled is a positive development as far as local counter-terrorism capacities are concerned, the attack should nevertheless compel the authorities to reassess their capabilities and address any deficiencies in their response to the IS threat. Moving forward, members of the International Coalition should also address the lingering question of what to do with the captive IS militants. However, with numerous international crises diverting attention and resources away from Syria, implementing robust measures to manage these concerns will be an uphill task.

What Do We Know of the Attack?

Located in the Ghwayran District of Hasakah City, the Sinaa Prison (also known as Ghwayran Prison) holds about 3,500 IS militants, many of whom are foreigners. Like the al-Roj and al-Hol Camps, the prison has been long regarded as a tempting target for IS militants.

On the night of Thursday January 20^th, the IS detonated two car bombs along the walls of the prison before launching a ground attack on the prison itself in an attempt to free the inmates.

During the initial hours of the attack, the IS militants appear to have had success in taking control of parts of the facility. In the hours following the attack, IS militants posted videos showing freed militants, as well as some of the hostages they took.

Since then, however, the SDF and the International Coalition mobilised and established a cordon around the district, and announced a curfew across the whole city. The International Coalition carried out airstrikes around the prison, signifying the intensity of the fighting. The fighting remain sporadic as of Thursday, 27^th January as the SDF clears the last blocs still under militant control.

Overall, the SDF reported that 550 IS militants who escaped have surrendered or have been captured, while another 175 have been killed during the clashes. These numbers will almost certainly change as the toll of the attack becomes clearer in the aftermath. Among the most significant considerations will be whether the large majority of the prisoners managed to break out or not.

What Does This Bloody Day Signify?

The assault on Sinaa Prison took place on the same day as another bloody IS attack, this time in the Diyala Province of Iraq. There, suspected IS militants attacked an Iraqi army barracks in the al-Azim District 120 kilometres north of Baghdad, killing 11 soldiers. It was the deadliest attack of 2022 so far and one of the deadliest to take place since the group lost its territorial holdings in the country in 2017. The attack represented an upwards trend in high-casualty attacks, having followed another attack in the Makhmour Mountains last month in which ten people, including seven Peshmerga fighters, were killed. As a whole, the ISF warns that IS attacks around the Baghdad belt, especially around Tarmiyah and Taiji have picked up.

Overall, these attacks were some of the most brazen to be conducted by the militants. The International Coalition framed the attack as one of desperation. Indeed, the group was likely, in part, motivated by a need to grab the headlines after being eclipsed by a succession of developments around the world, including the Taliban victory in Afghanistan mid-2021. A high-profile attack on a secure compound aimed at freeing its militants would almost certainly have raised the group’s profile among the global jihadi scene.

Similarly, desperation can also be attributed to why the group launched such a high-profile attack to begin with. After all, it is entirely possible that the decision to free thousands of imprisoned militants was motivated by recruitment pools elsewhere drying up. However, framing the attack as being entirely motivated by desperation would be a grave mistake. The attack was, by all accounts, well-coordinated. Furthermore, it was able to proceed even after the authorities in Iraq busted an IS cell last November that was preparing for an attack on the prison.

Significantly, the attack did not take place in isolation but was rather a culmination of a years-long insurgency campaign in both Iraq and Syria that sought to keep security forces off-balance. Attacks targeting community leaders, checkpoints and other soft targets have been a regular feature, especially in areas controlled by the SDF. Although the group has remained weaker than it was during its peak, US military officials warned that the group’s operational capabilities are showing higher levels of “maturity”. In this sense, the attack on the prison, as well as the attack on the Iraqi army barracks in Diyala, may represent the next stage of the IS insurgency as it tries to make a comeback. Indeed, in our forecast for 2022, we noted prison break attempts as a possible sign of the group reconstituting itself.

Echoes of 2014?

At Integrity UK, we have frequently warned that the IS could go back to the insurgency model it pursued between 2008 and 2014.

During those six years following the IS’ defeat back when it was known as “Islamic State of Iraq”, the group waged a low-intensity but constant insurgency in northern Iraq, targeting security forces and community leaders while embedding itself among remote communities in the region. Prison breaks around Mosul and Tikrit were one of the hallmarks of this campaign and offered the group an easy source of loyal recruits. Already building strength, they have exploited the conflict in Syria, the political disorder in Iraq, and the withdrawal of the United States in order to operate openly, taking over large swathes of territory.

The situation today resembles that of 2008-2013 in many ways. Iraq is once again in the midst of a political crisis over endemic corruption and political deadlock that has triggered a major, nation-wide protest movement. The hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the on-going withdrawal in Iraq has similarly emboldened jihadi groups who are expecting a similar development to take place in Syria where the US-led Coalition continues to support the SDF. With international tensions also rising due to developments in Ukraine, it is possible that the IS saw the current situation ripe for the next stage of its insurgency.

These trends are certainly paying attention to, and are indicative of what the group may do next. However, the strategic and political landscape has changed significantly since the last decade.

First off, both Iraq and Syria have significantly improved counter-terrorism capabilities. In Iraq, in particular, years of intelligence and counter-terrorism development capabilities have allowed the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to become almost entirely self-sufficient. Although there remain many questions about operational capabilities and, in particular, coordination between the different branches, the skills, capabilities and morale of the ISF has improved significantly since 2014.

Similarly, the SDF and the US-led Coalition have spent the years since the destruction of IS’ territorial presence improving counter-terrorism capabilities. Although limited resources and a fraught political terrain limits the SDF’s capabilities, the group has nevertheless remained capable of busting IS cells. Furthermore, the fact that no significant breakouts have taken place from prisons despite repeated attempts by the militants – albeit none as ostentatious as last week’s attack – suggests that the SDF is, for now, capable of addressing security needs.

The jihadi scene is also far more fractured than it was in 2014 when the IS was able to build alliances with a smattering of other factions. Today, many other jihadi groups are mistrustful of the IS for their established track record of liquidating former allies. The success of more “nationalist” models of jihadi governance in Afghanistan and Syria’s Idlib may also make the IS model less attractive to prospective jihadi militants.

Moving Forwards

Any optimism to be had, however, needs to be tempered. With international attention gradually moving away from the Middle East, despite many of the structural factors that led to the rise of the IS remaining unaddressed, the group will almost certainly continue to exploit the so-called grey zones, deficiencies in governance or political instability to rebuild its brand and recoup its capabilities.

The most important matter to address will be that of the IS prisoners still being held in SDF facilities across Syria. Since capturing the IS stronghold of Baghuz almost exactly three years ago, the SDF has been adamant that it cannot keep the group’s foreign militants indefinitely. SDF officials have repeatedly called on countries around the world to repatriate their citizens to take the burden off the SDF while preventing the group from bolstering its ranks in the event of a prison break.

Thursday’s attack should be a wake-up call for any government around the world which still has citizens held in facilities across northern Syria. A recent sentencing of a German IS militant and his wife for their part in the Yazidi genocide may offer a legal precedent that can help other governments repatriate their own citizens and put them on trial. Achieving this, however, is contingent on creating an effective international framework that may simply not be possible in today’s fraught international climate.

Meanwhile, counting the cost in the aftermath of the attack is the most pressing priority for the SDF and the International Coalition. It is entirely possible that the IS attack on the Sinaa Prison ended up costing the group more than it gained. If that is the case, then security forces should take this as an opportunity to go on the offensive against IS sleeper cells.

If the IS, however, was successful in freeing large numbers of militants and absconding with captured equipment from the SDF, then the coming days will see intensified attacks on high-security installations. Developments around holding facilities such as al-Roj and al-Hol will be especially important to watch. The group may also launch more cross-border attacks in a bid to expand its operation range, denying the SDF, Baghdad and Damascus spaces to secure and govern along more remote areas.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | January #1 2022

In this edition, we cover:

• Libya grapples with the aftermath of its postponed elections.
• Tunisia launches the national consultation on constitutional reforms.
• Syria joins China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
• Frontlines around Marib in Yemen shift, move south amidst gains by the Saudi-led Coalition.
• Lebanon announces new elections for May 15 as the Lebanese Pound crashes again.
• Iraq holds “chaotic” first parliamentary session after election results are confirmed by the Federal Court.
• JPMorgan Chase & Co. predicts Egyptian bond windfall for investors.
• King Abdullah II meets Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz.

Through it all, extremist groups and movements have been highly active, either taking advantage of pandemic-related shifts in priorities to recoup their strength or outright use the pandemic for their own benefits.

Despite initial hopes that extremist groups and organisations would struggle to maintain relevance amidst the pandemic, such groups have found fertile ground for support as a result of an increased reach in online communications over the past two years. Today, they are leveraging a mix of conspiratorial misinformation and public dissatisfaction with the status-quo to drum up support.

In this report, we identify six regions that are of interest to practitioners of research on violent extremism. These regions consist of:

• The United States and Western Europe, which continue to see the proliferation of far-right groups focused predominantly on “multiculturalism” and non-White migration.
• The Post-Soviet Space which is seeing rising “alt-right” groups who emphasise their white, European and Christian identities and espouse an explicitly “illiberal” model of governance, especially on matters of minorities, women and LGBT+ people.
• Afghanistan where a violent jihadi group, the Taliban, ousted the US, galvanising similar extremist movements elsewhere.
• Iraq and Syria, which continue to witness activities by Salafist-Jihadi groups who are looking to recoup their strength after being driven underground during the 2010s.
• The Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa region where jihadist groups of several affiliations are in competition against one-another even as they ramp up their attacks on weak governments.
• Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia where the rise of Hindu and Buddhist extremism is threatening other, smaller minorities.

In each region, we will assess the prevalent extremist risk and look at past and present trends to estimate their trajectories in 2022.

Overall, our findings suggest that various manifestations of right-wing extremism are the most prevalent flashpoint. The United States and Western Europe, the Post-Soviet Space, and the Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia are all seeing manifestations of nationalistic or religious right-wing extremism.

Meanwhile, the threat from jihadi groups remain prevalent, especially in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and the Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa. However, each of these movements will likely spend 2022 focused on recuperation and consolidation as they recover from the 2010s which saw many such groups’ capabilities eroded by security operations. Infighting among these groups will likely reduce their immediate threat. Developments around renewed recruitment, fundraising, and mergers should be observed as a possible prelude to renewal of the jihadi threat.

The United States and Western Europe

For much of the first two decades of the 21^st century, concerns around extremism in the US and Western Europe were focused firmly on Islamic fundamentalist extremism. The September 11 attacks in 2001; the resulting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the emergence of Al Qaeda affiliates and later the Islamic State (IS) in 2014; and the resulting global terrorist attacks by the group’s supporters all contributed to such preoccupations.

While the attention on white-supremacist and far-right extremism remained relatively unfocused during this period, there was also increased mainstreaming of far-right voices whose rhetoric focused on anti-Islam, anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism, especially in the US where such rhetoric was often justified as protected on the basis of freedom of speech. Although high-profile far-right attacks, such as the massacre perpetrated by Anders Breivik in 2011, occurred, these were usually seen as aberrations.

The 2015 refugee crisis, however, reinvigorated the Western far-right while mainstreaming previously fringe theories such as the “Great Replacement” which posits that immigration is being used by a vague group of “globalist elites” to “replace” the white European population. Indeed, violent activities by such groups increased exponentially since 2015, especially in Europe. The electoral wins of populist nationalists in Europe and the US were also linked to this phenomenon.

Landmark developments in 2020, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic, further bolstered far-right movements. Reframing their ideologies around personal freedoms, such movements came to vehemently oppose COVID-19 restrictions, decrying them as a means of social control. As part of such reframing, they sought to present themselves as “champions of personal freedoms.”

A combination of other factors, including social tensions following the worldwide Black Lives Matter protests and the polarising rhetoric around the 2020 US presidential election, further increased tensions, culminating in the violent riots in the US Capitol where protesters of mostly far-right affiliations attempted to prevent the certification of the electoral win of the then-candidate Joe Biden.

The Western far-right has been on the defensive since the events of January 6^th a year ago. Despite some efforts to disavow the conspiratorial rhetoric and the de-platforming of some of the most vocal and extreme ideologues, the prevalent trend in the mainstream right has been one towards reframing the events of that day. Meanwhile, they have turned their attention towards single-issues that tend to be in the interest of minorities, such as reproductive and LGBT+ rights, while ensuring that any legislation that could hamper future electoral gains – such as voting reform – are deadlocked. In 2022, such efforts will likely gain further momentum.

The Western far-right is also showing signs of becoming more “modular” and more ideologically pragmatic. The COVID-19 pandemic and opposition to pandemic-related restrictions, for example, have brought the far-right in contact with previously-unrelated movements such as wellness and anti-vaccination movements. Such hybrid, “intersectional”, “single-issue” far-right movements appear to be gaining favour among those following cohesive but often-dogmatic movements such as neo-Nazis, and this process will likely continue in 2022.

The Post-Soviet Space

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the post-Soviet space has seen the proliferation of nationalist parties. On the whole, this is unsurprising, as nationalists such as Hungary’s current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, had been highly active in the anti-communist opposition movements. Across the post-Soviet space (as well as non-Soviet states such as Yugoslavia), nationalism was often instrumentalised as a unifying ideological foundation for societies who had lost their main unifying pillar. Such exploitation of ethnic and national tensions was instrumental in the breakout of the Balkan Wars. The radicalising aftereffects of those wars continue to inform the far-right movements in the post-Soviet space.

As early as 2013, it was estimated that Russia was home to the world’s largest neo-Nazi population at about 50,000 to 70,000, making up about half the global neo-Nazi population. Although the Russian Government officially opposed neo-Nazi groups, such groups nevertheless found an enabling environment in Russia owing to Moscow’s own opposition to so-called “Western values”, especially within the context of the rights for women and LGBT+ peoples; as well as immigration and multiculturalism vis-à-vis Islam. Tropes and slurs used against Bosnian Muslims in Balkan Wars have seen a revival in their application against to Muslims as a whole. With anti-Islam a driving force of the European far-right as well, there have been increased linkages between far-right groups in Western and Eastern Europe. German officials warned in 2020 that German neo-Nazis were training at the camps operated by the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), an organisation identified as a terrorist group by the US.

However, it would be a mistake to frame far-right in the post-Soviet space as exclusively Russian-aligned. In Ukraine, the Azov movement (or Azov Battalion), known for its recruitment of neo-Nazis and assault by its members on feminist, LGBT+ and left-wing activists, has come into conflict with the Russian-backed forces in eastern Ukraine. While the European far-right may have more links with Russia-based far-right groups, Azov has gained support among the far-right in the US.

The Caucasus has also seen increased manifestations of far-right movement. In Georgia, where far-right parties struggled to gain electoral traction, an enabling environment nevertheless allowed them to act with relative impunity. When far-right activists attacked the Tbilisi Pride rally in 2021, Georgian nationalist and religious politicians denounced the members of the rally for “provocation” instead of the far-right. Armenia, a relative outlier as far as far-right activity goes, has also seen the emergence of far-right movements such as Adekvad, which has, like its counterparts, supported “traditional” values and espoused illiberal, anti-feminist and anti-LGBT+ views. The country’s fresh conflict with Azerbaijan also allowed for anti-Muslim rhetoric to gain traction. While far-right movements in both countries have been accused of having links to Russia, their goals and means of gaining support have been decidedly local.

In 2022, such movements will contend with several dynamics. The Russian and Ukrainian far-right may be preparing for a new confrontation as tensions in eastern Ukraine rise once more. How such groups reconcile – or gloss over – their mutual hostility despite wider ideological alignments on a global scale may inform far-right movements around the world.

Furthermore, the increasing visibility of far-right movements in countries like Georgia and Armenia, which have been comparatively more successful in their democratic experiments, raises concerns for the health of their democracies and the future of their civil societies. Far-right groups in these countries had a relatively good year in 2021 owing to increased political tensions and rising polarisation against a backdrop of on-going COVID-19 outbreaks. As such, they will seek to retain momentum in 2022 by looking for ways to remain relevant, likely resorting to violent confrontations if all else fails.

Afghanistan

2021 was marked with the end of the US mission in Afghanistan. The mission which started in 2002 in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, ended with the rapid collapse of Afghan security forces following the US withdrawal, resulting in the Taliban gaining control of the entire country.

The Taliban’s renewed ascent to power has led many experts around the world to speculate that the country would, once again, become a hub of transnational jihadism as it was in the 1990s. Although the Taliban have vowed to not let terrorists use Afghan soil to launch attacks elsewhere again, the appointment of senior figures from the Haqqani Network – known for its close ties al-Qaeda and recognised as Taliban’s hard-line faction – to positions of power in the new Afghan Government suggest that the new Taliban rule will be hardly different than the old.

However, although victorious, the Taliban will face a tough challenge unifying and governing the many jihadist factions that operate in the country. How this threat is managed will, in turn, determine how the extremist threat in Afghanistan will develop in 2022 and beyond.

To begin with, although victorious, the Taliban is not unified. Although the exact dynamics are hard to predict, the group is known to have a more pragmatic “nationalist” wing and a more ideologically jihadi hard-line faction, the latter represented by the aforementioned Haqqani Network. In the aftermath of the fall of Kabul, there were reports of clashes between the two factions. Although the exact details of what took place were never confirmed, the ascent of Haqqani Network officials to senior positions and the resumption of the extreme practices that characterised the Taliban rule in the 1990s, suggest that Afghanistan’s new rulers have little interest in moderating their actions, even for token or pragmatic purposes. While they may shy away openly hosting transnational violent extremist groups, the Taliban, as a supporter of an anti-Western, hard-line fundamentalist ideology, will offer groups with similar ideologies an enabling environment.

Indeed, since the Taliban’s capture of Kabul, the previously frosty relations with Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the so-called “Pakistani Taliban”, have improved noticeably in 2021. Attacks by the group against Pakistani security forces rose concurrently. In 2022, observing such attacks and how the Taliban leverages them against its relatively-cordial ties with Islamabad will be vital towards determining the future direction of transnational jihadism in the country.

On the other side is Islamic State – Khorasan (ISK), an IS franchise that has waged a constant war against the Taliban even as both groups fought an insurgency against the US. The ISK has bucked the trend in the jihadist world by not congratulating the Taliban on its victory, but instead denouncing it as a fake victory. Since then, the ISK has increased its physical and propaganda attacks against the Taliban. There have also been signs of the ISK poaching support from the Taliban through accusations that the Taliban, by focusing on a more national agenda, has failed to adhere to true jihadi goals. If the ISK continues to gain support for its hard-line stance, it might force the Taliban follow through with similar hard-line actions.

Somewhere in between these groups lies al-Qaeda. Although the group lost significant credibility and capacity in the 2010s after initial gains during the starting years of the Arab Uprisings, it remains a credible actor with a recognised brand. Furthermore, the group retains its connection to the Taliban via the Haqqani Network. As such, despite the Taliban’s promise to not let Afghanistan be used as a springboard for transnational jihadism, there is a significant likelihood that al-Qaeda will use Afghanistan as a base of operations, albeit more covertly.

Lastly, there are the myriad jihadi factions who are broadly aligned with the Taliban but have differing specific concerns. Some of these groups such as Lashkar-e Taliba, Hizb-ul-Ahrar, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Turkestan Islamic Party and others, are too small to become major players. However, they can nevertheless act as spoilers or kingmakers, giving the larger groups incentives appeal for their support. Should these groups, like the TTP, escalate their attacks on their enemies outside Afghanistan, they can also bring attention from wider foreign powers that can complicate the Taliban’s calculations.

Come 2022, the goals of the Taliban and al-Qaeda will be consolidating their gains and manage a fractious militant landscape even as the country faces economic collapse and possible famine over the winter. Suppressing dissent and retaining stability while rebuilding capabilities will likely be their main goals, limiting their ideological investment to extremist causes. The ISK, on the other hand, will likely continue the trend of escalating its attacks on the Taliban to keep the group off balance.

It is unlikely that Afghanistan’s extremist landscape will see any significant developments in 2022. However, the trends that could lead to significant developments past 2022 will become apparent this year.

Developments outside Afghanistan are likelier to impact the extremist landscape in the country. In particular, many jihadi groups around the world experienced a boost to their morale following the US withdrawal. Jihadi ideologues around the world are now looking at the Afghan model to experiment with local governance within a national framework. Some foreign jihadi fighters in regions like Syria even expressed interest in travelling to Afghanistan.

Going forward, it will be important to watch for the movements of jihadi fighters into the country and understand which group they are supporting and why. Another item to watch will be on whether the Taliban will utilise its governance as a model for other jihadi groups as an instrument of soft power.

Syria and Iraq

For better part of the last decade, much of the attention of international security experts were dominated by the events in Iraq and Syria. Since the breakout of the Arab Spring and especially since the breakout of the Syrian Civil War, the region has witnessed immense radicalisation. Such radicalisation was facilitated by the severe violence of the conflicts after the Arab Uprisings that pushed people into a more radical path, alongside the flow of weapons, money and fighters into Iraq and Syria that also made the most extreme groups also the best equipped ones, pushing out the more moderate views.

The IS was the most severe manifestation of this phenomenon. The group not only took control of large swathes of Iraq and Syria, committing genocide against non-Sunni Muslims under its rule; it also went through great lengths to ensure that its ideology and method of governance would persist. Although the group’s holdings in Iraq and Syria were eliminated, IS supporters in these countries have proven themselves to be adept at evading capture and keeping the group alive in some capacity. Insurgent attacks, especially in areas lacking governance, are common. Civilian supporters of the group have also engaged in crowdfunding projects to help secure the release of IS captives in holding zones such as the al-Hol Camp in Syria while ensuring that the children held there are raised with the group’s ideology.

The IS isn’t the only extremist group whose activities threaten further instability. Opposition-controlled Syria, in particular, has become home to a host of groups of varying jihadi persuasions. During the earlier years of the Syrian Civil War, al-Qaeda, which had been whittled down in the previous decade, managed to re-establish itself with groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra representing its cause. Although Jabhat al-Nusra, now rebranded to of Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has broken off from al-Qaeda, it retains its jihadist, fundamentalist ideology and appears to be looking to emulate a Taliban-style national governance model. Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, retains the loyalty of some smaller groups.

Further groups operating in the region include groups who draw inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood (such as the once-significant Ahrar al-Sham); conventional Salafi Jihadism (such as another once-significant group, Jaish al-Islam); or foreign jihadist groups with national goals (such as Uyghur or Chechen factions). The prevalence of such groups in a small stretch of region consisting of parts of Idlib and Aleppo, means that groups of jihadist persuasions have essentially squeezed out any other competition and frequently engage in infighting for resources and influence.

Since the campaigns against the IS, as well as Russian-backed efforts to help regain Damascus wrestle territorial control from the Syrian Opposition, jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria have been on the backfoot. In Iraq in particular, successive attempts by smaller insurgent groups to fill the vacuum, such as the brief insurgency by the White Flags organisation, were quashed with relative ease.

However, IS-linked insurgent attacks in both Iraq and Syria are picking up. The group is following patterns similar to its insurgency between 2008 and 2013, hitting soft targets, operating in ungoverned spaces and inciting intercommunal tensions. With Damascus focused on consolidating its control amidst a severe economic crisis and Baghdad focused on resolving the state of political flux in the country, there is a risk that the fight against violent extremist groups will take a backseat.

While 2022 is unlikely to see any major developments to the jihadi landscape in either country, observers should keep an eye open for continued attacks and signs for jihadi groups, especially the IS, reconstituting themselves. As was the case in the lead-up to 2013, developments such as prison breaks and assassination of security personnel will be especially pertinent as a prelude to wider jihadi violence.

In the Idlib and Aleppo regions of Syria, observers should watch the efforts of the HTS to mainstream itself and the reactions of other jihadi factions. Although the jihadist landscape in Syria is deeply fractured, the Taliban victory in Afghanistan appears to have inspired some groups, including the HTS, to reassess their approaches to governance and influence. Such Taliban-inspired methods of governance, already in progress in Idlib where the HTS backs a civilian government by the name of the Syrian Salvation Government, will be essential to understanding the nature of the extremist threat in Syria over 2022.

Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa

Many jihadi groups traditionally considered the Sahel, Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa regions as low priority backwaters. Although the region has been home to some jihadi factions, including in Algeria where they were party to a civil war in the 1990s, such groups rarely rose to significant prominence and their activities seldom elicited international attention.

The last decade saw this dynamic changing. Sustained pressure on al-Qaeda and IS operatives in the Middle East, Europe, Caucuses and Afghanistan forced many of these groups to turn their attention and resources to other theatres to retain relevance. Regional and local dynamics, such as the spill over of the Libyan conflict following the collapse of the Gaddafi rule.

Today, Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, is emerging as one of the hotspots of Salafi jihadi activity. Exploiting weak governance, corruption, proliferation of weapons and widespread poverty are all allowing jihadi groups to gain influence in these regions.

Indeed, even before the COVID-19 pandemic, there were signs that extremist groups such as the IS were directing their attention to the region. In 2019, attacks claimed by the IS in West Africa inflicted casualties (dead and injured) just barely short of the casualties inflicted in Iraq and Syria. While IS claims are often dubious, the United Nations similarly warned of “unprecedented” rise in terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, with 4,000 terrorism-related deaths in 2019 alone. The growing prevalence of Africa in IS propaganda also represented a shift as the group attempted to justify its continued existence in the aftermath of its losses in Iraq, Syria and Libya. This trend continued in 2020 which marked the deadliest year across the Sahel, West, Central and East Africa. Today, experts warn that the region could become the new focus of global counter-terror operations. Such developments are even more significant amidst an on-going drawdown by Western powers that could offer violent extremist groups a vacuum that they could fill.

Perhaps the main factor that prevented such groups from becoming an even more tangible threat is their disunity. No single group holds sway over the jihadi activities in the region. Instead, there are many factions, some of which are independent while others have loose affiliations with the IS or al-Qaeda. Although these groups cooperate with one-another more often than their counterparts in other theatres, factionalism is nevertheless taking its toll. For example, the summer of 2021 saw the death of a jihadi leader of legendary status, Abubakar Shekau, the former leader of the Nigeria-based jihadi group Boko Haram. Although Shekau allied the group with the IS and declared his group as the West Africa Province of the IS (ISWAP), disputes over leadership led him to leave the group with his core followers and he was subsequently killed by his former allies. Overall, experts have noted that transnational jihadi groups have become entangled in local rivalries at the expense of wider jihadi unity.

Overall, however, even the jihadi disunity is coming at the expense of local governance. Both ISWAP and a local al-Qaeda affiliate, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), have continued their attacks on security forces. They are also engaging in other, soft-power manoeuvres such as providing governance, water, sanitation and education to areas under their influence, functions that national governments in the region often struggled with. Indeed, at present, failures in governance and lack of opportunities appear, as well as heavily-securitised state responses appear to be leading the push factors for local populations to support these groups, as opposed to anything novel these groups offer.

Come 2022, violent extremist factions, regardless of whether they are independent or linked with the IS or al-Qaeda, will work to entrench themselves in the areas under control. Acts of propaganda, both in the forms of attacks but also services and education in their extremist ideologies, will aim to gather more support for each individual group. While infighting will be the main obstacle to jihadi unity, mergers between factions or shifting of allegiances that characterise the factional dynamics in the region may form the basis of a more unified front.

Extremist factions will likely be galvanised by the Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Western troops from the region and may seek to avoid actions that may jeopardise the wider jihadi movement, even if they don’t formally end their hostilities. The recent deployment of Russian troops in Mali following the withdrawal of French troops may also factor into the calculations of these groups, given Russia’s recent actions against jihadi groups in Syria.

The Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia

As a central flashpoint in anti-colonial struggles, a major theatre during the Cold War, and the scene of various regional power rivalries, the Indian Subcontinent as well as the wider South and Southeast Asia regions have witnessed numerous waves of armed insurgencies of various levels of extremism. Towards the end of the Cold War and their aftermath, a number of Muslim insurgencies have emerged across the region, turning more extreme amidst the emergence of the wider global jihadi movement. In the 2010s, the extremist landscape of the region was further complicated by the proliferation of Hindu and Buddhist extremists.

In India, the Maoist Naxalite insurgency present since the 1970s is still considered the “gravest threat” to India’s internal security. Although the group’s stature has diminished since the 2000s, it remains entrenched in its strongholds such as Chhattisgarh. Although the group has tried to take advantage of the farmer protests in India, it has yet to make a sizeable impact and there are presently no signs that this will take place in 2022.

Indeed, to outsiders, groups such as the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba are better known than the Naxalite insurgency, being responsible for the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. The clampdowns that followed the 2008 attacks, however, diminished the group’s abilities. Much of the group’s activities since then have been limited to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indian-administered Jammu Kashmir. Although the group did conduct attacks on the security forces in Jammu Kashmir, it has not performed a high-profile attack since 2008. The group may continue its attacks in Kashmir and may even engage in provocations between India and Pakistan, similar to the attacks by Jaish e-Mohammed in 2019 that nearly led to an Indian-Pakistani military escalation. Although the situation in Afghanistan where the Taliban have been victorious may benefit the group, it is unlikely to be highly active in 2022.

Across the wider region, although Islamic insurgencies exist, many of them, such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid in Indonesia; Jemaah Islamiyah, Darul Islam Sabah in Malaysia; Patani United Liberation Organisation, Barisan Revolusi Nasional – Koordinasi in Thailand have only been active sporadically.

Of all the jihadi groups present, Abu Sayyaf, an IS affiliate also known as the group’s East Asia Province, represents the most significant jihadi faction. The group was responsible for the capture of the city of Marawi in the Philippines in 2016. Although the group was ousted since, with its leader killed, there are on-going concerns among experts that the relative lack of reconstruction in the region and low levels of sustained counterinsurgency efforts are allowing supporters of the group keep up recruitment. Indeed, a 2019 bombing at a church in Jolo, southern Phillipines, which was claimed by the IS, shows that the group remains a threat. However, the relative lack of activity surrounding the group over the past couple years could suggest that 2022 will be mostly dormant for the IS as it recoups its losses. Recruitment of foreign militants from the region and attempts to elicit support of other dormant jihadi factions will likely be key indicators of Abu Sayyaf activity in 2022.

Indeed, today, the main source of extremist activity in the Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia does not come from Muslim or Maoist extremists but Hindu and Buddhist extremists. Although Hindu nationalist groups such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have a long history in India, this group – alongside Buddhist groups motivated by similar goals such as Bodu Bolu Sena (BBS) in Sri Lanka and Ma Ba Tha in Myanmar – have gained popularity in the 2010s. These groups have often incited hatred against their respective countries’ Muslim minorities, espousing majoritarian ideologies that explicitly “othered” Muslims. Anti-leftism, femonationalism[1] and anti-multiculturalism are frequent hallmarks of such ideologies. Thus, some experts have framed Hindu and Buddhist extremist movements as local variants of the alt-right movements present in Western Europe and the US. Indeed, the two sides, at times, attempted to cooperate towards mutual goals such as supporting the election of Donald Trump.

Myanmar, in particular, has seen the most violent manifestation of such extremism. After fighting between security forces and a local insurgent group claiming to represent the Rohingya Muslims in the country erupted in 2012, the government of Myanmar engaged in what has described as “ethnic cleansing” against the Rohingya population. Militant Buddhist nationalism and anti-Muslim rhetoric that othered the Rohingya people as foreigners was a common part of the campaign. However, both India and Sri Lanka have seen similar manifestations. Violent attacks against Muslims in India have become commonplace and the community has been subjected to numerous moral panics including conspiracies of a “Corona Jihad” involving Muslims deliberately spreading COVID-19. In all three countries, high-ranking government figures have remained noticeably quiet about attacks on Muslims and acquittals of those who attacked Muslims remain common. Internationally, such attacks drew little attention owing to the preoccupation with Islamic extremism over the 2010s, which has allowed Hindu and Buddhist extremists to frame their actions as defensive.

Come 2022, these extremist movements appear to be growing more volatile. In Myanmar, the country’s military forces have begun attacking Christian towns and villages following activities by rebels in these areas. Eyewitnesses reported that the language and tactics used by the military in Christian areas were similar to those used against the Rohingya, suggesting that the extremist narratives that targeted one minority is now being used to target another.

A similar dynamic is playing out in India where anti-Christian mobs have picked up their attacks against the country’s much smaller Christian population. Prominent Indian politicians have remained quiet or outright denied that such attacks are taking place.

Come 2022, this trend will likely continue amidst the continued conflict in Myanmar and rising polarisation in India and Sri Lanka. Geopolitical concerns, such as Washington’s need to keep India close as part of its pivot against China, will likely mean that international pressure over such attacks will be muted, emboldening the extremists in these countries.

[1] Defined as using the cause of feminism and the protection of women against “dangerous” foreigners.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | December #2 2021

In this edition, we cover:

• Postponement of elections in Libya amidst further signs of renewed conflict across the country.
• Iran’s Ambassador to Sana’a recalled to Tehran before passing away from Covid-19.
• UN Secretary General meets Lebanon’s President, Michel Aoun, to discuss the ongoing social, political and economic crises, as well as assurances that elections will be held in March 2022.
• The Syrian Government publishes its 2022 budget, with a large year-on-year drop, attributed to Damascus’s ongoing economic woes.
• Muqtada al-Sadr reaches out to rival Shia parties in an attempt to build a political consensus.
• Egypt’s trade picks up with China and East African states.
• Jordanian officials host Saudi-Iranian talks amidst a sign of thaw in relations.

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | December #1 2021

In this edition, we are covering:

• The UN warns that the situation in Libya may become too unstable for elections, amidst polarising candidates and growing militia impunity
• Further details emerge about the attempted assassination of Iraq PM al-Kadhimi
• Israel and Egypt Foreign Ministers meet in Cairo

• The removal of the Grand Mufti of Syria and the IRGC Head in Syria from their positions – what are the implications for their removal in Syria and the wider region?
• Libya’s updated candidate list for the country’s December 24th elections – who has been approved and rejected by the electoral commission?
• Jordan’s energy and water agreement with Israel, the UAE and the US – what were the responses from Palestinians in the country and the implications for the Saudi-UAE rivalry?

Bi-Monthly MENA Report | November #2 2021