Through it all, extremist groups and movements have been highly active, either taking advantage of pandemic-related shifts in priorities to recoup their strength or outright use the pandemic for their own benefits.

Despite initial hopes that extremist groups and organisations would struggle to maintain relevance amidst the pandemic, such groups have found fertile ground for support as a result of an increased reach in online communications over the past two years. Today, they are leveraging a mix of conspiratorial misinformation and public dissatisfaction with the status-quo to drum up support.

In this report, we identify six regions that are of interest to practitioners of research on violent extremism. These regions consist of:

• The United States and Western Europe, which continue to see the proliferation of far-right groups focused predominantly on “multiculturalism” and non-White migration.
• The Post-Soviet Space which is seeing rising “alt-right” groups who emphasise their white, European and Christian identities and espouse an explicitly “illiberal” model of governance, especially on matters of minorities, women and LGBT+ people.
• Afghanistan where a violent jihadi group, the Taliban, ousted the US, galvanising similar extremist movements elsewhere.
• Iraq and Syria, which continue to witness activities by Salafist-Jihadi groups who are looking to recoup their strength after being driven underground during the 2010s.
• The Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa region where jihadist groups of several affiliations are in competition against one-another even as they ramp up their attacks on weak governments.
• Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia where the rise of Hindu and Buddhist extremism is threatening other, smaller minorities.

In each region, we will assess the prevalent extremist risk and look at past and present trends to estimate their trajectories in 2022.

Overall, our findings suggest that various manifestations of right-wing extremism are the most prevalent flashpoint. The United States and Western Europe, the Post-Soviet Space, and the Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia are all seeing manifestations of nationalistic or religious right-wing extremism.

Meanwhile, the threat from jihadi groups remain prevalent, especially in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and the Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa. However, each of these movements will likely spend 2022 focused on recuperation and consolidation as they recover from the 2010s which saw many such groups’ capabilities eroded by security operations. Infighting among these groups will likely reduce their immediate threat. Developments around renewed recruitment, fundraising, and mergers should be observed as a possible prelude to renewal of the jihadi threat.

The United States and Western Europe

For much of the first two decades of the 21^st century, concerns around extremism in the US and Western Europe were focused firmly on Islamic fundamentalist extremism. The September 11 attacks in 2001; the resulting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the emergence of Al Qaeda affiliates and later the Islamic State (IS) in 2014; and the resulting global terrorist attacks by the group’s supporters all contributed to such preoccupations.

While the attention on white-supremacist and far-right extremism remained relatively unfocused during this period, there was also increased mainstreaming of far-right voices whose rhetoric focused on anti-Islam, anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism, especially in the US where such rhetoric was often justified as protected on the basis of freedom of speech. Although high-profile far-right attacks, such as the massacre perpetrated by Anders Breivik in 2011, occurred, these were usually seen as aberrations.

The 2015 refugee crisis, however, reinvigorated the Western far-right while mainstreaming previously fringe theories such as the “Great Replacement” which posits that immigration is being used by a vague group of “globalist elites” to “replace” the white European population. Indeed, violent activities by such groups increased exponentially since 2015, especially in Europe. The electoral wins of populist nationalists in Europe and the US were also linked to this phenomenon.

Landmark developments in 2020, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic, further bolstered far-right movements. Reframing their ideologies around personal freedoms, such movements came to vehemently oppose COVID-19 restrictions, decrying them as a means of social control. As part of such reframing, they sought to present themselves as “champions of personal freedoms.”

A combination of other factors, including social tensions following the worldwide Black Lives Matter protests and the polarising rhetoric around the 2020 US presidential election, further increased tensions, culminating in the violent riots in the US Capitol where protesters of mostly far-right affiliations attempted to prevent the certification of the electoral win of the then-candidate Joe Biden.

The Western far-right has been on the defensive since the events of January 6^th a year ago. Despite some efforts to disavow the conspiratorial rhetoric and the de-platforming of some of the most vocal and extreme ideologues, the prevalent trend in the mainstream right has been one towards reframing the events of that day. Meanwhile, they have turned their attention towards single-issues that tend to be in the interest of minorities, such as reproductive and LGBT+ rights, while ensuring that any legislation that could hamper future electoral gains – such as voting reform – are deadlocked. In 2022, such efforts will likely gain further momentum.

The Western far-right is also showing signs of becoming more “modular” and more ideologically pragmatic. The COVID-19 pandemic and opposition to pandemic-related restrictions, for example, have brought the far-right in contact with previously-unrelated movements such as wellness and anti-vaccination movements. Such hybrid, “intersectional”, “single-issue” far-right movements appear to be gaining favour among those following cohesive but often-dogmatic movements such as neo-Nazis, and this process will likely continue in 2022.

The Post-Soviet Space

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the post-Soviet space has seen the proliferation of nationalist parties. On the whole, this is unsurprising, as nationalists such as Hungary’s current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, had been highly active in the anti-communist opposition movements. Across the post-Soviet space (as well as non-Soviet states such as Yugoslavia), nationalism was often instrumentalised as a unifying ideological foundation for societies who had lost their main unifying pillar. Such exploitation of ethnic and national tensions was instrumental in the breakout of the Balkan Wars. The radicalising aftereffects of those wars continue to inform the far-right movements in the post-Soviet space.

As early as 2013, it was estimated that Russia was home to the world’s largest neo-Nazi population at about 50,000 to 70,000, making up about half the global neo-Nazi population. Although the Russian Government officially opposed neo-Nazi groups, such groups nevertheless found an enabling environment in Russia owing to Moscow’s own opposition to so-called “Western values”, especially within the context of the rights for women and LGBT+ peoples; as well as immigration and multiculturalism vis-à-vis Islam. Tropes and slurs used against Bosnian Muslims in Balkan Wars have seen a revival in their application against to Muslims as a whole. With anti-Islam a driving force of the European far-right as well, there have been increased linkages between far-right groups in Western and Eastern Europe. German officials warned in 2020 that German neo-Nazis were training at the camps operated by the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), an organisation identified as a terrorist group by the US.

However, it would be a mistake to frame far-right in the post-Soviet space as exclusively Russian-aligned. In Ukraine, the Azov movement (or Azov Battalion), known for its recruitment of neo-Nazis and assault by its members on feminist, LGBT+ and left-wing activists, has come into conflict with the Russian-backed forces in eastern Ukraine. While the European far-right may have more links with Russia-based far-right groups, Azov has gained support among the far-right in the US.

The Caucasus has also seen increased manifestations of far-right movement. In Georgia, where far-right parties struggled to gain electoral traction, an enabling environment nevertheless allowed them to act with relative impunity. When far-right activists attacked the Tbilisi Pride rally in 2021, Georgian nationalist and religious politicians denounced the members of the rally for “provocation” instead of the far-right. Armenia, a relative outlier as far as far-right activity goes, has also seen the emergence of far-right movements such as Adekvad, which has, like its counterparts, supported “traditional” values and espoused illiberal, anti-feminist and anti-LGBT+ views. The country’s fresh conflict with Azerbaijan also allowed for anti-Muslim rhetoric to gain traction. While far-right movements in both countries have been accused of having links to Russia, their goals and means of gaining support have been decidedly local.

In 2022, such movements will contend with several dynamics. The Russian and Ukrainian far-right may be preparing for a new confrontation as tensions in eastern Ukraine rise once more. How such groups reconcile – or gloss over – their mutual hostility despite wider ideological alignments on a global scale may inform far-right movements around the world.

Furthermore, the increasing visibility of far-right movements in countries like Georgia and Armenia, which have been comparatively more successful in their democratic experiments, raises concerns for the health of their democracies and the future of their civil societies. Far-right groups in these countries had a relatively good year in 2021 owing to increased political tensions and rising polarisation against a backdrop of on-going COVID-19 outbreaks. As such, they will seek to retain momentum in 2022 by looking for ways to remain relevant, likely resorting to violent confrontations if all else fails.

Afghanistan

2021 was marked with the end of the US mission in Afghanistan. The mission which started in 2002 in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, ended with the rapid collapse of Afghan security forces following the US withdrawal, resulting in the Taliban gaining control of the entire country.

The Taliban’s renewed ascent to power has led many experts around the world to speculate that the country would, once again, become a hub of transnational jihadism as it was in the 1990s. Although the Taliban have vowed to not let terrorists use Afghan soil to launch attacks elsewhere again, the appointment of senior figures from the Haqqani Network – known for its close ties al-Qaeda and recognised as Taliban’s hard-line faction – to positions of power in the new Afghan Government suggest that the new Taliban rule will be hardly different than the old.

However, although victorious, the Taliban will face a tough challenge unifying and governing the many jihadist factions that operate in the country. How this threat is managed will, in turn, determine how the extremist threat in Afghanistan will develop in 2022 and beyond.

To begin with, although victorious, the Taliban is not unified. Although the exact dynamics are hard to predict, the group is known to have a more pragmatic “nationalist” wing and a more ideologically jihadi hard-line faction, the latter represented by the aforementioned Haqqani Network. In the aftermath of the fall of Kabul, there were reports of clashes between the two factions. Although the exact details of what took place were never confirmed, the ascent of Haqqani Network officials to senior positions and the resumption of the extreme practices that characterised the Taliban rule in the 1990s, suggest that Afghanistan’s new rulers have little interest in moderating their actions, even for token or pragmatic purposes. While they may shy away openly hosting transnational violent extremist groups, the Taliban, as a supporter of an anti-Western, hard-line fundamentalist ideology, will offer groups with similar ideologies an enabling environment.

Indeed, since the Taliban’s capture of Kabul, the previously frosty relations with Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the so-called “Pakistani Taliban”, have improved noticeably in 2021. Attacks by the group against Pakistani security forces rose concurrently. In 2022, observing such attacks and how the Taliban leverages them against its relatively-cordial ties with Islamabad will be vital towards determining the future direction of transnational jihadism in the country.

On the other side is Islamic State – Khorasan (ISK), an IS franchise that has waged a constant war against the Taliban even as both groups fought an insurgency against the US. The ISK has bucked the trend in the jihadist world by not congratulating the Taliban on its victory, but instead denouncing it as a fake victory. Since then, the ISK has increased its physical and propaganda attacks against the Taliban. There have also been signs of the ISK poaching support from the Taliban through accusations that the Taliban, by focusing on a more national agenda, has failed to adhere to true jihadi goals. If the ISK continues to gain support for its hard-line stance, it might force the Taliban follow through with similar hard-line actions.

Somewhere in between these groups lies al-Qaeda. Although the group lost significant credibility and capacity in the 2010s after initial gains during the starting years of the Arab Uprisings, it remains a credible actor with a recognised brand. Furthermore, the group retains its connection to the Taliban via the Haqqani Network. As such, despite the Taliban’s promise to not let Afghanistan be used as a springboard for transnational jihadism, there is a significant likelihood that al-Qaeda will use Afghanistan as a base of operations, albeit more covertly.

Lastly, there are the myriad jihadi factions who are broadly aligned with the Taliban but have differing specific concerns. Some of these groups such as Lashkar-e Taliba, Hizb-ul-Ahrar, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Turkestan Islamic Party and others, are too small to become major players. However, they can nevertheless act as spoilers or kingmakers, giving the larger groups incentives appeal for their support. Should these groups, like the TTP, escalate their attacks on their enemies outside Afghanistan, they can also bring attention from wider foreign powers that can complicate the Taliban’s calculations.

Come 2022, the goals of the Taliban and al-Qaeda will be consolidating their gains and manage a fractious militant landscape even as the country faces economic collapse and possible famine over the winter. Suppressing dissent and retaining stability while rebuilding capabilities will likely be their main goals, limiting their ideological investment to extremist causes. The ISK, on the other hand, will likely continue the trend of escalating its attacks on the Taliban to keep the group off balance.

It is unlikely that Afghanistan’s extremist landscape will see any significant developments in 2022. However, the trends that could lead to significant developments past 2022 will become apparent this year.

Developments outside Afghanistan are likelier to impact the extremist landscape in the country. In particular, many jihadi groups around the world experienced a boost to their morale following the US withdrawal. Jihadi ideologues around the world are now looking at the Afghan model to experiment with local governance within a national framework. Some foreign jihadi fighters in regions like Syria even expressed interest in travelling to Afghanistan.

Going forward, it will be important to watch for the movements of jihadi fighters into the country and understand which group they are supporting and why. Another item to watch will be on whether the Taliban will utilise its governance as a model for other jihadi groups as an instrument of soft power.

Syria and Iraq

For better part of the last decade, much of the attention of international security experts were dominated by the events in Iraq and Syria. Since the breakout of the Arab Spring and especially since the breakout of the Syrian Civil War, the region has witnessed immense radicalisation. Such radicalisation was facilitated by the severe violence of the conflicts after the Arab Uprisings that pushed people into a more radical path, alongside the flow of weapons, money and fighters into Iraq and Syria that also made the most extreme groups also the best equipped ones, pushing out the more moderate views.

The IS was the most severe manifestation of this phenomenon. The group not only took control of large swathes of Iraq and Syria, committing genocide against non-Sunni Muslims under its rule; it also went through great lengths to ensure that its ideology and method of governance would persist. Although the group’s holdings in Iraq and Syria were eliminated, IS supporters in these countries have proven themselves to be adept at evading capture and keeping the group alive in some capacity. Insurgent attacks, especially in areas lacking governance, are common. Civilian supporters of the group have also engaged in crowdfunding projects to help secure the release of IS captives in holding zones such as the al-Hol Camp in Syria while ensuring that the children held there are raised with the group’s ideology.

The IS isn’t the only extremist group whose activities threaten further instability. Opposition-controlled Syria, in particular, has become home to a host of groups of varying jihadi persuasions. During the earlier years of the Syrian Civil War, al-Qaeda, which had been whittled down in the previous decade, managed to re-establish itself with groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra representing its cause. Although Jabhat al-Nusra, now rebranded to of Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has broken off from al-Qaeda, it retains its jihadist, fundamentalist ideology and appears to be looking to emulate a Taliban-style national governance model. Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, retains the loyalty of some smaller groups.

Further groups operating in the region include groups who draw inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood (such as the once-significant Ahrar al-Sham); conventional Salafi Jihadism (such as another once-significant group, Jaish al-Islam); or foreign jihadist groups with national goals (such as Uyghur or Chechen factions). The prevalence of such groups in a small stretch of region consisting of parts of Idlib and Aleppo, means that groups of jihadist persuasions have essentially squeezed out any other competition and frequently engage in infighting for resources and influence.

Since the campaigns against the IS, as well as Russian-backed efforts to help regain Damascus wrestle territorial control from the Syrian Opposition, jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria have been on the backfoot. In Iraq in particular, successive attempts by smaller insurgent groups to fill the vacuum, such as the brief insurgency by the White Flags organisation, were quashed with relative ease.

However, IS-linked insurgent attacks in both Iraq and Syria are picking up. The group is following patterns similar to its insurgency between 2008 and 2013, hitting soft targets, operating in ungoverned spaces and inciting intercommunal tensions. With Damascus focused on consolidating its control amidst a severe economic crisis and Baghdad focused on resolving the state of political flux in the country, there is a risk that the fight against violent extremist groups will take a backseat.

While 2022 is unlikely to see any major developments to the jihadi landscape in either country, observers should keep an eye open for continued attacks and signs for jihadi groups, especially the IS, reconstituting themselves. As was the case in the lead-up to 2013, developments such as prison breaks and assassination of security personnel will be especially pertinent as a prelude to wider jihadi violence.

In the Idlib and Aleppo regions of Syria, observers should watch the efforts of the HTS to mainstream itself and the reactions of other jihadi factions. Although the jihadist landscape in Syria is deeply fractured, the Taliban victory in Afghanistan appears to have inspired some groups, including the HTS, to reassess their approaches to governance and influence. Such Taliban-inspired methods of governance, already in progress in Idlib where the HTS backs a civilian government by the name of the Syrian Salvation Government, will be essential to understanding the nature of the extremist threat in Syria over 2022.

Sahel, Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa

Many jihadi groups traditionally considered the Sahel, Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa regions as low priority backwaters. Although the region has been home to some jihadi factions, including in Algeria where they were party to a civil war in the 1990s, such groups rarely rose to significant prominence and their activities seldom elicited international attention.

The last decade saw this dynamic changing. Sustained pressure on al-Qaeda and IS operatives in the Middle East, Europe, Caucuses and Afghanistan forced many of these groups to turn their attention and resources to other theatres to retain relevance. Regional and local dynamics, such as the spill over of the Libyan conflict following the collapse of the Gaddafi rule.

Today, Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, is emerging as one of the hotspots of Salafi jihadi activity. Exploiting weak governance, corruption, proliferation of weapons and widespread poverty are all allowing jihadi groups to gain influence in these regions.

Indeed, even before the COVID-19 pandemic, there were signs that extremist groups such as the IS were directing their attention to the region. In 2019, attacks claimed by the IS in West Africa inflicted casualties (dead and injured) just barely short of the casualties inflicted in Iraq and Syria. While IS claims are often dubious, the United Nations similarly warned of “unprecedented” rise in terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, with 4,000 terrorism-related deaths in 2019 alone. The growing prevalence of Africa in IS propaganda also represented a shift as the group attempted to justify its continued existence in the aftermath of its losses in Iraq, Syria and Libya. This trend continued in 2020 which marked the deadliest year across the Sahel, West, Central and East Africa. Today, experts warn that the region could become the new focus of global counter-terror operations. Such developments are even more significant amidst an on-going drawdown by Western powers that could offer violent extremist groups a vacuum that they could fill.

Perhaps the main factor that prevented such groups from becoming an even more tangible threat is their disunity. No single group holds sway over the jihadi activities in the region. Instead, there are many factions, some of which are independent while others have loose affiliations with the IS or al-Qaeda. Although these groups cooperate with one-another more often than their counterparts in other theatres, factionalism is nevertheless taking its toll. For example, the summer of 2021 saw the death of a jihadi leader of legendary status, Abubakar Shekau, the former leader of the Nigeria-based jihadi group Boko Haram. Although Shekau allied the group with the IS and declared his group as the West Africa Province of the IS (ISWAP), disputes over leadership led him to leave the group with his core followers and he was subsequently killed by his former allies. Overall, experts have noted that transnational jihadi groups have become entangled in local rivalries at the expense of wider jihadi unity.

Overall, however, even the jihadi disunity is coming at the expense of local governance. Both ISWAP and a local al-Qaeda affiliate, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), have continued their attacks on security forces. They are also engaging in other, soft-power manoeuvres such as providing governance, water, sanitation and education to areas under their influence, functions that national governments in the region often struggled with. Indeed, at present, failures in governance and lack of opportunities appear, as well as heavily-securitised state responses appear to be leading the push factors for local populations to support these groups, as opposed to anything novel these groups offer.

Come 2022, violent extremist factions, regardless of whether they are independent or linked with the IS or al-Qaeda, will work to entrench themselves in the areas under control. Acts of propaganda, both in the forms of attacks but also services and education in their extremist ideologies, will aim to gather more support for each individual group. While infighting will be the main obstacle to jihadi unity, mergers between factions or shifting of allegiances that characterise the factional dynamics in the region may form the basis of a more unified front.

Extremist factions will likely be galvanised by the Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Western troops from the region and may seek to avoid actions that may jeopardise the wider jihadi movement, even if they don’t formally end their hostilities. The recent deployment of Russian troops in Mali following the withdrawal of French troops may also factor into the calculations of these groups, given Russia’s recent actions against jihadi groups in Syria.

The Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia

As a central flashpoint in anti-colonial struggles, a major theatre during the Cold War, and the scene of various regional power rivalries, the Indian Subcontinent as well as the wider South and Southeast Asia regions have witnessed numerous waves of armed insurgencies of various levels of extremism. Towards the end of the Cold War and their aftermath, a number of Muslim insurgencies have emerged across the region, turning more extreme amidst the emergence of the wider global jihadi movement. In the 2010s, the extremist landscape of the region was further complicated by the proliferation of Hindu and Buddhist extremists.

In India, the Maoist Naxalite insurgency present since the 1970s is still considered the “gravest threat” to India’s internal security. Although the group’s stature has diminished since the 2000s, it remains entrenched in its strongholds such as Chhattisgarh. Although the group has tried to take advantage of the farmer protests in India, it has yet to make a sizeable impact and there are presently no signs that this will take place in 2022.

Indeed, to outsiders, groups such as the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba are better known than the Naxalite insurgency, being responsible for the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. The clampdowns that followed the 2008 attacks, however, diminished the group’s abilities. Much of the group’s activities since then have been limited to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indian-administered Jammu Kashmir. Although the group did conduct attacks on the security forces in Jammu Kashmir, it has not performed a high-profile attack since 2008. The group may continue its attacks in Kashmir and may even engage in provocations between India and Pakistan, similar to the attacks by Jaish e-Mohammed in 2019 that nearly led to an Indian-Pakistani military escalation. Although the situation in Afghanistan where the Taliban have been victorious may benefit the group, it is unlikely to be highly active in 2022.

Across the wider region, although Islamic insurgencies exist, many of them, such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid in Indonesia; Jemaah Islamiyah, Darul Islam Sabah in Malaysia; Patani United Liberation Organisation, Barisan Revolusi Nasional – Koordinasi in Thailand have only been active sporadically.

Of all the jihadi groups present, Abu Sayyaf, an IS affiliate also known as the group’s East Asia Province, represents the most significant jihadi faction. The group was responsible for the capture of the city of Marawi in the Philippines in 2016. Although the group was ousted since, with its leader killed, there are on-going concerns among experts that the relative lack of reconstruction in the region and low levels of sustained counterinsurgency efforts are allowing supporters of the group keep up recruitment. Indeed, a 2019 bombing at a church in Jolo, southern Phillipines, which was claimed by the IS, shows that the group remains a threat. However, the relative lack of activity surrounding the group over the past couple years could suggest that 2022 will be mostly dormant for the IS as it recoups its losses. Recruitment of foreign militants from the region and attempts to elicit support of other dormant jihadi factions will likely be key indicators of Abu Sayyaf activity in 2022.

Indeed, today, the main source of extremist activity in the Indian Subcontinent, South and Southeast Asia does not come from Muslim or Maoist extremists but Hindu and Buddhist extremists. Although Hindu nationalist groups such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have a long history in India, this group – alongside Buddhist groups motivated by similar goals such as Bodu Bolu Sena (BBS) in Sri Lanka and Ma Ba Tha in Myanmar – have gained popularity in the 2010s. These groups have often incited hatred against their respective countries’ Muslim minorities, espousing majoritarian ideologies that explicitly “othered” Muslims. Anti-leftism, femonationalism[1] and anti-multiculturalism are frequent hallmarks of such ideologies. Thus, some experts have framed Hindu and Buddhist extremist movements as local variants of the alt-right movements present in Western Europe and the US. Indeed, the two sides, at times, attempted to cooperate towards mutual goals such as supporting the election of Donald Trump.

Myanmar, in particular, has seen the most violent manifestation of such extremism. After fighting between security forces and a local insurgent group claiming to represent the Rohingya Muslims in the country erupted in 2012, the government of Myanmar engaged in what has described as “ethnic cleansing” against the Rohingya population. Militant Buddhist nationalism and anti-Muslim rhetoric that othered the Rohingya people as foreigners was a common part of the campaign. However, both India and Sri Lanka have seen similar manifestations. Violent attacks against Muslims in India have become commonplace and the community has been subjected to numerous moral panics including conspiracies of a “Corona Jihad” involving Muslims deliberately spreading COVID-19. In all three countries, high-ranking government figures have remained noticeably quiet about attacks on Muslims and acquittals of those who attacked Muslims remain common. Internationally, such attacks drew little attention owing to the preoccupation with Islamic extremism over the 2010s, which has allowed Hindu and Buddhist extremists to frame their actions as defensive.

Come 2022, these extremist movements appear to be growing more volatile. In Myanmar, the country’s military forces have begun attacking Christian towns and villages following activities by rebels in these areas. Eyewitnesses reported that the language and tactics used by the military in Christian areas were similar to those used against the Rohingya, suggesting that the extremist narratives that targeted one minority is now being used to target another.

A similar dynamic is playing out in India where anti-Christian mobs have picked up their attacks against the country’s much smaller Christian population. Prominent Indian politicians have remained quiet or outright denied that such attacks are taking place.

Come 2022, this trend will likely continue amidst the continued conflict in Myanmar and rising polarisation in India and Sri Lanka. Geopolitical concerns, such as Washington’s need to keep India close as part of its pivot against China, will likely mean that international pressure over such attacks will be muted, emboldening the extremists in these countries.

[1] Defined as using the cause of feminism and the protection of women against “dangerous” foreigners.

These operations come on the heels of an increasing number of attacks perpetrated by the ISK against the Taliban, in particular since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, suggesting ongoing fragility and insecurity, as well as an ever more fractured jihadi landscape.

With the Taliban still struggling to establish themselves as the new rulers of Afghanistan, it appears that the ISK is attempting to fill the vacuum in transnational jihadism to represent itself as the truer, more Islamic alternative to the Taliban. In doing so, the group appears to be recruiting non-Pashtun jihadi fighters to its cause while exploiting the Taliban’s practical and ideological vulnerabilities.

The ISK Exploits the Taliban’s Ideological Weak-Points

Between August and November 2021, more than 50 attacks were claimed by the ISK, not only targeting Taliban military assets like checkpoints, but also civilian assets, especially those used by persecuted minorities like the Shia Hazara. Some of the attacks in November claimed high casualties across Kabul, Jalalabad, Ghazni, and Kandahar.

One would expect that Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan – given its status as a hardline jihadi group – would be a source of celebration for the jihadi cause as a whole, regardless of their ideological differences. However, in the jihadi world, the group has stood as an outlier in not only condemning the Taliban’s victory, but also attempting to discredit them. However, several factors are likely motivating the ISK’s ongoing hostility towards the Taliban.

First of all, since losing its so-called caliphate in Syria and Iraq (and smaller franchises elsewhere), and facing widespread condemnation from Islamic leaders for its actions, the IS has been trying to justify its continued existence. As such, the Taliban’s more nationally-oriented goals – with the clear favouring of the Pashtun ethnicity – stand in sharp contrast to the IS’ more transnational goals, allowing the ISK to present its Salafi Jihadi ideology as a purer, more authentic alternative to the Taliban’s Pashtun nationalism-inspired jihadism. Indeed, the IS already attempted this in Syria where it denigrated the more nationally-focused jihadi groups such as its one-time partner, Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra).

The fact that the Taliban has entered talks with the United States has further allowed the ISK to frame the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul not as a victory but as an “agreement” with what the IS refers to as the enemies of Islam.

Such views were further hardened after the Taliban expressed a desire to establish relations with China to appeal for aid and prevent the Afghan economy from collapsing. Beijing, seeing an opportunity to clamp down on possible Uyghur insurgents and looking to avoid instability that could strike its interests, reacted warmly.

While these choices by the Taliban were logical from a pragmatic point of view, they nevertheless enabled the ISK to launch ideological broadsides against the group.

Instead, the ISK presented itself as an alternative home for the mujahideen, or foreign fighters, especially those from the Central Asian republics who tend to be more hostile towards China than the US.

Tensions between the Taliban and other Central Asian jihadi factions are nothing new. As early as 2015, the Taliban clashed with non-Afghan jihadi factions like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) when the latter splintered in support of the ISK. Similar clashes erupted in 2018 between the Taliban and a faction of Central Asian militants who attempted to join the ISK.

Thus, it was expected that these tensions would come to a head following the Taliban’s capture of Kabul.

Enter Uyghurs

Given these tensions, a suicide attack claimed on a Shia mosque in Kunduz in October stands out. The attacker, as the ISK mentioned in its statement, was an Uyghur, a rarity in itself. As a result, the bombing was interpreted by some experts as the ISK “punishing” the Taliban for its attempts to build ties with Beijing. An excerpt allegedly from an India-focused IS-linked publication named The Voice of Hind, was cited as proof of this notion by some analysts, as the publication referred to the bomber as a “a knight of Allah from China”.

While one might balk at the ISK “punishing” the Taliban by attacking a mosque belonging to a minority that was persecuted under the Taliban as well, the attack makes more sense when one views it as a “warning shot” against the Taliban and China. Simultaneously, the ISK informed the world that:

• The ISK is recruiting Central Asians, especially Uyghurs, at the expense of the Taliban (regardless of how many Uyghurs are actually part of the ISK);
• It is capable of launching high-casualty attacks despite the Taliban’s efforts to consolidate the monopoly on violence;
• It has China in its crosshairs.

Many commentators have focused on the China angle, suggesting that the attack by an Uyghur operative heralds the transformation of transnational jihadism waging a war against China – and perhaps Russia – as opposed to the US. Such analyses undoubtedly have some validity. However, it risks overlooking local dynamics.

One such dynamic is economic: It is no secret that the withdrawal of the US and many Western aid organisations have left the Afghan economy on the verge of collapse. The budding ties between Beijing and Kabul under the Taliban were in part intended to stave off such collapse, with Beijing in particular making a big show of the resumption of Chinese imports of Afghan products like pine nuts.

However, such Afghan exports pale in comparison to the country’s prospective rare earth riches, towards which Beijing repeatedly expressed interest in exploring and developing. In the past, such prospective investments were hampered by chronic insecurity and instability in Afghanistan and it is unlikely that many Chinese firms, already facing strong economic challenges, will be willing to enter risky ventures in a country that can see Chinese citizens targeted. Indeed, tensions have been rising between Beijing and its erstwhile ally, Islamabad, over recurring attacks that have targeted Chinese staff and assets.

Thus, the attack in Kunduz and the use of Uyghur operatives can easily be viewed as an attempt by the ISK to spook Beijing out of Afghanistan, restrict one of the few economic outlets Kabul has under the Taliban, and frame the resulting instability as the Taliban’s fault to gain further legitimacy.

While we have little insights into the finances of the ISK, IS supporters as a whole have proven themselves adept at fundraising and crowdfunding even when driven underground. As it stands, an Afghan economic collapse could easily allow the group to recruit disaffected Afghans, just as it has used its coffers to recruit disaffected Iraqis and Syrians.

Indeed, China is already showing signs of disengagement from an increasingly-unstable Afghanistan. Behind the optimistic statements of cooperation between Beijing and Kabul, Chinese security officials have been bolstering counter-terrorism capacities around Afghanistan, especially in Tajikistan where they are reportedly financing a counter-terrorism base along the Afghan border.

There are few good options for Taliban: It can double-down on Pashtun nationalism and fight a war against the ISK and, potentially, other jihadi groups. In doing so, however, the Taliban will risk losing the goodwill it earned from the wider jihadi world following the US withdrawal and isolate it further, leaving the group even more beholden to the goodwill and demands on regional and global powers. This is unlikely, as the Taliban already indicated its unwillingness to conform to international demands when it appointed sanctioned individuals and hardline jihadi leaders to important positions including but not limited to the Ministry of Interior. The group can ill-afford a jihadi blowback as it works to consolidate its power in Afghanistan.

Conversely, the Taliban may attempt to placate the transnational jihadist currents by offering safe havens or, at the very least, enough space to operate on their own accord. This would appeal to the interests of both the ISK, as well as Taliban allies such as al-Qaeda while making Afghanistan a haven for international jihadis looking for a new base of operations. In this eventuality, however, the Taliban is unlikely to have full control over the armed factions and militants in the country, risking the growth of factions that can challenge its authority, as well as international retribution if one of these factions chooses to launch an overseas attack similar to 9/11. At best, it would still leave Afghanistan a pariah state, with the Taliban forced to contend with a restive population, an economy in tailspin and an unsteady geopolitical position surrounded by hostile powers.

All in all, the preservation of the Afghan state and internal stability will be the top priorities for the Taliban, as well as neighbouring states. Appeasing groups such as the ISK is more than unlikely to yield any benefits for the aforementioned actors and so few will regard it as a viable option. Moreover, the ISK is still relatively a very small group in terms of numbers within Afghanistan. Its attacks on civilians and military targets and the media attention they receive are not quite in proportion to the group’s numbers and political capacity. The Taliban and neighbouring superpowers, such as China and Russia, are likely going to clamp down on the ISK in an attempt to herald a period of stability for Afghanistan, even if it is under the rule of the Taliban. How these actors respond to these terrorist attacks and also to local populations who support the ISK will determine the success of the goal concerning stability.

Over the course of August 2021, the Taliban in Afghanistan has managed to wrestle control of almost the whole country and has since established a government[1].

Through it all, the group has projected an image of unity and exclusivity, with the new government made up entirely of Taliban members and almost exclusively of Pashtun backgrounds, running counter to previous promises of inclusivity[2].

Despite the image of unity, however, the Taliban is experiencing fissures that could be capitalised on by other groups, even those that it counts among its partners.

This article will outline the positions of various militant groups active both inside and outside Afghanistan that could pose a range of challenges for the Taliban establishment that is seeking to consolidate both internal and external political legitimacy. In doing so, it will examine the opportunities they may seize and the risks they may pose to the Taliban, as well as the insurgency landscape in Afghanistan as a whole.

Domestically, the authors have identified three major factions of significance:

• The Haqqani Network,
• Al-Qaeda,
• Islamic State Khorasan (ISK).

The Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda have largely been on the same terms when it has come to the use of violence in achieving their aims. They adopted hard line stances when it came to peace talks with the US and have not been shy to derail attempts at dialogue. They will nevertheless seek to consolidate Taliban rule in Afghanistan and, thus, fortify the country as a safe haven for their presence and operations there. The ISK, on the other hand, will seek to destabilise Taliban rule and continue its efforts to poach militants from the Taliban and other jihadist groups present in Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda will likely coordinate operations to crack down on the ISK.

However, groups domestic to Afghanistan – relatively speaking – will not be the only concern as far as militancy in Afghanistan goes. Many observers expressed fears that the country could become, once again, a hub of transnational jihadism. While Taliban itself professes to focus purely on Afghanistan – with a preference for the Pashtun people – the presence of the Haqqani Network and the wider al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan nevertheless raises the prospects of non-Afghan militant groups taking shelter in the country, especially following the appointment of many Haqqani-linked individuals to government positions.

Four key groups have been identified as risk factors for foreign militancy:

• Anti-India Groups (Such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba),
• Uyghur Groups,
• Syria-Based Jihadi Groups,
• Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan/Pakistani Taliban (TTP).

There is a possibility that such groups may pose a risk even if they are clamped down by the Taliban. The bombing at the Hamid Karzai Airport in August 2021 that killed at least 170 civilians raises the question of whether the Taliban has the capacity to clamp down on violent extremist groups. After all, the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan will likely offer an enabling environment for jihadis as a whole, even for Taliban’s enemies such as the ISK which claimed the airport bombing.

Such risks are evident in Syria where militants associated with the Islamic State (IS) were found in the territories ruled by rival jihadi groups. Indeed, the IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi himself was killed in Idlib which is controlled by Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)[3], the biggest local rival of the IS. In Afghanistan itself, groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Jamaat Ansarullah have regularly been able to operate in regions like Badakhshan, Kunar and Nuristan where even the Taliban struggled to establish authority in the past[4]. With the Taliban itself still consolidating control around the Afghanistan, there will be plenty of blind spots for transnational groups to establish networks and operate under the radar.

Ultimately, however, the Taliban’s response to such groups will depend on their links and allegiances, with groups enjoying closer ties to al-Qaeda or the Haqqani Network receiving more passes. Such responses will be, however, tempered by the group’s own country-wide objectives, including greater international recognition and reconstruction. Many groups also run the risk of acting as spoilers for the Taliban’s relations with regional powers.

Domestic Factions

The Haqqani Network

The Haqqani Network sees itself as part of the Taliban[5]. However, it is known to consist of more hard-line elements that have at times expressed dissatisfaction with more “lenient” elements of the group. A significant proportion of the terrorist attacks committed in Afghanistan in the name of the Taliban have been organised and implemented by the Haqqani Network.

Since the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, the current head of the Haqqani Network, Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is wanted by the US, with a $10 million FBI bounty[6], has been appointed Minister of Interior Affairs[7]. Even after being adopted by the core leadership, Sirajuddin Haqqani continued to espouse a more hard-line stance, as demonstrated in his position on the US-Afghan peace talks, which he said must be held in accordance with Islamic Sharia[8]. Another member of the Haqqani network to join the government is Khalil ur-Rehman Haqqani, who was appointed Minister of Refugees[9].

Nevertheless, the formation of this Taliban government did not come about without any infighting. Reports came out over a week ago about a spate of shootings in Kabul and Jalalabad between supporters of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Sirajuddin Haqqani. The shootings took place at the time of the governmental appointments and so it is assumed that both candidates were vying for the chance to be the right-hand man of acting Prime MInister Hibatullah[10]. Mullah Baradar, who is known to be the closest to Akhundzada, was eventually chosen as acting Deputy Prime Minister. Later on, a brawl was reported from the presidential palace on 15^th September between the Mullah Baradar and Haqqani factions[11].

The close relationship between the Haqqani Network and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been frequently reported[12]. This relationship provides the ISI with a channel into Afghanistan and it consequently has an influence on developments in the country. The make-up of the interim Taliban government shows clear signs of this influence, with several members enjoying close ties with Pakistan[13]. The eagerness of the Afghan Taliban to control its affairs without a domineering external force interfering is bound to lead to rifts with the Haqqani Network and its prized relationship with the ISI, as was witnessed in the abovementioned skirmishes between supporters of Mullah Baradar and Sirajaddin Haqqani. Incidentally, Mullah Baradar was arrested by Pakistan for pursuing dialogue with the Karzai regime in 2010[14]. Pakistan’s influence especially on the Haqqani Network is thus a thorn in the side of the Taliban regime.

In addition, the Haqqani Network is primarily responsible for acting as the intermediary between the Taliban and foreign-based groups/allies, including Al-Qaeda, TTP, JeM, Lakshar-e-Taiba, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan[15]. The degree of leverage that the Haqqani Network has over these foreign-based groups and the way in which the core Taliban leadership manages its relations with the Haqqani Network will determine the level of control the Taliban will have over military developments within Afghanistan.

In particular, the ability of the Haqqani Network to cause disruptions will certainly keep the core Taliban leadership on its toes. However, the core Taliban leadership and Haqqani Network are dependent on each other, with the former possessing political/ideological expertise while the latter possesses military power. They may both seek to stabilise relations for mutual benefit. The recent brawl in the president palace, nevertheless, indicates that this is not the case for the moment.

Al-Qaeda

While the Haqqani Network is an integrated part of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda is a separate group that enjoys close ties with the Taliban, especially through the Haqqani Network[16]. The close relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda has been demonstrated on numerous occasions, not least the celebration of the former’s victory in Afghanistan by the latter[17]. Al-Qaeda has a long history of cooperation with the Taliban, based on the pledges of alliance (bay’ah) made by high-ranking Al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, to the Taliban[18].

Nevertheless, the Doha Agreement signed by the US and Taliban in February 2020 somewhat problematized the latter’s relationship with Al-Qaeda. The agreement stipulates that the Taliban “will not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including al-Qa’ida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies”[19]. Although this does not mean that the Taliban is obligated to remove Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, it has promised to curtail the latter’s activities when it comes to global jihad.

The Taliban have largely framed their goals in recent times in national terms and the group is seeking to gain legitimacy from regional powers by shying away from their connections with global jihadist groups[20]. However, years of cooperation and alliance building between the two groups are unlikely to be hampered by the Doha Agreement or the dynamics of regional geopolitics[21]. The composition of the transitional government, which consists of internationally wanted and sanctioned individuals, demonstrates that for the time being the Taliban is more eager to consolidate its rule in Afghanistan through its organisational and tribal alliances rather than to appease international actors[22]. It is more likely that the two groups will formulate a new modus vivendi wherein the Taliban will continue to provide a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups on the condition that they in turn respect the Taliban’s attempts at gaining international recognition by avoiding provocation of regional and global superpowers.

Islamic State Khorasan (ISK)

The ISK is officially a regional affiliate of the IS[23] and it harbours a complicated and generally antagonistic relationship with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The group was founded in 2015, when the IS’ power in Iraq and Syria was at its peak, by former members of the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban as well as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan[24]. The ISK’s position, as a group that was dedicated to global jihad, rejected the more compromising stances of the Taliban, who were holding talks with Western powers, as well as the Taliban’s aim to restrict their activities to the national boundaries of Afghanistan. Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the spokesman of former IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, even accused the Taliban of collaborating with the Iranian government[25]. ISK thus managed to allure several disenchanted members of the Taliban to join their cause.

The ISK’s recruitment of Taliban fighters has caused the animosity between the two groups to reach new heights[26]. The Taliban’s animosity towards the ISK reached a level where the former would tolerate, or even condone, American airstrikes on the latter[27]. As the Taliban was beginning to consolidate its power within Afghanistan, the ISK immediately reacted with violence and conducted the deadly bombing at Kabul airport on 26^th August[28].

Military clashes between the Taliban and ISK are reported to be at their worst in areas where Taliban-affiliated leaders switched sides to join the ISK[29]. The Taliban will thus be extremely cautious even with its own members due to the risk of defection. Defection not only leads to a loss of military strength but it adds the risk of leaking information away to an adversary.

The Taliban will also remain wary of any potential cooperation with intelligence services of other countries with the objective of uprooting the ISK from Afghanistan. Such an approach may further alienate more hard-line members of the Taliban and push them towards the embrace of the ISK. It is also worth mentioning that the ISK have attracted defectors not only from the Afghan Taliban but also other regional jihadist groups, including Lashkar-e Taiba, Jamaat ud-Dawa, TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan[30].

In any case, the ISK has lost ground to the Taliban in recent times and it has failed to retain many of the territories that were under its control, most notably in Nangarhar province, in the east of Afghanistan. The ISK presence in Afghanistan, largely in the form of sleeper cells, will continue to concern the Taliban. Regional states will also be interested in uprooting the ISK from Afghanistan. However, the Taliban have a tight rope to walk across as the risk of defections continues to loom large.

Foreign Factions

Anti-India Groups

India is widely seen as the loser in the recent developments in Afghanistan. New Delhi had close ties with the now-deposed government in Kabul and it has, so far, not been successful in making diplomatic overtures to the Taliban on the same calibre as Russia or China[31]. Conversely, the Taliban is widely seen as having had Islamabad’s tacit backing. The perception that Pakistan was the winner is fuelled by the appointment of Pakistan-friendly figures in the new Taliban-led government[32]. With Pakistan already experiencing renewed and increasingly violent tensions with India, analysts were quick to posit that Afghanistan would become home to anti-Indian and especially Kashmiri groups like JeM and Lashkar-e-Taiba[33].

There is precedent for such a development. Such groups were highly active in Afghanistan in the 1990s and partook in several major attacks in India or on Indian interests, sometimes with the direct backing of the Taliban[34]. JeM, in particular, continues to be a major threat and has launched violent attacks in Kashmir as recently as 2019[35]. While the Taliban is looking to avoid the perception of being a Pakistani proxy[36], the anti-India track may remain a viable way for the two sides to retain leverage on each other. Such a process may even be aided – or at least facilitated – by al-Qaeda which already called for the “liberation” of Kashmir, Palestine, Maghreb (Northwest Africa) from the “clutches of the enemies of Islam”[37].

It remains to be seen how other regional powers will have a say in this. The greatest unknown will be China which has expressively demanded that the Taliban cut ties with terrorism due to Beijing’s sensitivity to a Uyghur insurgency. It is possible that Kabul and Islamabad may bank on Beijing’s own increasingly tense ties with New Delhi for Chinese officials to look the other way. However, given that Chinese officials are deeply concerned about instability and proxy activity in Afghanistan[38], their tolerance for a proxy insurgency, even one that targets a rival, may be very limited.

Uyghur Groups

The conduct and approach of the Chinese government vis-à-vis the Taliban showed remarkable parallels between the 1990s and 2021. In both instances Beijing opened diplomatic relations with the Taliban with the express intent of preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base for a Uyghur insurgency that could operate in the neighbouring Xinjiang Province in western China[39]. Beyond the Uyghur concerns, Beijing today is also conscious about instability in Afghanistan, both for its own reasons but also for the fact that chronic instability resulted in severe financial losses for Chinese companies engaged in mining and other extractive industries[40].

With Afghanistan’s status as a “Graveyard of conquerors” playing in Beijing’s mind, Chinese officials have been content to offer financial opportunities and other incentives to the Taliban in return for “a clean break with all terrorist groups and live in good terms with other countries, especially [their] neighbours,” as stated by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi. Chinese officials also leveraged their partnership with Pakistan to help build stronger ties with the new government in Kabul.

Prior to the Taliban’s capture of Kabul, the mood among Afghanistan’s some 2,000 Uyghurs was grim, with many concerned that the Taliban would help China restrict Uyghur activities[41]. Such fears have come to pass as the Taliban responded positively to Beijing’s requests. While not justifying the repression of the Uyghurs in China, they nevertheless noted they have no right to interfere in China’s internal affairs[42]. Subsequently, Taliban told Chinese officials that members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Uyghur group most commonly cited as a threat to Beijing, has left the country, though offered no evidence of that, nor said anything about where the group went[43].

There is the possibility that the Taliban officials were truthful in their stated intent to prevent a Uyghur insurgency. After all, Afghanistan did not become a hub for Uyghur insurgency under the Taliban rule of the 1990s. The Taliban also likely consider that cooperation with China will bring more dividends than harbouring Uyghurs would. However, there remains the question of whether the group is capable of clamping down on the Uyghurs. As highlighted above, there are several parts of the country including Badakhshan, Kunar and Nuristan where non-Taliban Afghan groups have managed to operate. Badakhshan, in particular, is a region that geographically extends into Xinjiang (through Tashkurgan county) and may prove appealing for Uyghur insurgents as a base.

There is also the question of how al-Qaeda views the Uyghur matter. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) declared ETIM a terrorist entity due to alleged links to al-Qaeda[44]. Indeed, Uyghur foreign militants in Syria frequently fought under al-Qaeda-linked formations including Jabhat al-Nusra (the predecessor of the HTS)[45]. However, Uyghurs were conspicuously missing in al-Qaeda’s congratulations to the Taliban which also included calls for rebellions in a number of theatres including Kashmir and Palestine[46], leaving their exact position unclear. It is possible that the group may offer some covert support and shelter to Uyghurs, if nothing but to prevent them from being recruited by enemies such as the ISK who can then act as a spoiler for Beijing-Kabul relations. Any such covert shelter and support, however, will likely be limited and bound by conditionalities to prevent a Chinese blowback.

Syria-Based Jihadi Groups

In early September 2021, reports emerged on Twitter that many foreign jihadi militants in the Opposition-controlled parts of Idlib in Syria expressed a desire to travel to Afghanistan[47]. These news represent a significant development in the outflow of fighters from Syria which have, so far, happened only in limited capacities and under Turkish or Russian auspices[48].

One reason for this is that the HTS, which rules Idlib, recently started clamping down on Chechen and Uzbek factions present in the region in a bid to present itself as a legitimate Syrian actor.

Some of these groups disbanded and laid down arms while others ended up in clashes with the HTS[49]. However, with the conflict in Syria becoming increasingly frozen, it is also likely that many militants who arrived in Syria to wage jihad may look to other theatres. For such militants, Afghanistan likely presents a land of opportunity.

The question is whether the Taliban will welcome such militants. While the group likely could use new fighters as it tries to establish control over the country, it is, like the HTS, focusing on an increasingly national agenda. Thus, an influx of foreign fighters with little familiarity of Afghanistan and Pashtun culture could result in tensions it would rather avoid.

With many foreign militants in Idlib already boasting contacts with al-Qaeda, it is likelier that such militants will be welcomed and sheltered by al-Qaeda or the Haqqani Network. However, such militants will have their own agenda, especially with regards to taking the fight to Russia and its allies. Chechens, especially, may desire to take the fight to Russian interests, which could hamper the Taliban’s efforts to build cordial relations with Moscow and, potentially, Beijing.

Should conflict over such foreign militants arise, the ISK may also earn dividends by poaching any disillusioned fighters through the promise of waging “true jihad”. Others, meanwhile, may just seek to take advantage of the vacuum in the country to establish bases in the Taliban’s blind spots, testing the Taliban’s promise to prevent the country from being used as a launchpad for attacks.

Ultimately, far from aiding the Taliban, such militants could end up as a poisoned chalice for Kabul.

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan/Pakistani Taliban (TTP)

Formed in 2007, the TTP is the most active armed opposition group in Pakistan. Ideologically-aligned with the Afghan Taliban, the group is made up almost entirely of Pashtuns[50] and has been fighting the Pakistani government due to the repression carried out on the Pakistani Pashtuns[51]. Until 2018, the group was severely fragmented, suffering leadership crises and defections to the ISK. However, since 2020, the group has resurged, with August 2021 seeing the highest number of attacks[52].

Relations between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP are complicated and have traditionally been strained due to the Afghan Taliban’s closer ties with Islamabad[53]. However, the TTP is known to have sympathy among the Afghan public while the Afghan Taliban’s rank-and-file are known to be distrusting of Islamabad[54].

Although the new government in Afghanistan is relatively Pakistan-friendly, the Taliban has nevertheless shown signs of growing independence from Islamabad. The group resisted some of Pakistan’s security-related demands even as it has reached out to the TTP, describing relations between the two groups as friendly[55].

For his part, the new TTP leader, Noor Wali Mehsud, has renewed his oath of allegiance to the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan[56]. Mehsud has also deepened his cooperation with al-Qaeda and moved away from ISK-type violent tactics[57]. Further signs of integration of the TTP with the Afghan factions came when the TTP moved most of its forces away from eastern Afghanistan to the territories of the Haqqani Network in the southeast[58].

It is possible that Islamabad is banking on the TTP’s growing ties with Kabul in order to build leverage over the group and is engaged in backchannel mediation to this end.

However, it is likelier that the TTP itself is engaged in mediations to ingratiate itself with Afghan factions while riding the sympathy of the Afghan public to prevent the kind of clampdowns that could target Uyghurs, Chechens or others. In the medium-to-long term, this can strain Kabul’s ties with Islamabad. Although Islamabad will demand the Taliban to clamp down on the TTP, the Taliban may be hard pressed to do so without risking significant backlash and the added perception of being Pakistan’s puppet. Such balancing act on the Afghan Taliban’s part may give the TTP just enough room to ramp up its insurgency in Pakistan.

[1] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/7/taliban-announce-acting-ministers-of-new-government

[2] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/4/afghanistan-mullah-baradar-promises-an-inclusive-government

[3] https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/al-baghdadi-killed-idlib-hotbed-terror-groups-foreign-fighters

[4] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/08/syrias-foreign-jihadis-eye-afghanistan-new-challenges-arise-moscow

[5] https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/taliban-the-next-generation/

[6] https://per.euronews.com/2021/09/08/fbi-doubled-reward-for-arresting-taliban-interior-minister

[7] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-58479750

[8] https://tribune.com.pk/story/1123156/rare-audio-message-taliban-open-talks-sharia

[9] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/7/taliban-announce-acting-ministers-of-new-government

[10] https://www.baharnews.ir/news/292054/%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A8%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%AD%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C

[11] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-58560923

[12] https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF23_WeinbaumBabbar_Haqqani_web_0.pdf

[13] https://www.mei.edu/publications/pakistani-stamp-taliban-cabinet

[14] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-qa-idUSTRE62A1H920100311

[15] https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/363

[16] https://www.undocs.org/S/2021/486

[17] https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/13/taliban-victory-afghanistan-al-qaeda-victory-911/

[18] Ibid.

[19] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf

[20] https://www.integrityuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Responses-to-the-Taliban-A-Regional-Overview-Integrity-UK.pdf

[21] https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-the-taliban-will-allow-al-qaeda-to-stay-in-afghanistan-49611

[22] https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/the-focus-of-the-talebans-new-government-internal-cohesion-external-dominance/

[23] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-5833353

[24] https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873

[25] https://public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ExTrac_ISKP_0920.pdf

[26] https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/evolving-taliban-isk-rivalry

[27] https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873

[28] https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/south-asia/isis-k-who-taliban-afghanistan-b1912302.html

[29] https://ctc.usma.edu/challenging-isk-brand-afghanistan-pakistan-rivalries-divided-loyalties/

[30] Ibid.

[31] https://www.integrityuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Responses-to-the-Taliban-A-Regional-Overview-Integrity-UK.pdf

[32] https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/12/pakistan-might-soon-regret-its-win-in-afghanistan/

[33] https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/17/afghanistan-taliban-takeover-india-security-terrorism/

[34] Ibid.

[35] https://www.thehindu.com/topic/pulwama-attack-2019/

[36] https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/12/pakistan-might-soon-regret-its-win-in-afghanistan/

[37] https://theprint.in/world/liberate-kashmir-al-qaeda-tells-taliban-but-is-silent-on-uyghur-muslims-in-chinas-xinjiang/725835/

[38] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-09-13/chinas-afghanistan-dilemma

[39] https://www.integrityuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Responses-to-the-Taliban-A-Regional-Overview-Integrity-UK.pdf

[40] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-09-13/chinas-afghanistan-dilemma

[41] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58342790

[42] https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/21/china-taliban-afghanistan-biden-troop-withdrawal-belt-road-geopolitics-strategy/

[43] https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/uyghur-militants-of-etim-left-afghanistan-taliban-assure-china-101631285918334.html

[44] https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/eastern-turkistan-islamic-movement

[45] https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-counter-terrorism-calculus/

[46] https://theprint.in/world/liberate-kashmir-al-qaeda-tells-taliban-but-is-silent-on-uyghur-muslims-in-chinas-xinjiang/725835/

[47] https://twitter.com/ToreRHamming/status/1433006858059624449

[48] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210527-syrian-mercenaries-robbed-of-their-wages-report

[49] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/08/syrias-foreign-jihadis-eye-afghanistan-new-challenges-arise-moscow

[50] https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/resurgence-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan

[51] Ibid.

[52] https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1433298997284904962

[53] https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/resurgence-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan

[54] Ibid.

[55] https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/12/pakistan-might-soon-regret-its-win-in-afghanistan/

[56] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/08/pakistani-talibans-emir-renews-allegiance-to-afghan-taliban.php

[57] https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/resurgence-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan

[58] Ibid.