World Government Conspiracy

The COVID-19 pandemic saw governments across the world implement vaccine programmes in order to halt the spread of the virus. Far-right groups across the world viewed the enforcement of this programme as an infringement on civil liberties, personal health (due to fabricated concerns around the vaccine), and personal choices – a common trope among such groups, emphasising the political disenfranchisement of individuals and local communities.

There are claims being propagated that the monkeypox outbreak is simply another excuse used by supranational groups in their supposed plan to transgress the national sovereignty of nation-states and form a single world government. As with COVID-19, this plan is being labelled as the “monkeypox plandemic” and it is being orchestrated by so-called elites in Davos, where the World Economic Forum (WEF) hosts its annual meeting, and organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and World Health Organisation (WHO). InfoWars, a website launched by far-right commentator Alex Jones, has claimed that the current health outbreak represents the “second phase” of the UN and WHO “plan”, embodied in the so-called “pandemic treaty” being proposed by the WHO. This implies a first phase, likely referring to the actions planned and implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. How national governments and international organisations harmonise their efforts, however, is not mentioned.

The actions and intentions of governments and international organisations are often complemented with those of multinational corporations. Far-right news website The Gateway Pundit has made an unsubstantiated claim that the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved a drug treatment for monkeypox developed by “Pfizer-linked” SIGA Technologies. The logic is that such corporations are profiting from global crises and governments/international organisations are moving towards the formation of a single global government hand-in-hand. Of course, Pfizer has been one of the main producers of the COVID-19 vaccine and so this supposed association creates an imagined causal link, if one is to accept that their actions during the COVID-19 and then the monkeypox outbreaks were pre-planned. Claims have even been made that the COVID-19 vaccine is causing monkeypox symptoms.

Sexualism

Criticisms of globalisation, political disenfranchisement and corporate profiteering are not limited to the far-right, but are also prevalent among elements of the left. However, one stark aspect that differentiates the far-right, especially at such times of health, economic or political crises, is their focus on shifting the blame towards “otherised” groups in Western societies based on race and sexual orientation.

The current outbreak of monkeypox is known to have originated in west Africa and the WHO has claimed that most cases of the disease have been identified among “men who have sex with men (MSM)”, wording which has been the subject of criticism, but which has been echoed by far-right sympathisers. This emphasis is closely related to the far-right’s general grievances against “liberal” lifestyles and so-called “cultural Marxism”, the alleged ideology that promotes positive discrimination and places excessive attention on the sufferings of marginalised and oppressed groups. Sexualism is the discrimination against people on the basis of their sexual orientation. The far-right is linking news about the spread of monkeypox through sex at raves in Europe with their general discontent about “woke” and liberal culture.

Racism

In terms of racism, just as was the case with COVID-19 and its origins in China, much is being made of the African origins of monkeypox. Far-right British commentator Paul Joseph Watson posted news about the Nigerian Centre of Disease and Control calling on people in the country to avoid eating the meat of monkeys and rats in order to prevent the spread of monkeypox. Watson commented on this news stating that “some cultures are better than others”.

Indeed, while far-right groups are being criticised for the open racism and sexualism, mainstream media is also being accused of fuelling the fire of prejudices against the aforementioned “otherised” groups. Similar xenophobic commentaries and even physical attacks were witnessed against Chinese and, in general, East Asians in western countries at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The current monkeypox outbreak is revitalising those xenophobic sentiments among far-right groups, who, as mentioned above, take advantage of times of crises to propel their ideological agenda.

Broken cassette tape

At moments of political, social and/or economic crises, the far-right reproduces the same narratives from the past and, by and large, finds the same scapegoats for the problems that arise during these crises. In addition, these narratives are often based on unsubstantiated conspiratorial theories that neatly fit into their ideological framework, but frequently do not reflect reality.

An interesting, and worrying, parallel can be made with the AIDS pandemic from the 1980s. Stigmatisation of certain groups of people, especially of the LGBTQ+ communities, was rife not only among far-right groups, but also the mainstream media, which had even referred to the pandemic as a “gay plague”, somewhat similar to the racialist naming of COVID-19 as the “China virus”.

The political class and media are at times feedings the arguments made by the far-right, despite the latter’s defiance of mainstream politics. One recent example of this in the UK is the conclusion of the UK-Rwanda asylum agreement, which seeks to deport asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda. The announcement of the deal was hailed by the far-right as a move that will help to curtail illegal immigration to the UK. In the US context, the presidency of Donald Trump was deemed to be a boost for the far-right in that country, a situation which has now changed with the election of Joe Biden, which led to the 2021 Capitol attack by far-right figures.

The mixture of a failure to address the social conditions that produce the far-right and the actions of the political elite that are at times harmonised with far-right ideology feed the broken cassette tape that repeat and, at times of crises, amplify rhetoric that does not shy away from racism, sexism and other forms of identity-based discrimination. In the contemporary context of social media, arguments and conspiracy theories made by the far-right are shared and disseminated all the more frequently within such networks at blistering speed. Certain social media companies, such as Twitter, have sought to crackdown on far-right groups online; however, such groups have circumvented these bans and have moved to other platforms, such as Telegram, where they share and forward content.

The interlinkage between conspiracy theories, discriminatory ideology and real-life crises embolden the far-right in the propagation of the aforementioned views. This is compounded by a lack of factual and structural analysis of the problems that are discussed. Although tackling the factual inconsistencies of far-right narratives is an important task in and of itself, it is not enough to address the emotive and structural issues that underpins far-right arguments. A political strategy that focuses on empowering local communities to confront the far-right’s prejudicial stances through participation in political processes and economic empowerment can help to alleviate these issues. Whether there is a political will to do so is another matter.

The announcement came at a time when international attention was drawn away from the Middle East and North Africa region and instead focused on the escalating war between Russia and Ukraine. Alongside ongoing crises such as Covid-19, the news of the IS’ new leader was largely buried by the emerging conflict in Ukraine.

The relatively muted response to the selection of a new IS Caliph, however, is also telling about the group’s continued relevance after grabbing headlines over the 2010s. In this context, it would be fair to ask if the selection of a new leader is relevant at all.

In this article, we look into what we do and do not know about the IS’ new leader. In examining the announcement, as well as the facts and speculation around the man who now leads the group, we conclude that the IS’ main concern is threefold:

• To project a sense of resilience in light of ongoing (global) challenges;
• Maintain continuity between its past and present leadership;
• Generate a sense of legitimacy and inspiration for IS cells around the world while maintaining the independence of these cells through a broad guiding strategy.

We note that the IS strategy to rebuild itself resembles that of its strategy in the lead-up to 2014 and that the group has been investing in its resilience to continue its operations even after decapitation strikes targeting its leadership. We further note that while resilience and capacities of local communities against the IS improved, we warn that the current international climate may result in the erosion of these defences, allowing the IS to carve out a space for itself once again.

Background

The IS announced the selection of its new leader a little over a month after his predecessor, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, was killed in a raid by the US forces. Although the group did not acknowledge the US involvement in his killing, the statement did note that he died during a battle. The statement further noted that Abu Ibrahim handpicked his successor as Abu al-Hassan.

Over the month of relative quiet from the IS’ central command, there was some speculation that the group was experiencing a leadership struggle or was otherwise struggling to communicate between different cells in order to appoint a suitable leader. If this was the case, however, there were no visible internal clashes or reports of tensions within the group. Indeed, much of the group’s media retained a sense of casual calm during this period. When Abu al-Hassan was finally appointed as the group’s leader, IS franchises around the world were quick to acknowledge him. If there were internal tensions, the group was successful in hiding them.

Notably, little is known about the group’s new leader. The group did not share any photos of its new leader, nor did it reveal his name, instead referring to him only with his Nom-De-Guerre.

The inclusion of al-Hashimi al-Quraishi are possible indicators of Abu al-Hassan’s tribal background. Indeed, the IS has often sought to appoint leaders from the Quraish tribe, the original tribe of Prophet Muhammad and many early Islamic caliphs. This historical link is often held as a precondition for becoming a caliph by many modern Salafi Jihadis. When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared a Caliph, his connection to the Quraish bloodline was frequently emphasised in IS propaganda. His successor, Abu Ibrahim, was similarly given the “Quraishi” title despite him being widely believed to be a Turkman from Tal Afar. It is very possible that Abu al-Hassan does not actually belong to the Quraish tribe either and was bestowed the title for propaganda purposes.

However, given the lack of details around Abu al-Hassan, all such details remain speculative.

Ever since the IS announced the selection of its new leader, experts sought to decipher who he truly is. Citing Iraqi security officials, the Reuters news agency suggested that Abu al-Hassan is the brother of the group’s first caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

However, at least one claim has been made to cast doubts on that assertion, suggesting that Baghdadi’s brother is likely the group’s newly-announced spokesperson instead of the leader. Instead, it was suggested that the group’s new leader is Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaidai (also known as Ustath Zaid, Abu Khattab al-Iraqi, Abu al-Moez al-Iraqi and Abu Ishaq). He is believed to have been involved with the IS’ predecessor, Ansar al-Islam under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi during the 2000s before officially joining the IS in 2013. If these speculations are correct, this makes the IS’ new leader a veteran jihadi leader and one of the last remaining members of the IS’ original cadres.

What Does the Selection of a New Leader Mean?

Without knowing more about Abu al-Hassan and his background, it is difficult to ascertain how the new leadership will impact the group. However, some signs of the group’s main concerns and trajectory are apparent in the selection process as well as how this process was communicated with the wider public. Overall, the IS appears to be concerned with maintaining legitimacy among its supporters while offering a sense of continuity and resilience.

Just as the group is attempting to gain legitimacy from the distant past, it is also trying to connect itself to the jihadi struggles of the more recent times. If Abu al-Hassan truly is Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaidai, then his status as a veteran jihadi and a follower of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi would essentially confirm him as a hardliner who will not compromise or divert from the group’s ideological bedrock and virulent sectarianism. It is entirely possible that this was behind the group’s decision to message that Abu al-Hassan was handpicked as a successor by his predecessor.

Another message Abu al-Hassan’s selection sends is resilience. Although the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was met with some disbelief, concern and even panic among the group’s followers, the death of Abu Ibrahim drew little such reactions. In part, this was because he was not the leader of the group for a long time and was hardly visible. As far as the day-to-day affairs of the IS goes, his death appears to have had little impact.

Indeed, the group’s franchises around the world, especially in Africa, continued to launch and publish attacks, seemingly with little disruption. Overall, IS franchises from West Africa to Afghanistan appear to be committed to their objectives.

Following Abu Ibrahim’s death, experts noted that his death would likely have more symbolic consequences, as opposed to operational ones. This indeed appears to have been the case. However, even the morale damage predicted appear to have been limited. Instead, the group looks to have leveraged an orderly transition to show to the world that decapitation strikes will not end the group or dissuade its followers.

Ultimately, the IS’ goal to rebuild its strength by pursuing an insurgency will remain unchanged. In a bid to achieve this goal, the group will likely continue to follow tactics that resemble the tactics it pursued in the lead-up to its emergence as a territorial force in 2014. Such tactics include:

• To continue attacks on “apostate governments” in the MENA region to retain relevance and, where possible, free imprisoned supporters;
• To continue attacks on other jihadi factions deemed insufficiently devoted to Islam – such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda – to brandish its hard-line credentials;
• To continue attacking soft targets like community leaders to instil fear and suspicion in isolated communities;
• To exploit local grievances and failings in governance to gain supporters and recruits among local populations.

For a cell-based organisation, such tactics are easily achievable and do not require constant oversight from the leadership, reducing the need to engage in communications that could compromise the safety of the leaders. Instead, the leadership appears to be intended to serve as a source of inspiration, leaving cells capable of operating independently even in the aftermath of decapitation strikes.

After a US airstrike killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, the group that would become the IS was viewed as a spent force. His successor, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was similarly killed in a US raid in 2010, setting the stage for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the group’s eventual rise in Iraq and Syria.

Having experienced and emerged stronger from leadership losses, it is conceivable that the IS invested heavily into making the group more resilient against future strikes. Although the pool of the original jihadi leaders from the 2000s may be running low, the group retains large numbers of armed militants and supporters across Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It may also have as much as $50 million in reserves. Thus, viewing the group as a spent force on account of its reliance on jihadi symbolism to legitimise itself would be a mistake.

Regional and International Dynamics Will Influence the Actions of the IS

Although the IS’ inspiration and strategy may be drawing from the past, the group nevertheless finds itself in an environment quite different from when it rose to power nearly a decade ago.

Chief among such changes is the tone of caution among many experts about the group’s fortunes. Unlike the triumphalism seen in the 2000s and the early 2010s, experts today are adamant that the jihadi threat may resurge and that the elimination of the group’s leadership is not the end of the group itself. Unsurprisingly, post-conflict programmes in formerly IS-held areas have sought to address not only practical issues like reconstruction and services but also enhance community cohesion to make them more resilient against IS propaganda. The group may be employing its old playbook, but it will meet communities who are more aware of the group’s tricks.

The IS will also find the international jihadi scene a lot less welcoming compared to its emergence in the 2010s. When the group rose to power in Iraq and Syria in the 2010s, it did so through alliances with local factions, both jihadi and non-jihadi, before proceeding to co-opt or liquidate its former allies. Since then, the IS’ notoriety for violence was compounded by a reputation for picking fights with any faction that doesn’t pledge loyalty to the IS’ caliph. The IS has come into conflict with nearly every major jihadi faction around the world, with some local exceptions in West Africa and the Maghreb. As factions like the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria experiment with more pragmatic modes of governance, they will likely find the IS’ brand increasingly toxic.

However, other international developments may favour an IS resurgence. Chief among these is the on-going (and escalating) war between Ukraine and Russia. The world’s already-diminishing attention towards the MENA region was, practically overnight, turned towards Ukraine instead. With prospects of conventional, interstate war once again on the books, the preoccupation with counter-insurgency operations in the Middle East since 2001 may come to a gradual end. Indeed, even prior to the conflict in Ukraine, the US was drawing down its presence in Iraq, with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) conducting anti-IS operations with relative independence. Such improved capabilities are a far cry from the state of affairs when the IS emerged in 2014. Moving forward, it will be vital to ensure that local counter-terrorism and intelligence capabilities do not erode. Lulls in attacks, in particular, should not comfort security agencies into a false sense of comfort, as such lulls could be part of an IS subterfuge to wait for the world’s attention to fully move away from the group, allowing it to carve out a space in the MENA region more effectively.

More significantly is the possibility that the IS may exploit the war directly. In Syria, for example, IS militants remained highly active in the Syrian Desert, regularly attacking the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions and ambushing loyalist militias. Although Russian presence in eastern Syria is not widespread, Russian military and economic assistance nevertheless allowed the SAA to gain control of the region over the course of 2018, while the IS rule was collapsing. With the war in Ukraine potentially diminishing Russian assistance for the SAA, there is a possibility that IS’ insurgency may become ever-more brazen. Improved IS capabilities could then spillover into neighbouring regions such as those controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or across the border into Iraq.

Ultimately, much about the future of the IS remains uncertain, especially in light of lack of information surrounding the group’s new leader. The fact is that under the rule of Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, the IS faces a world that is both deeply changed from 2014, yet at the same time, worryingly similar.

For observers of democratic backsliding and rising violent extremism in India, the monk’s statements were hardly surprising. Over the 2010s, the secular model of civic nationalism that had been the hallmark of India’s ruling parties gradually eroded. Instead, there emerged a new strand of nationalism focused on Hindu ethnic and religious majoritarianism. Commonly known as Hindutva, Hindu nationalist movements have a long history in India. However, they had little political success until the election of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014. Since the election, India has seen a rise in hostile rhetoric against non-Hindu minorities, especially Muslims. Although the BJP itself balanced its rhetoric carefully to avoid accusations of discriminatory behaviour, many of the party’s supporters have engaged in increasingly aggressive behaviour.

Indeed, the conference in Haridwar, which is located in the BJP stronghold state of Uttarakhand, saw many prominent supporters of BJP engage in some of the most aggressive anti-Muslim rhetoric yet. In addition to Narsinghanand Giri, a Hindu nationalist leader by the name of Pooja Shakun Pandey called for a massacre of Muslims. Like Narsinghanand Giri, Pandey is now under police investigation.

The rising violent rhetoric has been accompanied by increased attacks on not just Muslims but wider minority communities. Indeed, the start of 2022 saw attacks against India’s Christians pick up. The rise in increasingly aggressive rhetoric and incidents has elicited warnings from Gregory Stanton, the director of Genocide Watch that India could witness a “genocide” against Muslims, especially in the state of Assam and the Indian-administered Kashmir. Stanton, who predicted the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda two years ahead, noted in a briefing that there were early “signs and processes” in India.

The BJP’s Balancing Act

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the country moved away from its traditional, non-aligned position in the international arena and sought to bolster its bilateral ties with the United States. The timing was auspicious for Modi, as the US, then under President Barack Obama, was increasingly pivoting towards Asia as part of its growing concerns with Chinese activities. A rising number of violent incidents between China and India, most notably clashes along the disputed regions of the Indian-Chinese Border in 2021, made such realignment an even greater priority for New Delhi. The growing ties are apparent in the increased attention given towards the Indian diaspora in the US by politicians and presidential candidates.

At a time when President Joe Biden is emphasising the need to counter the threat from the far-right, growing far-right extremism in India risks complicating bilateral ties. While the growing significance of bilateral ties between the two countries can offer New Delhi some protection from criticism, the Biden administration, already dealing with foreign policy crises from Ukraine to Afghanistan, can ill-afford violent social upheaval in a regional partner.

Thus, the escalation of violent extremism in India presents a challenge for the ruling BJP: BJP leaders face the need to counter the most virulent of extremist rhetoric in order to allay growing international criticism. But doing so will risk backlash from the BJP’s more extreme constituents whose actions and views have been tacitly endorsed by BJP’s “silence” over the years. While such challenges were easier to manage under the administration of President Donald Trump, in part due to linkages between the supporters between Trump and Modi, they will be far more challenging to manage under Biden.

These challenges, as well as the sheer virulence of the extremist rhetoric emerging from India, may be why authorities chose to take action against Yati Narsinghanand Giri and Pooja Shakun Pandey. Around the same time, India had already come under fire for enabling anti-Muslim extremism following the emergence of an app, Bulli Bai, that shared photos of Muslim women for “sale”. Authorities in India have since taken action against the app as well.

Through these investigations and criminal charges, New Delhi is likely attempting to draw the line in how much is permitted in the public discourse and to regain control of the nationalist currents.

Riding the Tiger of Nationalism

There is an old Chinese phrase that posits that “When you ride a tiger, it is hard to dismount.” Observers of nationalism frequently applied this phrase in reference to the cynical utilisation of nationalist fervour by opportunistic politicians and parties around the globe. Observers note that given enough rein, the nationalist public can instead force politicians and parties to act more ideologically even when a more pragmatic course of action would be in the national interest. The “rider”, in effect, ends up at the mercy of the “tiger”.

China itself has been cited as an example of such dynamics. During moments of international tension, the Chinese Government utilised nationalist rhetoric for legitimacy but found itself having to constrain nationalist movements in the country when they became too aggressive to benefit Beijing’s pursuits of its interests.

There is a risk that the same thing could happen in India. Although India’s foreign relations needs makes clamping down on violent far-right rhetoric a pragmatic priority, such priorities will clash headlong with the domestic needs for the BJP to retain its supporters. If the “true believers” of Hindutva feel Prime Minister Modi is turning his back on their cause, they may threaten to back a leader who will be more willing to pursue it and push it even further.

Unfortunately for the BJP, such shifts come at a time when it is already struggling to retain its supporters. With general elections due 2024, there are signs that the party may not be able to repeat its successes in 2014 and 2019. After all, the years under the BJP have not only seen attacks against non-Hindu minorities, but Hindus of left, secular or progressive convictions as well, resulting in a fairly broad opposition that the BJP will not be able to woo before the next election. This leaves the BJP with few options outside digging its heels on populist nationalism.

Past research shows that when populists start losing power, they begin eroding the democratic structures and damage the systems of checks and balances within governmental institutions. There are some Indian pundits who fear this may take place in India if the BJP senses an impending electoral defeat in critical states, such as Punjab. Such a course of action will almost certainly polarise the country even further, empowering domestic extremists even as the country may find itself in increased international isolation akin to the likes of Turkey, Poland or Brazil.

Indeed, the cases of Turkey, Poland, Brazil and several other countries show that India is not an isolated case when it comes to democratic backsliding and rising extremist rhetoric. It is merely part of the trend that has defined the on-going dynamics in many liberal democracies since the mid-2010s. As 2022 rolls, however, India is reaching the point where both extremist rhetoric and violence are becoming commonplace. The far-right of Indian politics and society have been exploited by the rhetoric and policies of opportunistic politicians, leaving them more space to act according to the tenets of a strictly Hindu-based nationalism. Should Indian officials not intervene and de-escalate the situation, however, they may find violence across the country escalating, forcing them to take action under far more serious circumstances, which they may eventually be incapable of controlling.